Ricœur's Theory of Fiction (Part I) - Jean-Luc Amalric

They are

Alfredo Ferrari,

he and myself. We are very young

scholars.

Um, we have a

different method.

Uh,

George used yesterday a

power PowerPoint. He is

the most modern of history.

Alfredo was working with with

a computer. He He is modern, but without

uh, projection.

I am in between. Yes, so so I I'm I'm

going to use the

old-fashioned paper.

But you you you will have my plan and

quotation here for you.

To help.

Okay.

Um,

>> [clears throat]

>> uh, I have divided this this lecture in

two two major parts.

Um,

in the first part I shall undertake, on

the one hand, a precise

uh, conceptual analysis

of Ricoeur's definition of fiction.

And on the other,

a work of

contextualization.

>> [clears throat]

>> I would like to situate Ricoeur's theory

of fiction within the broader

horizon of contemporary philosophy.

>> [clears throat]

>> Through this dual task of conceptual

analysis and contextualization,

my objective is to gain as much critical

distance. Yesterday, we talked about the

necessity of critical distance.

Uh,

as much critical distance as possible

from Ricoeur's the phases,

thereby facilitating more profound

reappropriation of them in in the second

step.

Then, in the second part of the lecture,

I shall attempt to present the main

lines

of the very core of uh

Ricoeur's theory of fiction

together with its uh ontological

implication.

As I As um I tried to show, I believe

that the substance of Ricoeur's theory

of fiction can be summarized

in three principal thesis.

Uh

these three thesis will serve as the

guiding thread of my presentation.

I would like this lecture to be um

as interactive as possible.

I shall therefore leave time at the end

of each session for for question, but

please do not hesitate to to interrupt

me uh if um at any point uh

you encounter a difficulty of an

understanding.

Uh the audience is composed um

in equal proportion in

French-speaking and English-speaking

participants, and although my lecture

will be delivered in English, I shall

occasionally resort to French uh as

well.

You are welcome to ask your question I

in either

language.

It will be

more simple.

Okay, so I I begin by the first part

um

of my lecture

uh the conceptual analysis and the

contextualization of Ricoeur's theory of

fiction.

Beginning by the

conceptual analysis.

If we wish to understand the the meaning

and scope of Ricoeur's concept of

fiction

and to appreciate its originality, we

must begin with a conceptual analysis of

the notion itself

in order to define it as precisely as

possible.

One might think that this initial

definition task definitional task is

straightforward.

Yet, this is far from the case.

Independently of Ricoeur's philosophy of

imagination, the term fiction itself

suffers from a profound equivocality.

Owing to the variety of uses to which it

has been put in literary theory,

sociology, history,

psychology, and psychoanalysis,

and this diversity of usage of equally

is equally evident within philosophy

itself.

Let us consider a few examples

to see what I call this equivocality of

the concept of fiction. What, for

instance, is common in Spinoza's

critical definition of fiction

when he explains the fiction of the

centaur

as the first spontaneous synthesis of a

revived perception of a horse and a

revived perception of a human being,

and, for example, Jeremy Bentham's

conception of legal fiction

developed at the beginning of the 19th

century

as legal fiction as a being of language

necessary

to the constitution of the law

and articulated with the principle of

utility?

Or again,

what is common to Hume's

use of the concept of fiction

in the Treatise of Human

where fiction is defined

as a complex idea entirely derived from

past experience, that is from images as

as copies of impressions uh

retained in memory.

What common in

this human definition of fiction and

Husserl's use of the same concept in the

famous paragraph

paragraph 70 of Ideas I

where he defines the principle of

ideative variation and intuition of

essences.

Famous paragraph that

uh Alfredo

uh

evoked evoked evoked

yesterday.

Uh as Husserl famously writes, uh quote

I quote

Hence, anyone fond of paradoxes may say

in strictest truth

provided that it [clears throat]

understands the ambiguity attaching to

the term

that fiction is the vital element of

phenomenology

as of all

eidetic science

the source from which knowledge of

eternal truth draws its nourishment.

We can note about this

this quotation that

uh it's probably Sartre the first

stresses the importance of fiction in

in

Husserl in the the conclusion of the

book of Sartre, L'Imagination.

One could multiply example indefinitely.

Yet, the interest of this last quotation

of Husserl

lies

for me in the fact that

it is not

it not only reveals the abyss

separating the union definition of

fiction and the ordinary use of fiction,

but also shows that Husserl himself was

actually aware

of the ambiguity surrounding the concept

of fictions, since he explicitly

emphasizes in in in the in this passage,

provided that

he understands the ambiguity attaching

to the term

that of fiction. So, so it's a it's very

striking to see Husserl

aware of this problem of equivocality,

of ambiguity of of fiction.

Independently of Ricoeur's philosophy of

imagination, therefore, we must

recognize

that we are dealing with

an

inherently equivocal and ambiguous term.

For this reason,

considerable caution will be required if

we are to grasp the specific specificity

of Ricoeur's concept of fiction.

This

equivocality is not merely the result of

competing philosophical and social

scientific theories of fiction,

but it reflects more broadly the

ambiguity of the term

term's ordinary usage.

I think this is precisely what Ricoeur

emphasized in the introductory lecture

of the lectures on imagination,

where he attempts

preliminary classification

or cartography

of images

by

distinguishing four

relatively coherent groups.

As Rico shows, fiction may be approached

as a

particular type of image

produced

by imagination.

The question then becomes, what

distinguishes fictional

images

from other form of images or pictures?

Let us briefly recall the four groups

identified by Rico.

The first group is the group of

pictures.

What he called pictures.

As Rico points out, it's the most

coherent

and homogeneous group

of pictures consist of images that are

example, pictures or portraits

of something

and possess a physical existence.

These include

paintings,

drawings,

diagrams, and other representation with

which both

depict something existing elsewhere and

stand

in for that thing.

This is the

clearly um

delimited domain of what Rico called

pictures. Or if we want uh

image portrait. It could be an an equi-

equivalent of pictures, image portrait.

Because we are trying to

to to make a distinction between image

portrait and image fiction. And I think

that would be a

uh

is the challenge.

The second group of uh images

mental images.

The second group comprise images that

evoke absent things without the physical

support of a photograph, painting,

drawing, or diagram.

These are what commonly called mental

images.

And we could say that most memories

belong to this category.

Such images correspond to the most We

could say the most common definition of

imagination as a faculty of

representative representing a thing in

its absence.

It's a classical definition of

philosophy, and it's also the definition

of philosophy that of imagination, but

uh

can't use this in the anthropology, for

example.

>> [sighs]

>> Fiction,

it's [clears throat] a third group

that will interest us today,

um

is precisely the group of fiction.

Ricoeur immediately notes that this

category in its is much less clearly

defined

than the preceding two,

and that is

its ambiguity gives rise to a host of

difficulties.

Here, the things evoked are not merely

absent, uh but as Ricoeur specifies,

nonexistence or

inexistence.

Such a broad definition encompasses

highly diverse examples whose

characteristics may even appear

contradictory.

As Ricoeur points out, one naturally

thinks first of literary fictions.

Yet, Ricoeur observes that in ordinary

language, as well as in psychoanalysis,

phenomena such as dreams are often is

assimilated to fiction.

Freud, for instance, frequently present

the dream as the stage of a mental

theater

when he speak for example of a

primal scene.

And for this reason, describes dreams

as fiction. And this will be a very

difficult problem.

This afternoon with the handwritten

notes, we we we could

revisit this this problem.

Problem because this is we have

obviously an analogy. But the this

analogic use of

the term fiction uh

to think the dream and the literary

fiction um

pose um

series of difficulties and problem. As

Rico notes, one may legitimately wonder

whether this analogy is justified.

Since the fiction of the dream

is bound to sleep,

whereas literary fiction presuppose

waking consciousness

and a reading experience that involves

awareness

of the distinction between the fictional

world and the real world. So, we are in

very different experience of fiction.

Is the dream really a fiction or has to

be considered as a fiction? That's

that's the problem.

Moving beyond ordinary language and

remaining within the literary domain,

Rico also invokes

in this third group, a notion that will

play a central role in his own theory of

fiction,

Aristotle,

Aristotle's concept of mythos in the

Poetics.

According to Aristotle,

tragedy

as the imitation of human action re-

requires the invention of a mythos,

that is the construction of a plot or

fable.

And in Ricoeur's interpretation, this

mythos itself

constitutes a a form of a form of

fiction,

uh paradigmatic case of fiction. For

Ricoeur, we will see that mythos will

really constitute a paradigmatic case of

fiction.

The last group, uh finally, is the for

Ricoeur the the group of illusions and

hallucination.

And uh

here, what predominates is an uncritical

belief in the reality of the image.

Such images are apprehended

as though they expressed a present

reality.

At this point, I would like to open a a

brief parenthesis which will allow me to

anticipate some of the question and

difficulties

that we shall be addressing today.

Uh in Time and Narrative 1 and 2,

Ricoeur himself confronts directly with

the problem of the

equivocality of the term fiction

when he attempts to characterize the

status of

mimesis 2

in its difference from the prefigurative

status of mimesis 1

and the refigurative status of mimesis

3.

In order to characterize mimesis two

recall that

he might have spoken of

I quote, the

the realm of

fiction.

In accordance with the common usage in

literary criticism.

Yet, he immediately adds,

I quote,

You you have the quote. I never for as

forego the advantage of this expression,

which is entirely appropriate to the

analysis of mimesis two,

in order to avoid the equivocation

created by the use of the same time in

two different senses. First, as a

synonym for narrative configuration, the

fiction as

narrative configuration, and second, as

an antonym of the historical narrative's

claim to constitute a

true narrative.

Yet,

literary criticism does not encounter

this difficulty

in so far as it does not take into

account the division that separates

narrative discourse into two major

classes.

It can therefore ignore a difference

that affects the referential dimension

of narrative and limit itself to the

structural structural feature common to

fictional and historical narrative.

The word fiction is then available to

designate narrative configuration

itself,

whose paradigm is in plotment,

without regard to those difference that

concern only the truth claim of the two

classes of narrative.

This

terminological choice, linked to the

question of fictions reference,

that is, to its relation to reality

already indicates the crucial crucial

importance that the problem of reference

assumes within Ricoeur's theory of

fiction.

In other words, it points us toward the

ontological scope of fiction

a theme to which we shall

return later.

Yet to conclude on this quotation of

Time and Narrative, as another remark in

the introduced

in the introduction to Time and

Narrative 2

the other quotation was from Time and

Narrative 1.

Um

in this second quotation

what Smith gives in second quotation is

that the decision to abandon the term

fiction in the context of Time and

Narrative

comes at a price

since it tend to obscure the productive

role of imagination in the creation of

fiction itself.

It's interesting to see that

terminological

choice of

Ricoeur

go against is the explicit explicitation

of his philosophy of imagination. I I

read the the last quotation.

Faithful to the terminological

convention adopted in the first volume I

give the term fiction a

narrower extension than many authors who

use it as a synonym for narrative

configuration.

This identification of narrative

configuration with fiction

is certainly not without justification.

In so far as the configurative act is as

we also

an operation of productive imagination

in the constant sense of term.

Nevertheless, I reserve the term fiction

for those literary creations that do not

share the historical narratives ambition

to constitute a true a true narrative.

We can there clearly see the gain

and the loss of this terminological

choice.

I now close this parenthesis.

Yet, I believe that the question

Ricoeur raises here already places at

the very heart of the stakes of his

theory of fiction and of the

difficulties it must confront.

What conclusions

should we draw from this preliminary

distinction among the four

principal groups of images

proposed by Ricoeur in the in his

introductory

introductory lectures of the lectures of

imagination.

As Ricoeur himself emphasizes, this

distinction remains at the level of

a mere enumeration.

The schematic

diagram he sketches at the end of the

lecture

by contrast already constitutes a

genuine construction.

It outlines a comprehensive

interpretation of the phenomena of

imagination and anticipate the central

thesis of the course concerning fiction.

>> The

I think all of all of you

know this schema but I recall the

some some elements of the schema.

In the schema proposed by by Rico

we have a schema organized around two

intercepting axes.

The horizontal axis which might call the

might be called the noematic

axis correspond on the side of your

object to the polarity of presence and

absence.

The vertical axis

which may be called the noetic axis

correspond on the other side of the

subject

to the polarity of fascinated

consciousness and critical

consciousness.

For Rico

to account adequately for the complexity

of imagination, it is necessary to take

this second axis

into consideration since it complicates

the meaning of presence and absence

themselves.

One does not simply move from

retained presence to free

absence.

In the case of hallucination precisely

situation

right quadrant opposite to the upper

right quadrant occupied by fiction, one

encounters pure absence but nevertheless

gives the illusion of presence.

My intention is is not to enter into

a detailed

commentary on the schema at the present

moment. What interests me rather is what

Ricoeur says about fiction,

which he situates,

as I have just noted, in the upper right

quadrant of the diagram.

Let me quote a

crucial

passage from the lectures on

imagination.

Thank you.

For me,

writes, uh,

so say Ricoeur,

fiction have the real

the real function of imagination,

since they have the elements of both

absence and critical distance.

We may therefore say that trace and

fiction are absolute opposites.

His preference for fiction is, of

course, a choice.

But what interests me in a theory of

fiction, as opposed to a theory of

trace,

a trea- a theory of fiction as

absolutely and extremely lengthily

opposed to a theory of portrait and of

illusions.

I think two expressions in in in in this

passage deserve particular attention.

First, the phrase

the expression the real function of

imagination. I think it's a very

interesting expression. The real

function of imagination. Second,

uh,

Ricoeur's appeal to the notion of

choice.

In,

justifying his, uh,

privileging of fiction as a paradigmatic

object of a theory of

imagination.

I would suggest here that these two

expressions, the real function of

imagination and the the idea of choice,

reveal the fundamental decision that

lies at the foundation of Ricoeur's

theory of fiction.

The specificity of this theory consists

first of all

in the fact that Rico seeks to situate

it

within the broader framework of a

general

theory of imagination.

Second point, this general theory of

imagination defines itself as a

philosophy of productive imagination.

We have here two main presupposition of

Rico's philosophy of fiction. We and I'm

going to try that these presupposition

are not

self-evident and

there is a

a choice of Rico which we which is which

not the choice of other contemporary

figures or contemporary

theoretician of fiction.

A choice to link the

theory of fiction to a theory of

imagination and the choice to link the

theory of fiction to the to the notion

the Kantian notion of productive

imagination. These are two two two very

important choice and I'm going to try to

to

uh explain the the

the specificity of these choices.

Uh first remark,

many contemporary

theories of fiction

limit themselves to an analysis of the

concept of fiction

while dispensing entirely with any

general theory of imagination.

This may occur because they adopt a

regional approach to fiction

for example, by concentrating

exclusively

on literary fiction.

For example, in

Thomas Pavel fictional worlds.

Alterna- Alternatively,

they may seek to develop an

anthropological theory of fiction

independent of any general philosophy of

imagination

as it's the case, for example, of the

book of Jean-Marie Schaeffer, Pourquoi

la fiction?

Anthropological anthropological point of

view

what is the function of fiction in a

human life,

but without any

theory of imagination.

Finally, last example, within the

framework of the contemporary new

realism

some philosopher defend a renewed

fictional realism

but is a new ontology of fictional

objects

but without developing a systematic

philosophy of imagination.

One may think here of Markus Gabriel's

last book,

one of the new

fictions

which extends them from his earlier

works while asking

how our supposed post-factual age could

emerge and how such a regime of

appearance could so profoundly blur the

distinction between fact and fiction.

No, these

example to to show that

we have many theory of fiction without

theory of imagination or without

systematic philosophy of imagination.

Second remark uh

even among contemporary philosopher who

have sought to develop a more or less

systematic philosophy of imagination

capable of integrating an analysis of

fiction

few have taken up the Kantian concept of

productive imagination.

Renewals of the philosophy of

imagination have followed other paths.

For example, in Sartre's The Imaginary

uh the renewal proceeds through

phenomenology.

Um

Sartre

doesn't use

the

Kantian concept of productive

imagination.

Uh

he tries to rethink the status of the

consciousness of image starting from

Husserl, starting from phenomenology.

Other example in Dewey's uh Art and Us

and our as experience or in Unamuno's

The Creativity of Action, we we have

another way of renewal of philosophy of

imagination, but it's a pragmatic way of

uh

rethinking imagination,

but without reference to the Kantian

productive imagination.

In Bachelard also uh

we have a

great philosophy of uh

material imagination. We have a

phenomenology of the poetic image, but

we don't have a reference to the

productive content

imagination.

Yet in none of these finger does one

find a sustained appeal to Kant's

transcendental approach or to the

fundamental distinction between

productive and reproductive imagination.

So I think that

against this

background, what gives Ricoeur's theory

of fiction its singularity is precisely

that it situates itself resolutely

within a Kantian orientation. We

Yesterday we we spoke a lot about this

this Kantian reference

and um

I think it's central in Ricoeur's theory

of fiction as I will try to to to show

um after in the

in the next um consideration.

As I shall try to show

throughout this lecture, I I think at

every stage in the development of his

theory of fiction, Ricoeur remains

engaged in the engaged in the dialogue

with both the the achievement and the

the limitation

of Kant's theory of productive

imagination.

It's a constant dialogue with Kant's

productive imagination.

And I completely agree with

Alfredo yesterday

um

that it's a strange dialogue,

a very selective dialogue with Kant.

So we have a uh

persistence of Kant, a constant presence

of Kant in Ricoeur's philosophy of

imagination,

but a very selective

reading of Kant uh

in the in the record argumentation.

Let us therefore return to the lectures

on imagination.

The fundamental polarity between picture

and fiction that governs the entire

75 course

both its overall argument and its

interpretation of classical and modern

theories of imagination

derives

directly from Kantian philosophy

and from the distinction between

productive and reproductive imagination

elaborated in the critique of a pure

reason.

For Ricoeur

although traces of this distinction can

already found in earlier philosophical

text Kant is the first thinker to have

given it a precise and rigorous

formulation

by conferring upon it

genuinely transcendental signification.

What then does the inaugural choice

underlying Ricoeur's theory of

fiction consist in?

I will point out the positive aspect of

this choice and the negative aspect of

this choice of of the critical aspect of

this choice.

On its positive side, it consists first

in adopting the Kantian distinction

between productive and reproductive

imagination

as the point of departure

of a philosophy of imagination of

imagination.

Adopting Kantian as

distinction as point of departure of

Ricoeur's philosophy of imagination.

Second, selecting in selecting fiction

as the paradigmatic manifestation of the

productive

function of imagination.

And I want to stress what

seems to me very important here. For

record, this double choice implies that

genuine philosophy of

imagination

can only be a philosophy of

productive imagination.

And that a genuine philosophy of

productive imagination can only be a

philosophy of fiction.

A philosophy which incidentally

incidentally can't himself never

explicitly developed.

This is for the

positive aspect of the choice.

The critical aspect on on this negative

side or where this this choice also

indicates the obstacles that

theory of fiction must overcome.

And

the critical task it must undertake.

This task may I think be summarized as

follow.

First,

to fight against the equivocacy and

ambiguity of the notion of fiction

by elaborating a precise concept capable

of accounting coherently for the

multiplicity of

fictional forms.

Second,

to resist the reduction of fiction to

trace or copy.

That is to a merely reproductive process

by elaborating a concept of fiction as

genuinely

creative fiction.

Um it's not sufficient to

speak of fiction. We have to

defend for Rico, we

defend a creative concept of fiction

because we have a in Hume

a theory of fiction, but for Rico it's

it's a theory of fiction derived from

reproductive imagination. So, uh

every theory of fiction is not necessary

a theory of productive imagination.

So, this is a

the task here is really to resist to the

reduction of fiction

uh

to a trace or a copy.

Finally,

the task to resist the devaluation of

fiction as mere illusion by elaborating

a concept capable of accounting for the

apparently

contradictory

aspects of fiction, fiction's relation

to reality, namely its combination of

critical distance and revelatory power.

This would be my my

attempt uh

to define the concept of fiction in a

in Rico. Do you have any

question on on this first point?

So, I can go to the con-

contextualization.

Yeah.

>> You mentioned the term transcendental.

>> Mhm.

>> And it would be helpful if you could

explain that more to us.

>> Yeah.

>> Because it gives a different if you want

level

>> Mhm.

>> to the story.

>> Yeah.

Uh

I have um I have

many developments on on on that point.

If maybe we would be more clearer if I

if if I end this

presentation and and after I I I I will

uh

respond to your to to your intro

I think it's

it's one of the problem of the

interpretation of Ricoeur's theory of

fiction. What kind of transcendental we

have in Ricoeur?

Okay.

So so I go to to

to the

situation contextualization and I

try to

to see the

pre- pre- precisely the style of

Ricoeur's theory of fiction and when I'm

going to speak of a style, it's a

transcendental style of his philosophy

of fiction.

Um

We

we have analyzed in detail the meaning

and implication of Ricoeur's decision to

inscribe his definition of fiction

uh within a Kantian orientation

and to connect his concept of fiction

directly to the Kantian notion of

productive imagination.

What light does an examination of this

decision shed on Ricoeur's theory of

fiction?

In my view

it allows us first to situate Ricoeur's

theory

within contemporary philosophy and to

bring it into proximity with

certain thinkers who share this broadly

Kantian orientation.

Second, it enables us

to define what I shall I call the

transcendental or more precisely of the

the quasi transcendental style of

Ricoeur's philosophy of imagination.

I do not time today to develop these two

points in detail, but I would like at

least to provide a brief

overview.

Let me begin with the first points,

namely the the contextualization of

Ricoeur's theory of fiction.

I shall do so by referring to the

several philosophical figures

who were important for Ricoeur, and

whose work helped us to situate his

theory within the broader landscape of

contemporary thought.

First, Jean Nabert.

Ricoeur was

deeply influenced by Jean Nabert's

profound and original interpretation of

Kant.

Nabert, one of the major which was of

the

major representative of French

reflective philosophy,

assigns a decisive mediating role to

imagination in the process of

symbolization,

through which our act of existing, what

you call the origin, originary

affirmation, expresses itself in signs.

In Éléments pour une éthique, the 1943,

Nabert argues that it is through the

interpretation of these signs

that an imaginative

reappropriation of our effort to exist,

and of the

originary affirmation constitutive of

our being, becomes possible.

This reference to Nabert would later

play a central role in Ricoeur's

hermeneutics of symbols, especially

during the period of the symbolism of

evil,

uh

fallible man,

uh Freud and philosophy, and the

conflict of interpretation.

In this regard, I I would refer to you

to Ricoeur's important essay

published in The Conflict of

Interpretation.

And which title is Act and Sin in Jean

Nabert.

This is first reference.

Second reference, uh

Hans Vaihinger.

As the lectures on imagination make

clear, Ricoeur's use of the concept of

fiction also

places him in a certain proximity to the

neo-Kantian philosopher Hans Vaihinger.

In his famous work The Philosophy of

As If, Die Philosophie des Als Ob,

uh

1911,

Vaihinger develops a general theory of

knowledge that is, in essence, a theory

of fiction.

Fictions.

His aim is to analyze the practical and

operative role played by fiction in both

ordinary and scientific knowledge.

The originality of uh Vaihinger's

interpretation of Kant uh lies in the

fact that he presents Kant as a

precursor of pragmatism.

The central thesis he he derives from

Kant is that certain ideas devoid of

theoretical validity may nevertheless be

justified from a practical practical

standpoint

insofar as they facilitate uh human

action within its environment uh

environment.

Vaihinger therefore assigns a

fundamental role to fictional

imagination within the sciences.

For him, imagination is the capacity

temporarily to simulate what is not

in order ultimately to establish or

discover what is.

One should also note that Vaihinger

develops the concept of

a realistic fiction.

A notion that would subsequently play a

decisive role in theories of scientific

models including those of Max Black

Models and Metaphor

Mary Hesse, Models and Analogies in

Science

and

this very important book of Ian Barbour,

Myths, Models and Paradigms, book of

'74.

As we shall see, this notion also

occupies a central place in Ricoeur's

own understanding of metaphor and

scientific models.

But we will see also that Ricoeur on the

other hand will refuse

to reduce fiction to purely

pragmatic interpretation, which is the

case of

Vaihinger.

I think it's necessary here to

analyze this notion of

a realistic fiction.

Because when we use this expression of

realistic fiction, it's important to

emphasize that it was Kant himself who

first brought the concept of realistic

fiction

in the Critique of the Pure Reason.

The relevant passage occurs in the

Transcendental Doctrine of Method

more precisely in the section entitled

The Discipline of a pure reason with

regard to hypothesis.

There Kant distinguishes carefully

between hypothesis

and what he calls precisely the

heuristic fiction

constituted by the ideas of reason.

I quote,

"In order that imagination may not

merely dream,

but may imagine under the strict

supervision of reason,

it must always rest upon something

completely certain and not itself

imaginary or merely supposed.

And this something is the possibility of

the object itself.

One may then resort to opinion

concerning the actuality of this object,

but such opinion, in order

to be groundless, must be connected as a

principle of explanation with what is

actually given and therefore certain.

And that case

and in that case, it is called

a hypothesis.

And a few pages later,

the concept of reason,

as we have said, are mere ideas and

certainly

have no object in any possible

experience.

Yet, they do not thereby designate

fictitious object regarded at the same

time as possible.

They are conceivably problematically

in order to provide

from their standpoint

as heuristic fictions

regulative principles for the systematic

employment of the understanding within

the field of experience.

In these passages, Kant clearly

distinguishes

hypotheses from heuristic fictions.

Um

hypotheses remain connected

to what is actually given

within experience

and therefore to what possesses

empirical certainty.

Heuristic fiction, by contrast,

corresponds to the merely regulative and

not constitutive use of the ideas of

reason.

Yesterday spoke about this issue.

They function as um

principles

guiding the systematic unification of

experience

without themselves constituting objects

of knowledge.

Um I'll take the time here to analyze in

detail how Finger

Max Black, uh Marías, and Barber

appropriate and transform

this Kantian notion of heuristic

fiction.

My

purpose is uh only to highlight the the

the Kantian uh lineage within which

Ricoeur's own conception of fiction is

uh situated.

Um let me conclude this

work of conceptualization

uh

by uh reference to this important book

of uh Jan Bauber, uh

Myths,

Models, and Paradigms,

uh

published in uh '74.

It was a very recent publication when

when Ricoeur

uh

made the lectures on imagination.

Uh I believe indeed that the uh

final lectures of the lectures

imaginations, specially lectures uh

um

18 and 19,

uh

standing close proximity to Barbour's

book.

One may first observe that the

opening

chapters of Myth, Models, and Paradigms

uh addressed

themes that are absolutely central to

Ricoeur's philosophy of imagination.

The first chapter, Symbol and Myth.

Uh and and then we we have also an

analysis and a discussion about metaphor

in the first chapter.

The second chapter, uh Models in

Science.

Third chapter,

Models in Religion.

The lectures on imagination uh

do not

uh uh

evoke the question of uh

uh do not analyze the the question of

models in religion, but in other texts,

Ricoeur does.

Let me recall in passing that the

question of models in religious

discourse uh

will also become later for Ricoeur in

the course of the

George will confirm [clears throat]

as as I think it's the course of '75 '76

'76 on

analogical and dialectical

language

uh with David Tracy and

the reference to Barbour is very

important also in in these courses.

What I would like to emphasize here is

that Barbour's central

thesis concerning theoretical models in

science resonates directly with

Ricoeur's conception of fiction

as a form of modeling, act of modeling.

Barbour summarizes his position as

follows. You you have a quotation.

First,

models have a variety of uses in

science. They serve diverse functions,

some practical

and some theoretical.

Second,

theoretical models are novel mental

constructions.

They originate in the combination of

analogy to the familiar and creative

imagination in inventing the new.

They are open-ended, extensible, and

suggestive of new hypotheses.

Third, such models are taken seriously

but not literally.

They are

neither picture of reality nor useful

fictions.

They are partial and inadequate ways of

imagining what is not observable.

I would

underline four aspects of

this definition that place

but place it for me in striking

proximity to Ricoeur's theory of

fiction.

First, Buber

attributes to models both a theoretical

and a practical function.

This practical dimension likewise

characterizes Ricoeur's conception of

fiction.

Because the very core of Ricoeur

conception of fiction hasn't been really

developed paradoxically, yeah. But I

think the very core Ricoeur

theory of fiction is the connection

between discourse and action. Uh it's

the connection between the theoretical

and the practical.

Um I think the

the ultimate aim of Ricoeur

theory of fiction was to as he say in um

short essay of 70

uh '76 to uh

to think a mediation between uh

discourse and action, to think a

mediation between uh

theoretical and practical.

First First remark. Second,

um

Barber explicitly appeals

to a notion also very important in the

lectures on imagination, the notion of

creative imagination.

And he refers also explicitly to a

process of invention.

Then very important in Ricoeur theory,

uh of semantic innovation.

Third, Barber insists that modeling

imagination cannot be reduced to a

temporary

psychological aid in the formulation of

theories. This This is a

theories of

what we call fictionalism or

fictionalism or conventionalism, for

example, the French uh

epistemologist

Pierre Duhem.

Uh this point also is particularly

particularly important in Ricoeur's

theory of the imagination.

Um

because unlike Husserl, who, in the

Logical Investigations,

uh assigns imagination largely

illustrative role,

Barber maintains that theoretical models

continue to play an essential role

in the modification of existing theories

and in the discovery of new phenomena.

Finally, and perhaps most significantly

in relation to the central opposition

between picture and fiction

that structure the lectures on

imagination,

uh

Buber uh

in this passage emphasizes

the fact that

theoretical model are neither pictures

of reality. This is the term pictures.

We have the term picture.

Not

merely useful fiction.

Uh

Um we can understand here fiction

understood as

uh

a pragmatic function of imagination.

imagination. Purely pragmatic function

of imagination.

If the models were

pictures, they would belong to the

domain of reproductive imagination.

And if they were merely useful fiction,

they would represent a

purely pragmatic use of imagination uh

devoid of any genuine relation to

reality. Therefore, devoid of

ontological

significance.

In this respect, Buber offers a

conceptions of modeling fiction as

modeling that

for me correspond remarkably

closely to Ricoeur's understanding of

fiction.

I shall return later to the ontological

implication of

this conception. But for the moment, it

is sufficient to note that Buber's

theory of scientific models

leads him to defend a form of critical

realism. Critical realism that closely

resembles Ricoeur's own understanding of

the heuristic power of fiction and its

capacity for ontological disclosure.

I now

come to the second consequence of Rico's

conception orientation.

What I earlier call the transcendental

quasi transcendental

style of his theory of fiction and then

can answer more in

question.

I think it's a very complex issue, but

that would would require extensive

discussion.

I shall therefore limit myself to both

aspects more relevant to our present

concerns.

I think if one may legitimately speak of

transcendental or I prefer quasi

transcendental style in Rico's theory of

fiction,

it must immediately be added that this

transcendental dimensions

falls far short of satisfying all the

requirements associated with the Kantian

notion of a transcendental.

Already in Fable Man, Rico explicitly

advocates a highly free appropriation of

Kantian thoughts. Yesterday, we talked

about this and uh

see

the expression Rico says sans souci

d'orthodoxie criticiste.

Without concern with the critical

orthodoxy.

It's

a lot of

liberté ici.

Indeed,

Rico never adopts the Kantian theory of

transcendental subjectivity

developed in the critique of pure

reason.

Rather, his philosophy of imagination

involves uh

selective

what I would call a selective

reappropriation of certain aspects of

the Kantian transcendental pragmatic.

For Rico, I would

I think it's a very recurring

remark on Ricœur's philosophy on

imagination.

The principal merit of Kant's theory of

productive imagination lies in the fact

that it liberates us from psychologism

and from all psychologizing

conception of imagination. This is

the principal aim of

reappropriation

of transcendental in Ricœur.

Such approaches

prevent us from thinking genuine

productivity

of imagination and confine us instead to

the domain of reproductive imagination.

In Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, for

for Ricœur, productive imagination does

not refer

obviously to private images or mental

entities.

It designates a moment within the

process through which objectivity itself

is constituted.

The function of imagination is therefore

not understood on the model of the image

conceived as a weakened perception

as in empiricist theories of

imagination.

Rather, it is grasped

through its linguistic expression or

propositional expression

that is in relation to an act of

judgment that applies categories to

experience.

That's why for Ricœur, for

this reading of

of Kant, of Ricœur, imagination in its

transcendental dimension

makes possible the emergence to think

the emergence of a new meaning which is

not linked to the mental image.

As Rico will later emphasize in his is

Chicago lectures on on Kant and

imagination.

Imagination belongs not in Kant to the

process of seeing, but to the process of

speaking.

Moreover, the Kantian problematic of

productive imagination introduces

another decisive concept, which is a

the concept of synthesis

linked to the possibility of synthetic a

priori judgments.

And this interests Rico because Rico's

idea of the synthesis of the

heterogeneous

uh is for him a kind of application of

the notion notion of productive

synthesis in Kant.

We

will be very very quick on this question

because we

with yesterday we analyzed at length

this this problem.

Uh

Of course, the over central

uh conception of Kant that interests

Rico is the question of schematism.

As

productive activity process capable of

generating new meanings and new

structures.

This brief reminder allows

us to understand more clearly what Rico

retains from Kant's transcendental

approach to imagination.

In his view, the principal merit of this

this approach

it's that is

it points the way toward the theory of

productive imagination

conceived as semantic imagination.

I think it's the main

main point of Rico appropriation of

the transcendental in Kant. The idea

that

the transcendental theory of productive

imagination

um opened the way to a new

theory of semantic imagination, which is

freed from psychologism.

For Rico, the primary interest of such a

theory lies in its capacity to connect

the creativity of imagination with the

creativity of language.

Link the

creativity of imagination with the

creativity of of language and thereby to

break

uh this is decisively

with any attempt to derive the image

from perception.

>> [clears throat]

>> Through this new relation

between imagination and language, one

may hope to free the theory of

imagination from

every residual form of psychologism.

Furthermore, this semantic conception of

imaginations

opens the way for a creative

reappropriation of Kant's theory of

schematism.

Rico proposed to understand the semantic

innovation at work in metaphor and

narrative

as the work of a productive imagination

whose schematism constitutes

the very matrix of meaning.

In that sense, um the

the elucidation of

the linguistic strategy

operative in metaphor and narrative

provide access to a theory of creative

imagination capable of accounting for

the structures of the creative process

itself

while avoiding the pitfalls of

psychology.

So, I think if we are justified

in characterizing

Ricoeur's philosophy of imagination as

transcendental in style,

this is because in the case of

metaphorical discourse as well as in the

configuring thing act proper to

narrative,

Ricoeur seeks to uncover

structural feature

or structures of linguistic creativity.

We have a strong link between the the

question of structure and the question

of transcendental.

But, this is classical in the the

appropriate the the appropriation of the

question of a transcendental

in Kant in contemporary philosophy.

Sartre spoke also of

the We have a work of structure, of

course, in structuralism of in in

Lévi-Strauss, but there are also

interpretation of Foucault

as

an appropriation of the the

transcendental the Kantian

transcendental

in in historical structures.

Many contemporary philosophy

uh

retain from

the the Kantian notion of transcendental

broader concept of structure structure

which is very different from the

philosopher to to another.

Um

At the same time, um um

in regard we see that Ricoeur refuses to

reduce this transcendental structural

dimension of productive imagination to

an innate

competence

of the kind postulated, for example, by

Chomsky.

Chomsky generative grammar.

Even more,

Ricoeur greatly admires Chomsky's

ability to think linguistic

productivity. What he What is What he

criticizes in in Chomsky is the idea of

innate competence, which we which for

for him is a is a loss in relation to

the the

notion of transcendental.

If there is indeed a transcendental

element in Ricoeur's theory of fiction,

it nevertheless remains only

quasi-transcendental.

In so far uh it lacks it lacks the

ahistorical character

associated with the Kantian a priori.

In his discussion of metaphor and

narrative, Ricoeur speaks instead of

transhistorical structures of discourse.

So, the the status of a Ricoeurian

transcendental, if you can

speak of a Ricoeurian

quasi-transcendental,

is transhistorical and non-ahistorical

as the a priori the Kantian a priori.

Uh

such a formulation implies a sustained

reflection on the

historicity of the process of productive

productive imagination itself.

So, it's a point I I don't have time to

develop it today, but uh

Ricoeur's philosophy of imagination of

productive imagination is a philosophy

of the

historicity of the process of productive

imagination.

It's a very important

dimension in Rico's philosophy.

So, I think the transcendental style

style of

to conclude this

this brief analysis of the question, the

transcendental style of Rico's

philosophy of fiction should not

therefore be confused with any form of

neo-Kantianism.

Kantianism.

On the contrary, the originality of

Rico's philosophical project,

it seems to me,

lies

precisely in his attempt to draw

simultaneously upon the resources of

phenomenology,

hermeneutics,

discourse, linguistics, analytic

philosophy, and

more broadly Anglo-American

semantics,

in order to forge the conceptual

instruments required by a theory of

fiction capable of overcoming the

limitations inherent in the counter only

count of productive imagination.

So, I

we try to conclude this this first part

of my lecture.

Uh

and

to stress a point that seems to me very

important to understand the

Ricoeurian concept of fiction. It's to

point out the extension of this concept

of fiction.

What are the consequences of this

Kantian orientation of Rico's theory of

fiction? or more precisely, what follows

from Ricoeur's decision

to establish a strict equivalence

between the Kantian concept of

productive imagination

and the concept of fiction that he seeks

to elaborate.

In the lectures on imagination,

Ricoeur's inaugural decision consists in

giving a generic meaning

to the opposed notion of picture and

fiction.

Consequently, both concepts acquire a

very broad extension. It's a

It's It's decision to

link to a

kind of demonstration.

Since the concept of picture is taken as

representative of the entire family of

phenomena pertaining to reproductive

imagination,

it encompasses, as we saw, both physical

replicas, photographs, portraits,

drawings, diagrams,

and the like,

and mental replicas, that is,

what are commonly called mental images.

This is the

domain of picture, the broad domain of

pictures.

By contrast, the concept of fiction is

treated as the equivalent of productive

imagination and consequently received a

remarkably broad extension.

I think this is really the specificity

of Ricoeur's conception of fiction, this

broad extension of this concept of

fiction.

Because in Ricoeur, the term of fiction,

we

we will saw that

second path, the the term applies not

only the heuristic fiction in the logic

of scientific discovery,

but also

uh

the fictional narrative

rendering from

folk tales, myth, drama, and novels,

etc.

It encompasses poetic expression as well

as in the

domain of social and political

imagination, utopias.

To this one must add metaphors and uh

parables in religious discourse.

That is both manifestation of creative

imagination in

religious language that Ricoeur explores

extensively in his writing on

uh biblical hermeneutics.

At the conclusion of lecture 16 of the

lectures on imagination, Ricoeur

explicitly refers to the four

principal domains of productive

imagination and fiction

that we have just seen that identified.

Uh

I read to finish this this first part. I

I read the

the quotation.

When I said in the last lecture that

there were two main domains in which we

could study

productive imagination, we were to

understand fiction.

I should have said

that there are in fact at least four.

The first two domains are the subject of

the present lecture, the productive

imagination

in the poetic dimension

and in the epistemological dimension.

A third domain

is the current subject of a separate set

of lecture on ideology

and utopia.

The topic where is the dialectics of

imagination in cultural, social, and

political life.

We should not break the theory of

imagination into a split between

sociology and

psychology. So, we we have to understand

that really the lectures in the of

imagination is a very partial part of

because theory of fiction.

And he conclude

this passage, "The fourth field, which I

do not now address, would be the domain

of religious symbols.

There should be a specific approach to

the functioning of symbol as depiction

also of certain kinds of meaning."

So, we have

a very large, very broad extension of

the concept of fiction.

Scientific fiction,

poetic fiction,

fiction

as utopias in social imaginary,

and religious fictions and models.

Although this question extend far beyond

the scope of today's today lecture, the

challenge will of course to

to think together both the difference

and the similarities among these

different form of fiction uh

which belong to

highly distinct domains of experience

and inquiry.

Well, so the but but that was the first

the the first

part of my my lecture.

The analysis of the concept and the

contextualization of the

concept. If you want

a question. Yeah.

>> Thank you.

I have a question regarding this

quasi-transcendental

because of course he said

he's not something historical but rather

transhistorical, but and it points to

the historicity of productive

imagination.

And as you clarified in your paper, it

is strictly linked to this dynamical

sedimentation and innovation in here.

>> Mhm.

>> So my question would be would you think

that framing this notion of

transcendental indicator in terms that

are closer to

maybe Husserl's phenomenological genetic

developments of phenomenology since

it's something that is strictly tied to

sedimentation, etc.

Would be better and

what would [clears throat] be the

problems there?

>> Mhm. Because of course it's not

Um

Yes, Ricoeur himself

refers to

It's

Ricoeur is always very um

skeptical in relation to

uh

genetic

genetic phenomenology.

Um

I think it's for a practical reason.

Uh

the infinity of the work of genetic

phenomenology

um

for Ricoeur uh

it's it's a kind of obstacle to think uh

a practical philosophy. And

we have to

to think about the central Ricoeur

philosophical

anthropology is is really action.

Uh it's it's uh it's it's a philosophy

of of action.

And uh

that's why

Rico is always um

mich ja

with

the genetic philosophy the character in

limited the genetic philosophy. And um

uh

But in Ideology and Utopia, uh

he characterizes the method as uh

genetic phenomenology as Husserl.

So, you're clearly in for for the social

imaginary when you want to um

by a a kind of uh

question auto look for a guy uh

appropriate of the the

the positive affirmative signification

of ideology and utopia, uh

he use uh genetic method.

Uh

but

this use of genetic method is um

can be explained by by the fact that uh

uh

this approach of uh

social imaginary is a strongly linked to

the action in society.

Uh

but

would explain the the the the exception.

Um

But as well as Rico

doesn't share the the the

constant conception of uh

transcendental subjectivity, uh

I think he requires also the the

conception of the

ego transcendental

in Husserl.

So, uh

we have

um

the same uh

critical relation to uh

foundation of of the transcendental with

subjectivity of the transcendental ego.

Um Um, this would be the limit, I think.

>> At the end of lecture 16 when I talk

about the religious and person as

religious symbols.

>> Yeah.

>> And which is very different than how he

writes about the biblical narrative

in the Simia

for

>> It's very very different from

>> different than how he writes about like

it's it seems like in the in the

lectures he's sort of

couching it a little bit, narrowing it.

>> Yeah.

>> But when he goes to actually write it

out it's a full, you know, it's a

religious language not symbols.

>> Yeah.

>> if he can reflect on a little bit of

what

>> The difference between religious

language and symbols?

>> Yeah, so he says that

>> Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah.

Yeah.

Yeah, in in the lectures it's a it's a

very very quick and short remark where

we

I think he's um

simply

I think maybe he's thinking to the

symbolism of

evil and

the work on symbol and religious symbol

develop in the

but

in that work. But

it's absolutely true that the the most

interesting work of Ricoeur

uh

hermeneutics of

the

religion discourse

uh is when he

analyze precisely what

metaphor and narrative uh becomes in a

biblical

text for example in the

parable in the parable.

So

it's very in the lectures we we have so

kind of classification.

This this is another domain but

uh

I think it's a

it's also the thesis of

we have a in the

barber

but there's this that

the models the theory of models has to

be think also for for for for really

religious models.

And I think we can

attempt to think also

metaphor and narrative as as model in

religious discourse.

Yeah.

Answer me.

>> I [snorts] think you very much

Um my question is rather about the last

the very last citation in which he could

give some idea of his overall design.

So, my question to you is

is he still working on his politics of

the world?

That's my first question. Second, I

noticed that among the defining aspects

of his theory of fiction you don't say

something like

he's actually working here on an

understanding of fiction that would

enable us

to better think something like

initiative in view of action. So, you

say quite correctly that he could say

apology is informed by action. But it's

as if

uh

Yes, the the the whole question about

action let alone politics is just

mentioned in passing. He shifted again

to the side he doesn't want to deal with

this now. How should I understand?

>> Mhm.

Uh and and your first question was uh uh

>> My first question is

is this a part of the continuation of

his project of the politics of the

world?

>> Uh yeah, yeah, politics.

Um

>> [clears throat]

>> Yeah, uh

All interpreters of Rico

are trying to do an interpretation of

what means of it

but Rico abandoned the other project of

politics of the will.

Uh

which was uh

central project of the philosophy of the

will.

Um

It's a very complex question,

a genetic question because we we have

uh

for

genetic critic because we have text

until the the '70s

in which Ricoeur correspondence in which

Ricoeur says um

"I'm working on on my poetic of the

will."

So the l'abandon est

très tardif.

Uh

And uh

But what is true and Ricoeur himself uh

show that is is

that the part of the philosophy of

imagination that he develops

is is is a part of this poetic of the

will, but separate from the question of

religious imagination.

And uh and separate from the the

question of

uh

regeneration, recreation of that was

central in in the introduction of

of voluntary and involuntary.

So uh

From that point of view, I think Ricoeur

um

decide

to

develop

an anthropological philosophy uh

without reference to uh

uh

religious imaginary.

This would would be the first one. And

in relation

to to to action,

uh we we could say

um

maybe two

Maybe I have two elements of uh

resonance for you.

The first one is for for me I

was

one of my first work.

Um

There is in the in the voluntary and

voluntary there is really

a phenomenology of

of action and

already in this book imagination is

central.

Um

as it's central also in the fablement.

Um

but it's true that after there is a

this this linguistic turn or textual

turn of Ricoeur

but um

conduce to

a philosophical direction

and

the only essay

synthetic essay is the essay imagination

in discourse and action and here we have

clearly

the

the

total

architecture of what

uh

would be the

theory of

total theory of Ricoeur theory of

imagination and

in the last part it's precisely the the

the passage from the move from discourse

to to action from theory to practice and

the fiction plays a

central role.

He says that the concept of productive

reference

the second part of my lecture

will be devoted to

mostly to the

this concept of productive reference. Uh

uh

is what make the

kind of transition of mediation between

representation and action.

So, um

it's it's it's a strange development

because

what is central

comes at the end in relation to the

philosophy of imagination.

Uh

I think we we get to

I work in trying to reconstructing

philosophy of imagination, but starting

from

the link between imagination and

practice.

And

on the primacy of act on representation.

Uh

and because

it's faithful in sense to to record that

but but record didn't

develop this philosophy completely.

Yeah, yeah. We have insight, but it's

not developed uh uh

>> Mhm.

>> You just shed some light

on Zahavi's question

about Husserl

and his Husserlian heritage

conception of the transcendental

>> Mhm.

>> I

I I I I surely did mention that

genetic phenomenology is not

the proper path, but nevertheless, I

think in the essay on imagination in

context of action

>> Mhm.

>> uh as well as in

the uh essay on intersubjectivity

in Ego and Husserl

in a certain sense, he appropriates the

concept of uh transcendental by of

transcendental analogy, let's say.

And uh I think that in the

uh essay on imagination

he equates uh transcendental analogy

between the

>> Between the

>> Between the egos

>> Mhm.

Yes, [clears throat]

but

this essay is is

an attempt to interpret

two theories of intersubjectivity.

And it's not

Ricoeur's theory of

of

It's not directly Ricoeur's theory of

of imagination.

Because of course when when he analyzes

Husserl

meditation on

on intersubjectivity,

he has to

to talk

on the ego.

The transcendental ego and

of the

apperception

analogic analogical apperception.

So

That's in the context. But Ricoeur

wouldn't

assume a theory of the transcendental

ego.

He would appropriate the the concept of

analogical

apperception

as a kind of uh uh

a mode of uh appraising uh appraising

the over. Yeah.

>> [laughter]

>> We We have No, no. We have a pause, but

we can take questions first.

>> Okay.

When a new study of the

working out of the influence Mhm.

regarding a theory of imagination, I

notice

something that I am working in this

area, the study of the Mhm.

Mhm.

He in that moment started thinking about

symbols and the symbols

in the first part, he

defines symbol in symbolic of figure,

like

something that is logos and ethos.

And then later on, he says metaphor are

only logos. Mhm. It's easier to deal

with that, so I go into metaphor.

And when you start reading all the book

of Ricœur, you are noticing a change on

the definition of symbol. Yeah. Yes.

But it was very strong because Ricœur is

saying that symbols are

when [clears throat] you study all

religion,

you are noticing some

similarities. Mhm.

fixed symbols. All religion have the

same symbols. Mhm.

ultimate good.

And but metaphor is about new meanings.

So, I think

when you start thinking about I don't

know the problem. I think it was the

problem of Ricœur.

the book.

And he said something about why not

symbol as

logos in religion

because he noticed also a

depend on the period of thinking,

there are

a phenomenological thinking about

presence and intuition and hierophany

and hermeneutics about

logos, war and

mediation. And every time I think

something very say something like this,

you know, the ontological claim I am

getting weaker weakening.

>> Mhm.

>> Because every time you have a new

mediation

and you get

the ontological [clears throat] point.

>> Mhm.

>> I don't know. I want to say something.

>> No, it's a No, it's a very very

>> [clears throat]

>> very important question. It's

what is the link between symbol and

metaphor. For me it's it's a central

question and

and

uh

There is a limitation of uh

theory of metaphor. It's uh

It's

We could link this to the discussion of

yesterday about the passivity, about the

receptivity.

Uh because

uh

What

Ricoeur

tries to think with his theory of

fiction is is clearly what what Husserl

would call

active synthesis

opposite to to passive synthesis.

Uh but uh

the problem is if we

if the focus is on active synthesis,

we miss

a fundamental dimension of imagination.

And

for example,

the the dimension of imagination present

in symbols. Because in symbols we have

at the same time

linguistic dimension,

what Ricoeur calls the

semantic core of a symbol, but we have

also a a non-linguistic dimension Uh uh

linked to forces, to energy, to uh

to cosmos, to uh pulsions in

psychoanalysis. And uh

uh

we lose

uh

that

that that's that's

form that's linked to to force, to

energies in in the theory of metaphor.

Because of the the choice uh of the

theory of metaphor is a choice is a

strategic choice because Ricoeur was

unsatisfied of his theories of symbols.

You think it's a

loose notion, very imprecise,

[clears throat]

and he

And what what what he really want to

think it's the creativity of

imagination.

And with the theory of symbol, it's very

difficult to avoid the pitfalls of

psychologism.

And for this reason, he tries to uh

isolate the the the core,

the nucleus of the

the the productivity of imagination in

in this notion of semantic innovation.

But uh

we there is something which is uh

lost. Uh

it's uh it's the roots of the symbol in

in in the cosmos, in the sensible, the

question of the sensible.

So um

there is one or two uh essay of

Ricoeur in in which we

there is an attempt to to think this

relationship. It's a

really Alfredo

spoke of.

This essay, for example, of uh

uh

75,

maybe,

uh Paroles et Symboles.

All these symbols if you might not

But it's very important problem.