Une Vie, une œuvre : Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), pensée du divin et poésie

The dictates and the thinkers are never the same. But one and the other can say the same thing in different ways. But this only happens when the gap between dictates and thinkers

What is collected in the poetic saying and what is collected in the saying of thought are never identical. But one and the other can say the same thing differently. However, this only succeeds if the gap between poetry and thought is damaged in the purity and the silt of its brilliance. This is what happens every time poetry has height and thought has depth.

This too, Hölderlin knew. We borrow his knowledge to the two stanzas entitled: "Socrates and Alcibiades" Why do you venerate, divine Socrates, this adolescent all the time? Do you know nothing greater? Why does he stand with love, as on gods, your eyes on him? The answer is given in the second stanza: "Who has thought the deepest, loves the most lively."

understand the high youth that has the world to look at. And they often incline the wise at the end towards beauty. A life, a work, Martin Heidegger, 1889-1976, thought of the divine and poetry by Fabrice Midal and François Connac.

Why this incitement to reproach Heidegger for having existed at a precise moment? Otherwise, what seems to me more and more obvious, but perhaps for me alone, to prevent precisely from reading the fundamental books, which are not so much

those from before the Second World War, even if we will see the dates, it is very important, than everything he has published since, and in particular his relationship to poetry, to what he calls God or the Gods, or the sacred, the divine, etc. We hear a lot about Martin Heidegger, but nothing, often, is said of the own adventure of his way of thinking.

are launched: political commitment, end of philosophy, over-the-top of metaphysics, thought of being. But rarely are they thought. And they end up working like well-known automatisms, making obstacles to the true work. No doubt, we cannot avoid such obstacles, as soon as it is a philosopher, necessarily man of tomorrow and after tomorrow, as Nietzsche says,

and whose greatness of the task, he still says, finally consists in becoming the bad conscience of his time. It is there that the furs and the will to censor take root, which still massively provokes the only name of Heidegger, whose one prefers to hide that he is indeed the thinker of our time.

to not have too much to confront all the texts unknown in France where the thinker, with a look launched at the heart of what is, brings us back to the terrible as it has already happened. The terrible, genocide, Nazi and the atomic bomb, in Heidegger's meditation, teaches us that they are perhaps not simple events, past, far behind us, and that their meaning, quite the opposite,

As for the being of the human being, it is still far from being clarified, even though our good consciences think they have finished with these crimes. It is in this context, where reigns in its full power the human subjectivity, that Heidegger opens a meditation of an unequaled magnitude on the divine and poetry. Adrien Françelanor, your first book was devoted to the neighborhood of thought and poetry, to the dialogue between Paul Celan

And Martin Heidegger, why did you write such a book? What is at stake in this relationship? The first thing that interested me was the possibility of the dialogue between a philosopher, or a thinker more precisely, and a poet.

Of course, philosophy has been interested in poetry since Plato, in the Republic, in the book X, up to Hegel's Aesthetics. But in a sense, the report was always condescending in a way, in the sense that the report was thought of from a definition of the human being as a rational animal, with a sensitive animal part, a rational part, the reason, the important part on the sensitive part, and properly defining the human being.

and between these two faculties, imagination, a kind of sensitive thought to which we could more or less rely as a kind of sweet and kind dream. From this definition of the human being, the dialogue between philosophy and poetry could only emerge

unilateral in a certain way, since philosophy thinks, due to the rational superiority, that poetry can be interesting, entertaining, even a form of manifestation of the mind, but nevertheless inferior to philosophical possibilities.

With Heidegger, things change completely, as the human being is thought of from Dasein, which means that the distinction between the sensitive part and the rational part has no meaning anymore. Thus, it releases a real field to put poetry and philosophy on an equal footing, as thought is no longer considered as a simple activity of reason,

and poetry is no longer simply viewed as an imaginative, sensitive activity. This is what René Char particularly appreciated when, after the first meeting under the Marronnier with Jean Beaufray, he told Jean Beaufray that evening that he particularly liked Heidegger and he had liked this meeting because for the first time he met a philosopher who did not explain to him who he was, what he had to do, what he had to think.

René Char, 1964

Les quelques impressions anciennes, que je vais dire, sont apparues souvent à l'intersection d'une lecture endurante, selon le mot de Jean Beaufray, des grands textes de Martin Heidegger et de l'exercice quotidien d'une vie d'homme que nous sommes nombreux à avoir tenté d'égaliser sans la dépeindre par le haut et par le bas.

They are a tribute of respect, recognition and affection to Martin Heidegger. The perspective of a hilarious paradise destroys man. All human adventure contradicts this and to stimulate us and not to entangle us. How to deliver the poetry of these oppressors? The poetry that is clear and enigmatic and eager to occur by discovering them, cancels them.

It is from this listening to the word that another understanding of poetry opens up. What is the singularity of the listening to the word that Martin Heidegger highlights? Let's say that he tries to go towards a word that is not only communication. Pierre Jasserne. He tries to show that the word is not only an instrument of communication.

He goes towards, as he says in Novalis, towards a word that speaks to speak. There is this beautiful phrase from Novalis that Heidegger repeats: "Speaking to speak is a deliverance." It is a matter of somehow making the word access itself, it is a matter of liberating it.

and in particular to free it from the framework of grammar, syntax, which is a metaphysical framework.

The whole difficulty is to allow the speech not to objectify things at once, but to let them be. Is it because there is this effort to no longer have a metaphysical relationship to the speech that this new understanding of poetry opens up in Martin Heidegger? Absolutely. At that moment, another space opens up.

If I understand that the word can be left to be, so to speak, to freeze, then it gives an unusual space of freedom where I can perceive everything differently. Think of this Rimbaud's verse in "Les Illuminations", the poem "Enfance": "In the wood there is a bird."

his song stops you and makes you blush. In the wood there is a bird. You see here what happens is that there is a huge space that is freed by this phrase, by this extremely simple phrase, "Meu" "Rimbo" pronouncing the "Ilya"

immediately reaches a space where there can be the wood, where there can be the bird, where there can be us who hear the bird, etc. etc. That is to say that the whole problem is to be able to hear the word spoken. But although

Philosophy is based on the profession of thought. Jean Beaufray, 1981. It only recognizes poetry at its level. It is not a question of science or religion. In other words, in the German domain, Hegel and Hölderlin are in the same rank as Heidegger, or in the Greek domain, Homer and Aristotle,

This is not to say that it would be less hard to learn the profession of a poet than to learn to think, but that on the one hand, the impasse is not of the same nature, although on both sides the word is equally at the service of the language and even as a leading profession

Why Paul Celan, the great modern poet of the second half of the 20th century, reads Heidegger with such intensity and such seriousness?

We can wonder why Ceylan, who was not a man to compromise on these issues, despite Heidegger's commitment in 1934, still met Heidegger several times and never stopped reading Heidegger from the 1950s until his death.

Even if the entire clarification between the two men did not happen, I think we must take into account certain things which Ceylan had a clear understanding of thanks to his reading of Heidegger's texts and to everything concerning the problem of nihilism in general. Because we insist on Heidegger's commitment in 1934,

in the university's rectorate, and in favour of Hitler, not of National Socialism, but of Hitler, we forget, and with this forgetfulness the question is almost incomprehensible, we forget Heidegger's radical disengagement from the resignation of the rectorate in 1934, and from that date until 1949 at the conference in Bremen,

a truly inouïe meditation on devastation, nihilism and Nazism as forms of nihilism is engaged by the thinker.

There are several stages of this analysis of Heidegger. In 1934, this sentence that signs the definitive rupture: "National Socialism is a barbaric principle" is briefly noted. In 1938, in Besinung, where Heidegger names Hitler a Hauptverbrecher, a criminal in charge,

and analyzes the way violence is deployed at this time as a feature of modern times. And finally, in 1949, in the conferences of Bremen, the analysis that Falle des Guerres of the way in which human beings have been exterminated in gas chambers, in extermination camps. Ceylan unfortunately does not have a full knowledge of these texts which have appeared for about twenty years and which still exist today, often only in German.

Only in the other texts, he clearly perceives that from 1934, which is also the date when Heidegger more and more clearly turns to Hölderlin,

How, freeing himself from his error, which we all take into account and which no one forgets to carry, from this error, Heidegger enters a true meditation of poetry, not as a cultural asset among others, but as truly what makes the stay of the human being possible on Earth. And that's what interests Celan at first sight.

That's what he sees in the texts, and that's what he sees as a possibility for Heidegger of alternatives to nihilism. In other words, Celan, even if once again he doesn't know all the texts we have today, takes the measure of the thought of devastation in Heidegger, and even in a sense for the poet Celan, a poet who comes after the Shoah, a poet for whom this question is central in all his poetry,

Celan takes the measure of the fact that Heidegger, in a certain way, can help us to think that. And there are texts today that we know, in particular a text in which I think, in volume 77, Heidegger wonders about the difference between destruction and extermination, "Fernichtung",

and signals that destruction is a simple ravage that destroys things, men, the world in general, while extermination

is not only a liquidation of human beings, but something that puts in danger the very being of the human being and the possibility of a stay for the human being on Earth. This is obviously what concerns Celan as our first chief, especially since the possibility of a stay, the possibility of finding a stay on Earth for Celan, goes through the question of the German language.

Look at the dates.

The seminars on Nietzsche and on Hölderlin start very early, in 1935, 1936, etc., and continue during the war. What do you want to do with the wars with Hölderlin and why?

I usually deal with people who react in a Pavlovian way to Heidegger's name, who drink, who lift their legs to grieve, to grieve themselves in the most complete ignorance. There is therefore an obscurantism against Heidegger,

in which I do not want to include Heideggerians themselves, even though they are sometimes very deficient in this relationship between Heidegger and the poetry of Hölderlin, not to mention Nietzsche's thought that allows to clarify one like the other. So you have to read these books carefully to enter into what Heidegger calls the sphere of power of poetry, which obviously concerns the divine.

The sphere of power of poetry will lead us to meditate as we can, if we have at least the impulse, the physics, on the fundamental substance of all this, which is "inigkeit", which is intimate, which is tense and in intimacy, that is to say tenderness too, tenderness forgetting the psychological or sentimental term that it could have.

I think that the dates are very important. At the time when Heidegger published his first great text on Hölderlin, it's a conference he did in Rome, it's "Hölderlin and the essence of poetry". I think it is necessary to quote, precisely on the level of history and politics, what he wrote in June 1937. He is attacked in the Nazi official press because of this conference, as it is curious. And here is what he says: "According to what was written,

the brilliant editorialist of the magazine "Wil und Macht" , my lecture on Hölderlin and Hitler's youth are incompatible with nature. It is no longer allowed to expect much from this kind of "German".

And then, at that moment, we understand what nobody wants to understand. And why? Because nobody wants to understand. It's that the internal dissidence of Skalideger begins to meditate on this tragically horrible regime. It is absolutely essential. As if nothing could be thought of at the heart of this tragedy and this horror. But precisely, yes. And that's what seems to me the most important.

We will see the dates of this absolutely fundamental book called "The Approach of Adlerlin" which is available, which must be read, but I can't talk about it with anyone. I'm so happy to be able to talk about it with you. It will be the first time in 30 years.

The text is called "Retour", translated by Michel Deguy, dated 1943. So you see the date, right? It's an extraordinarily important text, in the midst of a global collapse, European and global. Holder, "Line and essence of poetry", I just talked about it, it's from 1936, with this mention of 1937, "incompatibility of nature".

He chose these words very precisely, between the propaganda of the will, the strength, the blood and the soil, he repeats it, Nietzsche is full of allusions against the falsification of Nietzsche's thinking, which comes after the very funest one of the founding fathers of the Reich in 1870, that is to say, in the Schopenhauer, Darwin and Wagner order.

Then, we go even further, that is to say, the different falsifications of Nietzsche's thought. We must therefore try to understand what this falsification of a fundamental truth will have been, in Nietzsche's case, and also in Hölderlin's, because after all, Hölderlin's points were distributed

to the aviators, to the German soldiers who flew over, for example, Bordeaux, at the age of 4 years, 4 and a half, 5 years, I saw them in the sky bombing the city where I was born. What is God unknown, yet full of qualities is the face of heaven from him?

The lightnings, namely, the wrath, are of God; the more one is invisible, the more it sends itself into the unknown. But the thunder, the thunder, is of God; the love for immortality, the property also, like ours, is of God. What is God? What is God unknown, yet full of property, and the face of heaven, of Him?

"The lightnings, so called, are the anger of a god. The more something is invisible, the more it is destined to be a stranger. But the thunder is the glory of God. The love of immortality, the property also, like ours, is of a god." How can someone who is alone, essentially alone,

is put in a totally incredible situation which consists of thinking about the essence of poetry and the sacred and the gods. 1943, the memory of Bordeaux, in Duncan, 1943. And finally the great text called "Earth and Heaven" by Hölderlin, which dates from 1959, so all this over more than 20 years.

And finally, the poem, short text on Alderlin, always, dating from 1968, Curious Date. Well, that's what is obliterated, in my opinion. So what is obliterated? First, the question of poetry itself, that is to say, is misery such in this field that no one is able to think of it, whatever it is, apart from Heidegger, who is the only one to have gone so far, of course.

And that means something, it means even screaming something. So there is a mystification. Do you think that the rage against Heidegger is a rage against poetry? Of course. It may also be a rage of the poets themselves who lie too much, or small employees of what is called poetry. It's a rage, yes, absolutely. The rage against thought, the rage against poetry. Disguised.

in moral, in preci-precha, falsificators. It's seen every day. There's not a week where there's a kick in Heidegger's legs, in the newspapers, from the part of philosophers

as a philosopher, as a moral employer. As soon as you enter this system, it is impossible to ask the slightest question. The question is very simple: you take a journey towards the Word, it is still the essential book, there too completely, with whom you can talk about this, to know what it is to bring the Word to the Word as a Word.

It speaks to me immediately, because from my first books, I wondered what could be brought. It comes back to the same, I say writing, writing to writing as writing, that is to say something that is in the open route

of speech, that is to say, to be where it is thought when it speaks and it speaks when it thinks. And it is not at all a system of psychology and even less of moralization, where we are sinking into the precipitated invasion of servility in relation to the technique. So that's the bottom of the problem. What is interesting is that it could be indifference.

But no, it's a real rage. From the beginning of the 50s, Celan sees

in Heidegger's thought, a relationship to language that will allow him to find again, in his own way, the possibility of a stay on Earth. Adrien Françlanor. And besides, he finds, in Heidegger's person, regardless of the texts, someone who is truly listening, as he says in another letter in 1970 to Ilana Shmueli, his friend who stayed in Jerusalem.

In one of his letters in 1970, he says that Heidegger is an "eutherstes anhörend und verstehen", that is to say someone gifted with extreme capacity in listening and hearing.

And here, you have, in a certain way, formulated what Heidegger's dialogue with poets was: someone who listens, someone who has an inuit possibility of understanding because he does not present himself as the one who will explain things. And here we touch on questions that concern, more generally, the way Heidegger interpreted poets in general: Celan, Hölderlin, Trachl, Georg and all the others.

interpretation that is properly ennouye, either in the form of "Erläuterungen", of clarification, where it is not about explaining poetry but to make our gaze on poetry clear, or in the form of "Erörterung", for example with "Trackle", where again it is not about explaining "Trackle" but to find a site where what this poetry says can be found to be deployed.

What happens in the most favourable case is that we take care of beautiful letters, that the poems are printed or broadcast on the radio. Poetry is then denied as sterile nostalgia, flickering in the unreal, and rejected as a leak into a sentimental dream, or it is counted as literature. The value of literature is appreciated to the extent of the current moment,

The news on its side is made and directed by the organs that form the civilized public opinion. The literary movement is one of their agents and by agent, we must hear those who push others and are themselves pushed. Thus, poetry can appear only as literature. There, where it is considered as a means of culture and in a scientific way, it is an object of literary history.

The poetry of the West is under the general name of European literature. Beda Alman, 1964. What happens to poetry when Heidegger tries to engage it in a dialogue? Does he make violence?

Is it to put it at the service of a philosophy among others, or does it appear, thanks to this dialogue, in a light that makes it less incomprehensible than before? What separates Heidegger from the philology is his refusal to define the poem as an object, or even as an object of scientific research.

Ce qui ne veut pas dire qu'il plaide la cause d'une subjectivité quelconque. Il s'agit pour lui de dépasser les notions mêmes d'objectivité et de subjectivité telles que les entend la métaphysique moderne.

Poetry is a stay, it is only audible if we hear the word "Dichtung" in German, as Heidegger does, that is, in a broad sense, as not designating a literary activity, but not a literary genre by opposition to prose, and Heidegger hears, he says at the end of the "Origine of the work of art", as a saying in general. So from his etymology of the Latin "dicere",

and the Indo-European root "deik" which means "to show something". Poetry, "schallige der Gehr", both architecture, music, painting, and poetry in the narrow sense of the term, are ways of showing.

to show the world, to make the world appear and to show the dimension, he says, often, it's a word that often comes back, thanks to Alderlin, the dimension within which the human being on earth will be able to inhabit. It is the fundamentally ethical aspect, in a certain way, of Heidegger's thought, thanks to poetry,

He abandons the term "Ethic" because it is too marked by the Greek ethos and by the Greek relation to that. But in a sense, the whole thought of the "vonen", of the "habitation", is the fundamentally ethical dimension of Heidegger's thought, which unfolds in an essential dialogue with poetry.

Jean Beaufray, 1981. There is a being of things that is completely different from the one that science makes us know, that is to say the one whose revealer is art. For Heidegger, the complement of art is called poetry, and he means not only that the plastic arts, as we say, would be reducible to poetry,

that there is as much a plastic poetry as a poetry where the only matter of the poet is the word. But then, at that moment, it would be necessary to say that Notre Dame de Paris is no less a poem than any poem by Victor Hugo, for example. Man has these days, he has these days, as a speaker,

as a speaker, and if he listens to this speaking word, then he can, so to speak, enter into a new relationship. Pierre, I assert. He can inhabit this relationship, and he can exist, that is, at that moment, exist, inhabit, it has about the same meaning. It means: I am in the world, I exist, I am in the world.

To inhabit a poet is to be in the world by revealing this unusual space, this unsigned space, this wonderful space where I can recognize that things are, that is to say in all their dimensions of presence, in all their dimensions of being.

And that's also what happens in painting. In this sense, painting is poetry. When Cézanne lets the Montagne-Sainte-Victoire be fully present, when he tries to express this presence, then painting is poetry, in the sense that we said earlier, in the sense that we have to free a space that is wider than the usual space.

larger than space, let's say, which is regulated by scientific attitude. Jean-Loxer Roy. I think that the relationship that Heidegger's thought allows us to maintain with the work of art constitutes, as he says in the volume Bézénon, volume 66 of his complete works, constitutes precisely the possibility of a

The thought can be taken up again precisely in contact with the work of art. Why can it be taken up again? Because it goes to this dim dimension which is radically charmed by metaphysics, which can't name this dimension and which can be called the nothingness. This dimension of the nothingness which has made

so much difficulty. How to name this negative? This dimension of nothing precisely, it is constructed by the work of art, better than thought. It is precisely through this that Heidegger seeks to understand what could be, he says in the words of Anaximander, an experience of the abyss, an experience of the defect.

Nothingness, the abyss, this defect, is what the Greeks called chaos. What is it that Heidegger calls being? It is what is not being. In a way, we realize that being is like nothingness.

since he is the other of all beings. And when we read this passage in "Acheminement vers la parole" where he reconstitutes a possible dialogue with a Japanese, that is to say with the extreme East, where he tries to think this dialogue between the West and the East, we see that at one point Heidegger evokes this dimension of nothingness, and the Japanese too.

And this is about cinema. It's quite strange because there is an allusion, it's not often that this happens in Heidegger's work, but there is an allusion to a particular film, to "Rashomon" by Kurosawa. And when we look at the memoirs of Pézette, who tells his interviews with Heidegger, at one point we see that Pézette says that indeed Heidegger saw "Rashomon",

but he didn't say much about it. When he spoke with the Japanese, who gave him the opportunity to do this text later, with Tomio Tezuka, he spoke again about the film of Kurosawa, simply saying that he found it interesting. Now, if we look at the text, "Faits pareil des guerres", we can see that he reproaches the cinema

to produce, because of the machines, to produce an objectification of the data. And the Japanese, in a way, confirms this interpretation by saying that the Japanese found the film too realistic.

which, according to the context, means that Kurosawa would not have made a film that was quite Japanese. He would have made a film, in the end, for the West. Well, when we look at the dialogue as a whole, we realize that it is a central theme that is encountered by Heidegger, namely this idea that the Japanese would not be themselves.

because they would have adopted Western thought and would therefore be governed by metaphysics. That's what's funny, Heidegger shows that the Japanese are governed by Western metaphysics. And so the whole text takes place as if everyone had to join their own origin.

We see in the dialogue as he is imagined by Heidegger, of course, Heidegger turning little by little towards his own origin, his Greek origin, his Christian origin. And we see, at the same time, if I may say, the Japanese little by little

destroy the remains of western metaphysics that prevent him from seeing his Japanese origin and little by little, through Heidegger's question, which is the equivalent in Japanese of the word "speech"

and the Japanese little by little tries to look for it and finally finds it and says to him: "The equivalent of a word is a Japanese word: "koto ba" ". Well, he says that to him. But when he says that, it means at that moment that he has conquered his origin, that he has found his origin. And then at the same time, we understand that the dialogue took place.

But dialogue means that everyone has found their own origin. Everyone has moved towards their own origin. In other words, there is no confusion between one and the other, but there has been a parallel movement. And I go back to what I was saying about cinema. At the beginning, Heidegger tried to show that cinema tends to objectify

The real objectified time and did not make his part to be himself. And at that moment, the Japanese, who first, however, had criticized Kurosawa, he noticed that there is, however, in the film, gestures that lead to the inconsistency. "I was dead in that Shimizu's hair, wasn't I? At first, I started to be troubled with the pain of my eyes.

There are some rachomon gestures that are not Western gestures, but that evoke, that's what the Japanese explain next, that evoke some gestures of the "no" theater,

Except that for him, in the theater, we have something much purer than in the cinema. But the important thing is to get to say, by the gesture, something invisible, that is to say, this nothingness that is beyond all being, the inappearance. And that's very, very important because I would say that

Here, we can understand something about Heidegger's relationship to the work of art, which is fundamental. What Heidegger tries to do with the work of art is to find a place for art, because he thinks, a little like Hegel, that since art is no longer the essential document of the absolute demonstration,

Since art is no longer this essential document, at that moment, the consequence is that art has no place anymore. Art has no place anymore, and as Heidegger says in a letter to Pezet, art goes into society, and art is deprived of the world. So the whole problem would be to make art find a certain place. But what can this place be?

If we come back to the question of cinema, and we wonder how Heidegger can talk about cinema, he says that, in the famous paragraph 7 of "Etre et temps", he says that the phenomenon is not to show oneself. So how can he talk about cinema, which on the contrary shows through the image and is pushed

towards a sort of exhibition of phenomena. And we see that the only way for Heidegger to talk about cinema is to try to look for a cinema that goes towards the non-appearance, a cinema that is not necessarily objective. And that's extremely interesting. But behind this problem, there is the question of the place. That is to say that for Heidegger, the question of art is not aesthetic.

What is human life? A picture of the Godhead? As the earthly all wander under the sky, they see this. But reading the same as in a writing, the infinity of the future and the wealth of man. Is the evident heaven the kingdom? Like flowers are silver clouds,

But it rains from there the dew and the light. But when the blue is extinguished, the plain, the matt that is equal to marble, like iron. Announcement of the wealth. What a view of men, a figure of the divinity! As the earth is in the sky, all see it. But reading almost as in a writing,

The infinity imitates, and wealth, the men. Is it the simple sky, therefore rich, as flowers are indeed the clouds of silver? It still rains from there the pink and the wet, but when the blue is erased, the simple appears the matte, which resembles marble, like ore, sign of wealth.

And how is his listening to poetry and his listening to the divine linked to this reversal? Well, I think that first of all, we must try to see what he calls poetry. That is to say, Heidegger takes the term in an extremely broad sense. He says that we must think of what in German is called "Dichtung", that is to say that he refers to the idea of showing

in the broad sense, to show that the poem is what creates a wider space. That's how he means the poem. There are poems when a space, let's say, wider than the usual space is created. That's why he talks about the poem of art. And we must also see what he means by "divine".

What is the divine? For Heidegger, the divine is first and foremost what is most apparent. Just think of the Greeks. The divine is first and foremost this, that is, it is what looks, it is what appears, and from there, he tries to think of the idea of God, he also tries to think of the relationship to the sacred, etc.

So I think that first we have to see the meaning that he gives to these terms and then we can try to link all of this, for example, from the idea that, let's say, man is first the being who has the word, who can speak, who speaks. And from this idea that man

it's the time that speaks, so the problem is to know how we can free the word on the basis of this new idea that man is the time that has a relation to being, that has a relation to being through the word. And therefore, we must try to understand this relationship between the word and this dimension of being, which I was talking about earlier, this dimension of presence.

And that's where we can also find the theme of poetry, perhaps this time in a narrower sense, as a practice of speech. Is it for this reason that Heidegger, which is a completely astonishing phenomenon, begins to read with such seriousness? Hölderlin, from 1934, is perhaps a unique phenomenon in the history of Western philosophy that a philosopher begins to read with

In such a path, could a poet find direction in his own way of thinking? It is part of this framework and this dimension of Heidegger's thought. Adrien Franslanor. He is a poet that Heidegger has been reading since he was a teenager, that he will read until his death, where his son Hermann Heidegger reads at the time of the burial of the poems chosen, the extracts of poems chosen by Heidegger himself.

It is therefore the reading of a life, an author that Heidegger knows entirely by heart and who in a sense inhabits it truly and will, from the 1930s, inhabit his own words. It is a rather difficult point insofar as, once again, we cannot think of the relationship between the two from a comparative point of view.

even less from influences. Hölderlin does not influence Heidegger and Heidegger does not use Hölderlin. Heidegger is fundamentally in dialogue with Hölderlin, with his language which begins to spread in Heidegger's thought in places with great freedom, great flexibility, very surprising from a philosopher.

And indeed, the dialogue has a meaning from Heidegger's great meditation on the Greek beginning and the passage to another beginning of thought. It is in this historical framework, and not simply historical, that is why it completely escapes the question of influences from one to the other,

It's in this historical context of the passage from the "Ubergang", as Heidegger says, from the first Greek beginning to the other beginning. And in this perspective, Hölderlin plays a fundamental philosophical role, as a poet who was of considerable philosophical rank. He is someone who read Plato very intensely, who knows Kant perfectly, who followed Fichte's courses.

He was friends with Chamberlain, Schelling, Hegel. And he, in his poetic path, will extract himself from German idealism, from a thought of the subject. From a philosophical point of view, Hölderlin is an open voice before Heidegger, and in which Heidegger engages in a certain way by taking it back.

But, including poetically, that's the philosophical aspect, including poetically, Hölderlin opens a way that will allow Heidegger to situate himself, especially in what Hölderlin calls the "deficit of God", that Heidegger will think in his own way, that Heidegger echoes with what he calls "the oblivion of being". And in this dimension, there is indeed almost a kinship of the two authors.

Heidegger reads with such intensity Hölderlin to the extent that it is the thinker who, before Nietzsche, and in a certain way more open than Nietzsche, more future than Nietzsche, asks the question of the stay of the human being on Earth at the time when God is in defect. The defect of God, as Hölderlin thinks,

In a sense, Nietzsche will call it the death of God, except that the way in which Hölderlin thinks things is once again more open, especially because the defect of God in Hölderlin can help the human being in his modern stay and in his modern home. And that may even be the real challenge of modernity,

that the defect of God is thought of as help. Not help in the sense of rescue and something that could be instrumentalized. It is necessary that the human being, in modern times, enters into the sacred night of this defect of God, knowing that this defect of God does not mean for Hölderlin the disappearance of the sacred dimension. And that's where all the difficulty is.

because it forces us to make very clear distinctions with Hölderlin, and Heidegger has to rethink it even more clearly, between the gods, deity, sacredness, and the thought of being. The defect of God, with Hölderlin, means that for modern times, for our present,

no longer any figure of the divine is known, which does not mean that it is not manifest, but no longer any figure is identifiable. Which does not imply that we must simply forget the ancient figures of the divine, and Heidegger says this very well in a letter in supplement to Hartmut Buchner in the conference on the thing,

where he talks about the relationship to the ancient forms, to the past forms, and to the presence of these past forms of the divine, which are the Greek gods, the Jewish prophets, and the preaching of Jesus. That is to say, each time, the three forms of relationship under the most vivid angle of the relationship to the divine. The Greek gods as

figure, each time unique, of the whole world, in its radiance, in its splendor of being, the Jewish prophets,

We think of Buber, the faith of the prophets, as the center of the relationship between God and man in Jewish thought and the preaching of Jesus. Again, not the Christian doctrine constituted in theology or the system of the Catholic Church,

with which Heidegger broke, as he wrote in a letter from 1919, but the preaching of Jesus, that is to say the living word of Christ, the living word of God. "It is in the proximity of being that the decision is made whether and how the God and the gods refuse each other,

And if the night remains, if the day of the entire salvation of the sacred of the Heiligen is not yet, if and how in the dawn of this entire salvation, a manifestation of the God and of the Gods can at 9 take place. But the entire salvation of the sacred, which is first and foremost the space where the deity comes to be, which in turn preserves the dimension for the Gods and the God,

This entirety only comes to manifest itself if, first and in a long preparation, the being itself unlocks in its allergy and is proved in its truth. This is how the absence of a country or being at home can begin to be overcome. Look at the sacred, take action of the sacred, proper to our time, which does not manifest itself by a face of a God already known,

which leads him, for example, to look at the painting of Cézanne, which, unlike a painting by Nicolas Poussin, does not present any god, but just a mountain, a landscape, which shows us the experience he makes.

Yes, I think we are really pointing to the center of modern poetic question, which could be summed up in a certain way: "to say the sacred at the time of the runaway gods". That doesn't mean, I read it once, a person writing that Heidegger sacralizes poetry.

It's the worst way to take the question. You can't take it the other way around. If we wanted to keep these distinctions, sacred and sacral, we could say that Heidegger is the person who desacralizes the sacred. But we shouldn't keep that as a formula. "Desacralize the sacred", I mean that

Traditionally, the sacred, "sacere" in the Latin sense, with all that it implies of luminous phenomena, which Rudolf Otto spoke very well about, the sacred is traditionally thought of in relation to a divine power and from a transcendence. And from there, the distinction between a profane space, a sacred space, is established, frightening, with the double sense of "sacere", which Otto once again speaks of.

Rudolf Otto. For Heidegger, these distinctions have no meaning at all, because the sacred is not thought of in this Latin, Roman, and is not thought of in relation to a transcendence. To get to the point, the sacred in Heidegger, das Heilige, is first understood in its own sense from Heil, which means "save, whole",

And Heilige is therefore the indication of a fullness, in a sense, and not at all of a separation, of a fullness of relationship, if you will. Das Heilige is the world when everything is fully put into relationship and that it resounds from the full harmony of these relationships. What is surprising is that from being to being, in Heidegger, the world

n'est lui-même pas pensé comme un ensemble de choses. Le monde est pensé comme ensemble de rapports, entièreté de rapports. Le monde est lui-même une ganzheit, dit-il, donc une entièreté.

And at the time of the Etre Etant, he specifies in "Veisendes Grundes", in a small note, he specifies that the thought of being in the world, as it was outlined in the Etre Etant, does not allow to decide positively or negatively the relationship of the human being to God. And he adds, however, a real elaboration of the question of transcendence would allow to advance in the question of the relationship to God.

Only here, transcendence does not mean a beyond, a different world that would exceed human beings. Transcendence, even in "être-étant", is the way in which human beings relate to their being, go beyond time to listen to the being. But it is not a supersensible transcendence. And because the word is confusing, Heidegger gives up on it quite quickly.

And while this thought of transcendence is abandoned, it's in the middle of the 1930s, more or less, truly, in all clarity, but in a way, the thought of the world, as being, as an entirety of relationship, prepares the thought of the sacred, in quotation marks, perhaps we could say the "save-entirety" of the sacred, it's a little bit of a developed translation, but to simply enlighten the phenomenon.

The sacred, in the sense of Heidegger, is the possibility of keeping all these relationships that constitute the world. And there you have a real opening with, in particular, modern painting. To hear, in the sense of today, the question of the defect of God, Jean-Loxeroy. Heidegger has two ways of saying it.

On the one hand, he uses a plural: "the gods". We obviously go on the side of what Walter Friedrich Otto tries to call, for lack of a better word, a "prophane religiosity", in the sense that he says that the word "belief" has no meaning for the Greeks. And Heidegger joins him when he says: "there is no belief for thought".

So the plural, on the one hand, the gods, which are an element of what he calls the "Gefirth", that is to say this A4 game, the gods, the men, the sky and the earth. But there is also the "one god" which intervenes, as we know, in the interview he gives to the "Journal des Spiegel", it is what he calls the "indeterminate". So we are on the one hand the plural formulation,

and on the other the formulation of the indeterminate and he even says that this indetermination is absolutely decisive to say the divine. Mandorla Paul Celan, 1967 In the mandle, what is written in the mandle? The nothing. There is the nothing in the mandle. There it is written and it is written in the nothing. Who is written there?

Der König, da steht der König, der König, da steht er und steht. Judenlocke wirst nicht grau. Und dein Auge, wohin steht dein Auge? Dein Auge steht der Mandel entgegen. Dein Auge dem Nichts steht entgegen. Es steht zum König, so steht es und steht. Menschenlocke wirst nicht grau.

"You will not be gray, empty mandel, royal blue." Mandorle, in the mandel, what is in the mandel? The nothing. He holds the nothing in the mandel. There he holds and holds. In the nothing, who is there? The king. There the king holds, the king. There he holds and holds. Jew's loop does not gristle. And your eye, what is your eye looking at?

Your eye is against the amende, against him. Your eye against nothing is against him. He supports the king. Thus he holds on and holds on. Man's buckle does not gristle. Empty amende, blue king.

I think it is important to note that the question of the defect of God is not a particular question that would be specific to Heidegger or even to Heidegger and Hölderlin together. It is once again the truly modern poetic question and we find it in many poets, as well as Rimbaud, "A season in hell", it is the experience that the Gospel has passed,

and what future for this way of being resolutely modern, as in the Rimbaud's work, or as in Celan's work, for example, the question arises very clearly in one of the most beautiful collections, in my opinion, "The Rose of Persons", and in particular in the poem "Mandorla", which designates the space in the form of a mint, which was on the tympans of the Roman churches.

It is in this space in the form of an amende that in principle the Christ is found in majesty as king. And the poem "Mandorla" is precisely a way to take up this question, with for Celan the question of the Jewish God, of course,

What does the Jewish God become in modern times, and especially after Auschwitz? It's a question that is asked, modulated each time in a different way, but among many modern poets, and not only with Hölderlin or Heidegger. We are, in the end, since Plato and then with all the philosophies of perception,

We are in an interpretation of the gaze that forgets that there is, in what happens with the vision and beyond, what Fénelon would call the dimension of a non-seer. To enter into a relationship with painting, it is necessary, as Fénelon says, to go beyond the non-seer, that is to say,

to free themselves from the capacity to hear the manifestation that is at work in the exercise of painting.

In other words, the gaze can pass through what we call contemplation, perhaps the word is not sufficient, but in any case it must pass through this dimension of a manifestation which is not in the order of what philosophy has always called perception, to grasp what is at work in painting.

In this respect, I think that, I quoted Cézanne earlier, Matisse, the great abstraction, I think that insisting on the dimension of white, the importance of the dimension of the reserve in this painting, has profoundly transformed our relationship to the pictoriality itself. We can take the example of Cézanne's white, we can take on another terrain, because it is not the same, Malevich's white,

We can also take what is in play in the cut-out papers of Matisse.

there is in a way the possibility of the construction of a spacing which is a spacing both spatial and temporal, without a doubt, which releases, in a certain way, our relationship to space and opens us to this dimension of what I called earlier the manifestation. Pierre Jasserme. The aesthetic approach

You don't have to try to tempt it, but you have to make an approach to art that is topological. That's very important. At Heidegger, we have a topological approach to art. And the question is: what is this place? What can be the place of art? Heidegger tries to show that this place must be inapparent. That is to say, we are dealing with a topology of the inapparent.

And little by little, as Heidegger deepens his thought, little by little, he starts talking a lot, more or less from, I would say, especially after the 40s, after 1940, he starts talking a lot about what he calls the nearness of thought and poetry. And he talks about it more and more.

the neighborhood. But what is the neighborhood? It is an "inapparent place" because at the same time, he always says that the poet and the thinker are on separate mountains. They do not have the same place. So how do they think of their neighborhood? Their neighborhood is of the invisible order. It is of the order of the inapparence. That is to say that little by little, the place of art is, so to speak, "moved"

from the aesthetic sphere, it is torn away from the aesthetic sphere and it is moved towards the question of the possibility of a nearness between thought and poetry. Now for what is breaching, the breach or what can also be called the "between the two". Shogam Trungpa who is a Tibetan master who had to leave Tibet

at a time and who started teaching in the United States in 1970-71. At that time, Trongpa made a seminar on the bardo. But what is remarkable is that this term bardo gave it an extremely broad meaning. He says that bardo means "between the two". And at that time, we can bring Trongpa closer

And Heidegger, in this respect, insofar as Heidegger also speaks of an "between the two". But what is this "between the two" in Heidegger? It is the difference between being and time.

At this moment, there is a gap indeed, and we can try to dig this difference between time and being, as I said earlier. We can try to see man as time that has to do with being and not only with time, so not only the one who wants to dominate, but the one who lets be, the one who listens

this word that is itself, this spoken word, we can do that. But on the other hand, there is another meaning of the breach, it is the one that is in particular thematized by Hannah Arendt in her preface to the crisis of culture. In the end, the breach is what happened in the 20th century. The breach is the fact that we are, so to speak, prey

to this thought that keeps haunting us, this thought of extermination and this thought of Hiroshima. There is something that has happened that is terrible because it is as if reason would encounter its own contradiction. Because it is obvious that

extermination was carried out on a basis of rationality, as well as the atomic bomb is based on rational calculations. So there is something terrible here. It is, so to speak,

this idea of a threat that would be at the heart of reason, at the heart of science. And that's what produces, in a way, in philosophy, but also everywhere else, that's what produces a breach, a breach that we cannot overcome. At that moment, it is not impossible, of course, to bring Heidegger's thought closer

who tries, from this gap, to think differently. And that's what maybe connects Shogiamtronpa and Heidegger the most. Just as because he had to flee Tibet, because of the Chinese occupation in Tibet, at that time, it was necessary to change the transmission. And there was therefore a gap within the Tibetan transmission.

The same philosophy lived in the 20th century something that interrupted its previous mode of being, that is to say, at that moment we can say that metaphysical thought has come to an end and it is absolutely imperative, if we want to think again, to think differently. And that's what Heidegger tried to do.

I think of Braque, who developed a thought of the proportions in an extremely precise way. At the end of "Day and Night", we read: "Let's forget things, let's only consider proportions." Even the very practice of painting, for example in Cézanne, where nothing is painted anymore, it is only a matter of color proportions.

in a truly explicit way, or in abstract art, with Grandinski, a painter that Heidegger could see at Bayerler, where he also saw all the Paul Klee. In modern art, the question of the world as a relationship is, in a certain way, not how do we paint an object,

but how do we really make the light in which the object manifests itself appear, the relationship of the object to the world, which will translate into a relationship of color, a relationship of tone, a relationship of space.

And if we start from this modern thought of the sacred, of painting, we can actually hear these artists who no longer speak of God. When Mathis painted the chapel of Vence, he said to himself: "I am not a believer like Heidegger, who has no faith anymore, who was a believer but is no longer a believer." Mathis speaks of the fact that he is no longer a believer, he no longer believes in any god, but that does not prevent him from working in a sacred space,

which he calls in his painting "spiritual space". There are several places where he talks about that. And I believe that the challenge of this spiritual space is precisely to make the world appear. So again, not the whole thing, but to make this light appear within which, through a full harmony of relationships, things appear to us fully as things to human beings, fully human.

A manifestation of modern times is the dispossession of gods. The dispossession of gods is the vacancy in relation to god and to gods. Monotheism is the main responsible of this event. However, the dispossession of gods excludes so little religiousness that it is rather with it only that the relationship to god moves in religious experiences. When things come to that, the gods disappear. The void that results is then filled by historical and psychological exploration.

myths. The real danger is that this defect is not perceived as a defect. In other words, Heidegger in a sense, deliberately designates his thought as atheist in a certain way. He says in a place "Das Gottlose Denken", but he says of this thought without God, atheist if you will, that it is perhaps a more real and more

has resulted in the creation of what he calls the divine god, and not the god of philosophers like Cosa Sui, like Fundament, like First Cause. This god in Heidegger says that the human being cannot pray in front of him, cannot play music, cannot dance, in a very beautiful passage.

In other words, for Heidegger, the defect of God, the fact that no God today presents a defined face, can be thought of as atheism, but in the sense that Leutmose has for Sophocles. The challenge is that this defect of God can help us by reinstituting a new relationship with the sacred,

that the defect of God does not fade away as a defect, because without it we would lose the trace of the sacred, we would even lose the face of deity, as much there is no more God, as much the deity is still alive, and it is this possibility of the relationship to the divine that must be kept safe. To keep safe does not mean

grandiloquent attitudes. He speaks in a text of simply "Ein Glanz der Gottheit in allem was ist", that is to say the splendor of deity in everything, in anything. As he also says in the conference on the thing, in the least of things.

And here again, I believe we have a real link with modern art in this attention to the slightest of things, like in a Morandi, for example, or a Ponge or a Braque. The attitude of endurance in the defect of God starts there. But what is being? Mozart's heart?

Angelus Silesius, whom we have already listened to, can make us hear him in his own way, by means of a very ancient thought. In the pilgrim at Rubinique, fifth book, we read, Dicetique 366: "A calm heart in its depth, calm before God as He wants it. God touches it willingly, for this heart is his struggle." These verses are entitled "The struggle of God", by Mozart.

What is joy, after all? The divine is that. The gods are the joyful, the immortal blissful, as the last Hyperion says. The joyful himself is the god who gives serenity, who is clear.

And then you have, indeed, in Duncan's memories, what is it? There, he knows well what it is that the essential thing is: the party. And so, if you are with the flowers, nature in the sense that I do not hear it, not the naturalist nature, not the nature of the greens, nature in the really fundamental sense, as a sensation, practically nobody has, except Mozart, I find, nature, joy, serenity and the party.

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It was "Une vie, une oeuvre" by Fabrice Midal. With Adrien-France Lanor, Pierre Jacerme, Philippe Solers, Jean-Loc Serrois. Archive, voice of René Char, 1964. Jean Beaufray, 1981. Béda Allman, 1964.

Paul Ceylan, 1967, and Martin Heidegger, 1957. Thanks to Geneviève Hutin. Texts read by Anne Kreis and Jean-Louis Jacopin. Sound effects by Yves Lehorce, Michel Mestre. Mixing by Jean-Michel Després. Production by François Connac.