Full Transcript

·YouTLDR

Ukraine Has Six Months to Win.

17:563,521 words · ~18 min readEnglishTranscribed Jun 4, 2026
AI Summary

Ukraine's military leadership believes the next 6 months represent a critical, optimal window to shift the war's dynamics through localized counteroffensives and intensive drone warfare, forcing Russia to negotiate on Kyiv's terms. Sustaining this pressure is vital before winter sets in or Russia adapts its tactical approaches.

Understanding this 6-month window is critical for evaluating the trajectory of European geopolitical stability, defense procurement cycles, and the real-world operational efficacy of autonomous hardware on modern battlefields.

Section summaries

0:00-1:37

Introduction and Core Thesis

watch

Establishes the central premise and the 6-month timeline proposed by Ukrainian leadership.

1:37-4:44

St. Petersburg Economic Forum Drone Strikes

optional

Provides a narrative illustration of Ukrainian long-range strike capabilities but is not essential to the strategic thesis.

4:44-10:25

Drone Technology and Russian Attrition

watch

Crucial analysis of the hardware changes and logistical breakdowns shaping the battlefield.

10:25-11:23

Sponsor Segment

skip

Promotional segment for an external subscription platform.

11:23-17:53

Strategic Objectives and Negotiating Terms

watch

Outlines specific tactical targets, funding allocations, and the ultimate diplomatic objectives of the campaign.

Key points

  • The Six-Month Strategic Window — Brigadier General Andre Balletki outlines a critical 6-to-9 month window where Ukraine must secure strategic battlefield positions to force a stable, favorable peace truce.
  • Asymmetric Drone Dominance — The introduction of semi-autonomous Bumblebee and Hornet drones has disrupted Russian logistics and staging areas up to 250 kilometers behind the front lines.
  • Russian Attrition and Supply Crises — Russia's troop losses in 2026 have exceeded its recruitment capacity, exacerbated by deep localized fuel shortages and severe damage to transit routes like the Kerch Strait Bridge.
  • Targeted Counteroffensives over Broad Fronts — Rather than attempting a massive, high-risk territorial reclamation, Ukraine is focusing resources on high-value, localized targets like the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant.
I believe the next 6 to 9 months are a turning point. more precisely, I think the next six are the most critical. Brigadier General Andre Balletki
we need to define those directions where we can improve our positions, take some strategic points, and then speak with the Russians from a position of strength Brigadier General Andre Balletki

AI-generated from the transcript. May contain errors.

0:00

If the next six months go according to

0:01

plan, then Ukraine's about to win the

0:04

war against Russia. That was the bold

0:06

prediction offered by Brigadier General

0:08

Andre Balletki, founder of the Azov

0:11

Battalion and commander of the Ukrainian

0:12

Third Army Corps when he sat down for an

0:14

interview with Reuters just a few days

0:16

before this episode was released.

0:18

Speaking from an undisclosed location in

0:20

a bunker deep below the region of

0:22

Kharkiv, Bletki laid out his timeline as

0:25

follows. Quoting him, I believe the next

0:27

6 to9 months are a turning point. more

0:29

precisely, I think the next six are the

0:31

most critical. End quote. If in that

0:33

time, Ukrainian forces can surge ahead

0:35

on the battlefield, make meaningful

0:36

strategic gains, and most of all, hold

0:38

the line against Russian troops, then

0:40

Russia may end up offering concessions

0:42

at the negotiating table and possibly

0:44

before the year is out. It's an idea

0:46

that was practically unthinkable back in

0:48

2022, that Ukraine could force its way

0:50

to a negotiating position where Russia

0:52

might agree to a lasting truce. But as

0:55

the summer of 2026 begins, it's become

0:57

clear that Ukraine's chances are better

0:58

than ever. Russian territorial gains

1:00

have slowed to nearly a halt, and month

1:02

after month, Moscow's watched more of

1:03

its troops die on the front lines than

1:05

it can recruit to replace them. Ukraine

1:07

has achieved an unprecedented level of

1:08

dominance in drone warfare. Warning

1:10

signs are flashing red all across the

1:12

Russian economy, and Vladimir Putin's

1:13

trusted elite are showing signs that

1:15

they've already lost faith in their dear

1:17

leader. As Ukraine understands all too

1:19

well, this war isn't over yet, and there

1:22

are still plenty of ways for things to

1:23

go wrong. But if Ukraine can just

1:25

maintain its current course, then peace

1:27

may finally be within reach. According

1:29

to General Bitki, Kiev needs six crucial

1:31

months to turn the tides of history. So,

1:35

start the countdown.

1:37

6 months to save Ukraine. Wednesday, the

1:40

3rd of June was supposed to be a big day

1:42

for Vladimir Putin, who made a rare trip

1:44

away from the bunker and visited the

1:46

city of his birth, beautiful and

1:48

historic St. Petersburg. He wasn't just

1:50

traveling to reminisce or to guzzle

1:52

vodka alongside his childhood friends.

1:54

Instead, he was traveling on business

1:55

for the opening day of the St.

1:56

Petersburg International Economic Forum.

1:59

The event has long been described as the

2:01

Russian version of Daravos, the Swiss

2:03

Alpine Resort, where global leaders and

2:05

business elites gather each year for the

2:06

World Economic Forum. Although western

2:08

heads of state would be making an

2:10

appearance, as they've avoided doing

2:12

since the start of Russia's full-scale

2:13

invasion of Ukraine, Putin was getting

2:15

ready to welcome luminaries like the

2:17

presidents of Isbekistan and Tanzania,

2:19

the minister of energy from Saudi

2:20

Arabia, and even the vice president of

2:22

China, Hangen. This year, Putin had even

2:26

secured the attendance of a range of

2:27

Americans who fall at varying points on

2:30

the scale of odious, malignant [ __ ]

2:32

From minor influences on the low end to

2:35

literal Andrew and Tristan Tate at the

2:38

extreme end of the scale. What is

2:40

happening? This is the crossover nobody

2:42

needed. But just as attendees were

2:45

making their way to the conference, a

2:46

plume of heavy black smoke began to rise

2:48

over the city. Flying low across the

2:50

Baltic Sea and then close enough to the

2:52

city skyline that conference goers could

2:54

capture them on camera. Ukrainian drones

2:56

and missiles rain down upon St.

2:57

Petersburg's major oil terminal as well

2:59

as a naval base on a nearby island and

3:01

what the city governor claimed were

3:03

several other infrastructural targets.

3:05

The city's main airport was forced to

3:07

shut down for nearly 5 hours as

3:08

conference attendees snapped photos with

3:10

unmistakable smoke trails in the

3:12

background. Oddly enough, perhaps in

3:14

some misguided attempt to save face,

3:16

Russian air raid sirens never went off.

3:18

Although, if Putin and his allies had

3:20

hoped that the drones might fly off

3:21

course, they were sorely mistaken.

3:24

Russia, as usual, vowed a systematic

3:26

response, which was a credible threat

3:28

less than 48 hours after a wave of 656

3:31

drones and 73 missiles killed at least

3:34

23 people across several Ukrainian

3:35

cities. But just as that comprehensive

3:37

strike and others like it have

3:38

completely failed to deter Ukraine's

3:40

drone attacks, it's unlikely that a

3:42

retaliation for St. Petersburg will

3:44

accomplish anything more. The conditions

3:45

that allowed Ukraine to devastate St.

3:47

Petersburg on one of the most important

3:49

days for Vladimir Putin this year are

3:50

the same conditions that allowed

3:52

Brigadier General Bletki to issue his

3:54

six-month timeline. But before we get

3:56

into the details of what the next 6

3:58

months could hold, we've got to

3:59

understand Bletki's prediction just a

4:02

little bit better. Bitki and other

4:04

Ukrainian leaders, including those

4:06

who've since echoed his claims, are not

4:08

arguing that after the next six months,

4:09

Ukraine will somehow be marching on

4:11

Moscow. Nor are they arguing that

4:12

Ukraine is just 6 months away from

4:14

retaking territory that Russia's held

4:16

since 2014, like the Crimean ismas or

4:18

these cities of Daetsk and Lahansk.

4:21

Instead, those six months represent the

4:23

time Ukraine thinks it needs to get

4:25

Russia to peace negotiations on terms

4:28

that are favorable to Kev. Quoting

4:30

Bletki again, we need to define those

4:32

directions where we can improve our

4:34

positions, take some strategic points,

4:36

and then speak with the Russians from a

4:38

position of strength, not weakness,

4:40

about a truly stable truce. From a

4:42

military point of view, this is

4:44

realistic. Now, the chief of staff to

4:46

Ukraine's president, former battlefield

4:47

commando Bodanov, used the same word in

4:51

reference to a winter ceasefire.

4:53

Realistic. At the core of Bitki's

4:55

assessment is the unavoidable fact that

4:57

something in Russia's offensive has

4:59

broken down. Ever since 2023, the war in

5:01

Ukraine has looked basically consistent.

5:02

As researcher Jack Watling explained in

5:05

a recent piece for foreign affairs,

5:06

quoting, "Russia's full-scale invasion

5:08

settled into a predictable rhythm of

5:10

summer and winter offensives between

5:12

which the pressure of attacks would ease

5:14

while Russian units rotated and

5:16

regrouped." End quote. But even though

5:18

Russia went into 2026 seeming to fully

5:21

expect that it would launch a spring and

5:22

summer offensive as usual, Ukraine has

5:24

been able to turn the tides. Part of the

5:26

change is the result of major

5:28

improvement coming out of Kiev, where

5:30

new drone and missile technology and

5:31

especially a pair of designs known as

5:33

the Bumblebee and the Hornet have

5:35

completely changed a game on the

5:36

battlefield. Impervious to Russian

5:38

jamming and largely autonomous or

5:39

whatever they need to be, Hornet drones

5:41

in particular have been able to

5:42

devastate the Russian military at medium

5:44

range. Anywhere from 25 to 250

5:47

kilometers from the front, Ukraine has

5:49

relentlessly attacked supply depots,

5:51

staging areas, weapons stockpiles, and

5:53

quite literally anything that moves.

5:55

Sewing such complete chaos that Russia

5:57

can't get his act together and properly

5:59

manage an offensive. Instead, Russian

6:01

soldiers are increasingly caught with

6:02

their pants down, sometimes quite

6:04

literally, when they're left exposed,

6:06

isolated, and highly vulnerable, even as

6:09

their own commanders force them to try

6:10

and make forward progress. Ukraine's

6:12

mid-range campaign has also led to the

6:14

devastation of the highway that bleeds

6:16

from the Russian border through parts of

6:18

occupied Ukraine and finally to Crimea,

6:20

where just about all above ground oil

6:22

infrastructure has now been destroyed.

6:24

Already, the fuel shortage there is so

6:25

complete that most civilians can't use

6:27

their cars. Although Russia might want

6:29

to send relief via the Kirch Strait

6:31

Bridge, which connects Crimeir to Russia

6:33

directly, the bridge has weathered such

6:34

significant undersea damage from

6:36

repeated sea drone attacks that it's no

6:38

longer safe for trains to move across.

6:40

And that's without even discussing

6:41

Ukraine's long-range strike campaign,

6:43

which has devastated Russian refineries,

6:45

fuel storage infrastructure, and the

6:47

military-industrial complex. Those

6:49

strikes are focused on drone and missile

6:50

production facilities and some of the

6:52

highly specialized manufacturing centers

6:54

that build component parts Russia can't

6:56

make anywhere else. Nor have we factored

6:58

in Ukraine's aerial drone dominance

7:00

nearer to the front lines, where rapid

7:01

advances in Ukrainian technology have

7:03

leapt past what Russia's able to match.

7:06

Moreover, in a war where Ukraine's

7:08

greatest weakness has always been his

7:09

manpower, K has introduced unmanned

7:11

ground drones at massive scale, using

7:13

them to resupply and sustain troops in

7:14

foxholes or strapping machine guns onto

7:16

them and letting them capture territory

7:18

themselves. With drones taking on such a

7:20

high share of the combat burden,

7:21

Ukrainian troops are much safer than

7:23

they were before, and the reduced

7:25

requirement for actual people on the

7:26

front lines has meant that some

7:27

Ukrainian soldiers have had the chance

7:29

to rest and recover. At the same time,

7:31

Ukraine's tactics are changing. After a

7:33

few months of testing at the less

7:35

intense, more southerntherly parts of

7:36

the front line, Kiev started to bring

7:38

back artillery systems and even

7:40

mechanized units under specific

7:41

circumstances, after years in which

7:43

those systems were sitting ducks against

7:45

drones on either side. But Ukraine's

7:47

growing technological advantage is only

7:49

half the battle. And Kiev has been

7:50

helped tremendously by the fact that

7:52

Russia's begun to fall apart. Near the

7:54

battlefield, Russia is losing

7:56

unprecedented number of troops before

7:57

they even reach the front line. And

7:59

although the Kremlin has been able to

8:00

recruit enough troops to replenish its

8:02

forces for years, the calculus has

8:04

recently flipped upside down. Month

8:06

after month in 2026, Russia has lost

8:08

more troops than it can recruit. Even as

8:10

the country's remaining recruitment pool

8:12

starts to dwindle, Russia is especially

8:15

low on the sorts of units that would

8:17

help to stabilize the front line,

8:18

particularly drone operators who've been

8:20

recruited and trained in low numbers,

8:22

targeted and killed in high numbers, and

8:24

forced to accept cheap, ineffective

8:26

drones from the drone force's new

8:28

commander, a man with zero combat

8:30

experience who has a drone company that

8:32

he's clearly trying to monopolize. In

8:34

fact, the problem is so bad that Russian

8:36

units outside the drone force have been

8:38

directed to give up their drones,

8:40

throwing away one of the only assets

8:43

that has kept Russians alive. On the

8:45

home front, Ukraine sustained long-range

8:47

drone campaign has crippled military

8:48

industry, contributed to deepening fuel

8:50

shortages, and led Russian citizens to

8:52

really feel the impact of war in a way

8:55

they never had before. In a show of

8:56

discontent that would have been

8:58

unthinkable just a year ago, even

9:00

instruments of the Russian state are

9:02

beginning to reflect what's happening.

9:03

State pollsters are acknowledging that

9:04

support for Putin is dropping fast and

9:06

military analysts and economists are

9:08

releasing think pieces that insinuate or

9:11

claim outright that it's time for the

9:13

war to end. That's not something that

9:14

Russian intellectuals get away with

9:17

saying and less things are getting real

9:20

bad. According to Insider Reports, the

9:22

Russian elite feels the same. Quoting an

9:24

oligarch who spoke anonymously to the

9:26

Guardian in May, there is profound

9:28

disappointment in Putin, a growing sense

9:30

that some kind of catastrophe is

9:31

looming. end quote. All in all,

9:33

Ukrainian leaders have assessed that

9:35

they're facing optimal conditions for

9:37

Kiev to start making breakthroughs, but

9:40

they've also acknowledged, as Brigadier

9:41

General Bletki described, that this

9:43

window won't stay open forever. This war

9:46

has been a constant give and take

9:47

between the Russian and Ukrainian sides.

9:50

One side makes a rapid series of

9:52

improvements and enjoys a temporary

9:53

swell of momentum, but then the other

9:55

side finds a way to catch up, and the

9:56

momentum stabilizes or even reverses. In

9:59

a worst case scenario, 6 months is about

10:01

how long Russia might need if Putin and

10:03

his allies were to immediately get their

10:05

act together and start finding ways to

10:07

thwart Ukraine's recent successes. Even

10:10

in a better scenario, 6 months from now,

10:12

when winter sets in, advances become

10:14

much tougher and Ukraine is forced to

10:16

weather months of attacks on its

10:17

civilian energy infrastructure. So,

10:19

these next 6 months are the critical

10:21

window. If Ukraine is going to find its

10:23

way to the finish line, then it has to

10:25

happen now. Now, we're going to discuss

10:27

what Ukraine might do with its 6 months

10:29

in just a moment. But first, a quick

10:30

pause to tell you about our new

10:32

subscriber site. Fronts.co is our outlet

10:34

for all the stories we don't have space

10:35

to do justice here on the main channel.

10:37

A place where we can dig deeper and go

10:39

dirtier than we ever do on YouTube.

10:41

Every week we upload two exclusive

10:43

videos, two expert written articles, and

10:45

a podcast or two, all covering the

10:46

conflict and geopolitical stories that

10:49

matter most to you. Often our coverage

10:51

is focused on the Russian invasion of

10:53

Ukraine, but we also host plenty of

10:55

pieces on Iran, Sudan, the Sahel,

10:57

Europe, and elsewhere. Not to mention

10:59

all the minor conflicts that the rest of

11:00

the world tends to ignore. This week, we

11:02

released an exclusive deep dive episode

11:04

providing a close look at the way that

11:05

North Korea understands the rest of the

11:07

globe. That's nearly an hour and a half

11:09

on Pyongyang's wild but crystal clear

11:11

view of things. And well, you can't find

11:14

it anywhere else. A subscription to

11:15

Fronts costs just $5 a month or $50 a

11:17

year. Again, that's fronts.co. Check it

11:20

out. And now back to it.

11:23

How to tame the bear. Right now in Kiev,

11:27

the clock is already ticking. 180 days

11:30

or thereabouts to break the back of the

11:32

Russian offensive once and for all.

11:34

Before that can happen, Ukraine will

11:35

need to accomplish three key tasks.

11:37

Deliver meaningful strategic setbacks to

11:39

Russia on the battlefield. [ __ ] the

11:41

Russian capabilities that would allow it

11:43

to stabilize despite setbacks. and

11:45

arguably most important, convince

11:48

Vladimir Putin that the war is lost.

11:50

Putin's perception really, really

11:52

matters here. He's surrounded by people

11:54

who are terrified to give him bad news

11:56

and who know they can enrich themselves

11:58

by first giving good news and then

12:00

placing themselves in the right

12:02

positions to siphon away the funds Putin

12:04

allocates to what he believes to be a

12:07

further offensive. According to Kremlin

12:09

insiders, Putin still believes that

12:10

Russia is on track to capture the rest

12:12

of the Dawnbast region. And considering

12:14

oh what it might cost a person to be the

12:16

one who gives Putin a reality check,

12:18

Ukraine can't rely on the idea that

12:20

Putin would learn the truth on his own.

12:22

Ukrainian forces have to make the truth

12:24

unavoidable. Because if there's any way

12:26

for Putin's advisers to keep him in the

12:28

dark, they will. As for how Ukraine goes

12:31

about changing the situation, a growing

12:33

chorus of war experts soundingly alarmed

12:35

that a counter offensive might be within

12:37

reach. Now, even if Kiev can achieve

12:39

something along those lines, it's not

12:41

going to be a counteroffensive across

12:42

the whole front line or even a

12:44

territorial recapture on the scale of

12:46

what Ukraine achieved in 2023, Kiev just

12:49

doesn't have the bodies available to

12:50

make that happen. And even if it did,

12:52

the risk is too great. Instead, if a

12:54

counteroffensive does take place, it's

12:56

likely to focus on relatively small

12:58

geographic areas where Ukraine believes

13:00

that it can set overwhelmingly favorable

13:02

conditions for a victory. That means

13:04

concentrating incredible numbers of

13:06

drones and drone operators using tactics

13:08

similar to what the architect of

13:09

Ukraine's offensive drone strategy, Ilia

13:12

Secharin, has explained on this very

13:14

channel, you can check out our interview

13:16

with Ilia on warfronts and check out the

13:18

multiple articles he's published with

13:20

our team over on Front Stockho. If you'd

13:22

like to learn more about what Ukrainian

13:23

offensive drone swarms could look like,

13:25

judging by Ukraine's recent successes in

13:27

pulling mobile howitzers, main battle

13:29

tanks, and armored personnel carriers

13:31

into frontline areas, those assets will

13:33

probably be deployed as well as a true

13:34

force multiplier in areas where Ukraine

13:36

already controls the sky. As for the

13:38

potential targets, the most obvious is

13:40

Ukraine's Zaboresia nuclear power plant,

13:42

the largest nuclear power plant in

13:44

Europe and a place that Russia has

13:45

controlled since 2022. Ukrainian troops

13:48

appear to be moving within striking

13:49

distance of the plant. And if it could

13:51

be recaptured, Ukraine would deprive

13:53

Russia of some of its most important

13:54

leverage. Since the plant was taken

13:56

over, Russia has been engaged in a long

13:58

theatrical display of nuclear blackmail.

14:00

And if the war were to conclude with the

14:02

power plant in Russian hands, it would

14:04

be a massive boon to the Russian and

14:06

occupied Ukrainian energy sector.

14:08

Elsewhere, although Ukraine is neither

14:10

close enough to take Crimea nor in a

14:12

position of sufficient forces for that

14:13

kind of operation, Kiev may try to get

14:16

as close to Crimea as possible to

14:17

demonstrate its ability to threaten the

14:19

ismas in the future. Ukrainian advances

14:21

in the Donbass are also possible,

14:23

although they'd be modest with Ukraine

14:24

starting to make limited advances toward

14:26

the city of Povsk. In the north, Ukraine

14:29

may try to bleed Russia dry near the

14:30

city of Sunumi, where Russian forces

14:32

have recently captured a number of

14:34

abandoned villages that Ukraine didn't

14:36

seriously attempt to defend. probably in

14:38

an attempt to boost perceptions that

14:40

Russia is still gaining ground month

14:41

over month. That outward push, however,

14:44

may have left those troops overextended.

14:46

Then there's Ukraine's long-range strike

14:48

campaign. With Ukrainian drones falling

14:50

over St. Petersburg during an extremely

14:52

high-profile international event while

14:54

Putin was in the city, it's clear that

14:56

Russian air defenses no longer have the

14:57

strength to consistently prevent Ukraine

14:59

from hitting high-v value targets. But

15:01

what Ukraine may choose to do next is

15:03

expand the volume of its strikes rather

15:05

than its range. production lines. More

15:07

capable long-range weaponry have been

15:09

coming online with greater regularity

15:11

over the last few months, and recent

15:12

Ukrainian strikes have suggested a

15:14

greater willingness to concentrate

15:15

drones and missiles to hammer specific

15:17

targets instead of spreading them out

15:19

and trying to elude air defenses. That

15:21

means Ukraine will need to build and

15:22

purchase those weapons in greater

15:24

numbers. But in that regard, help is

15:26

already on the way from Europe.

15:27

Recently, the EU unlocked a delivery of

15:30

90 billion e across 2 years, a full 2/3

15:33

of which will be funneled toward

15:34

military capabilities. Ukraine does have

15:36

a number of other priorities when

15:37

choosing how to allocate those funds.

15:39

But if Kiev truly believes that it's

15:41

just a few months away from victory,

15:43

then the potential is obvious. Surge

15:45

that funding into acquisition of as many

15:46

longrange weapons as possible until

15:48

Ukraine's recent long-range sanctioning

15:50

campaign against Russian oil

15:51

infrastructure looks like child's play

15:54

in comparison. Again, it's critical to

15:55

remember that Ukraine's objectives

15:57

wouldn't be to defeat Russia outright,

15:58

but to force Russia into as favorable a

16:01

negotiating position for Ukraine as

16:02

possible. That's a principle that a

16:04

number of Ukrainian leaders have

16:05

reiterated over the last few days,

16:07

including President Zilinski himself.

16:09

Objective number one is to get Putin to

16:11

the negotiating table. And objective

16:12

number two is to ensure that once

16:14

negotiations begin, Russia is willing to

16:17

support an unconditional ceasefire or

16:18

perhaps even make concessions in order

16:20

to get the war to end. In past rounds of

16:23

talks that barely qualified as

16:24

negotiation, Putin and his allies

16:26

stonewalled, demanded that Ukraine

16:27

abandon territory it hasn't captured,

16:29

and tried to impose a wide range of

16:30

concessions on Kev. But if Ukraine can

16:33

accomplish what it believes to be

16:34

possible over the span of the next 6

16:36

months, then the ultimate hope is that

16:38

those roles could be reversed. Ukraine

16:40

could demand more stringent security

16:42

guarantees and deterrence against future

16:44

Russian aggression or call for

16:46

assurances that its path to NATO in the

16:48

European Union will not be obstructed.

16:50

Ideally, Ukraine would be able to

16:52

convince Russia that there's simply no

16:54

possibility that Russia would gain

16:55

territory through negotiations beyond

16:57

what would eventually be agreed as a

17:00

concrete line of contact. And perhaps

17:01

there's an outside chance that Ukraine

17:03

could negotiate a return of some

17:04

territory that's been lost, although

17:07

that would be a stretch with this

17:08

Russian leadership. Either way,

17:10

Ukrainian leaders seem to have decided

17:12

the events of the next 6 months will set

17:13

the stage for a genuine negotiation

17:15

effort. But now that knowledge is out in

17:17

the open, meaning that Ukraine, Russia,

17:19

and the rest of the world will all be

17:21

operating with a somewhat clearer

17:23

timeline. Ukraine doesn't have to meet

17:25

Russia at the negotiating table in six

17:27

months. It could continue because this

17:28

next stretch of warfare doesn't go as

17:30

planned or because this stretch goes so

17:32

well that Kiev wants to press an

17:34

advantage. But Russia will be trying to

17:36

hold out. Ukrainian soldiers will be

17:37

counting down the days until they can

17:39

finally go home. And Europe and the

17:40

United States will be eager to return to

17:42

normal. Ukraine has set a clear

17:44

expectation on when and how this war

17:47

might end. And now it's of the utmost

17:48

importance that Ukraine can hold up its

17:51

end of the bargain. Thank you for

17:53

watching.

More transcripts

Explore other videos transcribed with YouTLDR.

Get the TLDR of any YouTube video

Transcribe, summarize, and repurpose videos in 125+ languages — free, no signup required.

Try YouTLDR Free