Quentin Meillassoux (6) - Critique 3: Hyper-Chaos and the Necessitarian Inference

Hey everyone, Nathan here, absurd being

and video six in this series on Mayor

Sue. We're going to be looking at

two ideas basically hyper chaos and the

necessitarian inference or also and

probably more focusing on the

frequentialist implication which kind of

goes along with that.

Uh so yeah, we're just going to look at

at the ideas, some of the arguments in

detail that Mayor Sue puts forward

regarding these two concepts and then um

analyze them, see if they see if they

stack up. So we'll start off with hyper

chaos.

So the arguments that Mayasu uses

regarding hyper chaos are essentially to

try and rein that idea back a bit.

We've gone he's kind of gone too far

with what he was trying to do here. So

his principle of factuality

ends up as as um

putting forward the idea that the

absolute is pure contingency. Another

[clears throat] way he puts that the

principle of factiality, the principle

of unreason.

And the basic idea is that anything can

happen at any time for no reason at all.

So we have hyper chaos and that doesn't

work for Mayu because he wants to ground

scientific discourse in something

certain in an absolute.

And we we've he's gotten an absolute but

the nature of this absolute is such that

it brings about this notion of hyper

chaos which doesn't ground which can't

ground scientific discourse. So he wants

to rein it back and he's going to put

two limitations on hyper chaos that he

thinks um

follow. And the the two limitations are

basically going to bring it back in line

with the weak version of correlationism

which was Kant's version uh which leaves

us with something which is in itself

which is unknowable but thinkable

and um and yeah so the the limitations

that we're going to look at here kind of

bring bring the this notion of hyper

chaos or the principle of factuality

back into kind of a place which is

solid instead of this rampant hyper

chaos.

So the first limitation

is the notion that a a contradictory

entity is absolutely impossible.

And Mayasu's argument goes like this. If

an entity were contradictory,

it would be necessary

because there would be no alterity

for it which it could become.

And the idea behind this is that what

Mayasu is saying is if a contradictory

entity existed,

it couldn't lapse into non-being because

even if it happened to not be,

it would still be in accordance with its

paradoxical or contradictory essence.

So that's the argument

and the point of this is to validate the

principle of non-contradiction which

you're if you remember was one of the

um ideas behind K's thing in itself.

So trying to validate this principle of

non-contradiction um a contradictory

entity is impossible.

If something sounds a little bit off

with that as I've described it, um,

you're not alone in thinking that

because basically

this is all just semantics. It's all

just word play I think. And the reason

is that contradiction

does not apply to entities themselves or

as Mayasu says they're their essences.

In other words, talk of a contradictory

entity

is conceptual nonsense. And that's

exactly what Mayasu is trying to put

forward here. The notion that a con a

contradictory entity is absolutely

impossible. But right from the start

there, if you if you just direct your

focus on that on that expression, that

proposition,

it's it's easy to let it slide and kind

of um go go with it from there. Go with

it as Mayasu puts it forward. But if you

actually take a moment to think about

it, we know what contradictory is and we

know what entity is. So, we know what

the words all mean here,

but they've been put together in such a

way that they just don't make any sense.

That and that's the trick here. That

that's why it sounds plausible because

we know what these words mean

individually.

So, we think there that he's saying

something meaningful, but actually if

you put them together, you don't get

anything meaningful. A contradictory

entity. What What could that even mean?

Contradiction applies to things like

ideas, to propositions, claims, beliefs

about things,

not to existing things themselves or the

essences of things.

So it it's contradictory, say, to

believe in evolution and creationism at

the same time, to think that they're

both true in some way. Or it's a

contradiction to say to claim that I

took the bus to work and that I drove to

work as well. So contradictions about

things

claims or beliefs about certain things,

not about things themselves. It just

doesn't mean anything to say this is a

contradictory entity.

And you might think about this, this

might come to mind. What about a square

circle? Isn't that an example of a

contradictory entity? But the circle is

not contradictory there.

What's contradictory is the claim that

the circle is square, i.e. that it has

certain properties.

In other words, it's a claim about the

predicates of the circle, the properties

of the circle, not the circle itself,

the essence of the circle, whatever that

might mean. So, this is the problem with

this. A contradictory entity is is

impossible. May sue claims, but a

contradictory entity just doesn't it

doesn't mean anything.

So there's so that that's the first the

first claim and the first problem with

it or and the the problem with that

first claim. The second claim uh of May

to try and limit this hyper chaos he

calls the thesis of the there is

and basically the idea with this he

wants to say that he wants to emphasize

that there is an absolute. So even

though his absolute

um

his principle of factuality gave us or

gave him an absolute that was

contingency

possibility facticity. This opened the

door to that that notion of hyper chaos

in which we might be able to say that

maybe there there could be nothing then

for no reason at all. um there could be

no absolute that the situation might

change in some way again for no reason

at all but he wants to rule that out

that possibility

there is an absolute

and so the argument

that may uses here he starts by

considering a possible objection

against his claim that there is an

absolute and there are two possible

thesis here that he puts forward the

weak thesis is if something exists then

it must be contingent

and the strong thesis there are things

and those things must be contingent.

So both of those claims argue that there

are only contingent things. There's no

nothing is absolute.

So the strong thesis

um we don't need to worry about so much

because may for mayor sue this grants

his goal already. In other words, that

contingency is necessary. Right? To say

that the strong thesis there are things

and those things must be contingent is

to grant that contingency is necessary,

which is exactly what he wants to say.

There is an absolute.

So he assumes the weak thesis.

And if we assume the weak thesis,

the situation is it's not necessary that

factual things exist. In other words,

things don't have to exist. But if they

do, they're factual.

But once you grant that, once you allow

that, you've already unwittingly given

Mayor Sue everything he needs because he

then will just move his analysis back a

step

and say that okay, the things

themselves, the things that exist, if

they do, are factual or contingent. And

he calls this first order facticity.

But the proposition

that only factual things exist is itself

being treated as necessary here. In

order for you to state that thesis in

the first place, you're having to

presuppose something necessary, namely

that proposition that only factual

things exist.

Further, this necessary proposition,

this proposition that you must make if

you want to put forward this thesis

expresses a contingency

in the fact that it says if something

exists

and this Mayu calls a second order

facticity.

So putting all of that together, we have

the situation that there is an absolute,

the proposition that factual things

exist, and it is contingent because the

proposition may or may not hold.

So contingency is necessary. That's

exactly what Mayasu was after. Um, and

that's what he's got. Problems.

First first of all just note before we

look at the problems this is basically

saying the same thing as the principle

of factiality.

Um so it it asserts that there is an

absolute by arguing that the absolute is

contingency or facticity which is the

same as possibility when we were talking

about it in the last video but it does

use a slightly different argument.

Um so

given that it's the same kind of thing

although

um coming at this

deriving the conclusion slightly from a

from a slightly different position.

What we're going to see is that it will

um

it's also as we saw with the principle

of factuality a kind of a bit of a

semantic game of mirrors. And even

although it works in a slightly

different way, it falls to exactly the

same kinds of criticisms.

So I'm going to frame this whole section

in exactly the same with exactly the

same um format that I used to talk about

the principle of factiality.

and and there as with we did as as we

did with that we'll start by looking at

with the word play the semantics that

are going on here. So Mayasu's weak

thesis says that if something exists

then it must be contingent

which on its own is 100% reasonable.

There's no problem with that. But Mayasu

can't leave it there because he wants to

prove that something does exist.

namely the absolute. So the whole as I

said the whole thing the whole focus of

Mayu's

um

the whole Mayasu's entire focus shifts

back a step from the things themselves

to the proposition about those things

and this is exactly where the problem

is. His conclusion is that there is an

absolute the proposition that factual

things exist

and it is contingent because the

proposition may or may not hold.

The you what we saw with the usage of

the word if. But

propositions, statements, ideas,

these things can't be necessary or

contingent.

What what can be necessary or contingent

are things actually concrete existing

things they can be necessary or

contingent. In other words, first order

facticity

which is actually the only order

facticity here.

Second order facticity is actually

nothing. It's it's a metaphysical

chimera.

Um because what it claims is factical

is an abstract concept i.e. that

proposition that factual things exist

and this just doesn't mean anything to

say that a proposition

an assertion a claim is necessary or

contingent.

It's just not the kind of thing that can

be necessary or contingent. It's a

category mistake.

And u it's interesting you because this

is exactly the opposite of what we just

saw mayu

asserting regarding um contradictory

entity.

Right? Contradiction applies to ideas,

things and beliefs, not actual things.

But now it's the reverse. The necess

necessity or contingency doesn't apply

to ideas, propositions, beliefs. It only

applies to real existing things.

And this is and this is the the game.

This is the the the

semantic play that's going on here,

shifting around these meanings. So

second order facticity, which this whole

argument turns on, it's it's not real.

It's nothing. It's it's an it's an empty

abstraction.

So what about this then? Mayu could

possibly then pivot to claim that the

proposition

that factual things exist is actually a

synonym for existence

such that the claim would then be that

existence itself

is the necess the necessary/contingent

thing the necessity that is contingent.

But again, it's the same problem.

Existence is just not something that can

be contingent or necessary.

Contingency and necessity are predicates

that presuppose existence in the first

place. In order for something to be

contingent or necessary, there must be

something in the first place.

And this is

the same kind of thing that we saw

Anelm, St. Anselm arguing in the last

video when he tried to argue backwards

from the predicate perfect to the

existence of God.

Both of these

ways of arguing are perfect examples of

what happens when you start forming

arguments with abstract concepts.

And just to take a little detour here,

this is I think in general and it's

something that pervades all of Mayu's

arguments. It's what happens. It's the

danger with and and why I don't like

analytic philosophy because it takes

language concepts which are inherently

ambiguous as they must be which which is

not a bad thing in and of itself. It's

just what they are. It's how they

it's how they must be if they're to do

the job that we want them to do.

but it misuses them in all sorts of

subtle ways that seem reasonable at

first glance. That was the problem.

As we saw with the the notion of a

contradictory entity, we know what

contradictory means. We know what entity

means. So, we think if they put

together, we think there must be a

meaning there. But if you actually take

a moment to to dwell on it, you'll see

that it doesn't mean anything. What

could what could it mean to say an

entity is contradictory?

Contradiction doesn't apply to entities.

So, it takes these these concepts, puts

them together in ways that seem

reasonable at first, but in the end, if

you if you let that kind of um

method slide, in the end, you find

yourself surrounded by a whole bunch of

abstract phantoms and um illusions that

you've completely lost touch with

reality. And that's that's my number one

complaint with abstract uh with analytic

philosophy is that's what

I I find it doing all the time. It gets

lost in concepts and definitions and

meanings and and it it it equivocates on

certain things and applies concepts to

entities when it shouldn't and and

applies um predicates to concepts when

it shouldn't and just it does all of

this this um

abstract conceptual maneuvering

with concepts that that makes sense, but

in the end you've you've lost yourself

in the concepts. There's nothing. It

doesn't it it just doesn't connect back

to reality. Doesn't connect back to

anything concrete, anything meaningful.

Um, and not only that, another danger is

that you can you can

deceive yourself because you're creating

arguments out of thin air believing that

you are reasoning clearly when all

you're doing is generating fictions like

Mayasu's second order facticity.

It just doesn't mean anything. It's a

it's a it's an abstract empty

conceptual illusion.

But if you let it slide and it seems

like it might be real. It seems like it

might be talking about something and if

you let it slide then there's no hope

after that because you can never claw it

back. Once you let that initial

um semantic trick take hold

uh nothing else you can never get out of

it after that point. You've got to stop

it there.

So that's the first problem anyway, the

first part of this critique, word play

and semantics. The second part following

the framework from the last video is the

way that this argument also jumps from

thought to reality.

Remember that everything that Mayosu is

talking about here is happening in

thought. It's all abstract. It's all

conceptual. He's taking ideas, concepts,

and thoughts and trying to conclude

something about reality from them. And

this is impossible.

My point here,

as I mentioned in a comment on the last

video, it it's not that you can't think

about reality or use reason and logic to

glean certain things about reality. My

point is that something about your

thoughts, concepts, ideas themselves

cannot be reality

like a second order facticity. That

can't be metaphysical truth,

metaphysical reality. It cannot be

being. It can't be the absolute.

It It's just It's just a concept. It's a

proposition.

It's literally creating reality. Well,

it's not literally, but it is creating

reality out of thin air.

And it is literally defining a concept

into existence.

And that um is it was exactly what we

saw Anelm do with God. Masu does the

same thing, I think, with um with every

with all of this facticity, with

possibility. He's turning these

concepts into

existing things, metaphysical things.

And finally, although this is a minor

point, but just note the structure of

this argument, it's another style

argument. And that Mayus starts by

getting his opposition, the fool, to

declare their position before applying a

semantic maneuver to undermine it. He

gets the thesis first. What's your

thesis? Okay, let's take your weak

thesis and now I can

go to work on it and point out these

inconsistencies or point out in this

case find a a necessity

behind the very fact that you're making

this claim. So it it it has that same

structure that Anselm style structure.

get if you can get your opponent to to

stake their claim in a position in a in

a proposition then you can work your

semantic magic on it and um undermine

it. Okay. So that is what I have to say

about um hyper chaos and the limitations

that may tries to impose on it. Now

let's turn to the necessitarian

inference and the frequentialist

implication.

Okay. So the necessitarian inference and

the frequentialist implication the um

this is basically an objection that may

assue assumes or puts forward in order

to

knock it down and and strengthen his his

claim.

So the objection as may imagines it to

his [clears throat] principle of

factuality might go like this. If

everything were contingent as you say,

this would mean then that the physical

laws would also be contingent.

Meaning that they would be changing all

the time. And this is the frequentialist

implication.

Since this isn't what we observe,

these laws, these physical laws must be

underwritten by a necessity that rules

out disorder.

And that's the necessitarian inference.

So that's the objection. Mayor Sue gives

an argument then to refute this.

So he he's going to attack this via the

frequentialist implication.

The notion that um if everything were

contingent, the physical if the physical

laws, including the physical laws, were

also contingent, they would be changing

all the time. That's what he's going to

attack. So he says this

this um objection the frequentialist

implication is a piece of probabilistic

reasoning

which notes that there are many a priori

possible configurations of laws but only

one configuration that is constantly

experienced.

Now for probabilistic reasoning to be

valid, the total possible configuration

of laws must be thinkable in terms of a

numerical totality.

And this total totality must be larger

than the set of physically possible

events.

For example, a single throw of a die. um

there are six possibilities but there's

only one physically possible outcome and

what may is going to argue here is that

probabilistic reasoning based on this

totality which is an important idea

is valid only for events internal to the

universe so empirical not the universe

as a whole which is only conceptualized

ible

not empirical.

When we try to apply this probabilistic

reasoning which works for things within

the universe

to our conception of the universe as a

whole, we assume that it's legitimate to

consider the conceivable as a totality

in the same way that we considered the

total number of empirical possibilities

as a totality.

And the specific problem [clears throat]

for probabilistic reasoning here comes

in the form of Canour's set theory. And

this is going to get a little bit tricky

um especially if like me you're not um

well-versed in mathematics. So, Cantor

showed that mathematically there can be

actual comparable infinite sets and

[snorts] that there are therefore

degrees of infinity which can be

quantified by what he called transfinite

numbers.

More importantly for Mayu he showed that

there can be no set of all sets. In

other words, the totality of an infinite

set [snorts] can always be exceeded by a

larger one, i.e. a larger transfinite.

Um, and that's what he showed. So, Mayu

is going to use that

to

undermine this idea of the

frequentialist implication. So he takes

KTOR's proof that there can be no set of

all sets

um regarding infinite sets and applies

that to our conception of the universe

[snorts] which is specifically here a

set of possible configurations of

physical laws.

And so what I think may is getting at

here is he's saying that

um infinite sets are not subject to

empirical observation. They're therefore

only conceptualizable

and nor is the set of the universe as a

whole which we've already said is only

conceptualizable as well. Therefore,

what applies to the former infinite sets

also applies to the latter, the set of

the universe. And Mayasu glosses all of

this by saying the quantifiable totality

of the thinkable is unthinkable.

And I I think we can summarize the

argument in

with three premises and a conclusion.

So, premise one, since the universe as a

whole isn't susceptible to empirical

observation, it is therefore only

conceivable.

Premise two, probabilistic reasoning

requires a totality thinkable in terms

of a numerical totality.

Premise three,

by we can't think the totality of what

is only conceivable.

And the conclusion is therefore

probabilistic reasoning cannot apply to

the universe as a whole.

So

let's see if we can um break some of

that down. First of all, the uh

necessitarian inference. I don't I I

just don't get the argument here when um

so I kind of reject

the necessitarian inference and of

course this is an objection that Mayor

Sue has raised himself. So in rejecting

it it looks a little bit like I'm

helping him but really what I'm doing is

pointing out what I think are flaws in

his thinking.

So my problem with the necessitarian

influence is just is that just because

the laws of physics are stable doesn't

mean they're underwritten by a

necessity. That's that's the leap I

can't see here. Um just because a

certain situation holds

doesn't mean that that that situation is

necessary. Doesn't mean that it must be

the case.

So that that's the first small point a

problem with the the the necessitarian

inference itself.

Now the frequentialist implication the

problems here are a little bit more

complicated

and basically

the way I think of this is it's all a

game of mathematical semantics. So, it's

still semantic games, but this time with

with math.

Um,

yeah, because I mean, we've seen Mayasu

take abstract concepts and ideas and

twist them and and work with them and

manipulate them in such a way that he's

able to generate paradoxes or reality,

ultimately concrete metaphysical

realities out of them. Now he's doing

something similar this time with

mathematics. Specifically, he's taking

an he's taking abstract mathematical

axioms

and applying them to thought.

And that's where this whole thing goes

wrong. Everything comes back to thought.

Everything that may the the content of

all of his arguments, it's all thoughts.

It's all ideas. It's all concepts. And

it's it's kind of the same problem again

and again just

cropping up in a different in a

different kind of format.

Or rather it's the same format but

cropping up in a different with

different content. It's the same formal

problem just with different ideas.

So the best way to to go through this I

think is look at the the argument that I

laid out premise by premise. So premise

one, [snorts] since the universe as a

whole isn't susceptible to empirical

observation, it's therefore only

conceivable. We can only think of the

universe as a whole. We can't

empirically observe it or measure it or

quantify it. That's fine. I have no

problems with that. Um, I I might even

go a step further and say that it isn't

actually conceivable, but that's kind of

drifting down my own lane of

metaphysics, which is not really

relevant here. As that premise stands,

there's nothing wrong with it. Premise

two. Now, this is okay. The premise is

probabilistic reasoning requires a

totality thinkable in numerical terms

quantifiable. [clears throat]

Now this is false

um or rather

its validity is restricted to the domain

of mathematics.

So if you want to quantify or calculate

probabilities then yes I would agree

with mayasu you need a numerical

totality of the possibilities

in this case the configuration the

number of configurations of possible

laws of nature but the frequentialist

doesn't need this

um they don't need to perform a

mathematical calculation all they need

to know is that there is some massive

number of possible configurations of

physical laws which they do because this

is obviously true. That's no one's

denying that even may sue and that means

that there's nothing wrong. There's

nothing illegitimate about the

frequentialist implication.

They don't need to have a numerical

totality,

a quantifiable totality for the possible

configurations of laws. If if they were

doing if they wanted to perform some

kind of mathematical calculation, fit it

into an equation, calculate something

with it, then yes, they would need to

know that, but they don't need to know

it. So this this whole digression of

Mayus into Canour's set theory and

transfinites, it it's it's irrelevant

here. The frequentialist doesn't need to

concern themselves with any of this. We

know that there is some massive number

of possible configurations of physical

laws and we know that only one is in

evidence and that's the problem. We

don't need to quantify the

possibilities.

And then premise three by contour we

can't think the totality of what is only

conceivable.

And this is also I think false or at the

very least it's not it's an

interpretation of cantor didn't say we

can't think the totality of what is only

conceivable.

This is

like I said mayasu's interpretation or

even better his extension of canour the

transfinite and canour set theory.

It's a piece of mathematical reasoning

but it says nothing at all about limits

to conceptualization in general.

Thus our probabilistic reasoning isn't

faulty and the frequentialist

implication is again valid.

And this by the way is another example

of Mayor Sue and the the other um thing

that he does quite regularly is

transgressing domains. taking what what

works in one domain and applying it in

another domain where it doesn't work

where it's it's illegitimate there. So

for example, we've seen him go from

thought to reality. Jump from those

domains as if as if as if you can. We've

seen him jump around between

metaphysical, conceptual, and scientific

being conflating all of those different

kinds of being beings.

Um, and also the the latest one from

first order to second order facticity.

This these kinds of these jumps that

just don't respect these different

areas. Um, which [clears throat]

and you just can't apply things that

work in one area, one domain to these

other domains or or you can, but that's

my whole problem with analytic

philosophy. That's what it does. That's

that's how it secures all of these

insights that it that it that that it um

gleans

by by manipulating words and concepts

and misapplying them, misappropriating.

Um and that's that's this is just

another example of that.

So that's that's the main problem with

the frequent with Mayasu's criticism of

the frequentialist implication. This

mathematical semantics

that um I think he he indulges in a

smaller problem with this

is that Mayasu himself says that the

non-totalizing aiomatic of the

transfinite is not the only possible

aiomatic. So all he's done is show that

there is at least one way to think that

the possible is untotalizable.

And this really weakens his claim. I

think he tries to claw back some

legitimacy here by noting that reason

suggests there's no necessity to

physical laws. That's what may argued

for, but I've already argued against

that.

And he tries to also say that the

necessitarian inference results in

physical laws being necessary with no

one knowing why it is these laws rather

than others which necessarily exist.

But first, I've already argued that the

stability of the laws of physics doesn't

mean that that they're necessary. And

second,

the fact that no one knows why we have

these laws rather than others is not a

good reason for either accepting or

denying anything in relation to it. So

it's a smaller problem, but it's one

that may himself um discusses. So to his

credit, I guess he points that out, but

that seems like a bigger problem than

May Sue um lets on there.

Uh this brings me to the end of my

critique of Mayasu's um conception of

the necessitarian inference and his

defense against the frequentialist

implication.

Uh neither of which seem compelling to

me.

It also brings me to the end of the

video. So let me close out with a

summary.

So first up the limitations on hyper

chaos. This was an attempt by Mayasu to

reign in the situation

we've found it he's found himself in in

which anything can happen at any time

for no reason.

And the first limitation he imposes is

on a contradictory entity. A

contradictory entity he says is

absolutely impossible. And this is an

attempt to validate the principle of

non-contradiction.

The problem here was as we saw talk of

an of a contradictory entity is pure

sophistry. Contradiction applies to

ideas, properties, sorry, propositions,

claims,

etc. Claims about entities, not entities

themselves.

How can an entity be contradictory? It

just doesn't make sense.

And his second limitation he called the

thesis of the there is.

[clears throat]

And this says that there must be an

absolute.

Uh

and this argument then starts from the

weak thesis of the advocate against the

existence of an absolute. So if

something exists then it must be

contingent.

And Mayasu says assuming the weak thesis

presupposes a second order facticity.

So if we assume the weak the thesis this

makes the thesis itself which is a

proposition necessary and because this

proposition might or might not hold it's

contingent.

The problems I have with this first it's

this notion of second order facticity is

pure sophistry. Contingency and

necessity apply only to concrete

existence. They don't

by that I mean concretely existing

things. They don't apply to propositions

or ideas. What could it mean to say a

proposition is necessary or a

proposition is contingent? nor do they

apply to existence itself.

Contingency

or necessity presuppose an existent to

be contingent or nec necessary in the

first place.

The second problem is this whole

style of argumentation jumps from

thought to reality by turning an ab

abstract fiction which is second order

facticity into a metaphysical existent.

Then we looked at the necessitarian

inference and the frequentialist

implication.

The frequentialist implication basically

says that if everything were contingent,

we would expect to see physical laws

changing all the time. And the

necessitarian infer inference says that

since we don't see this, these physical

laws must be underwritten by a necessity

that rules out disorder.

Mayu's response probabilistic reasoning

applies to empirical objects within the

universe but doesn't apply to the

conceptualized universe itself

and mayasu uses canour's set theory and

the transfinite here

the problems that I have with this first

regarding this the necessitarian

inference the stability of the physical

laws doesn't imply their necessity I I

don't think there's no there's no

logical leap from one to the other.

And regarding the frequentialist

implication,

my first problem, my biggest problem was

the one of mathematical semantics.

So Mayasu's restriction on probabilistic

reasoning doesn't transfer to the

probabilistic intuition of the

frequentist.

And second, KTO's transfinite numbers in

relation to infinite sets don't transfer

to our conceptualized

totality of the universe.

And so that is us for this video, which

means there's only one video left. And

um it's going to be a much shorter

video. I'm just going to there's one

more thing I want to

um critique in May's philosophy and it's

regarding what he calls the task of

philosophy and then I want to close off

with some positives actually some things

that I agree with in Mayu uh even though

I don't agree with maybe the reasoning

behind how he gets to the certain things

there are some things that I think he's

he he has right that I I agree with

anyway. Um and we'll talk about those as

well. But that's it for today. Thanks

for watching. I'll see you next time.