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Mercado, empresas y consumidores, Defensa de la competencia Parte 2

32:09EnglishBy Jesús AumenteTranscribed Jul 17, 2026
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0:00

With regard to unfair competition

0:02

within the framework of competition,

0:05

the law that you need to be studying

0:08

is Law 18.159. The purpose of this law, while on the

0:15

one hand it is to legitimize the

0:17

defense of competition, which we will

0:19

see shortly, the other purpose of this

0:22

law is precisely to

0:24

sanction the competitor who

0:29

uses illicit means to compete in

0:31

the market, harming the competition

0:36

and

0:38

producing a deviation from the competition

0:42

by using unfair means that are

0:44

classified as illicit.

0:47

In this sense, we are going to see what

0:50

those elements are that must be

0:53

configured simultaneously to understand

0:57

that competition is taking place.

1:00

One particularity before getting into

1:03

this point is that our law

1:06

promotes competition

1:08

because competition comes

1:11

from the constitution as something

1:14

that is good to generate in the

1:17

market because it is efficient. The issue is

1:20

when there is

1:26

illicit means and

1:29

harm is being generated, that is what this law

1:31

intends to prevent. So, what

1:34

are these

1:38

elements that constitute unfair competition? Competition

1:41

is real; there must be

1:44

concurrence. Unfair competition is impossible

1:46

if the activities

1:49

carried out by the agents are not

1:51

competitive with each other. For example, a

1:55

butcher shop is not competitive with a

1:57

shoe store because there is no way for the

2:01

shoe store to attract the

2:03

butcher shop's customers. Therefore, there must be a

2:06

certain similarity of products that

2:08

generates the possibility for both

2:11

businesses to compete with each other for

2:13

customers. If there is no

2:16

shared clientele, there is no possibility of

2:19

diversion.

2:21

The second element is that there must not only

2:25

be concurrence but also an

2:27

illicit means. For example, under

2:31

our legal system, based

2:34

precisely on what I

2:37

mentioned earlier, which is the principle of

2:39

Article 36 of the Constitution, that

2:42

each person has freedom of choice

2:44

of profession or industry, while

2:48

competition is legal, this does not preclude the

2:51

use of unfair means

2:55

when this competition also employs

2:58

unfair means. What the legislator

3:01

intends is to regulate and prevent this from

3:04

happening, and it is also required that

3:09

a risk be generated. Diversion of customers from one

3:12

competitor to another,

3:14

from risk or diversion of customers from

3:17

one competitor to another, that is, the result

3:20

is that this illicit means of competing

3:23

must translate into the actual diversion

3:26

of customers or the risk of a certain

3:29

actual diversion of customers.

3:31

At the level of doctrine,

3:34

the

3:38

following acts of confusion have been considered unfair means of competition. For

3:41

acts of confusion to occur,

3:44

for example, there is a businessperson

3:46

who has a reputation in the sector of

3:48

that activity and who wants to be taken

3:51

advantage of by another businessperson who is

3:54

in the same sector of activity but

3:56

whose product has less prestige

3:59

than the other. So this second

4:02

businessperson who has less prestige

4:05

makes the presentation of the product, the

4:10

packaging, the brand very similar to that of the

4:13

first businessperson who has even

4:15

greater prestige and what he seeks

4:18

unfairly is to confuse customers,

4:20

attracting them to buy his own

4:23

product and not the other one, the one that has

4:26

greater prestige

4:27

in the sector. In the exercises that we marked, there was

4:31

one that I shared with you, which was to

4:34

inject with two boxes of chocolates for an

4:37

hour per Ferré roll, and another from another

4:39

company that would be precisely This

4:41

second businessman, who doesn't have as much

4:44

prestige, and if it can be understood as a

4:49

dairy confusion, the one where the packaging

4:52

was identical, I

4:55

think even the sizes and the material

4:57

of the boxes, what tends to be good is that

5:01

I only get a customer thinking it's Ferro de

5:04

Roger, but I'm buying from this

5:06

second businessman who has less

5:09

prestige. This would be an act of

5:11

confusion. Another act is

5:15

migration, when the competitor spreads

5:19

false information and perspective about their

5:22

competitor. It has to have both

5:25

characteristics: it has to be false and it must be

5:28

negative. That is, when the businessman

5:29

tries to denigrate a competitor so that

5:32

the first one's clientele

5:35

is diverted to the second. Where have you

5:37

seen this? In some advertising, for example,

5:42

there is an advertisement, I don't know if you

5:44

remember it, I think it

5:47

was for Pepsi and it used

5:50

Coca-Cola kittens to climb onto the

5:52

Pepsi machines and make the Pepsi rule. It is the type

5:54

of advertising where two

5:57

direct competitors, one tries to denigrate and give

6:01

false information about the other. It is also

6:05

a behavior that is understood as a

6:09

means of competition. Also, for

6:11

example, I don't remember well, but there have been

6:15

advertisements with Soap brands,

6:17

and previously the brand of another, a

6:20

direct competitor, was displayed, which was

6:23

precisely about giving false information and

6:25

perspective.

6:27

Another means is

6:30

disorganization, which implies that, through

6:33

improper means, disruptions are generated in the

6:36

organization of the

6:37

competitor's company. For example, through

6:39

improper means, a businessperson learns

6:42

industrial or commercial secrets of a

6:45

competitor and reveals them. Obviously,

6:47

this revelation of secrets can lead

6:50

to a loss of clientele, and it

6:53

is clearly a means of real competition that

6:58

is covered by this law. So what is

7:01

done is legal protection against

7:04

acts of unfair competition. The first

7:07

norm that regulates and precisely sanctions

7:10

real competition is the

7:13

Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property,

7:17

dated March 20, 1883, and its Article

7:23

10 bis defines what is understood

7:27

as real competition.

7:30

Our legal system

7:35

has ratified the Paris Convention, and therefore it

7:39

constitutes domestic law and

7:41

is not applicable. What it establishes and defines

7:45

as fair competition is that which is

7:49

contrary to honest practices in

7:51

industrial or commercial matters, and it adds

7:55

that, in particular,

7:57

acts likely to create confusion

8:01

regarding the Establishing the

8:04

products or the industrial or

8:06

commercial activity of a competitor, or

8:09

false claims in the exercise of

8:12

commerce capable of discrediting the

8:16

establishment, the products, or the

8:18

industrial or commercial activity of a

8:21

competitor, or statements that

8:24

could mislead the public

8:27

about the nature, method of

8:30

manufacture, characteristics,

8:33

suitability for use, or quantity of

8:35

products—as can be seen, the

8:38

main means that the doctrine

8:40

recognizes as suitable for generating

8:43

unfair competition, that is,

8:44

acts of emigration, means of

8:49

disorganization, and acts of construction,

8:52

are precisely regulated by this

8:54

norm. That is to say, in

8:56

our Uruguayan law,

8:59

these acts of unfair competition

9:02

constitute unlawful acts whose commission

9:05

generates the obligation to repair the

9:08

damages caused,

9:10

and other foundations in national law

9:14

that can be applied to

9:16

justly compensate for the damages caused by

9:19

real competition can be

9:22

found in the general principles

9:24

of the civil code, the subject matter of

9:26

liability for unlawful acts,

9:28

article 319: every unlawful act of

9:33

man generates the obligation to

9:35

indemnify, and to the extent that the

9:37

unlawfulness is already typified by the

9:41

Paris Convention, the

9:43

obligation to repair the damages is generated. And

9:46

damages caused.

9:50

Well, now finally, we're going to get into what is

9:53

competition law.

9:57

This is the same law we've been developing, Law

9:59

18.159, and its purpose is precisely to

10:05

protect the normal development of

10:08

economic equity and

10:09

free competition, avoiding

10:12

competitive distortions. Free

10:15

competition in the market aims to achieve the

10:17

greatest economic efficiency and, ultimately,

10:20

the best well-being for the population.

10:23

Regarding the regulation and limits of

10:29

competition law, the objective

10:33

is to preserve the general welfare

10:36

and economic efficiency.

10:39

And as we just saw, regarding

10:43

unfair competition, the objective is to

10:45

prevent unlawful harm to a

10:48

consumer caused by it.

10:53

So, we're going to get into

10:56

competition law. The model, for example, if

10:59

we look at the history of the US, was and

11:04

still is

11:06

the limitation of

11:08

construction operations or business concentration,

11:13

and even within its regulations,

11:16

they admit anti-competitive conduct. That is to

11:19

say, these

11:23

conducts themselves, beyond their objective, the

11:26

results will be classified as

11:29

anti-competitive.

11:31

In the example of the American model, the

11:36

most typical

11:41

anti-competitive measure is

11:44

price fixing. Minimum or maximum

11:47

supply levels for a good or service

11:50

are behaviors that tend to decrease

11:52

consumer surplus.

11:56

On the other hand, European regulations

11:59

are designed to favor the

12:03

European Union by preventing the creation of barriers

12:06

to entry for national businesses against

12:09

competition from ventures

12:11

beyond the geographical borders of each

12:15

member state. In this case, what characterizes

12:19

the provisions of the European model

12:22

are related to the performance of

12:25

individual or

12:28

collective anti-competitive acts or agreements, and also to

12:31

the abuse of a

12:32

dominant market position.

12:36

Therefore, in all cases,

12:39

the rule of reason must be followed, which

12:42

implies that it does not admit any hypothesis

12:44

of anti-competitive acts. This

12:47

is a major difference with the

12:50

US model, which does have a clear direction, meaning it

12:53

regulates certain

12:56

anti-competitive behaviors. Regarding

12:59

the regime in

13:01

our country, it is fundamentally the

13:04

European model in this matter.

13:07

Therefore, it prohibits acts that may have the

13:09

object or effect of distorting

13:11

competition in the market, and it also

13:14

prohibits the abuse of a

13:16

dominant position. But it has the rule

13:19

of reason, meaning that it does

13:22

not regulate

13:26

anti-competitive conduct. It seems appropriate to

13:32

establish that Article 1 of

13:35

Law 18.159 stipulates that it is a regulation

13:42

of public order. This means,

13:44

like consumer protection law,

13:47

that it cannot be disregarded by the

13:49

will of the parties; it is therefore non-derogable and

13:52

of public order. The

13:56

objective of this law is to

13:58

promote the well-being of current and

14:00

future consumers. The guiding principle

14:04

is free competition, which, as we

14:07

saw, comes from Article 36 of the

14:11

Constitution.

14:13

Therefore, all markets are

14:16

governed by the principles of free

14:18

competition, except for the exceptions provided by

14:21

law. Article 3 of

14:25

this law establishes that all

14:28

markets are subject to the

14:31

competition law, and so are

14:33

all persons, whether public or

14:36

private, always within the

14:38

national territory. Article 2

14:41

regulates the prohibition of

14:43

abuse of dominant position, as well as prohibiting

14:46

all anti-competitive practices and

14:48

conduct that have the

14:51

object or effect of limiting, distorting, or

14:54

restricting competition in the market,

14:58

whether current or future. This

15:02

is also provided for in Article 2.

15:04

The advantage of a better positioning

15:06

in the competitive

15:12

market, or rather, the positioning of an economic agent as a consequence of its own

15:15

commercial or business success, does not

15:17

constitute anti-competitive conduct. Nor does it occur

15:19

when the

15:23

law grants a special benefit or privilege

15:25

to a specific individual. This

15:27

situation does not only involve receiving the

15:30

powers of activities

15:31

developed in a monopolistic manner as a

15:33

consequence of regulations that conferred

15:36

legal monopolies for their exploitation. It

15:39

must be borne in mind, then, that

15:42

our law does not foresee

15:49

anti-competitive conduct.

15:55

To understand, or rather, to be able to

15:58

comprehend and develop this area, the

16:02

legislator is the one who regulates what constitutes the

16:04

relevant market,

16:06

and this will allow us to analyze whether

16:08

or not a certain conduct exists in

16:10

the market.

16:13

It is necessary to know the sector of

16:15

activity and its geographical scope. It is

16:17

understood that the broader

16:21

the relevant market is in terms of

16:24

substitute goods and

16:26

geographical scope, the less likely there is that

16:32

anti-competitive conduct will develop because there are many more

16:35

substitutes in a larger

16:38

geographical area. The law contains a

16:41

definition of relevant market that

16:43

allows us to analyze the

16:45

economic terms. To determine the existence of

16:48

anticompetitive conduct, it is

16:51

necessary to analyze

16:54

the existence of substitute products or services,

16:57

as well as the geographical scope of

17:01

the market.

17:03

The regulated conduct controlled by the law

17:07

is

17:10

established in Article 4, which outlines

17:11

prohibited practices. This list is not

17:15

exhaustive but rather illustrative,

17:18

meaning it serves as an example;

17:20

more practices may be considered

17:24

prohibited.

17:26

Among them, I

17:30

recommend a detailed reading

17:33

of the article. You will find, for example, the

17:35

application of prices or quantities to be

17:38

sold in the market; that is, the situation

17:40

in which these businesses

17:43

agree among themselves on how much

17:46

each will sell, in which

17:48

geographical market, and at what price.

17:51

These are known as

17:53

collusive practices. One factor that

17:57

facilitates this is the presence of few

17:59

producers or suppliers who

18:02

know each other and where

18:04

conditions exist for reaching an

18:06

agreement.

18:08

Another example that also constitutes

18:12

prohibited conduct established in

18:15

Article 4 is collusive agreements

18:17

between construction companies, which

18:20

are relatively scarce in our country, and

18:23

which suppliers... Public tenders for

18:28

infrastructure projects

18:30

are known to each other, so trusting

18:34

them beforehand—

18:36

who will submit a bid, what price they will

18:39

bid, and why the tenders are divided up in the

18:43

market—is

18:46

another way of colluding. The

18:49

literal "ife" (i.e., article 4) also

18:51

establishes preventing competitors' access

18:53

to infrastructure

18:56

essential for production,

18:58

distribution, or marketing. For

19:01

example, if

19:03

a competitor asks

19:06

you to use your

19:10

electrical power cable infrastructure to sell electricity, and

19:12

you refuse, this would be a prime example of

19:15

conduct

19:19

described in the literal "ife."

19:23

So let's go a step further and see what

19:26

abuse of a dominant position is,

19:28

which is regulated in article 6.

19:31

When there is a dominant position in the

19:34

market, the situation arises when

19:37

an economic agent can unilaterally change

19:44

essential variables in this

19:46

sector of activity without considering any other agent. Fundamentally, they

19:49

can change the quantity or prices

19:52

without taking into account what their

19:54

competitors or buyers might do. The

19:57

typical example of a dominant position The dominant position is that

19:59

of a monopolist, who

20:03

is clearly the sole supplier of a

20:07

particular good or service in the

20:09

market.

20:11

It is clarified that a dominant

20:13

market position is not

20:15

anti-competitive conduct. This is because

20:18

a dominant position is a

20:21

factual reality in the market; that is,

20:22

monopolies exist, they are not

20:25

prohibited. The law, in Article

20:27

6, prohibits the abuse of a

20:31

dominant position, which is defined by law as

20:33

a situation in which the agent or agents in a

20:39

dominant position act improperly

20:42

to obtain a profit that does not

20:44

correspond to the rules of competition

20:46

or to harm third parties.

20:49

It is necessary to define, then, on a case-by-case basis, when

20:51

conduct becomes

20:54

abusive. The classification of these

20:58

conducts will generally be carried out

21:01

by the law's enforcement agency,

21:03

which is the Commission for the Promotion and

21:06

Defense of Competition,

21:08

dependent on the Ministry of Economy and

21:11

Finance, and whose purpose is

21:13

precisely to determine whether

21:16

or not conduct should be classified as

21:19

anti-competitive.

21:22

The third type of conduct regulated

21:25

by the law is that of concentrations, which it

21:28

refers to in Articles... 7 and 9.

21:32

Firstly, there is a

21:35

notification obligation regulated by

21:37

Article 7, which establishes the obligation to

21:40

report certain operations that

21:42

have the effect of concentrating a sector

21:45

of economic activity. It is necessary to

21:48

notify the Commission for the Promotion and

21:50

Defense of Competition of all

21:53

operations that have the effect of

21:54

generating greater concentration in any

21:58

sector of the company, provided that

22:00

one of two circumstances is present. These circumstances must

22:06

not necessarily occur; that is, if

22:09

one of these circumstances occurs,

22:10

this reporting obligation arises. On the

22:13

one hand, when it comes

22:16

to ventures that

22:18

result in the acquisition of,

22:20

for example, a 50

22:23

percent share of the considered market sector.

22:25

Let's give an

22:27

example: if I own a

22:31

chain of pharmacies that

22:37

represents 10% of the market in Uruguay,

22:41

and on the other

22:45

hand, there is another owner who owns a

22:47

chain that has 40 percent, the owner of the

22:50

10 percent will acquire the

22:53

40 percent. The sum of the two shares means that

22:57

50

23:01

percent of the chain is acquired. Market participation of

23:05

a pharmaceutical company, that is, of pharmacies,

23:07

then when this

23:09

type of operation is going to be completed, it is necessary to notify the

23:12

enforcement body, which is precisely

23:15

the Commission for the Promotion and Defense of

23:18

Competition.

23:19

So this first obligation to

23:22

communicate, in this case, another

23:25

circumstance that also applies is

23:28

the second measurement parameter that gives

23:31

rise to this obligation: when there is

23:34

a turnover volume of the

23:37

participants in the same,

23:39

if in any of these in the last

23:43

three fiscal years there is one or the group

23:45

of participants in the operation that invoices

23:48

at least 750 million, the

23:53

operation must also be notified to the

23:55

commission. Going back to the example we

23:57

saw of stopping this, of generating that

24:01

purchase of shares, the one that buys the 10 that

24:04

buys the 40, you will have 50. If instead of

24:07

buying 10,

24:10

the 10 that buys the one that has the 40,

24:13

buys one that has the 20, with the two you

24:16

would have 30, you would not have the obligation

24:18

to notify, but if that 30 implies that

24:22

in the last three fiscal years there is

24:25

a turnover that I know of of at

24:29

least 750 million, this obligation arises.

24:37

The important thing to note is that the notification does not

24:41

imply that the commission must approve,

24:43

authorize, or issue

24:46

any ruling regarding the

24:47

transaction subject to notification. This

24:50

circumstance is expressly foreseen

24:53

for

24:55

monopolistic concentration operations, which we will now

24:57

examine. The law also does not establish

25:00

the purpose of this notification, nor does it

25:03

impose on the commission the

25:05

obligation to keep the information

25:08

obtained confidential.

25:10

Similarly, the

25:12

confidentiality of the obligation is covered

25:15

by the

25:18

administrative regulatory authority, specifically Article

25:22

8. This article addresses four cases of the

25:24

notification obligation established by

25:26

Article 7. We saw, for example,

25:29

situations where the operation aims to

25:31

acquire debt securities without

25:33

voting rights, or when the operation

25:35

involves a business venture or is in a

25:38

situation of economic and financial crisis.

25:41

As I just mentioned, Article 9

25:44

regulates prior authorization; here, it is not

25:48

a notification but rather an

25:49

authorization to concentrate.

25:52

Monopolistic actions, that is, those by virtue

25:55

of which a

25:56

de facto monopoly is generated,

25:59

require communication that is indispensable for

26:01

carrying out the operation

26:04

and thus require a

26:07

pronouncement from the Commission for the

26:09

Promotion and Defense of Competition,

26:11

authorizing or not.

26:14

We see that the communications

26:16

in Article 7 do not aim to

26:19

obtain consent

26:23

from the implementing body, that is, the

26:25

Commission for the Promotion and Defense of

26:27

Competition, whereas those in

26:29

Article 9, regarding de facto monopolies, do. A de facto

26:33

monopoly is a

26:35

factual market situation in a certain

26:38

sector of activity characterized by the

26:41

existence of a single supplier of a

26:43

good or service who does not possess

26:46

any prerogative or

26:49

real right that prevents any

26:52

third party from entering the same sector and

26:55

competing.

26:58

The difference between a

27:00

de facto monopoly and a de jure monopoly,

27:01

which constitutes the establishment of

27:04

rights by provision of

27:06

law, is that it attributes to a supplier

27:09

the exclusive right to offer a

27:12

certain good or service.

27:15

Therefore, for de facto monopolies

27:17

that require this pronouncement from

27:20

the Commission, it is understood that the lack of a

27:23

pronouncement... The Commission for the

27:25

Promotion and Defense of Competition's decision

27:27

within 90 days of

27:30

notification implies

27:33

tacit authorization for the operation in

27:36

question. In other words, if 90

27:38

days have passed and the opinion is not expressly issued, it is

27:41

understood as approval to carry out the

27:45

operation. Therefore, we return to the fact that

27:49

the law

27:51

regulates and establishes all these

27:54

particular

27:57

activities of the Commission for the

28:00

Promotion and Defense of Competition,

28:01

which is a decentralized body of the

28:04

Ministry of Economy and Finance.

28:06

Starting with Article 21, you can

28:09

see all this regulation, how it is structured,

28:11

and what its specific duties are. I

28:17

refer you to the reading from

28:20

Article 21 onwards regarding the entity

28:23

and the procedure. From

28:26

Article 11 of the law, the

28:29

procedure for investigating

28:31

prohibited conduct or practices is established. This

28:34

procedure is the responsibility of

28:36

the Commission for the Promotion and Defense of

28:38

Competition, and what is established is the

28:41

possibility of adopting

28:43

preparatory measures, such as requesting

28:46

information, before initiating an

28:48

investigation. Evidentiary

28:50

measures can also be requested judicially.

28:51

The law regulates the

28:54

investigation itself, whether... Whether

28:57

initiated ex officio or by complaint,

29:00

the enforcement agency is also authorized to

29:02

request

29:05

precautionary measures through the courts, including

29:08

the preventive cessation of the

29:11

conduct.

29:14

A particular feature is that

29:17

all economic agents and all

29:20

persons are obligated to collaborate with the

29:22

enforcement agency by providing all information

29:25

about themselves or their sector of

29:28

activity. The only exception

29:30

to this obligation is when

29:34

that information is protected by

29:36

industrial or commercial secrets. At the

29:39

end of the procedure, if the

29:43

enforcement agency concludes that the

29:45

analyzed conduct is prohibited, it

29:48

may sanction the agents

29:51

who carry it out. These possible sanctions

29:54

are outlined in Article 17, as

29:58

amended by Law 19.300,

30:02

Article 205, and range from

30:06

warnings to

30:09

very high fines. Furthermore,

30:15

Article 19 stipulates that these fines can be applied not only

30:18

to the economic agent but

30:22

also to directors, administrators, or

30:25

representatives who actively

30:28

participated in the

30:30

anticompetitive conduct, or to the

30:33

controlling company of the offender. The

30:35

sanctions apply not

30:38

only to the individual who committed the

30:41

act but can also be extended to

30:44

members of the

30:45

governing bodies or representatives who

30:48

actively participated. This

30:52

procedure is established in

30:54

Law 18.159. I hope I've been clear,

31:00

but it covers all the topics

31:03

developed in the slides and goes into

31:06

greater depth so you

31:07

can access this material.

31:12

What I reiterate is important is

31:15

reading Law 17.250 on

31:21

Consumer Protection and Law 18.159

31:27

on Competition. You need to

31:29

read these

31:31

articles we just reviewed in detail to

31:34

understand these topics. I also

31:37

reiterate that they are also covered

31:39

in this book, as we saw from

31:43

pages 46 and 47 onwards, the section on companies, and from

31:46

page 259

31:51

onwards, you have everything

31:53

related to competition,

31:55

unfair competition, and the regulatory framework for

31:57

consumers. If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me at my email address, and

32:00

the slides will be available. I

32:02

wish you much

32:05

success. Goodbye.

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