Willard Van Orman Quine interview with Bryan Magee (1977)

if we took a poll among professional

teachers of philosophy on the question

who is the most important living

philosopher it's not at all obvious to

me at least who would get the most votes

but we can be fairly sure about some of

the names that would be in the top

half-dozen Quine Papa Jean Paul Sartre

Chomsky probably though strictly

speaking he's not exactly a philosopher

well the first of those names and one on

which Idol a pretty short odds is that

of willard van orman quine

one of the professors of philosophy at

Harvard Quine was born in 1908 and is

still highly productive so he's had a

long career and it's by no means over

yet he's published in numeral articles

and over a dozen books the best known of

which are from a logical point of view

published in 1953 and word and object

published in 1960 first and foremost

he's a logician

and the original contributions to the

subject which made him famous are for

the most part highly technical and not

really accessible to the laymen though

they always had their ultimate roots in

problems fundamental to philosophy

however in the latter part of his career

he's become more overtly interested in

philosophy in a more general sense and I

thought it would be uniquely valuable in

this program to have a philosopher at

the very summit of world reputation

talking about the basics of philosophy

and of his own activity professor Quine

what do you regard as the central tasks

or tasks of philosophy I think a

philosophy is concerned with the with

the with our knowledge of the world and

the nature of the world

I consider I think of velocity is

attempting to round out the system of

the world as Newton but it there have

been philosophers who thought of

philosophy as somehow separate from

science and as providing a firm basis on

which to build science but this I

consider an empty dream science much of

science is firmer than philosophy is or

can even perhaps aspire to be

I think of philosophy as can

with science even as a part of science

well if it's continuous with science and

even part of science how does it differ

from the rest of science uh it differs

in generality and in abstractness

science is a continuum extending from

history and engineering and at one end

if we think of science broadly to such

abstract pursuits as philosophy and

mathematics at the other

philosophy can considers the question of

the nature of cause for instance where

physics contents itself with the finding

causal relations between specific sorts

of events biology with between other

sorts of events again whereas the

zoologist will tell us that there are

wombats and the physicists will tell us

that there are electrons the

mathematician of athos there are no end

of prime numbers the philosopher is

interested rather and what sorts of

things there are altogether it's in

these ways that philosophy is more

abstract in general in other words the

philosopher is investigating what

constitutes the connective tissue of

everyone's thought including other

peoples for so that the physicist is

trying to find out whether or not a

causes B but the philosopher is saying

what but what does it mean to say that

anything causes anything the physicist

is trying to find out say what

particular subatomic particles there are

and the philosopher says but what does

it mean to say of anything that it

exists it's at this level of complete

generality that the Philosopher's

investigations occur now do you do you

include in this or do you exclude from

it the age-old questions or how the

world got here in the first place or how

life began I exclude these from

philosophy how the world began is a

problem for the physicist and astronomer

and of course there have been

conjectures from that quarter how life

began there's a problem for the

biologist on which he's made notable

progress in recent years why the world

began

i life began on the other hand I think

our pseudo questions because I can't I I

can't imagine what an answer would look

like and you think that because there's

no conceivable answer to these questions

they are said to be meaningless quest

yes yes so in other words you regard the

the central tasks of philosophy as the

analysis and elucidation of concepts

that are central to various fields of

human activity and also in particular

notions like core what it is for

something to be a cause of something

else what it is for something to exist

what it is for something to be shall we

say a scientific law the most general

notions that that are as it were the

connecting tissue of thought and that we

have to use and have to employ in the

specific activities that people like

scientists or it could even be

politicians lawyers and so on are

engaged is that a correct way of putting

your view yes yeah so do you do you

think that the main or the most

important questions that philosophers

have to deal with can be grouped under

any particular headings there are two

headings which I think provided an

important classification to begin with

there are the ontological questions as

it might be called well I think you need

to explain that term these are because

any questions as to what there is any

general questions as to what sorts of

things there are as well as the question

what it means to exist but what it means

to exist for there to be something and

the other classification the other class

would be might be called the predicated

questions questions as to what sorts of

things can meaningfully be asked about

what there is in other words you've got

two enormous spheres of questioning here

one about what there is and the other

about what we can know what we can say

about people yes and epistemology would

be included in the letter yes yes yes

now I think since you've made this

distinction for clarity's sake in our

discussion we ought to cling to it a

little and I think we'll take these two

areas

one at a time and we'll take your first

one first the whole group of questions

about what there is what exists or as

you say what is called ontology by

philosophers although there are

innumerable theories about this I think

it's fair to say that throughout the

history of the subject there have been

two broad opposing views in metal

ontology between what you might very

roughly call materialists and what you

might call idealist I mean although

there are innumerable different versions

of both doctrines you do have on the one

hand of view that reality consists of

matter or material objects in space and

time which exist independently of

anyone's or any things experience of

them and on the other hand you have a

view of reality as consisting altom

utley in spirits or minds or is existing

in the mind of God or as being put

together in our minds now can I put very

crudely the $64 question to you and ask

you which side you're on I'm in the

materialist say yes yes yes yes yes I

hold that physical objects are real and

exist externally and independently of us

I don't hold that there are only these

physical objects there are also abstract

objects objects of mathematics that seem

to be needed to fill out the system of

the world but I don't I I don't

recognize the existence of minds of

mental entities in any sense other than

as attributes or activities on the part

of physical objects mainly persons that

must be in them that you not only reject

idealism it must also mean that you

reject dualism I mean one might describe

dualism is almost the common sense view

I think throughout human history most

human beings have taken the view that

reality consists automatically of

entities of two categorical E different

kinds minds and bodies and as far as we

know in all civilizations

I am present most people seem to have

thought this that they were bodies and

that they were minds and that these were

two fundamentally different kinds of

thing now that's what is meant by the

term dualism this

now you must reject this view if you

don't believe in the existence of minds

yes true I do I do reject the view the

the dualistic view presents problems

creates problems which are neither

soluble nor it seems to me necessary

it's it's clear that that an

individual's decisions will affect his

movements will determine his movements

in many cases and his movements in turn

will will have consequences in the

movements of other physical objects at

the same time the natural scientists the

physicists insist on a a closed system

there being physical causes physical

explanations in principle for for the

physical events they allow no place for

the incursion of influences from outside

the physical world given all this it

would seem then that persons decisions

must themselves be activity on the part

of a physical object of the alternative

of rejecting the this basic principle of

the physical science of the effect that

every change is that there's no change

without a change in the distribution of

micro physical properties over

space-time over the over space that

alternative I find uncongenial but

because the successes in natural science

have been such that we must take their

presuppositions very seriously in other

words what you are saying is that that

wishes emotions feelings decisions forms

are all things which take place in

physical objects namely people and of

course in a sense that's an obvious fact

and what you're saying is that not only

are these all

accompanied by micro physical changes

changes in our brains and our central

nervous systems and so on but they

indeed are those micro physical changes

exactly now before I go on to raise with

you some of the apparent difficulties

inherent in that view I wonder if you

can explain how it is that almost all of

mankind as I said only a few minutes ago

has disagreed with you about this so why

people in general take a dualist view of

reality I mean let me add this point I

mean if I put that question to almost

anyone else he could say well it's

obvious why people think like that they

think like that because dualism

corresponds to directly experience

reality that is how we experience things

but you can't say that because you don't

think it is how we experience things so

what would your answer be I recognized

certainly a profound difference between

so-called mental events and externally

observable physical ones is in spite of

construing these mental events as

themselves event states activity on the

part of a physical object the reason and

as for the traditional dualistic

attitude certainly this goes back to

primitive times I think one cause of it

partial explanation may be the

experience of dreams and the seeming

separation of the of the the mind from

the body in that state certainly animism

antedated science Bailey is the first of

the Greek philosophers is said to have

said that all things are full of God's

primitive people the peoples today are

said to be Animists very largely and to

believe that the what we call inanimate

objects are are animated by spirits the

one can even imagine

traces of animism in the basic concepts

of of

our science itself the notion of cause I

suspect began with the feeling of effort

of pushing on the part of the individual

the subjective feeling the as a as a

mental entity and force surely had that

sort of origin but as time was going on

and as science has progressed and in

recent centuries of the the dissociation

of these concepts from their original

the mental context seems to have been

conducive to to a great scientific

progress and I think of the I think of

physicalism as a departure a product of

latter-day science which of course is a

phenomenon that's a very

uncharacteristic of the history of

mankind but I don't think that the chief

reason why most people take a deal with

list view of reality is to do with

dreams or the other things that you've

mentioned I think it's chiefly because

we all do have it seems to me direct

experience of an internal flow of

thoughts and emotions and responses and

desires and fantasies and memories and

so on which is going on all the time

that we are awake and which is extremely

complex not only in the sense that it

may be about complicated things but also

in the sense that there may be several

different things going on at once and I

think we're all directly aware of

something like this going on inside

ourselves and this doesn't manifest

itself in any way in observable external

behavior we are we are aware of these

things and and and I'm not denying their

existence but I am construing them or

reconstructive --'tis on the part of

physical objects namely on our part and

the fact that these are not observable

on the whole from from the outside

doesn't distinguish them from much that

the physicist assumes in the way of

internal microscopic or sub microscopic

structure of inanimate objects a great

deal goes on that we don't observe from

the outside and that we have to account

for conjecture Lee the import the

important reason for construing all this

activity as activity on the part of

bodies is to preserve the the closed

character of this system of the physical

world does this mean that you deny the

real existence of the age-old problem

about whether or not we had free will it

doesn't mean that but I because the will

would retain its its status even though

becoming a a ultimately a neural

phenomenon and a an aspect of the

activity of a physical object however I

think the problem of the freedom of the

will is an outcome of a confusion

there's no question in my mind about the

freedom of the will of the wiliest free

in the sense that people very often do

what they will to do they are free to

within limits of constraint into the

within limits of their their strength or

talent to do things that they will to do

freedom of the will does not mean that

the will is free to will as it will that

would be nonsense and it doesn't mean

that the will is on cars the will is

cars and we all are prepared to

recognize that the will is caused when

we try to train children in such a way

as to influence their behavior or enact

laws to discourage criminals or we we

try to get you try to

votes people try to sell things all

these are cases of of cause causing

people to will but they're the freedom

of their will remains insofar as their

activity is the result of a causal chain

one link of which is the Willing and

that Willing can be itself caused it is

given you to hold these views how do you

see the traditional body mind problem I

mean let me just remind viewers of what

that is I mean I've said earlier that

most people seem to take a dualist view

of reality the view that everything in

the universe consists out in the clear

either minds or bodies that there are

both kinds of entity and that is given

rise to a traditional problem which no

one has ever come up with a thoroughly

satisfactory solution to that is the

question how are these incorporeal

abstract non material Minds able to

actually move and push about the

material bodies now it's clear that you

since you don't believe in the existence

of minds as independently of bodies the

problem does not present itself to you

in that form do you given your views do

you will simply bypass the mind-body

problem totally no as you say the body

my body my problem doesn't exist in that

forum for me there's no longer that

problem of interaction and in fact it's

in order to eliminate the problem in

that forum that I that I opted for

physicalism but however the problem then

arise is how are we to talk about all

these ordinarily so-called mental events

and mental activity or this flux of

experience if we're not recognizing

Minds not recognizing mental entities

it's no good trying to paraphrase all

this into a neuro neurological terms

because it would take too much in the

way of detailed understanding of the

mechanism of the nervous system

now there's a there's a as a first step

a quick easy solution to that once may

simply keep the mentalistic terminology

but regard all these terms as terms

applicable to bodies and to the activity

of bodies this is easy this is too easy

in a way because there's another point

about the in favor of the physical istic

attitude which I haven't touched on up

to now namely the advantage of interest

objectivity objectivity the data are not

introspective data the data are shared

care can be shared by other observers

it's because of this in large part at

least that that the Natural Sciences

have been so successful now and and

introspective psychology has not been

compromised successful well now if we

simply take overall the conceptual

conceptual apparatus of introspective

psychology and mentalism and simply try

to excuse it by saying all these

attributes or activities of bodies we're

no longer getting the benefit of the

intersubjectivity of of natural science

however there's a there's a way of

coping with this difficulty and it is

behaviorism in the sense of which I

think the inner ISM is important and

invaluable

I think its role the role of behaviorism

is the legitimation of mentalistic terms

without having to go through the

indirect and in fact impracticable a

channel of Neurology criteria observable

interests objectively observable

criteria for mental states

our phone of in behavior in observable

behavior but include verbal behavior

well including verbal behavior yes and

insofar as such criteria are available

we do have the benefits of natural

science after all and this is without a

full neurological explanation so the

extent to which I'm a behaviorist is in

seeing behaviorism as a way of making

objective sense of metallicity concept I

don't identify the mental states with

the behavior I identify the mental

states rather with neural States nor do

I regard the behavioral accounts as in

the last analysis explanatory of the

mental states mental phenomena I think

that the full explanation of the issues

to be found rather at the neurological

level in other words if you're saying

that behaviorism is not an explanation

of the kind of problems as which the

philosopher deals but a way of

formulating them I mean it's a kind of

language in which the problem should be

a couch or formulated before we then go

on to try and provide solutions exactly

yes I think it would be helpful if we

paused a moment at this point professor

quiet and if I try to recapitulate the

ground that we've covered it won't be

attempt any forward moves

I started this discussion by asking you

what you regarded as the as the central

tasks of philosophy and you you not only

said what you thought philosophers ought

to be doing you also said what you

thought they ought to be doing then you

ruled out a number of questions but you

you grouped the questions that you

thought philosophers ought to concern

themselves with under two main heads

first head being questions about what

exists what does reality consist on and

the second group being what can we know

about this and how can we know and what

can we say about it and so on now from

that point onwards we've been pursuing

the first of those those two groups of

questions and you said that in your view

your view of reality is physic

you think all reality consists in

physical entities that there are not

minds separate from physical entities

and that the notion that there are leads

us into all sorts of conceptual

confusions which you think a behaviorist

analysis liberates us from I'd like us

now to to start going over to questions

of the second kind because we were

beginning to get into them already and

that's why I thought it time to stop and

reassess where we were can we now move

into the second area of how we acquire

knowledge of this physical world in

which we find ourselves

good the one one correction that would

make though my position is not that

there are only physical objects there

are also abstract objects but these

abstract objects are not mental it's

important about their National Ignition

isn't it that's you don't believe in the

existence of minds that separate from

physical things but you do believe in

the existence of certain abstract

entities yes numbers notably but I think

you need to explain that a bit if you

are a physicalist how can you justify

your belief in the existence of abstract

entities at all the status of sets or

classes and numbers and functions I

think from the again not now from the

point of view of the predicate of side

of philosophy is not basically different

from the status of hypothetical entities

and such as elementary particles in

physics in both cases it's a matter of

framing hypotheses which imply our past

observations of which five future

observations under-under specifiable

conditions which would then serve to

corroborate or refute these hypotheses

and these general hypotheses repeat

reference not only to the ordinary

ordinary observable objects but also to

many auxiliary objects we might say in

the way of unobservable physical

particles and also in the way of numbers

and functions because these come into

the formulations into the hypotheses of

a quantitative kind and even classes or

sets of the the biologist speaks of

general and species of of in of

organisms and all these entities are

furniture of the of the world posited on

an equal footing in our system of the

world or you say on an equal footing but

it does seem to me that there is a very

important difference between the sense

in which subatomic particles are

unobservable and the sense in which say

numbers are unobservable and subatomic

particles are bits of stuff but it just

so happens perhaps because of the

accident of our optical apparatus that

there bits of stuff which are too small

for us to see but if we had microscopic

eyes or super microscopic eyes perhaps

we could see them and if we had

different kinds of fingers we could pick

them up I mean they are bits of material

but numbers aren't bits of material

however small are they I mean they are

as it were abstract through and through

there is nothing but abstraction to them

it's true that they there's this

discontinuity but the continuity of

ordinary observable objects with the

with elementary particles is rather more

tenuous than I had once been supposed

because an elementary particle is too

small for instance even in principle to

be detected by by light because it's

because it's a smaller than any a any

wavelength furthermore the behavior of

the elementary particles it is basically

unlike that of a larger bodies so much

so that it says I think only by courtesy

that they're called material of the

determinacy with respect to whether two

segments of the two segments of paths of

an electron are segments of path of the

same electron or two different ones into

term indeterminacies of position the the

antithesis between wave and corpuscle as

a in the interpretation of light and

other anomalies something called the

Bose Einstein statistics all suggest

that the analogy of body is an analogy

that was useful for extrapolation up to

a point but then the the really the the

evolution of hypotheses in the light of

further experimentation and further

refutation

I have finally Carrodus to the point

where these where the the continuity is

no longer so evident I would like to

leave at that particular point there

professor Kline because I want to step

back three paces in our discussion and

take up something which strikes me as

being a very much more general interest

that we were talking about a moment ago

and then we got slightly sidetracked and

I think it was partly my fault that we

did I want to go back to the point where

you were saying or suggesting anyway

that the adoption of a physicalist

approach to reality or behaviorist

analysis of behaviorist way of

formulating problems has the effect of

liberating you from the spell of certain

entrenched ways of looking at things

which though there may be part of common

sense are nevertheless mistaken now

that's the point I want to take you up

and can you say what some of the

entrenched ideas are from which you

believe your approach would liberate us

good liberation is one way of looking at

it a sterner discipline is another way

of looking at behaviorism but at any

rate a major example is the notion of

meaning the the there's the come

notion that word somehow convey meanings

how do we know that these that the same

words convey the same meaning to two of

speakers we can see that the speaker's

react in the same way all this is

describable in behavioral terms but

might the meanings themselves be

different yet what behavioral sense can

be made of the question no behavioral

sense no adequately here real sense has

been made of it there are other notions

that come similarly into question

translation once the notion of meaning

is questioned the notion of translation

becomes more complex we can no longer

say it's simply a matter of producing

another another sentence it has the same

meaning as the sentences being

translated the the notion of necessity

again comes into question the well there

are two kinds of answers yes their

article and causal yes the one commonly

is understood as a necessity by virtue

of the meanings of the words the

sentence is true by virtue of the

meanings of the words that it contains

this characterization goes by the board

if the notion of meaning does then

there's the notion of physical necessity

of especially by virtue of physical law

this doesn't depend in the same way I'm

meaning but by somewhat the same sort of

scruples it also becomes questionable

the it's not clear that there's a not

clear to me that there's a difference

between a general truth truth in the

form of a general proposition and

general statement which just happens to

be true and one that is a law the the

term necessary the adverb necessarily is

in very common use and suggests that

perhaps people have a distinction in

mind between two sorts of truth the

necessary and the accidental or

contingent but I think the use of the

the ordinary use of that word can be

explained otherwise I think it's it's

dependent on situation on context

once says necessarily and follows it

with the sentence when he when he thinks

that the other person is bound to admit

it because of what he already has

committed himself to or because he may

be presumed to believe and that this

will vary with the context so you're

calling into question such very

fundamental notions of our thinking as

causal necessity logical necessity the

idea of a law the notion of meaning yes

the ground is beginning to disappear

from under our feet and I think what I

would like to do at this stage professor

Kwan is asked you to characterize for us

as a whole the kind of view of the world

that we're coming out with I can can't

can you good well let's proceed again by

the in terms of it that dichotomy

between the ontological and a pretty key

predict a tional on the ontological side

of what I am accepting assuming surprise

the physical objects a physical object

being construed quite generously as the

content of any portion however scattered

in discontinuous of space-time and all

classes of such things and all classes

of such classes and so on and

mathematicians have known gabador over

the past century how all talk of numbers

and functions and all other mathematical

entities can be paraphrased into talk of

the pure set theory of classes

classes classes of classes appropriate

ones can be made to do the work of

numbers and functions in the rest so we

need these on the other hand these are

abstract objects that I accept there are

others that I would reject properties I

would reject because there's the

question of there's the question in what

circumstances do two descriptions two

characterizations determine the same

property and in what circumstances do

they determine different properties we

just happen to be properties of all the

same things the problem in turn in chart

of individuation of identification of

properties and it's ordinarily said that

two two clauses that say two phrases

determine the same property if they have

the same meaning but of course this

characterization goes by the board if we

don't accept the notion of meaning in

the case of classes this problem of

identification that's not arise because

classes are identical simply if they

have the same members properties I am

persuaded are dispensable in science

it's not clear how to dispense with the

classes so this would be my tentative

ontology and I would regard it as part

of science and subjects the availability

of the rest of science namely the

individuals and the hierarchy of classes

and classes of classes and so on build

upon them the individuals being physical

objects on the on the predicated side my

view is I think mainly or rather

negative it's one of rejecting

predicates that that have too little in

the way of of behavioral or let's say of

observable criteria for their

application or failing that I think one

must also accept theoretical predicates

which don't admit of observable

observational criteria

but there one must insist on their being

pretty firmly related to predicates of

the observational kind now through laws

hypotheses better general physical

theory which makes for a well-knit

system of the world which expertise

prediction so that I would insist not

that pretty cuts have a have necessary

and sufficient their conditions in

observation but that they have a good

share in the way of observe observable

of criteria symptoms of application or

that they play a quite a promising role

in the theoretical hypotheses one thing

that pleases me very much about the

discussion that we've had is that none

of it

so far has been specifically about

language or about words and I say that

because a lot of intelligent blamin who

begin to take an interest in philosophy

are sometimes put off by what they take

to be the discovery that modern

philosophers are doing nothing but

talking about words talking about terms

analyzing sentences statements and so on

and you haven't talked in that way at

all it's quite clear the problems with

which you are concerned are not problems

about language nevertheless someone

opening your books or a student coming

to study with you at Harvard for the

first time would find that a great deal

of your technique of approach to these

problems is via the analysis of concepts

and therefore careful attention towards

the elucidation of sentences and

statements and so on and why is it that

you and other contemporary philosophers

adopt this linguistic approach to what

are after all essentially non linguistic

problems one one reason is a strategy

that I call semantic ascent ASCE unti

philosophical

issues are often concerned with very

fundamental traits of one's conceptual

scheme and if two philosophers disagree

on such points it's difficult for them

to discuss their disagreement without

each of them begging the question

because it's hard to reason and argue

without making use of the fundamental

principles of one's own conceptual

scheme yeah and a way of avoiding or or

some of minimizing this difficulty is

the device of moving up one step

semantically and talking about words

instead of using the words to talk about

the things and if one makes this move

then one can talk about the rival

systems as systems of sentences one can

compare them in point of simplicity and

in point of inclusiveness and that make

a judgment on a on a shared basis

without the circularity the question

ringing well we're coming to the end of

our discussion now professor Carr but I

would like just before we do literally

and I'd like to ask you if you can say

anything at all perhaps in the light of

the discussion we've had up to this

point about what you are currently

working on now I'd have to ask you to be

briefer than I would like because we

have so little time left I would like

you before we end to say something about

what you're doing original work on that

well at present I'm I've been writing

short things in an effort to elucidate

some of the points already in my in my

other writings or to extend and improve

them but there are several problems on

which I would like to see someone make

breakthroughs one of them is connected

with language namely the development of

some conceptual scheme to take the place

of the untenable old-fashioned theory of

meaning something new in something more

acceptable in the way of theory of what

goes into good translation for instance

this is a job perhaps for linguists but

it's something with a philosophical

interest and it's a job also where

someone with the philosophical curiosity

is apt to be helpful to the linguist a

second one is related rather to

psychology

I should like to see a concept resistant

with concepts developed which would do

the work of the old mentalistic idioms

of propositional attitude X believes

that P X regrets that px hopes that be

the sort of thing these idioms are

subject to some subtle logical

difficulties and complications and their

variant wanting in large part of their

applications wanting in adequate

behavioral criteria I should like to see

foresight not for general discourse but

for scientific purposes some apparatus

which would be of which would serve the

same purposes as these and be free of

those faults the third is related rather

to mathematics of the somewhat somewhat

begrudgingly when I accept I accept the

apparatus of abstract objects sets of

the rest as auxiliary to science because

it seems to be needed but I should like

to see a a a minimum basis an economical

basis and a and and a very clear clearly

intelligible basis for for set theory

which was adequate just barely adequate

to so much mathematics as is needed in

Natural Science and it might be that if

this were developed it would among other

things give us a more intuitive

understanding of the so-called paradox

is the antinomies of set theory and

their solution such things as Russell's

paradox which are familiar to some of

our viewers I'm sure and not to all so

that might be a good place to start

well we will have to stop thank you very

much professor Kwan