A Compendium on the Soul by Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā) | Complete (Human-Read) Audiobook with Text

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Ibn Sina, known in the West as Avicenna, remains one of the most prominent figures of the Islamic Golden Age,

celebrated for his lasting contributions to philosophy, science, and medicine.

His works, particularly The Canon of Medicine and his extensive writings on the nature of the soul and the universe,

have profoundly influenced both Islamic and Western intellectual traditions.

While some of his ideas sparked significant debate among Muslim scholars and

theologians—especially his interpretations of metaphysical

concepts—his thought continues to be a cornerstone of philosophical and scientific inquiry,

embodying a bold synthesis of rationalism and spirituality.

We are dedicated to fostering a rich intellectual environment by sharing the works of diverse and impactful thinkers.

Our commitment lies in presenting ideas that inspire,

and deepen our collective understanding of the world and the human journey.

INTRODUCTION

In the Name of GOD, the Merciful, the Compassionate: May GOD bless our Lord Muhammad and his Kinsfolk,

and give them peace. O my God facilitate [this undertaking]; and make [it] end in good, O Thou Bounteous Being!

Abu-´Aly, Ibn Sînâ, the chief elder, learnèd and erudite leader, the precise and accurate researcher,

Truth’s plea against mankind, the physician of physicians,

the philosopher of Islâm, may the Most High GOD have mercy upon him, saith:—

The best of beginnings is that which is adorned with praise to the Giver of strength for praising Him;

and for invoking blessing and peace upon our Lord Muhammad, His prophet and servant,

and upon his good and pure offspring after him. And after this beginning, he saith further:—

Had not custom given leave to the small and low to reach up to the great and high,

it would be most difficult for them ever to tread those paths in going over

which they need to lay hold of their upholding arm and seek the help of their superior strength;

to attain to a position in their service, and join themselves to their social circle;

to pride themselves on having become connected with them, and openly declare their reliance upon them.

Nay, the very bond which joins the common man to the man of élite would be severed,

and the reliance of the flock upon its shepherd would cease; the frail would no longer become powerful through the strength of the mighty,

nor the low-born rise through the protection and countenance of the high-born;

the foolish would not be able to correct his folly and ignorance by intercourse with the prudent and wise;

nor the wise draw nigh to the ignorant and foolish.

And whereas I find that custom has trod along this highroad, and prescribed this usage,

I avail myself of such a precedent and excuse to warrant my reaching up and aspiring to the Prince,

GOD give him long life, with an offering [an acceptable present];

and I have given prevalence to the thought that my choice ought to fall upon an object

which will at once be most acceptable to him,

and best calculated to attain my aim of ingratiating myself into his favor;

and this, after coming to the certain conclusion that the chief virtues are two,

namely 1. Love of wisdom as to the Articles of Faith, (i.e., Love of Philosophy in theoretical principles);

and 2. Choice of the most honest of deeds as to intention

(i.e., the preference of pure purposes in practical life).

And in this connection I find the Prince, God prolong his days,

to have given to his intrinsically worthy character so much of the polish

and lustre imparted by wisdom that he far outstrips his rivals among the princes,

and overtops all such as are of his kind.

And hence I clearly perceive that of all presents the one he will appreciate most is such

as conduces to the most precious of the virtues, to wit wisdom. I had, however,

so far profitted from a careful perusal of the books of the learnèd as to find their researches

into the spiritual faculties among the most abstruse and refractory against the mind’s grasping what they mean,

and the most bewildering, obscure and misleading as to their results.

And yet I have seen it reported about a number of wise men (philosophers)

and pious saints that they agree in this dictum (motto), viz:

“Whoso Knoweth himself, Knoweth his Lord”; and I have also heard the Chief of the Philosophers say,

in agreement with their saying: “Whoso faileth to Know himself,

is still more likely (apt) to fail of Knowing his Creator”;

and “How shall he, who is trusted as a reliable authority in a science,

be deemed to have any views at all, when he is ignorant of himself?”

I see further the Book of the Most High GOD pointing to the measure of truth of this,

where He says, when mentioning the distance separating the Erring from His mercy: Surah 59,

al-Hashr, v. 19: “they forgot God, and He made them forget themselves”;

is not His making the forgetting of self to depend upon forgetting Him done

so as to awaken the attention to His closely binding the remembrance of Him with the remembrance of self,

and the knowledge of Him with the knowledge of self, scilicet of one’s own soul?

Furthermore, I have read in the books of the ancients that the hard task of going deeply into the knowledge

of self had been enjoined upon them by an oracle

that had descended upon them at one of the temples of the gods,

which says: “Know thyself, O man, so shalt thou know thy Lord.”

I have also read that this saying was engraved in the façade of the temple of Aesculapius,

who is known among them as one of the prophets,

and whose most famous miracle is that he was wont to heal the sick by mere loud supplication;

and so did all priests who performed sacerdotal functions in his temple.

From him have philosophers got the science of medicine.

Thus I have thought fit to make for the Prince a book on the soul, in the form of a compendium;

and I ask the Most High God to prolong his life, to keep intact from the evil eye his frail and mortal body,

to refresh through him wisdom after its fading, to revive it after its languishing,

to renew its might through his might, and to give it length of days through length of days to him,

in order that by his prestige the advantages accruing from the prestige of its kin shall become all-embracing,

and that the number of the seekers after its fullness shall abound.

Nor shall I achieve this my ambition save through God: He is my all-sufficient stay,

and best helper. I have arranged the Book in sections, ten in all:—

SECTION FIRST

To Establish the Existence of the Spiritual Faculties, the Detailed Analysis of which I have undertaken.

Whoso wishes to describe anything whatsoever before proceeding to establish first its reality of existence,

such a one is counted by the wise among those

who deviate from the broad beaten track of perspicuous statement. It is incumbent upon us,

therefore, to first set to work to establish the existence of the spiritual powers,

before starting to define each one of them singly, and enlarge upon it.

And whereas the most peculiar characteristics of spiritual properties are

two—one of them Setting in Motion (Impulsion), and the other Perception—it is incumbent upon us to show

that to every moving body there is amoving cause (ground, reason, motive, pretence).

Then it will become evident to us therefrom that bodies moving in motions over and above the natural

motions—an example of natural motions is the sinking of the heavy, and the rising of the

light—have moving causes, which we call souls or spiritual powers;

and that we further show that any body, in so far as it shows signs (traces)

that it is perceptive, such perception by it cannot be validly ascribed to its body,

except because of powers (faculties) in it that are capable of perception.

We now start by saying that not a shadow of doubt or perplexity hampers the mind, as to things,

that some of them share some one thing in common, and differ in an other;

and that that which is shared in common is other than that in which they differ.

The mind encounters all bodies whatsoever as having this in common, viz.

that they are bodies; and afterwards it encounters them as differing in that they move

(in different ways); otherwise there would be no such thing as rest of a body,

and not even such a thing as motion of a body, except along a circle,

seeing that of motion in a straight line it is established by its very form

that it will not proceed save from stoppings and to stoppings (resting-places to resting-places).

Hence it is evident that bodies are not to be clothed with the attribute of motion because they are bodies,

but for reasons (causes) above and beyond their corporeity,

from which causes their motions proceed, like the resulting of the footprint from the walker

(or, just as the effect proceeds from the agent). So much having become clear to us,

we say that we find, among bodies generated from the Four Elements, such as moves,

not by constraint, in two kinds of motion between which there is more or less difference:

The one kind inherent in its element by reason of the supremacy over it of the power of one of its constituents,

and thus decreeing its motion towards the position in space naturally appointed for it,

as for example a man’s moving by the nature of the preponderating heavy element in his body downwards;

nor will this kind of the motions of bodies be found to take place save

in one direction and with a constant tendency;

The second kind of motion going against the decree of its element,

which decree is either rest in the natural position as soon as it reaches that position,

as for example a man’s moving his body along its natural home which is the Earth’s surface;

or else a moving away from the natural position when already separated from it,

like a flying bird’s motion with its heavy body high up through the sky.

It has thus been made manifest [to the reader] that the two motions have two accounting causes,

and that they are quite different one from the other: the one is called Natural,

and the second called Soul or Spiritual Faculty. Hence it is quite sound,

as to motion, to affirm the existence of spiritual faculties.

Whereas, in respect of Perception, because that bodies exist with this in common,

viz. that they are bodies, and with this in distinction, viz.

that they are repeatedly perceptive, it is quite manifest by the first (preceding)

process of discrimination that perception will not ever differ from bodies through difference of their substance,

but by certain powers or faculties borne within those bodies.

It therefore becomes quite clear by this sort of exposition

that spiritual faculties have an existence: and this is what we wished to demonstrate.

SECTION SECOND

Of the Division of the Spiritual Faculties and their Classification into Three Main Classes,

and the Definition of the Soul in a General Way.

SUB-SECTION A:

It has been clearly shown by us in the foregoing that of things there are some

which have one thing in common and differ in an other, in that the one in common is other than the one differed in.

Then we found compound ensouled bodies—I mean possessing

souls—to have agreed and differed in the properties both of their impulsion and their perception.

As to impulsion, they agree and differ, in that one and all of them has in common that they move in quantity the motion of growth;

and they differ, in that one sett among them moves,

together with that growth, in local motions according to the will;

and one other sett among them does not so move, such as plants.

Likewise living beings have in common that they are both sentient and perceptive,

up to a certain sort of sensuous perception; and then afterwards they differ in that one sett among them perceives,

together with that sort of sensuous perception, by intellectual perception;

and one other sett among them does not so perceive, such as the ass and the horse.

We further found the power of impulsion to be more widely embracing than the power of perception,

in that we found plants to lack the latter utterly. Hence we knew for certain that the faculty in which the animal agrees

with the plant is more general than this perceptive faculty,

and than the impelling faculty which is in the animal; and each one of them is more general than the speaking

(rational) faculty, which belongs to man. Thus then,

the spiritual faculties come forth (or stand out) before us set and ranged,

in respect of the common and the peculiar, i.e., according to the general and special,

under three classes or ranks: The first of which is known as the plant or vegetable power,

on account of the participation therein of the animal and plant; The second is known as the animal power;

The third, as the speaking power, or rational faculty.

Therefore, the primary parts of the soul, in contemplating it from the standpoint of its powers, are three.

SUB-SECTION B:

To treat now of the definition of the Soul at large, I mean the universal,

absolute, generic soul. This will become apparent,

according to the tenets I hold, that among truths that are plainly manifest one is

that every one of all natural bodies is compounded of “hyle” I mean matter,

and of form. As for hyle, one of its properties is that through it a natural body is affected

(or acted upon) in its very self; seeing that the sword, for instance,

does not cut through its iron, but through its sharpness, which is its form;

whereas it gets jagged owing to its iron, and not owing to its form.

Another of those properties is that bodies do not differ through it, I mean through the hyle;

for earth does not differ from water through its matter, but through its form.

Still another property is that it—the hyle or matter—does not afford (supply,

furnish) natural bodies their characteristics peculiarly belonging to them,

save potentially; since in man, e.g., his humanity—his being

man—is not actually derived from the four elements, save potentially.

As for the form, its peculiarity is 1.o that through it bodies put forth their actions

(or perform their manifold deeds and workings); since a sword does not cut through its iron, but through, its sharpness;

and 2.o that bodies differ one from the other only through their genus or kind,

I mean the form, since earth does not differ from water save through its form,

whereas in its matter it does not; and 3.o that natural bodies get

(derive, acquire) their being what they in fact are from the form,

since as to man, his being a man (his humanity) is in fact through his form,

and not through his matter, which is of the four elements. Let us proceed a little further,

and we shall say that a live body is a natural compound body that discriminates the non-living through its soul,

and not through its body; and that performs multifarious animal works through its soul,

and not through its body; and is alive through its soul and not through its body;

and its soul is within it. Now, what is within a thing, while this form of its continues,

is its form [or, this its form being so and not otherwise, is etc.].

Thus then the soul is a form; and forms are realized perfections

(enteléchia), since through them the features (identities,

characteristics) of things become perfect. The soul, therefore is a perfection

(realized identity). And perfections (enteléchias) come under two divisions:

either the principles underlying the doings and their effects, or the very doings and effects themselves.

The one of the two divisions is first, and the other is second. The first is the principle

(or source and origin), and the second is the doing and the effect (or trace).

In this sense the soul is a first perfection (or prime actuality); for it is a principle

(source), not an outcome of a principle (source). And of perfections,

there are such as belong to bodies, and such as belong to incorporeal substances.

In this sense the soul is a prime perfection attaching to a body. And among bodies, there are such as are artificial,

and such as are natural. Now the soul is not a perfection of an artificial body;

hence it is a prime perfection attaching to a natural body.

Again, among natural bodies there are such as perform their multifarious workings through organs

(tools, instruments), and such as do not perform their workings through organs

(tools); as, for example the simple bodies, and those acting through the prevalence

(constraint) of the simple forces. In other words we may say, if we like,

that among natural bodies there are those whose design is, among other things,

that they produce of themselves [whose task or business is to perform animal acts voluntarily,

of their own will,] manifold animal actions;

and there are those whose design is, among other things, not so to produce. Hence again,

the soul is not a perfection attaching to the two last divisions in both the foregoing manners of statement.

Therefore its full and finished definition is to say that— It is a prime perfection

(consummation, realization) attaching to an organic natural body; and, if we wish,

to say further, a prime perfection attaching to a natural body having a life potentially

(a first, perfection belonging to a natural body which body may have life);

that is to say, a source of the manifold animal actions potentially

(it is the source and origin of the deeds done by such beings as may be alive).

Thus then we have divided (described) the generic soul, and defined it—which is what we had undertaken.

SECTION THIRD

To Establish that not One of the Faculties of the Soul Originates out of a Combination

(Blending) of the Elements, but on the contrary Comes upon Them from Outside.

All the various things that are, however composite they may be,

and whatever form may have come about in the compound, will be

(a) either inclining towards some one of the forms of the simples,

or else will not be so. And if they be not so inclining, they will be

(b) either resulting from an aggregate (or mean) of the forms of the simples,

according to the degree of disproportion and deviation of the constituents from equality,

or else (c) they will not be assimilated to any one of the simples, but there will be made

(generated, produced) a form exceeding the requirement of the forms of the simples,

both in regard to the measure of its simplicity and in regard to the measure of its complexity.

An example of the first division is the bitterish taste on compounding aloe,

which is overpoweringly bitter, and honey, which is feebly sweet.

An example of the second division is the color grey, holding an equal relationship to both of the extremes

(contrasts) blackness and whiteness, which results on compounding a white and a black opposite.

An example of the third of the said divisions is the seal’s stamp (imprint) remaining in the clay

(mortar, putty) which is composed of dry dust and liquid water on their being mixed up together;

for it is known that the imprint remaining in the putty is not in pursuance to the requirement of the forms of the simples,

neither whether they be considered in respect of the resultant compound,

nor whether they be considered in respect of the simple constituents taken singly.

To recapitulate:—it is known that the first division, if it be produced,

from simples whose forms are opposed (contrary) not through mechanical mixture (commingling)

but through blending (alloy, amalgam)—it is clear I say in such cases

that the overpowered contraries will no longer have an existence of their own,

nor an existence of the effects peculiar to them,

because of the impossibility of two contraries working together in one and the same carrier (medium),

but the utmost effects they can exert will be to introduce a decrease in the strength of the overpowering constituent,

and nothing more; and it is known that the second division, in what proportions soever it be found,

imposes reciprocity and equality both passive and active,

that is to say the manifold workings that the forms of the simples necessarily exert and the corresponding effects

that these forms suffer mutually one from the other must of necessity be reciprocal,

and in the ratio of their respective proportions and strengths; and lastly,

it is known that the third division, if it comes about, will not have resulted from the intrinsic

(very) self of the compound, since it in no way at all belongs to it,

neither in consideration of its simple nor of its composite form.

Hence it is gained (got, acquired) from without. It is now necessary,

since we have prefixed these premisses, that we go deeper into our pursuit, so we say:—

That the soul has only come forth [for us through the foregoing contemplations] in compound bodies

whose forms are opposed and in none others; nor will its manifestation in them be devoid

(divested) of one of the three divisions; but it is not of the first division;

else it is heat or coldness, dryness or moisture (dampness),

in any of which soever a decrease has more or less come about;

and how shall any one of these powers be fit to put forth from itself multifarious psychical deeds,

given the fact of the decrease (defect) occasioned in the very composition,

and given also what it would have expended in that decrease out of its strength?

nay, how shall any one of these powers cause motion save towards one direction alone?

and wherefore has it become necessary to effect mutual exclusion (displacement)

among psychical movements so that their mutual exclusion (displacement)

shall engender a dullness (or weariness), since in the effect (influence)

of one identical thing there does not arise exclusion;

nor is it of the second division, since the existence of the second division is an impossibility,

and this because the elements, however much they may be compounded, under

(proportionate) equality of the powers, this necessitates in them the stoppage

(cessation) of all the effects attaching to each one of the two,

and thus if the compound were left alone (abandoned to itself) it would never have to move,

neither upwards—else the heat is the overpowerer and the cold is the one overpowered—nor

downwards—else the cold is the overpowerer and the heat is the one

overpowered—nay nor even would it remain at rest in one of the four spots of space

(wherein dwell all the four elements)—else Nature which attracts towards itself is the overpowerer

therein—whereas it has been asserted that all of them are equal both to overpower and to be overpowered,

and this is a contradiction: Therefore this body (such a body) is neither still nor

moving,—whereas every body which is surrounded by another body is either still or

moving,—and this too is a contradiction;

and what leads to contradiction is itself a contradiction;

so then our assertion that the elements may possibly be compounded under equality of the powers is a contradiction,

and hence its opposite, to wit our saying that such is impossible,

is true [reduction ad absurdam]. Wherefore the coming forth of the soul,

i.e., its combination with body, occurs only after the method of the third division;

and it has been already said that what is after the method of the third division is gained from outside:

The soul then is got from without—which is what we wished to show.

SECTION FOURTH

Specification of the Vegetable (Plant) Powers, and Mention of the Need there is for Each One of Them.

Souled bodies, I mean having souls, if considered from the side of their vegetable powers,

are found to have in common the getting of nourishment, and to differ in growth and generation

(reproduction of offspring); since, among nourishment-taking beings, there are such as do not grow,

for example a living individual that has reached full growth and the period of stand still,

or that has declined therefrom through withering. Yet every growing thing gets nourishment.

Again, among nutriment-taking beings there are such as do not propagate,

as seeds that are not yet harvest-ripe, and an animal that has not yet reached puberty.

Nevertheless, every propagating thing has inevitably passed through a preceding stage of nutrition;

nor will the state (stage) of propagating ever be deprived of nutrition.

Further, we find them, beside having the getting of nourishment in common, to have growth also in common,

but to differ in the propagation (of offspring) since there are, among growing things,

such as do not beget, as an animal not yet arrived at puberty, and the worm.

Nevertheless every begetter has already passed through a period of growth; nor will the state

(stage) of begetting be deprived of the power of giving growth [to the young that are being produced].

Hence the vegetable powers are three: 1. the nutritive; 2. the growth promoting;

and 3. the propagating. Of these the nutritive is as the starting-point;

the propagating as the aim and end; and the growth-promoting as the means binding the end to the starting-place.

Indeed the souled body stands in absolute need of these three powers for the following reasons:

Whereas the Divine Command came down upon Nature enjoining (imposing)

upon her the task of forming a compound living being out of the four elements

after such wise fashion as they called for in it;

and whereas Nature of herself is unable to originate a souled body at one stroke,

but can do so only by promoting its growth little by little;

and whereas an individual that is put together after the manner of animal composition is susceptible

of being again decomposed and melting away by the natures of its constituents;

and whereas a thing composed of opposites will not keep up

so protracted a duration and last so long a time as is expected of

it—therefore Nature is in want of a power by which she can fabricate a living body by promotion of growth;

so she has been supplied by Divine Providence with the growth-giving power;

and is in want of a power whereby she can preserve the souled body at an even standard over against the waste

which it undergoes in making up for what disintegration wears away from it;

so she has been succoured by Divine Providence with the nutritive power;

and is in want of a power that shall mould, out of the living natural body, a piece that she shall dwell in,

in order that if corruption permeate the body it shall have sought for itself a successor as a substitute,

whereby to arrive at the preservation of species;

so she has been helped by the Divine Providence with the propagating (generating) power.

And we ought, in this connection, to bear in mind as a certain and true fact that the growth-giving power,

although it has been found, from the standpoint that we have mentioned, to be following close upon the nutritive,

and the propagating (generating) to be following close upon the growth-imparting

(promoting), yet the precedence of the part played by each one of the three,

in their undertaking the task of creating the living body

and preserving it through their special and peculiar workings, is the other way about;

for the first to enthrall the material predisposed to receive life is the generating

(procreating, propagating) power, since this power clothes the material at first with the form

(prototype) of that which is intended to be realized through the ministry

(service) of the growth-promoting and nutritive powers;

and as soon as it has achieved in that material a perfect form it delivers over the sway to the growth-promoting power,

which assumes it through the ministry (service) of the nutritive power, and imparts to the

material—all the time keeping up the form of the material within the due proportions of the [three] dimensions [length,

breadth and thickness]—a motion (activity) of growth towards the end striven after by it,

the growth-promoting power aforesaid. Then this latter stops;

and the nutritive power enthralls the material. Again, the generating

(propagating) power is the one served, not the servant;

and in comparison with it, the nutritive power is the servant, not the one served.

Thus too the growth-promoting power is served in one sense, and serving in an other sense.

And the nutritive power, although it does not exist as the one served in the spiritual powers,

yet it does sometimes employ the four forces of Nature—to wit,

the attracting, the holding, the digesting, and the excreting (repelling).

And, even as that which is striven after in the process of form-making is solely the bringing about of the [due] form in matter in the shape

(kind, design) proposed, and not at all the bringing about of growth or of

nutrition,—only that there is need for the two latter for the sake of realizing the desired form,

and not the converse—so also the final aim in the [several] powers is the procreating

(propagating) power, to the exclusion of the growth-promoting and of the nutritive.

Wherefore, the procreating power is given precedence for a teliological reason.

And through God is fitness to be achieved.

SECTION FIFTH

Specification of the Animal Powers, and Mention of the Need there is for Each One of Them.

I affirm that every animal is sentient, and hence it moves itself at will, in some sort of motion;

and that every animal moves itself in some sort of motion at will, and hence it is sentient;

since sensation in what does not move itself at will is wasted and useless,

and the lack of it in what does move itself at will is harmful;

whereas Nature, owing to that much of Divine Providence as has been joined to her,

gives nothing whatever that is either wasted or harmful, nor witholds either the necessary or the useful.

Perhaps some one may speak out here and object to us that shellfish are of such as feel

(are sentient) and yet do not move themselves at will.

This objection, however, will speedily vanish on experiment; for shellfish,

although they do not move themselves from their places in a sort of organic (mechanical) locomotion at will,

yet they do more or less shrink themselves up and spread out inside of their shells,

as I have witnessed with mine own eyes on having tried the experiment more than once,

in that I turned the shell over onto its back,

so that its position for drawing nourishment became separated from the ground;

whereupon it ceased not to struggle until it had again stood in a position

that made it easy for it to draw in nourishment from the muddy bottom.

And now that this has become surely certain for us, we shall further say:

That whereas Divine Wisdom has decreed that an animal moving itself at will shall be composed of the four elements,

and as such animal would not be secure against the evils of mishaps in its successive change of places during locomotion,

it has been fitted out with the touching power (sense of touch),

so as to flee through it from unfit places, and seek those that are fit.

And whereas any such animal’s constitution (make-up) cannot get on without the getting of nourishment;

and as its gaining its food is a sort of free will effort; and as some articles of food suit it,

and others do not,—it has been fitted out with the tasting power (sense of taste).

These two powers (senses) are both useful and necessary in life: the rest are useful,

not necessary. Next after the Tasting, in degree of utmost need for it,

comes the Smelling Sense, since odors will point the animal towards suitable articles of nourishment,

with a strong indication; nor will the animal be at all able to get on without nourishment,

neither will its nourishment be got by it save through self-help.

So Divine Providence has deemed fit to impart the smelling power unto most animals.

The next after the smelling power in usefulness is the Seeing Power:

the How and Why of its usefulness, as to the animal, which moves itself at will,

is that whereas its betaking itself to certain spots, such as fire-hearths,

and away from certain spots, such as mountain peaks and seashores, is such as will lead to its hurt,

therefore Divine Providence has deemed fit to impart the seeing power unto most animals.

The next after the seeing power in usefulness is the Hearing Power.

The How and Why of its usefulness is that things harmful and things useful may often be recognized as such,

through it, by the peculiarity of their sounds and voices;

so Divine Providence has deemed fit to impart the hearing power unto most animals.

Moreover, the use made of this power by the rational (speaking)

species of the animal genus almost surpasses the three [—is of all three nearly the highest].

This then is an outline of the How and Why of the uses of the Five Outward (External)

Senses. And whereas trustworthy arrival at a knowledge of the mutually suitable

and the mutually repellent will come about only through test (experiment, experience),

Divine Providence has deemed fit to impart the peculiar participating property

(or sense)—I mean the picturing power—unto living beings (animals),

in order that they shall through it preserve the forms of things perceived by the senses;

and to impart the remembering preserving power, in order that they shall through it preserve the meanings

(significances) conceived out of things perceived by the senses;

and to impart the imaginative power in order that they shall through it fit up (restore)

what shall be wiped out from the memory by a sort of motion; and to impart the conjecturing

(surmising) power in order that they shall through it fix upon the sound

(true) and the weak (false) of what the imagination extracts,

namely to fix upon the true and false thereof with more or less presumption of certainty,

until they [the living beings] shall review it in the mind. As for the How and Why of need for the moving power,

it is that whereas the position of the animal is not the same as the position of the plant in its adaptation

for attracting such foods as are useful and pushing off such as are harmful and incompatible,

but on the contrary as this is brought about for the animal through a sort of earning by self-help,

it needs a moving power for the purpose of drawing to itself the useful and driving away the harmful.

Wherefore all the powers of the animal are either perceiving or motion-promoting.

The motion-promoting is the yearning (desiderative, longing, craving) power:

it is either urging on to the search after a chosen object of animal good,

and then it is the lusting power; or else it is urging on to the warding off of an object of animal dislike,

and then it is the hating power (angry power). The perceiving power too is either outward

(apparent), such as the five senses; or else inward (internal, hidden),

such as the picturing, the imaginative, the conjecturing, and the remembering power.

Furthermore, the motion-promoting power does not cause to move save on a peremptory bidding from the conjecturing,

through the agency (means) [or by the employment] of the imaginative.

Also, the motion-promoting power, in animals other than the speaking

(or rational) species, is the aim and end; and this is so,

because the motion-causing power is not imparted unto them in order that they shall through it direct aright the workings

of sensation and imagination so as to adapt these workings to the attainment of their own good,

but on the contrary the power of sensation and of imagination are imparted

to the non-speaking irrational animals solely in order to direct aright through them the workings of motion,

and to adapt these workings to the good of the animals.

Whereas, the speaking rational species of living beings is on the reverse wise;

because unto it was imparted the motion-causing power wholly

and solely in order that through this power it shall be fitted to set aright the speaking self,

i.e., the rational intelligent soul, not the other way about. Thus then,

the motion-promoting power in the irrational animal is, as it were, the prince commander that is served;

the five senses, the spies that are sent forth; the perceptive power,

the post-master of the prince commander unto whom the spies return;

the imagining power, the foot-messenger going to and fro between the post and the post-master;

the conjecturing power, the prince’s adjutant minister; the remembering power,

the closet of state papers. As for the starry firmament and plants,

the feeling power and the imagining power have not been imparted unto them,

even though each one of them has a soul and though it has life: the firmament has not these powers,

because of its loftiness; plants have them not, because of their abasement in comparison to it.

SECTION SIXTH

Treating in Detail of the Five Senses, and of How they perceive.

As to the seeing power, philosophers have differed on the question of How they perceive.

Thus one set among them asserts that they perceive wholly

and solely through a ray that shoots out beyond the eye,

and so encounters the sensible objects that are seen. This is Plato’s way.

Others assert that the perceiving power itself encounters the sensible objects that are seen,

and so perceives them. Still others say that visual perception consists in

this:—When the intervening transparent body becomes effectively transparent by light shining upon it,

then an impression of the outspread (flattened) individual of such sensible objects as are seen

is effected in the cristalline lens of the eye,

just such a pictorial impression as is effected in looking-glasses

(mirrors); indeed the two effects are so similar that were mirrors possessed

of a seeing power they would perceive the form imprinted in them. This is Aristotle’s way;

and it is the sound reliable opinion. That Plato’s view is false, is quite clear.

For, were it true that a ray goes out from the seat of sight and encounters sensible objects,

then sight would be in no need of light, but would on the contrary perceive in the dark,

and would rather illuminate the air on its exit into the dark.

Moreover such a ray will not fail of one of two modes:

either it will subsist throughout the eye only, in which case Plato’s opinion that it goes forth from the eye is wrong;

or else it will subsist throughout a body other than the material of which the eye is composed;

for it must inevitably have a vehicle to carry it, seeing that a ray is an accidental quality or mode,

and furthermore seeing that that body which is other than the eye will not fail,

in its turn, of being, either, firstly, sent out from the eye,

in which case it will follow as a matter of course that the eye will not see all that is beneath the clear blue of the sky,

since one body will not penetrate throughout the whole of another body,

unless forsooth it moves the latter away and occupies its place;

and even should the disputer plead a vacuum, not only does Plato deny the existence of a vacuum utterly,

but also if we accomodatingly yield this point and admit the existence of a vacuum,

yet for all this the body that goes forth from the eye will penetrate throughout the body of water,

for example, into such of its pores as are empty only,

and not into the whole of the water’s bulk; so that even according to this opinion it will necessarily

so be that the eye will see only some places of all that is under water;—or else, secondly,

that body which is other than the eye will not fail of being an intervening body intermediate between the seer and the seen,

in which case the light which comes forth from the eye will subsist through it;

nevertheless this opinion too is unsound, for the reason that every thing whatsoever is,

in proximity to its source, so much the stronger, and in this respect light has not its equal;

whence it follows as regards the object seen that, however closely and nearly it approaches to the eye,

our perception will then be stronger; and thus if we do away with the intermediary body,

the eye will still perceive the object felt by its sense of sight,

and thus the intermediary which is the vehicle and carrier of light is no longer needed,

save accidentally (by chance); and then too there is no need, in order to see,

for an exit of light: this too is a falsehood. Wherefore Plato’s opinion is worthless.

As for such as hold that the perceiver of the thing seen is the imaginative power itself through the imprinting of the form

(image) of the sensible object upon it, these render the absent on the same footing as the present,

since in the imaginative power there may exist the image of a sensible object,

notwithstanding the absence afterwards of the object that had been so felt:

at which time however the living being so preserving that image will not be qualified with sight but with imagination and memory.

Furthermore these theorists (opiners) make a greater blunder still,

seeing that they render a thing of Nature’s make and composition wholly idle,

useless, and unneeded in the operation of visual perception;

inasmuch as in their opinion the imaginative power itself meets immediately sensible objects,

and thus spares Nature the task of adapting an instrument (organ), to wit the complex eye.

Wherefore the sound theory is that the configurations of things stand out in the transparent

ambient—if it be effectively transparent on the shining of a luminant upon

it—and hence they do not appear but in a polished body capable of receiving them,

such as mirrors and the like; and so too there is in the eye a crystalline lens (or humor)

into which the forms (pictures) of things are imprinted, just as their impression into mirrors;

and in it, i.e., the lens or the eye, has been fitted up the seeing power;

so that, if such forms are imprinted in it, it perceives them.

Moreover, the objects of perception belonging in truth and deed to sight are the Colors.

As for the Hearing Power: it hears only sound.

And sound is a motion of air that the ear feels on two hard smooth bodies coming quickly close up one to the other,

the escaping of the air from between them, its striking the ear,

and its moving the air that is kept ready within the instrument (organ) of hearing.

Thus, if this inside air move the instrument, and if this instrument’s motion act upon the nerve of hearing,

the hearing power (sense, faculty) perceives it in the measure of the strength or weakness of that motion.

Indeed hardness is a conditio sine qua non; for, in the case of two soft bodies,

the air will not escape from them, but will dissipate itself throughout their pores.

Smoothness too is just such a condition; because, in the case of rough (unsmooth) bodies,

not the whole of the air will escape from between them suddenly and violently, but will be witheld

(shut up) in the passages. And rapidity of contact also is a like condition;

for if it come about gently and slowly, the air would not escape violently.

The echo too will arise from the rebound of the air escaping from between the two encountering bodies by reason of its hitting

(slapping) against another hard, flat or hollow body filled with air,

because of the air that is within it hindering the penetration of the escaped air,

and the latter’s striking the ear [again] after the first stroke;

on the same wise as in the first instance. As to the Smelling Power;

it smells odors on the sniffing in of air that has received its odor from an odoriferous body,

as one body receives its warmth from another warm body.

Thus, if an animal snuffs up air like this into its nose until such air touches the front of the brain,

and alters it to its own odor, the smelling power feels it. As for Taste,

it arises only on the coming to pass of the following change: When the moisture of the tasting instrument

(organ)—to wit the tongue—becomes transformed into the juice of the newly-come food;

and when the mass of this instrument (organ) has received that juice,

the tasting power will perceive what has happened within the instrument. As for Touch:

it will only arise upon the organ’s (instrument’s) receiving the quality of that which is touched,

and upon the touching power’s perceiving what has been thus presented (offered) within the organ.

Furthermore, simple sensibles, that are at once primary and as such the bases of all others,

are in pairs, of which there are eight; and if we make each into singles,

they become sixteen, to wit:— 1. Touch,

four pairs:—1. heat and cold; 2. moisture and dryness; 3. roughness and smoothness;

4. hardness and softness. The four remaining senses, each having a pair, viz.,

2. Smelling, one pair, which is fragrant odour, and fetid stinking odour,

3. Tasting, one pair, viz., sweet and bitter, 4. Hearing, one pair,

namely, heavy sound and sharp sound (or dull and shrill), 5. (e) Sight,

one pair, to wit, white and black. All other sensibles are made up from these simples,

and are intermediates between some two of them, as for example grey

(dusty color) from white and black, lukewarm from hot and cold.

Moreover all sensibles are felt wholly and solely through a sort of gathering and sundering,

shrinking and spreading; except sounds, which are felt only through sundering.

Thus:— 1. [Warmth is felt through sundering] 2. Cold is felt through gathering 3. Moisture,

through spreading 4. Dryness, through shrinking 5. Roughness,

through sundering 6. Smoothness, through spreading 7. Hardness,

through repelling, which is a sort of gathering and shrinking 8. Softness,

through being repelled, which is not devoid of spreading and sundering 9. Sweetness,

through spreading, devoid of sundering 10. Bitterness,

through sundering and shrinking 11. Fragrant Odor,

through spreading, devoid of sundering 12. Stinking Odor,

through sundering and shrinking 13. Whiteness,

through sundering 14. Blackness, through gathering [15. and 16. Sounds:

one pair, as above under “d.”] As to the media (intermediaries)

between the feeling powers and the felt forms, they are themselves devoid of the forms of sensibles;

otherwise it would not be possible for them to be media, since their own forms—if they had

any—would then so engage the apposite power as to divert it from perceiving any other forms.

Such voidness or freedom from forms is either voidness wholly and altogether,

or else relative voidness through equableness of the forms in the media,

such as the equable proportion of the qualities touched in meat,

which is a medium between the touching power and the quality touched,

although meat is incontestably made up of qualities that are touched,

yet notwithstanding this the equableness of the qualities has annihilated the forms in it.

Examples of the first division—absolute voidness and freedom from form—are the freedom of air,

of water, and of what resembles them among the various media of sight, from color;

the freedom of air and of water, both which are the two mediums of smelling, from odor; the freedom of water,

which is the medium of tasting, from flavor; and the steadiness of the air, which is the medium of hearing,

and its freedom from motion. Further, each of these powers, to wit the five senses,

if actually functionating, perceives only through coming into relation with the object felt,

nay rather it only perceives at first so much as has been traced in it of the form of the object felt.

Thus, the eye only perceives that form which has imprinted itself in it of the object felt;

so also the remainder of the powers (or senses).

Again, in the case of strong wearying sensibles, such as a loud noise, a strong smell,

a shining and a flashing light, if they are repeated upon the organ (instrument),

spoil and dullen it through their overworking it. Again, each one of the five senses perceives,

through the means of its own rightful perception and besides the same, five other things,

to wit: 1. shape; 2. number; 3. size; 4. motion;

5. rest (quiet). That sight, touch, and taste perceive them, is evident.

As to hearing, it perceives, in accordance (pursuance) with the variety of the number of sounds,

the number of the sound-emitting objects; and, through the strength of the sounds,

it perceives the size of the two objects that are hitting against each other; and,

in accordance with a kind of change and fixedness of the sounds, it perceives motion and rest;

and, in accordance with their volume around the sound-emitter, be the latter solid or hollow,

it perceives some sorts of shapes. As to smelling, it knows,

in accordance with the change of directions whence the odors are emitted and reach it,

and through the variety of these odors in their qualities, it knows I say the number of the things smelt;

through the measure of abundance of the smells, the size of such things; through the measure of proximity and distance,

changeableness and fixedness, it recognizes their motion and their rest;

and, in accordance with the sides on which their odor reaches it from one and the same body,

it knows their shape. Still, these discriminations are very weak in this power among mankind,

owing to the weakness of the power itself in the human race. [For all this,

men have not the keen scent that many other animals have, and therefore such discriminations are in men very weak.]

SECTION SEVENTH

Dealing in Detail with the inward Senses, (and the Motion-Promoting Powers).

I. Not one of the outward senses unites within itself perception of color,

odor, and softness; and yet, we often come upon a body that is yellow,

and perceive at once so much about it, namely that it is honey, sweet,

nice of smell, and fluid, although we have neither tasted, nor smelt, nor even touched it;

whence it is manifest that we possess a power wherein are assembled the perceptions of the four senses,

and have thus become summed up in it into one single form;

and were it not for this power we should not know that sweetness, for instance, is other than blackness,

since the discriminator between two things is he who has known them both.

This is the power which is designated as the common-sense, and the picturing

(or representing) power. And were it one of the outward apparent senses,

its sway (dominion) would limit itself to the state of wakefulness only;

whereas ocular observation attests what is quite otherwise;

for this power does at times perform its action in both the states of sleep and wakefulness.

II. Furthermore, there is in animals a power

which sets up such forms as have assembled in the common-sense, discriminates between them,

and differentiates them, without the forms themselves disappearing from the common-sense.

And this power is undoubtedly other than the aforesaid picturing power;

since in the latter there are none but true (real) forms that have been acquired (obtained) from sense;

whereas in this power the case may be otherwise, and it may imagine and picture wrongly and falsely,

and what it had not received after such a [wrong and false] pattern (shape) from any one of the senses.

This power is the one named imagination. Further, there is in animals a power that passes judgment,

upon such or such a thing that it is so or not so, decisively,

and through which the animal flees away from shunned evil and seeks chosen good.

It is also evident that this power is other than the imaginative, since this last imagines

(pictures to itself) the sun, in accordance with what it has got from the apposite sense,

to be of the size of its disc; whereas the matter stands in this power quite otherwise.

So too the lion finds his prey from far off of the size of a small bird,

yet its form and size in no way perplex him, but he makes for it.

It is also evident that this power is other than the imaginative,

and this because the imaginative power performs its manifold deeds without belief

and conviction on its part that matters are in accordance with its imagining.

This power is what is named the conjecturing or the surmising faculty (or judgment).

III. Further, there is in living beings a power that preserves the purports

(or thoughts and conceptions) of what the senses had perceived, such as,

for instance, that the wolf is an enemy; the child, a darling next of kin.

Wherefore, so much at least if not more is evident, that this power is other than the common-sense

(or picturing), inasmuch as in the latter there are no forms but such as it has gained from the senses;

whereas, again, the senses did not feel the wolf’s enmity, nor the child’s love,

but alone the wolf’s image, and the child’s bodily shape; and as to love and fierceness,

it is the mind’s eye alone that has got them, and then stored them up in this power.

It is also clear that this power is other than the imaginative power,

for the reason that this last does at times imagine what is other than that which the mind’s eye has deemed right,

found true, and has derived from the senses; whereas the former power, i.e.,

the one here dealt with, imagines none other than what the mind’s eye has deemed right, has found true,

and has derived from the senses. This power is also other than the conjecturing

(surmising) power, for the reason that this last does not preserve what some other has deemed to be true,

but it of its own self deems to be true,

whilst the power here treated of does not itself pass judgment of truth or falsehood,

but only preserves what another has deemed to be true. This power is called memory,

the preserving or keeping faculty. Again, the imaginative power is called by this

name—imagination—if the conjecturing (or surmising) power alone use it:

and if the speaking (rational) power use it, it is called the thinking (cogitative) power.

The heart is the source (spring) of all these powers (faculties), in Aristotle’s opinion;

yet the sway over them is in different organs (instruments). Thus the sway over the outward

(apparent) senses is in their known organs; whereas the sway over the picturing

(representing common-sense) power is in the anterior hollow (ventricle) of the brain;

the sway over the imaginative, in the middle hollow thereof; the sway over the remembering,

in the posterior hollow thereof; and the sway over the conjecturing, throughout all the brain,

but above all in the compartment of the imaginative within the brain [or,

throughout the whole of the brain, but more especially alongside of the imaginative thereof].

And in so far as these hollows (ventricles) suffer harm and hurt,

so will the manifold workings of these powers suffer also; for were they,

(the powers,) standing independently, that is to say subsisting in themselves,

and efficient independently, that is to say putting forth their workings of themselves,

they would not need, for their proper and peculiar actions, any sort of instrument or organ:

in this wise one recognizes that these powers do not subsist in themselves,

but that the undying power is the Speaking (Reasoning) Soul, as we shall hereafter set forth;

yet for all this, the soul does maybe at times seek out for itself after a fashion

(so to speak) the purest quintessences of the kernels of these powers,

and cause them to exist of themselves, the setting forth of which shall, D.v., soon follow.

SECTION EIGHTH

A Sketch of the Human Soul from the Starting-Point whence it sets out

until the End-Point whither it reaches its Perfection. No doubt that the speaking

(rational) species of the [genus] animal is distinguished from the non-speaking (irrational species)

by a power, through which it is enabled to imagine things rational, which power is called the speaking

(rational) soul; and the custom has obtained of calling it the “hylik” mind,

that is to say the potential mind, thus likening it to the hyle,

which is potential matter. Moreover this power is found in the whole human species;

and it possesses in itself at the outset none of the mentally-grasped forms,

but these arise within it after two sorts of processes:

The first is through a Divine guidance, without effort of study,

and without profitting from the senses, as for example the mentally-grasped self-evident axioms,

like our conviction that the whole is greater than the part, and that two contradictories

(contrasts) do not come together at one time in one and the same thing;

so that sane-minded adults share equally in the acquisition of such forms.

The second sort of process is through earning [the mental thought or truth] by reasoning process,

and by array of proof and demonstration, such as the conception of logical truths,

like genera, species, differentia, and properties, simple terms,

and terms compounded in the various modes of compositions [of several ideas into one composite term],

justly-moded syllogisms both valid and false,

propositions which if moded into syllogisms lead to necessary demonstrated results,

or to argumentative probable results, or to equally balanced rhetorical results,

or to primary (axiomatical) sophistical results, or to impossible poetical results;

and such mentally-grasped forms as the recognition of the certainty of natural realities,

like hyle (primitive matter) and form, privation

(non-existence) and Nature, place and time, rest and motion,

bulky bodies of the sky-firmament and bulky elemental bodies,

absolute universal being and absolute nothingness, generation absolute and corruption absolute,

origen of things generated that are within the sky, that are within the deepest depths of mines,

and that are on the earth’s crust, amongst which last-named are plant and animal,

the true conception “Man” and the truth of the soul’s conception of its own self;

and still further such mentally-grasped forms as the conception of ideas mathematical,

amongst which are number, pure geometry, stellar geometry,

harmonical or musical geometry, optical geometry; and again,

further still, such ideas as the conception of divine affairs,

like the knowledge of the principles of the absolute self-existent in

so far as he exists per se, and of the principles consequently adhering to him,

such as potentiality, power and efficiency, first cause and accounting cause,

essence and accidens, genus and species, incompatibility and homogeneity,

agreement and disagreement, unity and multiplicity; and,

still further, the fixing of the principles of the speculative (theoretical)

sciences, amongst which are the mathematical, the natural and the

logical—all which cannot be attained save through this latter science; and still further,

such as proving the first Creator and the first Created, the universal (generic)

soul and how creation came about, the relative position of mind towards creation,

and the relative position of soul towards mind, the relative position of hyle towards nature,

and of forms towards the soul, the relative position of the skies, orbs,

planets and all existing things towards hyle and towards form,

and why and wherefore they differ so widely as they do as to forwards and backwards

([Greek: proteron kai hysteron: προτερον και ὑστερον]) of development;

and the knowledge of the divine government, universal nature, primal providence,

prophetic inspiration, the divine holy spirit, sublime angels,

attaining to the certainty of the Creator’s being beyond all partnership and similitude [i.e.

recognizing the truth that polytheism and anthropomorphism, are to be rejected];

and attaining to the knowledge of what rewards await the righteous, and what punishments impend the wicked,

of the delight and the pain overtaking souls after their abandoning the bodies.

Further, this power which conceives these ideas does at times gain from sense forms mental, imaginative,

and innate in (instinctive to) itself; and in such a case it does this in that it lays

before itself the forms that are in the conceiving power and in the remembering (preserving)

power, by employing the imaginative and the conjecturing power, and then contemplates them,

and finds them to have participated in some forms and to have differed in some other forms;

and finds some amongst the forms that are in these powers to be essential,

and others to be accidental. And as to their participation in forms,

it is like the participation of the form Richard and an ass, in the conceiver’s mind,

in the idea of Life; and the differing of the two in the idea of speaking (rational),

and non-speaking (brute). As to the essential form, it is e.g.

like the life that is in them both; as for the accidental, it is e.g.

like their blackness and whiteness. So that if we find the two aforesaid on this

wise—i.e., as stated,—[the mind] makes each one of these essential and accidental,

participated and peculiar forms, one universal mental form singly and alone,

and thus through this working-over process, it gets at mental genera,

species, differentia, properties, accidens;

then it combines these single notions into particular combinations;

then into syllogistic argumentative combinations and deduces from them corollaries from the

results—all which it gets through the service of the animal powers,

with the help of universal mind, after the manner that we shall set forth later on,

and through the intermediary of such necessary self-evident mental axioms as it has been endowed with.

Moreover this power, although it derives help from the sensuous power

when getting out single mental forms from the sensuous forms,

yet it does not need the sensuous power for conceiving these ideas (notions)

within itself and for setting up syllogisms out of them, neither when affirming,

nor when conceiving the two dicta [of abstraction & generalization],

as we shall afterwards explain. And to whatever extent it derives sensuous corollaries,

for which there shall be need, through the said working-over process,

yet it dispenses with the employment of the sensuous powers, nay it is even sufficient for and in itself,

for the carrying on of all its manifold activities.

And just as the sensuous powers perceive solely and wholly through an assimilation of that which is felt,

so also do the mental powers perceive solely through and wholly through an assimilation of the mentally-grasped;

and this assimilation is the abstraction of the form from matter,

and the adhering to it; only that the feeling power does not get the sensuous form

through willed motion and voluntary action on its part, but through the arrival of the very thing felt unto it,

either by chance or through the intermediary of the motion-promoting power, and laying bare of the forms unto it

(abstraction) through the help of the media that connect the forms with it; whereas,

in the case of the mental power, (Reason Understanding) this process is otherwise;

for by and through itself it at times does itself perform the abstraction (laying bare)

of the form from matter as often as it wills, and then clings unto it.

And for this reason it is said that the sentient power is more or less passive in its conception [or,

that the feeling power is after a fashion acted upon when it conceives],

and that the mental (understanding) power is active; nay rather it is said,

for this reason, that the sentient power cannot do without instruments (organs),

and has in itself no efficiency; and how is it possible to apply such a statement

(proposition) to the mental (understanding) power? The mind (Understanding, Reason)

is in fact and deed wholly and solely nothing else than the forms of mentally-grasped things,

if these be arrayed in the very mind potentially, and through it they are brought out to effective action;

and hence it is said that the mind is in fact and deed at once both understanding and understood.

Amongst the properties of the understanding power is this,

that it unifies the many and multiplies the one through analysis and synthesis.

As to multiplication, it is such as the analysis of one man into essence,

body, nourishment-getting, animal, speaking (rational).

As to unification of the many, it is such as the composition (synthesis)

of this one man out of essence, body, animal, speaking (rational)

into one notion which is mankind (human being). Moreover the mind,

although it applies its activity within a duration of time in arranging syllogisms,

through using reflection, yet the result itself, which this reflection obtains,

and which is the fruit of thought and the end sought after, is not dependant upon time,

nor is it obtained save at an instant; nay more than this,

the mind itself is wholly above and beyond all time. And the reasoning (speaking) soul,

if it engages itself upon the sciences, its activity is called mind or intellect,

and it is accordingly called speculative or theoretical mind: which I have already described.

And if it engages itself upon overcoming blameworthy powers, that entice unto wrongdoing through their excess,

unto folly through their abandonment, unto impetuosity through their agitation,

unto cowardice through their indifference or lukewarmness, or unto wickedness through their excitement,

or unto degeneration through their smouldering, and leads them over into the paths of wisdom,

endurance, chastity—in short unto righteousness, then its activity is called ruling or governing,

and it is accordingly called practical mind or reason. Again, the reasoning (speaking)

power is sometimes so fitted out in a few persons throughvigils and conjunction with the universal mind

as to be quite independent of taking refuge unto syllogistic argument and reflection,

but rather is sufficiently stored with inspiration and revelation

to render it wholly absolved from such ordinary means as mental ratiocination:

this peculiar property of the reasoning mind is called hallowedness or sanctity, and it is accordingly called Holy Ghost.

Unto such a favoured rank and degree none shall attain save prophets and apostles, upon whom be peace and blessing.

SECTION NINTH

in which the Proofs of the Essentiality of the Soul, and of Its Independence of Body in its Structure,

are set forth in pursuance of the Method of Logicians.

SUB-SECTION A:—

One of the logical proofs for establishing this Claim: Let us however first preface it with premisses,

among which are:— First Premiss: that man conceives universal (generic)

notions wherein a greater or less multitude participates, such as man at large, and animal at large.

And of these generic notions there are such as he conceives through a particular [or partial,

or an obligatory] synthesis, and there are such others of these generic notions as he does not conceive by any synthesis,

but singly and individually. And unless he shall have conceived the latter division

(class, sett), it is not possible for him to conceive the former.

Further, he conceives each one of these generic universal notions only under one form,

wholly stripped (abstracted) from all relationship to its concrete sensuous particulars,

since the particulars of each one of the generic notions are potentially endless [in variety and number] and no one of the

particulars has any right of priority over another particular in respect of

that one form of the generic notion. Second Premiss:

that a form, whatsoever body it detaches, reduces, and adorns,

and in general whatsoever individual of divisible things it so takes hold of,

it clothes the same and exactly fits the same in every one of its parts.

And whatsoever clothes and exactly fits a divisible thing in all its parts is itself divisible;

and hence every form that has clothed and exactly fitted any body whatsoever is itself divisible.

Third Premiss: that in every generic (universal) form, if regard be had,

in the division of such form, purely and simply to its abstract self,

then it will not at all validly follow that the parts into

which it has been divided shall necessarily resemble the whole in its complete notion;

otherwise it must follow that the generic form, whose division has been made in respect of its abstract self,

has not been itself divided, but that it has been divided into its constituents,

whether these be its various species or its numerous individuals,

whereas multiplicity of species or of individuals does not necessarily entail division

in the abstract generic notion itself.

But it has been laid down as a fact that such division has actually taken place, which is a contradiction.

Hence our assertion that the parts of the generic form do not resemble it in its full

and complete notion is a true dictum. Fourth Premiss: that in the mental form,

if regard be had to its division, it will not validly follow that its parts are denuded

(stripped) of the totality of its notion. This is so because, if we admit such total denudation,

and assert that these parts are utterly aloof from the complete conception of the generic whole,

then the form will arise, in such parts, only upon their assembling together,

so that they are in fact things devoid of that form which will arise in them on their being set together,

which is a quality of the parts of materia capax or passive matter which occupies space

([Greek: dektikon: δεκτικον]); [Note: The recipient is the acted upon, and it is called matter,

and also place.]; and hence the division has not been effected in the generic form,

but in its objective concrete materials. But it has been asserted that the division has come to pass in it:

this too is a contradiction. Therefore our assertion:

“It will not validly follow that its parts are stripped of the totality of its notion” is a true statement.

Fifth Premiss: which is the result of the two preceding:

that in the generic form, if it be possible that divisibility be considered in it,

then its parts are neither wholly devoid of the perfect form nor are completely exhaustive of it,

and are as it were [component, constituent] parts of its definition and outline (or description).

Given then these premisses, we shall further unquestionably say that a mentally-grasped

form—in short all knowledge—claims some abode somewhere,

which abode is both an essence itself and a part of man’s self,

so that such essence will not be devoid of being either a divisible (material)

body or a non-corporeal indivisible essence.

I however say, that it is not licit that it be a corporeal body;

because a generic mentally-grasped form, if it abide in a body,

then it is inevitably possible for divisibility to befall it, as we have shown above.

Nor is it licit that its parts be otherwise than resembling the whole from one standpoint,

and contrasting with it from another standpoint, in a word each one of the parts contains somewhat of the notion of the whole;

whereas there is no generic form whatsoever but of whose parts a compound can be formed

that is partly like it and partly unlike it save genera and differentia;

consequently these parts are genera and differentia,

and hence each one of them is in its turn a generic form; and thus the same assertion repeats itself as above.

Inevitably this will end in a form that is no longer divisible into genera and differentia,

owing to the impracticability of progression ad infinitum into parts differing in notions,

even if it be established that corporeal bodies are so divided into parts ad infinitum.

Moreover it is well-known that the generic (universal) form,

concerning which it is held that it is divisible only into genera and differentia,

if there be nevertheless some of these two that is not divisible into genera and differentia,

then this some will be in itself utterly indivisible in every sense and respect;

and consequently what is compounded, of these two of that some,

will also be indivisible, seeing that it is well-known, for example,

that man cannot be conceived except along with the two conceptions living and rational (speaking).

In short, it is not possible to conceive a generic universal form

that has genus and differens save by conceiving them all together.

Therefore, the form which we have described as having taken up its abode in the body has not taken up its abode therein,

which is a contradiction, and therefore the diametrically contrary to it is true,

namely our assertion that a generic (universal)

mental form does not abide in any corporeal body whatsoever;

and consequently the essence in which a generic mental form abides is a spiritual essence, not qualified with the qualities of bodies,

which is what we call the Rational Speaking Soul. And this is what we set out to show.

SUB-SECTION B:—

A second of the proofs, which corroborate this claim and confirm (correct) it,

is what I am now going to set forth. I say then that body of and through itself does

not effect conception of mentally-grasped things, since all bodies have in common that they are body,

and differ amongst each other in capacity for conceiving mentally-grasped things. Wherefore living (animal)

bodies are qualified to conceive mentally-grasped things only by and through certain powers that are put within them.

And if these powers conceive by and through themselves, without the cooperation of the body,

it follows that they are in themselves fit and apt to be an abode for mental forms.

And what is thus qualified is itself an essence; consequently if such conception is occurring,

they, namely these powers, are essences.

Now, it is clear that this power conceives mentally-grasped things by and through itself only,

and not at all through cooperation of body; for, we contend,

concerning whatsoever perceives any thing through cooperation of body,

that the oftener wearying perceptibles are repeated upon it the more do they tend towards ruining

and spoiling it and producing dullness and exhaustion in it,

it being nothing but a frail instrument and organ whose strength has been reduced,

owing to the over-tasking imposed upon it on the power’s employing it; and for this cause the seeing power,

for example, gets weaker the oftener it persists in looking at the sun’s shape.

So too the hearing power, if loud sounds reach it repeatedly.

Whereas this power, to wit the one that conceives mentally-grasped things,

the more it perceives wearying mental conceptions the stronger it becomes for its work [the more efficient it becomes],

wherefore it has no need for an instrument in its operation of perceiving, and hence it perceives of itself.

Now, we have already shown that every power perceiving of its own self is an essence;

so then this power is an essence, which is what we set out to show.

SUB-SECTION C:—

Among the proofs that guide to this claim is what I shall now show, so I say as follows.

The indwelling (immanence) of form in body is at once both passive and

receptive—passivity of the form and receptivity of the body.

And whereas one and the same thing excludes the possibility of its being both doer and done,

it becomes clear unto us that a body is not able of itself

to dress itself in one mentally-grasped form and strip off another.

Yet nevertheless we see a man consciously and with forethought conceiving

and proceeding from one mentally-grasped form unto another,

which operation is not devoid of being either an act peculiar to body,

or else an act peculiar to the rational speaking power,

or finally an act commonly shared between them both.

It has been already shown [perhaps he here refers to the Second Section of this Essay]

that it is not licit to attribute action and doing peculiarly and specially to body;

nay I will say and not even to body conjointly with the rational power;

since body is a co-adjutor of that power,

helping towards affording an abode for any form whatsoever in that body’s own self,

seeing that it has become known to us that body along with the power will both become fit subjects for this form that has thus arisen;

a subject however is to be stigmatized with nothing beyond simple passivity alone,

whereas both these two are [aggressive] acts and deeds.

Consequently this is an act peculiar to the power. And everything that,

in its act which emanates from its own self, has had no need for another thing to help it,

will not need in its own structure anything beyond its own self to help it,

seeing that independence or isolation in the structure of self precedes independence

or isolation in the putting forth of self-emanating action.

Therefore this power is an essence standing of itself [independent of body];

and consequently the rational soul is an essence.

SUB-SECTION D:—

Among the proofs that guide (point) to the validity of this contention is what I am now going to say.

No doubt a live body and live organs or instruments,

if they accomplish their growing age and the age of standstill, begin to wither and diminish,

to lose power and waste away, which [in human beings] is on passing forty years.

Now, were the rational reasoning power a corporeal organic power,

then there would be found not one single individual of mankind at these years of his age

but what this power of his would have begun to diminish.

But the case in most people is quite otherwise, nay indeed it is usual amongst the majority that

as to intellectual power they improve in cleverness and increase in insight.

Hence the structure of the rational power is not upheld by the body nor by the organ;

and hence this power is an essence standing of itself, which is what we wished to show.

SUB-SECTION E:

—Among the proofs for the validity of this contention is the following also. So much at least is clear,

namely that not one of the bodily powers has the strength for performing infinite multifarious actions;

and this is so because the strength of the one half of such a body will inevitably be found to be weaker than the strength of the whole;

and the weaker is less powerful to perform and overcome than the stronger;

and whatsoever, other than the infinite, gets less is itself finite;

hence the strength of each one of the two halves is finite;

hence too their sum is finite, since that the sum of two finites is itself finite,

whereas it has been contended that it is infinite, which is a contradiction.

Hence the sound view is that the powers of bodies are not powerful enough to perform infinite manifold deeds.

The rational power however is powerful enough to perform many infinite deeds,

seeing that forms geometrical, arithmetical, and philosophical,

which the rational power has to perform among other of its acts, are infinite.

Therefore the rational power is not standing by and through the body,

and hence therefore it stands of itself and is an essence of itself.

Further, so much at least is clear that the corruption of one of two conjoined essences does not entail and enjoin the corruption of the other:

wherefore the death of the body does not render obligatory the death of the soul,

which is what we wanted to show.

SECTION TENTH

To Establish that there is a Mental Essence, Distinct from Bodies,

which stands towards Human Souls in the stead of Light toward Sight,

and in the stead of a Source or Fountain; and To Establish that Souls,

if they leave the Bodies, unite therewith. As to the mental essence,

we find it in infants devoid of every mental form. Then, later on in life,

we find in it self-evident axiomatic mentally-grasped notions, without effort of learning and without reflection.

So that the arising of them within it will not fail of being either through sense and experience,

or else through divine outpouring reaching to it.

But it is not licit to hold that the arising of such primary mental form will be through experience,

seeing that experience does not afford and supply a necessary and inevitable judgment,

since experience does not go so far as to believe or disbelieve definitively the existence of something different

to the judgment drawn from what it has perceived. Indeed experience,

although it shows us that every animal we perceive moves on chewing the lower jaw,

yet it does not supply us with a convincing judgment that such is the case with every animal; for were this true,

it would not be licit for the crocodile to exist which moves his upper jaw on chewing.

Therefore not every judgment we have arrived at, as to things, through our sensuous perception,

is applicable to and holds good of all that we have perceived or have not perceived of such things,

but it may so be that what we have not perceived differ from what we have perceived.

Whereas our conception that a whole is greater than a part is not [formed]

because we have sensuously felt every part and every whole that are so related,

seeing that even such an experience will not guaranty to us

that there will be no whole and no part differently related.

Likewise the dictum concerning the impossibility of two opposites

(contrasts) coming together in one and the same thing,

and that things which are equal to one and the same thing are equal to one another.

And likewise the dictum concerning our holding proofs to be true if they be valid,

for the belief in and conviction of their validity does not become valid by

and through learning and effort of study; else this would draw out ad infinitum [inasmuch

as each proof rests upon given presuppositions, whose validity would in its turn have to be proved].

Nor is this gained from sense, for the reason that we have mentioned.

Consequently both the latter as well as the former [certainty] are gained from a godly outflow reaching unto the rational soul,

and the rational soul reaching unto it; so that this mental form arises therein.

Also, as to this outflow, unless it have in its own self such a generic

(universal) mental form, it would not be able to engrave it within the rational soul.

Hence such form is in the outflow’s own self.

And whatsoever Self has in it a mental form is an essence, other than a body,

and not within a body, and standing of itself.

Therefore this outflow unto which the soul reaches is a mental essence, not a body, not in a body,

standing of itself, and one which stands towards the rational soul in the stead of light to sight;

yet however with this difference, namely that light supplies unto sight the power of perceiving only,

and not the perceived form, whereas this essence supplies,

exclusively by and through its sole and single self, unto the rational power, the power of perceiving,

and brings about therein the perceived forms also, as we have set forth above.

Now, if the rational soul’s conceiving rational forms be a source of completion and perfection for it,

and be effected and brought about on reaching unto this essence,

and if worldly earthly labors, such as its thought, its sorrows and joy,

its longings, hamper the power and withold it from reaching thereunto,

so that it will not reach thereunto save only through abandoning these powers and getting rid of them,

there being nothing to stop it from continued Reaching save the living

body,—then consequently if it quit the body it will not cease to be reaching unto its Perfector and attached to Him.

Again, what reaches unto its Perfector and attaches itself to Him is safe against corruption,

all the more so if even during disconnection from Him it has not undergone corruption.

Wherefore the soul after death shall ever remain and continue unwavering [and undying] and attached to this noble essence,

which is called generic universal mind, and in the language of the lawgivers the Divine Knowledge.

As to the other powers, such as the animal and the vegetable:

Whereas every one of them performs its proper peculiar action only by and through the live body,

and in no other way, consequently they will never quit live bodies,

but will die with their death, seeing that every thing which is, and yet has no action,

is idle and useless. Yet nevertheless the rational soul does gain,

by its connection with them, from them their choicest and purest lye and wash,

and leaves for death the husks. And were it not so, the rational soul would not use them in consciousness.

Wherefore the rational soul shall surely depart (migrate, travel)

taking along the kernels of the other powers after death ensues.

We have thus made a clear statement concerning souls, and got at which souls are [ever]lasting,

and which of them will not be fitted out and armed with [ever]lastingness. It still remains for us,

in connection with this research, to show how a soul exists within live bodies,

and the aim and end for which it is found within the same, and what measure will be bestowed upon it,

in the hereafter, of eternal delight and perpetual punishment,

and of [temporary] punishment that ceases after a duration of time that shall ensue upon the decease of the live body;

and to treat of the notion that is designated by the lawgivers as intercession (mediation),

and of the quality (attribute) of the four angels and the throne-bearers.

Were it not however that the custom prevails to isolate such research from the research whose path we have been treading,

out of high esteem and reverence for it, and to make the latter research precede in order of treatment the former,

to the end of levelling the road and paving it solidly, I should (would)

have followed up these [ten] sections with a full and complete treatment of the subject dealt with in them.

Notwithstanding all this, were it not for fear of wearying by prolixity,

I would have disregarded the demands of custom herein. Thus then whatever it may please the

Prince—God prolong his highness—to command as to treating singly of such notions,

I shall put forth, in humble compliance and obedience, my utmost effort,

God Almighty willing; and may wisdom never cease to revive through him after fainting,

to flourish after withering, so that its sway may be renewed through his sway,

and through his days its days may come back again,

and that through his prestige the prestige of its devotees be exalted,

and the seekers after its favor abound, so God almighty will.

IT IS ENDED.