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Stanford CS153 Frontier Systems | Scale, AGI, and the Future of Everything

41:071,533 summary words · ~8 min readEnglishTranscribed Jun 15, 2026
Summary

The fundamental driver of machine intelligence is the counter-intuitive power of scaling laws, which generate massive emergent properties that outpace scientific consensus. To sustain this trajectory, frontier labs must transition into utility-scale inference providers while navigating structural hardware constraints dictated by highly elastic demand.

This shift changes the global macroeconomic landscape from labor-driven value to capital-and-compute ownership, requiring sovereign-level wealth redistribution frameworks to manage compute access as the ultimate physical commodity.

Section summaries

0:00-2:04

The Strange Origins of OpenAI: Research Lab as a Startup

optional

Sam Altman reflects on his return to Stanford ten years after teaching his original startup course, CS183. He contrasts conventional silicon valley startup paths with the bizarre corporate trajectory of OpenAI, which began as a pure research lab and later bolted on a commercial product engine out of necessity. Altman argues this reverse-hybrid model is highly atypical and generally not recommended for founders, though it was required due to the capital-intensive nature of pre-AGI research.

  • Starting as a research lab and bolting on a company later is an inefficient, highly unusual startup mechanism.
  • Traditional startup rules assumed products were built using existing, predictable technological foundations.

It offers valuable context on OpenAI's structural origin but is less technical than the subsequent sections on system scaling.

2:04-4:08

The Hyper-Deflation of Startup Engineering Cost

watch

Altman discusses how the economics of starting a company have completely shifted. In the current post-AI landscape, cheap access to tokens allows tiny teams to rival the output of historic 100-person engineering departments. He urges developers to raise their operational ambitions, as the time-to-market, parallel processing of workflows, and capital efficiency of AI-enabled entities make old Silicon Valley playbooks obsolete.

  • AI agents and cheap token pipelines compress startup coordination and labor costs down to near-zero.
  • Obvious ideas assigned by professors or investors are usually too late; the high-leverage opportunities lie in undiscovered automated coding ecosystems.

Directly explains the macroeconomic shift in startup operations and the deflation of engineering costs.

4:08-8:16

Emergent Properties and the Mathematics of Extreme Scale

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This section unpacks the systems concept of scale. Altman observes that the most transformative breakthroughs across his career—including Y Combinator's batch size mechanics and deep learning scaling laws—exhibit non-linear emergent properties when pushed beyond conventional limits. Despite strong skepticism from established academic consensus, pushing models to unprecedented compute scales consistently yields unanticipated returns.

  • Scale reveals unexpected network dynamics and emergent features that are invisible at lower resource tiers.
  • Human systems and technological networks both reward aggressive scaling, even when immediate scientific theory cannot explain why.

This is the core philosophical pillar of the entire talk, detailing why scaling is heavily under-explored due to risk-aversion.

8:16-11:22

Systems Engineering and Human Resistance to Exponentials

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Altman breaks down the multi-faceted challenges of scaling AI models, which span physical hardware orchestration across tens of thousands of GPUs, capital acquisition, and institutional culture. He highlights that human brains are not naturally evolved to comprehend exponential curves, which causes researchers and managers to systematically underestimate scaling laws, organizational complexity, and market growth.

  • Systems break dynamically and unpredictably during rapid scaling, requiring rapid engineering refactoring.
  • Managing human alignment during exponential scaling requires a unified, non-diversified commitment to a single first-principles bet.

Crucial for system designers and managers dealing with organizational and computational scaling bottlenecks.

11:22-16:32

The Discovery of ChatGPT: Post-Training and Product Validation

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This section chronicles the creation of ChatGPT. Following the release of GPT-3, OpenAI struggled to monetize the raw API, which was initially deemed too complex for general developers. However, observing that developers were hacking their API keys to build conversational wrappers, OpenAI integrated post-training instruction tuning (RLHF) on GPT-3.5 and launched ChatGPT as a free research demo. Its viral growth trajectory signaled a highly scalable product, prompting OpenAI to rapidly pivot into a massive consumer-facing product infrastructure.

  • ChatGPT was built as a research demo to drive API consumption because OpenAI could not find a product market fit for GPT-3.
  • A product that achieves high growth despite bad UX or limited functionality indicates a guaranteed viral hit.

Provides an outstanding real-world case study on using post-training to dramatically lower a system's user activation energy.

16:32-19:38

Automating the Research Pipeline: The AGI Intern Roadmap

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Altman addresses Codex and the future of LLMs writing code, identifying code as the actuator for AI systems to interact with digital infrastructure. He presents OpenAI's internal roadmap to transition deep learning architectures. Rather than relying on the current, suboptimal sequential training pipelines, the lab intends to use automated AI systems to design the next generation of model architectures.

  • Code acts as the physical actuator for software systems, while robotics acts as the actuator for physical worlds.
  • OpenAI aims to deploy 500,000 A100-equivalent GPUs as an autonomous AI research intern by late 2024 to automate deep learning architecture design.

Essential for understanding OpenAI's concrete milestones on automated research and model architecture self-improvement.

19:38-23:46

The Utility Paradigm: Abstraction of Compute to Intelligence Pipes

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Drawing a historic parallel to early electric companies that marketed 'light at night' rather than abstract electricity, Altman argues that frontier AI will be packaged as a utility. Consumers and enterprises will not interact directly with underlying hardware, GPU clusters, or raw tokens. Instead, they will subscribe to integrated, background intelligence pipes that run constant agentic workflows on behalf of the user.

  • The underlying hardware and model layers will eventually be completely abstracted away from end users.
  • Marketing intelligence requires finding 'light at night' metaphors that make abstract utility computing immediate and valuable to non-technical users.

Offers deep insights into product positioning, neocloud dynamics, and the consumer interface of future agentic workflows.

23:46-25:50

The Frontier Pivot: Engineering the Inference Stack

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Altman advises students on framing their academic or start-up projects, introducing the 'one-person frontier lab.' He suggests that while frontier labs will continue to handle model training, the most severely under-invested domain is the inference stack. Because frontier labs are morphing into massive inference utilities, systems engineering focusing on cheap, abundant, and hyper-scalable inference delivery is highly valuable.

  • To monetize effectively, frontier AI labs must fundamentally transform into specialized inference companies.
  • Optimizing the throughput, cost, and latency of running models is a highly lucrative and under-engineered layer of the AI ecosystem.

Directly actionable advice for founders and engineers specializing in infrastructure and edge deployment.

25:50-28:56

Refuting LLM Skepticism and the Pathology of Static Identity

optional

Altman addresses critiques from academics like Yann LeCun who claim LLMs are a dead end. He points out that LLMs have already disproved such limits by solving complex, unsolved mathematics problems, such as Erdős conjectures. He suggests that the field of artificial intelligence has been historically throttled by senior scientists who tied their personal identities to static theories and could not adapt to empirical scaling data.

  • LLMs are empirically capable of generating novel scientific knowledge and resolving legacy mathematical conjectures.
  • Scientific progress is consistently delayed when researchers associate their professional identities with a specific dogmatic methodology.

Interesting debate on research philosophy, but less focused on hard systems engineering.

28:56-33:04

Institutional Education Failure and the Unseen Social Trajectory

optional

Altman admits to a significant prediction error, expressing surprise that three and a half years post-ChatGPT, the global education system has failed to implement systemic structural changes. He notes that evaluating students based on pre-AGI metrics will lead to critical-thinking atrophy. He emphasizes that society remains largely unaware of the radical transformations that will occur if AI progress maintains its exponential trajectory for another three years.

  • The institutional education system has shown extreme inertia and failed to adapt its curriculum or evaluation to the presence of AGI.
  • Writing remains a vital meta-skill for structuring thought and logic, even if machine generation is superior.

Primarily focused on social commentary and academic adaptation, though the 'unseen trajectory' warning is striking.

Key points

  • Emergent Properties at Extreme Scale — Scaling physical systems, organizational networks, and neural architectures yields non-linear returns and emergent behaviors that cannot be predicted or observed at smaller scales.
  • The AI Research Intern and Automated Architecture Timelines — OpenAI set explicit targets to deploy 500,000 A100-equivalent GPUs as an autonomous AI research intern by late 2024, aiming for fully autonomous end-to-end AI researchers designing new neural architectures by March 2028.
  • The Intelligence Utility and the 'Light at Night' Abstraction — Similar to how early electric utilities sold 'light at night' rather than abstract electricity, the future of AI lies in abstracting physical GPU clouds and API tokens into integrated, always-on agentic intelligence pipes.
  • Sovereign Citizens' Wealth Funds over Cash UBI — As economic leverage permanently transitions from human labor to compute capital, states must construct sovereign wealth mechanisms that distribute equity shares of the technology sector directly to citizens.
  • Jevons' Paradox of Compute Demand — The structural demand for high-end inference compute is highly elastic; lowering the price or increasing the efficiency of an agentic run increases total aggregate compute consumption exponentially.
with like an affordable amount of spend on tokens, you can do what a 100 person incredibly great engineering team would do as a startup and that was just totally impossible. Sam Altman
we have set this goal that by September of this year, we will use 500,000 A100 equivalent GPUs, like a lot of computing power, as an AI research intern, and by March of 2028 that we will have a full end toend very talented researcher like figuring out complete new architectures. Sam Altman

AI-generated from the transcript. May contain errors.

0:09

Please join me in welcoming Sam Olen.

0:13

[applause]

0:18

This class was designed as an

0:19

inspiration from a you know from a set

0:21

of different experiences uh while I was

0:23

a student here. One of them was Terry

0:24

Wintergrad's uh intro seminar CS47N

0:29

computers and the open society. Uh but a

0:31

second one that was a pretty formative

0:33

experience uh for me and a lot of my

0:35

friends and peers on campus at the time

0:37

in 2014 was uh CS183

0:40

how to start a startup by SAM. Um and so

0:43

it's really cool to have you back. Uh

0:45

what's it like? How how's it feeling for

0:47

you to be back? I was thinking as I was

0:49

walking in, if I had just a little more

0:50

time, I would do uh an update to that

0:52

class because I think everything about

0:55

starting a startup has changed so much

0:57

and I have not seen anyone do a good

1:00

version of how you're supposed to make a

1:01

startup now. Uh so I had that like just

1:04

walking in here I had that like ah it'd

1:05

be fun to do it again.

1:06

>> So uh timeline wise yeah you you taught

1:09

that in 14 I think open was founded in

1:12

2015 is that right?

1:13

>> 16 basically 16. Okay. So, so then you

1:16

went, you know, it was like you were it

1:18

it it felt to me from the from an

1:20

observer perspective that you had like

1:22

come up with your working theory for how

1:23

to do it right and then you went and

1:25

tried to implement it. Is that is that a

1:27

spare assessment or is that not the

1:28

case? Obi was like the strangest startup

1:32

of the last maybe couple of decades in

1:35

the Silicon Valley because it started as

1:37

a research lab. It was it was really not

1:38

a company at all,

1:39

>> right? Um, and that

1:44

the kind of normal course of of startups

1:46

is that you start a product company and

1:48

then it like grows for a while and then

1:49

growth slows down and then you start a

1:51

research lab and you like bolt that on

1:52

and you try to figure out the next thing

1:53

to do. And we were the opposite of that.

1:56

We were a research lab first that later

1:58

had to bolt on a startup,

1:59

>> right?

2:00

>> And uh I don't really recommend that.

2:02

It's kind of an unusual thing, but that

2:04

that's not quite what I meant. What I

2:07

meant is like we still followed the

2:09

preAI rules of a startup because we were

2:11

trying to make AI. We didn't have it

2:12

yet.

2:13

>> But now like watching what the best

2:15

startups do is so different than how

2:18

startups worked even a couple of years

2:19

ago. Um that I think someone I'm

2:23

probably not going to do it. Someone

2:23

should do that class again. And what

2:25

would be the biggest updates you you'd

2:27

make based on your data? Um,

2:34

you with like an affordable amount of

2:37

spend on tokens, you can do what a 100

2:40

person incredibly

2:43

great engineering team would do as a

2:45

startup and that was just totally

2:46

impossible. That was like not in the set

2:48

of options for a startup and now it is.

2:52

So, so I think what you can take on, uh,

2:54

the level of ambition you can have, the

2:55

speed of which you can move, the amount

2:57

of stuff you can do at once, uh, is just

2:59

totally different. And, um, does that

3:02

change the shape of the problems you

3:04

feel like you'd assign at the end of the

3:06

class for people to attack, you know, at

3:08

the end of that quarter if you were

3:10

teaching it again? I don't think

3:12

assigning problems to attack ever works

3:14

because if you like if I can think of a

3:17

problem, if I can think of like a really

3:18

great startup idea, uh if it's like

3:20

obvious enough to me, uh then it's

3:23

probably obvious to a lot of people.

3:25

When we started OpenAI, we were we were

3:26

like the uh you know, one of maybe

3:29

generously speaking four AGI efforts in

3:32

the world, right? And you want to find

3:33

something like that. And I'm sure that

3:35

there exists something today that just

3:37

wasn't possible at all pre like

3:40

automated coding era uh that is totally

3:43

unobvious that will be you know a multi-

3:46

trillion dollar market soon uh and that

3:48

only four companies are working on right

3:49

now. But I don't know what that is. It's

3:50

much more likely you all know what that

3:52

is than I know what that is. I just you

3:54

know my brain is like taken over by open

3:55

AAI. Um but you know the kind of idea

3:59

someone can assign you to work on is

4:01

probably not what you want.

4:02

>> Yep. Um, okay. So, that that's fair. Um,

4:06

but I think it would be helpful since

4:07

this is a systems class to maybe uh

4:10

reason about a particular problem that

4:12

you have to reason through so that they

4:14

can then apply the shape of the

4:16

techniques used to break down from a

4:18

systems perspective that problem into

4:19

solutions to their own problem.

4:21

>> Yeah. Um and a and a concept that uh you

4:24

had started to tease in the class you

4:25

know back in 2014 and then uh clearly

4:28

you've talked about publicly over the

4:29

years is um scale right scale is its own

4:33

beast it's it's you know quantity is its

4:35

own quality what scale as a concept has

4:39

been something it seems like you've um

4:42

empirically investigated in all kinds of

4:44

ways over the last 10 years.

4:46

Um could you help help us first unpack

4:48

like what you mean by scale now 10 years

4:50

later how would you deconstruct that as

4:52

a systems design uh attribute to apply

4:55

whether it's a as as a tool um can can

4:58

we start there yes uh so I don't know

5:03

why the following observation is true I

5:06

offer no theory

5:09

that I find satisfying to explain it and

5:11

that makes me a little bit nervous to

5:14

suggest trust you follow it, but I'm

5:16

going to anyway because empirically it

5:18

does seem to be true, which is all of

5:20

the most interesting things I have

5:22

observed in my career in watching other

5:25

uh things happen. All of the most

5:27

interesting ones uh have had something

5:31

to do with emergent properties that

5:34

scale or scale continuing to provide

5:36

returns far beyond what the consensus

5:39

thinks will work. And this obviously

5:41

happens with like scaling loss for AI

5:43

models. Um but this happens with uh you

5:48

know getting more smart people together

5:50

to think about one problem. This h in a

5:52

in a research setting. Um this happens

5:54

with uh companies and the sort of

5:57

economy of scale. You can get all the in

5:58

all these different ways. I really

6:00

learned this at Y Combinator when uh it

6:03

became clear to me that everybody was

6:06

saying, "Oh, Y Combinator's gotten too

6:07

big. It should shrink. We should film

6:08

less companies per batch." you know, the

6:10

best times of Y Combinator when it was

6:12

like 10 companies per batch. And a lot

6:14

of like very smart people were saying

6:16

this and

6:18

and it was like tempting because it

6:20

would have been like much less work. And

6:21

the theory was that, you know, the best

6:23

companies are always kind of obvious and

6:25

then you fund the rest and it's not as

6:26

helpful. Um, but a huge part of the

6:28

magic of what made YC work were uh was

6:32

the sort of the network effects inside

6:34

of the batch and that was an emergent

6:36

property at scale that just hadn't been

6:38

discovered before. No one had tried to

6:39

fund startups

6:41

at scale in the same way and and thus no

6:43

one had ever happened upon this

6:46

observation of when you do that um

6:48

there's

6:50

there's something important that happens

6:52

that just didn't exist at all at the

6:54

110th to 1/100th of a scale.

6:57

There's a bunch of other examples like

6:58

this. Uh I

7:03

and I'll skip them in the interest of

7:05

time, but I I would say again I offer no

7:08

explanation for why, but empirically

7:10

speaking, when you find a time that you

7:12

can push on,

7:15

you can push something to a scale people

7:16

have not tried before and it's already

7:18

working in some interesting way at the

7:20

smaller scale. More often than not, that

7:22

seems to be a good idea. And it also

7:24

seems to be something that

7:28

most people don't do enough.

7:30

>> And I don't offer an explanation for

7:32

this either, but like in, you know, when

7:34

we were like, we're really going to

7:35

scale AI models. Um, all of the like

7:38

geniuses in the field, most of them

7:40

were, oh, this isn't really working. You

7:41

know, that's that's barely a scientific

7:43

result. It's not interesting that it

7:44

gets better at scale. You've already

7:45

shown that. Why keep scaling it? I

7:47

mentioned the YC example. Um, I've seen

7:50

a lot of

7:52

startup founders where they're like,

7:53

well, you know, there might be something

7:55

interesting that would happen if I

7:56

scaled this up, but I'm a little worried

7:59

about it for non-specific reasons. And

8:01

again, looking back at like a huge data

8:04

set of people that have scaled their

8:07

companies in all these different ways.

8:08

There's almost always interesting stuff

8:09

there. So, I think directionally that's

8:12

like an interesting thing to push on and

8:16

severely underexplored.

8:18

Um on the systems design part of that uh

8:24

I think one reason people don't do it as

8:26

much is stuff breaks uh at an

8:31

accelerating rate and in an

8:32

unpredictable way as you scale it and if

8:35

you are going to really scale something

8:37

um

8:39

it's always like a little bit broken.

8:41

there are always like very smart people

8:43

who say why you shouldn't do this you

8:45

know don't get too ambitious don't get

8:46

too big let's try this smaller and so

8:49

breaking that down as a systems problem

8:51

I use the thing of when we were like

8:53

scaling up AI models there was

8:55

technically can we do this at all this

8:56

seems crazy like no one had ever thought

8:58

about trying to do a run across 10,000

9:00

or 100,000 GPUs and that was going to

9:01

require stacks of engineering talent um

9:04

there was the capital requirements and

9:06

what was going to take to do this and

9:08

like how is there ever going to be a

9:09

business how can you think about taking

9:10

this risk

9:12

uh there was this sort of like cultural

9:13

stuff of researchers saying well if

9:14

we're going to get all this comput

9:18

something why not have to divide it up

9:19

among all these all these projects and

9:21

this also happens in kind of every area

9:23

I've looked at almost every area for

9:25

scale and breaking it down into the sort

9:29

of each difficult area or each reason

9:32

not to do it and trying to address them

9:34

one at a time that's been really

9:35

important. Um,

9:38

I'm going to push on that a little bit

9:40

because

9:41

there's very few people who've been able

9:42

to sort of repeatedly scale new products

9:45

and systems the way uh the OpenAI team

9:48

has over the years. But it seems like

9:50

one of the issues is there are all these

9:53

prior conditioning sort of mental models

9:56

and expectations humans have. And you

9:58

said things break. And one of the things

10:00

it seems often breaks that's hard the

10:03

hardest to refactor is is human the

10:06

human side of the the systems design,

10:09

right? Wherever there's human

10:10

implementers or there's uh human

10:12

participants in that. And so what have

10:13

you learned about humans at scale like

10:15

organizing humans at scale to

10:17

participate in a system that may not be

10:19

uh like just a redo of some past system

10:22

that they they get naively on at a

10:25

priority on first blush. Um,

10:29

I think like clear a clear goal, a clear

10:33

plan to get there. Uh, and like a clear

10:40

answer to the way that you're going to

10:42

get there and kind of how you're going

10:43

to make decisions along the way. That's

10:44

that's very important. So, um, you know,

10:48

if we go back to the example of when we

10:49

decided to scale up models, there were a

10:51

lot of people who were like, ah, this

10:52

isn't really going to work. It's going

10:54

to have these problems. It's also not,

10:55

you know, we need a more diversified

10:57

portfolio. But once we say no, we're

10:58

going to make a bet on scaling deep

11:00

learning, like that's our thing. If

11:01

we're wrong, we'll fail, but we're going

11:03

to do that. Here's why we're going to do

11:04

that. Here's what we believe about what

11:06

the state of the world could be like if

11:07

we get there. Uh, that's very powerful.

11:11

And then

11:13

for whatever reason, um, we did not

11:16

evolve to be good at thinking about

11:19

exponentials. People have a hard time

11:22

imagining that scaling laws are going to

11:25

continue exponentially, that revenue

11:26

will grow exponentially, that an

11:28

organization can take on exponential

11:30

complexity. And in my experience, it

11:34

takes a lot of time to really reason

11:36

through first principles with people

11:37

about why why that can happen. Can we

11:40

take two examples uh to walk through

11:42

that? The first being tach and the

11:44

second being codeex. You know, both of

11:46

these have transformed. Can can everyone

11:48

hear? I'm going to try to project it.

11:50

Yeah. Okay. Um so let let me put in a

11:54

frame and you can challenge both the

11:55

assumption and then we can hopefully

11:56

reason to example what happened. In the

11:59

case of chat GP you know for a long time

12:00

in scaling of models a big mental block

12:03

that seem to be prevalent in the space

12:06

is what are these things going to be

12:07

useful for this is you know it's a

12:09

research uh sort of solution solution

12:12

chasing a problem research first

12:14

approach. It's not a product. Um and

12:16

then you know chat GPD came out and it

12:18

proved to the world that you know that

12:21

chat experience was a killer app for

12:23

general models um at scale for consumers

12:27

and then a couple of years later you

12:29

know it's clear that coding has been the

12:31

killer enterprise app. So what how would

12:34

you compare and contrast the systems you

12:35

guys used to discover those use cases

12:37

ship them scale them monetize them any

12:40

any salient learnings from those two

12:42

systems? Yes. Um,

12:46

so we had made GPT3 and

12:50

we needed to make money cuz we wanted to

12:52

go scale up to, you know, a billion and

12:53

multi-billion dollar computers and we

12:54

had GPT3 and it was kind of interesting.

12:56

It was a cool demo but we couldn't

12:58

figure out a product to build around it

13:00

and we had been thinking thinking we

13:02

just couldn't do it. We had tried a few

13:03

things. They they hadn't worked. Um, and

13:05

so we knew the models were gonna get

13:07

better, but we also wanted to like start

13:09

a revenue engine sooner. And we said,

13:12

well, since we can't figure out what

13:13

product to build, we're just going to

13:14

put this into an API and we're going to

13:17

hope that somebody else can figure out

13:18

what product to build. And so we

13:20

launched in like, I don't know,

13:21

something in the summer of 2020 the GPD3

13:24

API. And initially, it kind of got no

13:29

traction at all. And then about a month

13:32

later, randomly, as far as we can tell,

13:35

it went viral on Twitter on the same

13:37

day, uh, a few different developers kind

13:39

of found got it to do something cool,

13:41

posted it, other people started trying,

13:43

and and then like a lot of people

13:46

started trying the API. Um, but it was

13:49

shockingly bad. If you go back and use

13:51

GBT3 or 3.5 um you will be astonished at

13:56

how bad the models were then uh relative

13:58

to the amount of excitement they

14:00

generated at the time. Uh so people

14:02

tried all these things and really the

14:04

only business that people got to work in

14:07

a significant way with GPT3 was

14:09

copyrighting. Um and that was like not

14:12

that great and not that exciting and we

14:13

were kind of like you know h it's just

14:15

going to have to wait for a better

14:16

model. But although no that was the only

14:20

business that was working, developers

14:22

had figured out how to like put in a

14:23

prompt and get and be able to chat with

14:25

it. And we saw this a lot like more

14:29

people were using they couldn't get the

14:32

API to work for their business, but they

14:34

were using their API key to just chat.

14:35

And we said, well, we can build a good

14:37

chatbot. People clearly want that. And

14:40

we had a new model. We actually had UPV4

14:42

done, but we had a new model we were

14:43

ready to release in between called 3.5.

14:45

And we had figured out a new kind of

14:47

post training where we could get the

14:49

models to do like a good job with

14:50

instruction following so it can make it

14:52

easier to chat with. And we said, well,

14:54

you know, the API is not working great.

14:58

Maybe it was like a 10 or a $20 million

15:00

run rate kind of business, but there is

15:02

this thing that people love. Uh, and

15:05

under the YC principle of see what your

15:07

users love and do that, we said we'll

15:08

we'll build a chatbot around it. And we

15:10

put that out and we still didn't think

15:12

it was going to do that well. Uh there

15:14

was it was really meant as like a

15:15

research demo uh to convince other

15:18

people that they should build chat light

15:19

products and pay us for the API,

15:22

but that went like crazy viral. And

15:24

another thing I had learned from YC is

15:26

when something really starts growing and

15:28

it's not very good, you have like a

15:30

guaranteed hit on your hams. And so we

15:32

had like five days where the traffic

15:35

would shoot up, fall off, and everybody

15:37

be like, "Well, that was just a hype

15:38

cycle." But then the next day it would

15:39

get to a higher peak, fall off again

15:41

later in the day. People would say

15:42

that's a hype hype cycle. By the fourth

15:44

or fifth day, I was like, I know how

15:46

this works. I know what's going to

15:47

happen. Like, we have the potential here

15:50

>> at a killer product. Um, and we knew we

15:54

could make it much better. We knew we

15:55

could we knew we had GPT4. We knew we

15:57

could keep scaling. Um, but by that

16:02

fifth day, we got everybody together and

16:04

said, "This is an emergency. This is a

16:06

good kind of emergency, but we have to

16:08

build a company and a product all at

16:10

once.

16:11

Uh we then had like two months of crazy

16:14

scaling. Uh and then we said, you know,

16:17

we have to figure out a business model

16:18

later. For now, we're just going to

16:20

charge people so that we don't like run

16:21

out our compute bills. But that's

16:23

obviously not the long-term answer. That

16:25

also turned out just to work. Um and

16:28

that was the story of Chach. And then

16:29

there was so much utility that people

16:31

just had not gotten over the activation

16:34

energy to find that that has worked

16:36

really well. Um and then codeex.

16:40

Actually the plan before chatbt was that

16:42

we were going to go all in on code.

16:44

>> Um we knew these models could write

16:45

code. Uh we knew that they could be

16:48

really and we knew that that would be

16:50

like a valuable area. But then we had

16:51

this incredibly exciting thing happen.

16:53

Um but our kind of internal belief at

16:55

the time was that coding was how these

16:59

models would control things on computers

17:01

and robots were how these models would

17:04

control things in the physical world.

17:05

And if you made a smart enough model

17:07

that had sort of the actuators of

17:08

writing code and robot and driving a

17:11

robot, you could then kind of actually

17:14

get this intelligence to do stuff for

17:15

you in the world.

17:16

>> So, uh, then it took us a while to get

17:18

there. And then I think codeex got

17:21

really good by early this year, but with

17:24

5.5 is when we saw this real inflection

17:26

point where people are now like doing

17:29

just incredible things with it. And um

17:32

you know that we earlier in the class

17:34

we've talked about how the capabilities

17:36

pipeline uh is starting to look is

17:39

starting to become somewhat more legibly

17:41

standard across different research

17:42

groups. You got you know pre-training

17:45

mid-training post training. Then you got

17:46

the RL and supervised feedback loop. Is

17:48

do you think that's roughly like the

17:50

shape of the pipeline that allowed

17:52

codeex to you know go through a

17:54

capability jump and that will basically

17:55

stay stable now and consistent or are we

17:57

going to go through a major rewrite of

17:58

that pipeline? I think that is

18:00

definitely the current pipeline. I

18:02

expect we will go through a major

18:03

rewrite. I don't know when it'll happen

18:04

or exactly how. Um, but

18:08

it is a little odd to me that it's so

18:11

happens as a pipeline and doesn't quite

18:14

feel like the optimal solution. Um, what

18:18

would be an optimal solution in your

18:20

head?

18:20

>> I think that's a research problem for

18:21

the AIS to figure out. Um, I think we're

18:24

at a point where and we've set this goal

18:26

that by September of this year, we will

18:28

use 500,000 A100 equivalent GPUs, like a

18:31

lot of computing power, as an AI

18:33

research intern, and by March of 2028

18:35

that we will have a full end toend very

18:38

talented researcher like figuring out

18:40

complete new architectures. Um, so I

18:43

think we are going to get like with the

18:45

current pipeline, the current

18:46

architectures, I think we're going to

18:48

get over the line of when AIs can do

18:50

incredible incredible work. Um, you

18:53

know, one of the things that you you

18:56

just described there

18:59

is you you we we've been talking a lot

19:01

in the class about systems frameworks

19:03

and analogies to make concepts from one

19:05

domain legible to other people who may

19:06

not have all the context in another and

19:09

that sometimes because of the

19:11

translation problem, you know, reasoning

19:13

by analogy is not helpful because then

19:15

errors compound. Yeah. Um right there

19:17

you said you know our goal is to try to

19:19

use it as an AI intern which obviously

19:21

is a very useful metaphor within the

19:23

context of you know Silicon Valley a

19:25

class that understands how these

19:26

pipelines work and so on and then as as

19:28

you scale actually that metaphor

19:30

globally people who might not have all

19:32

that context go start analogizing these

19:34

models in ways that they shouldn't be

19:35

like how should we think about the

19:37

limits of of that of of what are the

19:40

limits to scale of um what are the

19:43

product analogies the research analogies

19:45

you find most useful

19:46

within the valley and which one of the

19:48

what have you found about the limits of

19:51

those analogies scaling and now how do

19:53

you navigate between those two problems?

19:56

I I've been very interested in studying

19:59

how like

20:02

I think what is happening is we are we

20:04

are in the process of creating a new

20:05

utility. This doesn't happen very often.

20:07

you know, electricity is utility,

20:08

internet's a utility, there water, I

20:10

guess there's not a lot of these. Uh,

20:12

and so there are not a lot of examples

20:14

that we can study for good metaphors or

20:17

learnings about how to explain this to

20:19

the world. Um, but I was recently

20:22

looking at what happened when

20:24

electricity became a utility. And it's a

20:28

good analogy for many reasons. It's

20:29

imperfect, of course, too. But the

20:31

electricity companies, at least the ones

20:33

I could find information about, they

20:35

didn't talk about selling electricity

20:36

cuz no one knew what that was or why

20:38

they wanted. It sounds like very scary.

20:39

It's this thing that's like going to

20:40

come into your house and it could kill

20:42

you in this like gruesome way and you

20:44

you know it feels sort of like very

20:46

different than the world before. Uh and

20:49

maybe they tried to sell electricity or

20:51

market electricity at first. I don't

20:52

know. But in any case, that didn't work.

20:54

And then what they started

20:56

marketing selling to people was light at

20:58

night. You know, we are going to what

21:01

you are getting from us is not

21:02

electricity. It's light at night. By the

21:04

way, you can use the same thing that

21:06

lets you get light for all these other

21:07

things. But people are like, well, why

21:09

would I want that? And they're like,

21:10

well, you know, it'll wash your clothes

21:11

for you someday. And no, no, it won't. I

21:13

can't. That's too far of a jump for me,

21:15

>> right?

21:15

>> Um, so I don't know what our analogy

21:20

for this should be. Um, but I suspect

21:23

that even if even if we're totally right

21:26

and intelligence is going to become this

21:28

new utility that every company, every

21:30

customer, every government just needs

21:34

access to and is going to use in all

21:35

sorts of incredible ways and you will

21:37

have like a OpenAI token subscription

21:39

that you will plug into everything and

21:41

use to access everything and you have

21:42

running for you all the time and doing

21:44

this amazing stuff. I kind of don't

21:46

think at least right now the right way

21:48

for us to analogize that is we're

21:50

selling intelligence because people are

21:51

just like somehow not resonating. I

21:54

don't know what our equivalent of we're

21:57

selling you light at night is going to

21:58

be. But I think if we're going to become

22:00

a new utility, we need to find a way to

22:03

explain to the world what it means to

22:05

have this like intelligence pike that

22:07

you can just do whatever you'd like with

22:09

>> it. So um one

22:13

question that has emerged an emerging

22:15

property of this class of of having a

22:17

diversity of different speakers is that

22:19

the utility analogy has come up several

22:20

times but in reference to different

22:22

things. So Jensen likened like compute

22:26

to a utility um and why there should be

22:29

access and so on and talked about how

22:30

Stanford should pull budget and so on

22:32

and and and procure that as a utility

22:34

for everybody on campus whereas you just

22:36

likened the intelligence part to util

22:38

are both of these things true is one of

22:40

them true one is one more likely to be

22:41

true how should people reason about

22:42

compute as a utility versus tokens as a

22:45

utility and and by comput I mean here

22:47

chips versus tokens does that make sense

22:50

>> I think as a consumer as like a business

22:53

or an individual um you will think in

22:56

something closer to tokens or probably

22:58

even one level up from tokens. I don't

23:01

think you'll care very much about you

23:03

know where the hardware is, what

23:05

particular chip it is, what's powering

23:07

it. I think that stuff will be

23:08

abstracted out and what you will care

23:10

about is when you're interacting with

23:12

the system. Um

23:15

can you use it a lot? Is it cheap? Is it

23:17

doing a good job? Um so right now it's

23:20

like tokens. It may get as we move into

23:23

a world where we all just have like this

23:25

constant agent running for us, being

23:27

useful to us all of the time. Um, you

23:29

may think about it as even one level up.

23:31

But yeah, my my guess is is you when you

23:34

like pay for your cell phone bill,

23:36

you're like, "All right, I'm buying

23:38

access to airtime and some number of

23:40

gigabytes and, you know, it's going to

23:42

do all these things and I'll use all

23:43

these apps and whatever else." But like

23:45

what you think about paying for the kind

23:47

of internet utility in this case is just

23:49

like access to the whole system and the

23:53

particular hardware at the base station

23:55

and how it connects to the internet. You

23:57

don't think about that as much.

23:58

>> Um I know I could nerd out about utility

24:01

infrastructure for a long time but I

24:02

want to make sure we switch a little bit

24:03

to being relevant for the students.

24:05

Usually we have uh questions where we're

24:07

not hearing those today unless you're

24:09

comfortable. Oh, okay. Great. How about

24:11

that? Improv. Okay. Uh so one final

24:15

question to start getting the creative

24:16

juices flowing is um the final project

24:18

for this class or fiber 183 is the

24:21

oneperson frontier lab. So everybody

24:23

here is working on projects where

24:25

they're simulating being an individual

24:28

uh as a lab with access to all the right

24:30

tools. They've got hundreds of thousands

24:31

of dollars of credits from Cloudflare. I

24:33

think we've got some open AI tokens

24:35

maybe. But there's a bunch of compute at

24:36

their disposal. Um, what would you, if

24:39

you were in the class, what would you be

24:41

working on for your oneperson Frontier

24:42

Lab project? First of all, I think

24:44

that's an awesome project. Um,

24:48

I think this is top of mind because uh

24:52

you we we were just like talking about

24:54

utility frame frameworks. I think

24:56

there's a lot of very smart people

24:58

working on uh great training ideas and

25:02

we're going to have incredible models.

25:04

No matter what you all do, we're going

25:05

to have incredible models. I promise

25:07

here uh like pretty quickly but

25:11

I I think we have not invested enough in

25:13

being able to deliver at scale huge

25:16

amounts of cheap intelligence. So maybe

25:17

I would go work on like the inference

25:19

part of the stack

25:20

>> and how are we going to get this

25:22

incredible intelligence to be cheap and

25:24

abundant? Uh I think that's

25:26

underinvested in and and I think all of

25:28

the frontier labs are going to have to

25:30

become inference companies to a

25:31

significant degree. Um, okay.

25:36

It might be too late to pivot your

25:37

projects, but better late than never.

25:39

>> Work on whatever you want to work on.

25:40

[laughter]

25:42

>> Uh, okay. Let's start taking questions

25:43

and I'm going to moderate and try to be

25:45

not, you know, please try to be

25:47

productive and not spicy, etc. Remember,

25:49

it's a CS class, but up to you Sam is

25:52

fine.

25:53

>> Oh, we've got questions. Oh, perfect.

25:54

All right. First one, the questions

25:56

about your views on Yan Lun's view that

25:59

LLMs are a dead end. Um,

26:03

first of all, in terms of achieving

26:05

human level intelligence, these models

26:07

have already far surpassed human

26:09

intelligence in some ways and then

26:11

they're wildly worse than others. Like

26:13

for example, they seem much worse than

26:15

people are at very long horizon

26:20

kind of high judgment signal and tasks.

26:24

Um on the other hand yesterday we had

26:28

one of our models uh discover or

26:31

disprove a conjecture one of the airish

26:33

problems that had smart people had

26:35

worked on for a long time and a lot of

26:37

people a lot of smart scientists I don't

26:39

know if lun was one of them or not had

26:41

even quite recently said something like

26:43

that was not going to happen. Uh and

26:45

then like the model just did it and you

26:47

know now you have all these

26:48

mathematicians saying like is math over?

26:50

What does this mean for our field? So

26:52

clearly LLMs are capable of figuring out

26:56

new knowledge and clearly they are

26:58

capable of doing some things that some

27:00

intelligence tasks that humans just

27:02

can't do. Um they are going to scale

27:04

much further. So how much better and

27:06

what distribution of the tasks they can

27:08

do better than humans. We'll find out

27:09

but I suspect it's a lot. And the you

27:12

know in terms of this like lack of a

27:15

belief in the exponential we were

27:16

talking about earlier. Um, I think the

27:18

field was honestly held back by a

27:21

generation of scientists who just were

27:23

way too certain on what wouldn't what

27:25

what scaling was not going to produce

27:27

and then some people just looked at the

27:29

graphs and said, "Well, it looks like

27:30

it's continuing beautifully. Let's keep

27:31

going." Um,

27:34

I think world models are clearly

27:37

important and to

27:39

we'll need that for things like

27:41

robotics. Uh but betting

27:44

against LLM scaling at this point

27:48

uh feels quite misguided to me.

27:53

>> Does it get annoying to be the I told

27:54

you so guy?

27:55

>> No. I mean

27:58

there are these like Twitter trolls that

28:00

you know for years have just been like

28:02

it's not going to work. It's not going

28:03

to work. This is so dumb. Like you know

28:04

this is a fraud. This company's going to

28:06

fail. This research approach is going to

28:07

fail. And I used to get more bothered by

28:09

them. But I don't even like feel the I

28:11

told you so at this point. It's like you

28:12

were like she was nervous.

28:14

>> You're still going on about it. Like the

28:16

data is

28:19

>> quite strong on our side and I don't

28:22

think it'd be that fun to say I told you

28:24

so. And also the fact that you're like

28:25

still saying we're wrong doesn't really

28:26

bother me.

28:27

>> I think there's that kind of move on.

28:29

>> There's that saying that like insanity

28:30

is doing the same thing over and over

28:32

again when presented with data that is

28:34

not working and they keep repeating

28:35

that. And in a sense it's it's it's a

28:37

form of insanity. I think

28:39

>> I I think there's something that happens

28:40

which is if you make your identity about

28:43

a particular

28:45

thing is going to work or not work

28:48

and you associate yourself with that

28:50

belief and then the science or the

28:52

empirical results disprove you and

28:55

you're like too hung up on your

28:57

identity, you can't let it go. You can't

28:58

see the truth.

28:59

>> Yeah.

29:00

>> And I think this is like a important

29:01

reminder in both directions.

29:03

>> Yeah.

29:04

>> How do you see education?

29:07

Um, it clearly has to super adapt and I

29:11

am worried. I I thought by now it would

29:13

have. Um, the the I think if we continue

29:17

to teach and evaluate students

29:20

as if we were in a pre-agi world, um,

29:23

it's not going to work and it is going

29:25

to lead to like atrophy of learning how

29:27

to think or whatever. And I thought that

29:29

was going to be obvious enough that I

29:31

wasn't that worried. You know, when

29:32

Chhatbt launched, I was like, "Yeah,

29:33

we're going to have one year of like

29:35

students like cheating and not learning

29:37

that much. And then the educational

29:39

system is just going to redesign

29:40

itself." And there's and we're going to

29:41

teach people so much better. You know,

29:43

people are going to really

29:45

get projects where they have to they

29:48

have to use AI to be able to do it, but

29:49

they still have to like stretch their

29:50

brain more and think more and figure out

29:52

new things to do. And honestly, I

29:56

struggle to point to any significant

29:58

systemic change that I've seen in the

30:00

education system at large in the three

30:03

and a half years since Chad launched.

30:04

And I that was a prediction error for

30:06

me. I thought I thought that would have

30:07

happened. So I have no doubt that we can

30:12

uh like we have done with every other

30:13

technological leap before redesign how

30:16

education works so that you still have

30:18

to learn how to think. And there will be

30:20

some things like I I I am a person who

30:23

thinks by writing and I write a lot of

30:26

stuff that I never show anyone else but

30:28

it's still important to me to figure

30:29

something out and so I'm grateful that I

30:30

I learned to write. People say the same

30:32

thing about programming. Um so there

30:35

will be some things that we teach people

30:36

to do that machines can do better just

30:38

because it's helpful to teach them the

30:42

meta skill of thinking and learning and

30:43

that makes sense. But there are a lot of

30:45

other things where we should just

30:46

totally teach totally change how we

30:49

teach or how we learn or how we

30:50

evaluate. And

30:53

if we don't do that, I think there will

30:54

be like significant atrophy in people's

30:57

critical thinking skills. Uh question is

30:59

what was your favorite class and what

31:00

what do you wish you had taken while

31:02

when you were at Stanford?

31:03

>> Does Stanford still do intro Sims? I did

31:06

like all the I did like three intros a

31:08

quarter my freshman year like and I

31:10

loved all of them. Uh they were all

31:12

super different. Uh I but looking back

31:17

the fact that I

31:19

was able to get such a broad exposure to

31:21

stuff and h have like a a very shallow

31:24

understanding of lots of different

31:25

fields was an incredible thing. If it

31:28

had not been for that I just would have

31:29

taken like CS and physics classes which

31:31

still would have been great. But um I I

31:35

think more about the stuff the classes I

31:37

took that were like totally random and

31:40

unrelated to what I do now but in some

31:42

important way

31:44

gave me a perspective than I do I think

31:46

I would have like learned to program no

31:49

matter what. Uh so I and I didn't think

31:53

that at the time I was like kind of like

31:54

yeah you know this is this stuff is all

31:57

cool but it's mostly going to be about

31:58

like learning CS. Um, I only did two

32:01

years of school. Uh, so there was a lot

32:03

of stuff I wanted to take that I didn't

32:04

get to. Um, but that's kind of the

32:06

surprising thing.

32:08

My question is, what is your spiciest

32:11

take of all?

32:17

I I think with more time to think uh I

32:20

could come up with a much

32:22

spicier one, but um

32:26

I think AI is just going to keep going.

32:29

And

32:31

I think this is considered

32:34

I don't I don't think this is like

32:35

widely believed yet. And I think if this

32:37

were widely believed, there would be

32:39

like significantly more reverberations

32:41

that are happening through society right

32:43

now. And maybe I don't have the spicer

32:45

tag. Actually, maybe this is the high

32:46

order bit that if AI progress continues

32:49

on the exponential that it's on for

32:52

another,

32:54

it's been three and a half years since

32:55

tragedy. If even if we're another three

32:56

and a half years on that same

32:57

trajectory, the world

33:00

the potential the way that society

33:03

what's society is capable of are just

33:05

completely different. Well, let me try

33:07

to prompt more thinking tokens on that

33:09

one. um you you have if we treated you

33:13

as a model like as a frontier model and

33:16

you have some inherent capabilities and

33:17

we're going we're going to try to elicit

33:19

capabilities that people don't know

33:21

about for the next few minutes. Um one

33:23

of them is that you've been postrained

33:24

now on you you've been continuously RL

33:27

on OpenAI as well as the external

33:29

feedback loop of the world on what

33:30

doesn't work and works and doesn't work.

33:33

So now if we're going to treat you as a

33:34

prediction engine for a sec, the prompt

33:36

is what are the three most likely forks

33:39

of the universe you see over the next 10

33:41

years and what is your what is your

33:43

probability assessment on each of those?

33:45

Does that make sense?

33:47

One that feels very important is uh like

33:52

how much is this technology going to be

33:54

very widely democratized versus how much

33:56

is it going to sit in a few companies. I

34:00

I think a world there are all of these

34:02

reasons why you could imagine the

34:03

default is that this gets concentrated

34:05

to a few companies and they become like

34:08

you know a significant fraction of the

34:10

wealth on earth that would obviously be

34:12

terrible and we work super hard to push

34:14

against that but I think that's going to

34:16

require like the will of the world to to

34:18

really avoid um because there is a sort

34:21

of a tractor state there and I think

34:22

part of the reason that we need to push

34:24

to this kind of utility model of the

34:25

world is that a it's quite unstable and

34:29

quite bad will feel quite unfair if a

34:31

few companies have all of this. But B, I

34:33

think there's a real alignment failure

34:34

and a very fragile world. Uh, and the

34:37

best way to get to a world we want that

34:39

represents like everybody winning and

34:41

everybody's values being represented,

34:43

everybody having agency is to just put

34:44

push this technology out into the world.

34:48

Um, but there will be a very strong

34:49

argument against that around sort of

34:51

safety and stability. And I think that

34:54

will be a big fork. And it's very

34:55

important and I encourage all of you in

34:57

your careers to push hard that this is a

34:59

technology.

35:01

It can bring us an incredible sci-fi

35:03

future. Life can be unbelievably much

35:05

better. We are going to incur some risk

35:07

to get there. But the risk of keeping

35:09

this concentrated in a handful of

35:11

companies even though we would be one of

35:12

these companies is not something we

35:14

should tolerate. So I think that would

35:15

be a big fork. uh in terms of

35:17

probability I think it's

35:21

the world should have such an interest

35:23

in it happening this way that I think

35:25

it's like 80% we end up on the

35:27

democratic path but there will be a very

35:30

strong safety message and you know there

35:32

will be a lot of power seeking people

35:34

who who want to concentrate the power

35:36

and

35:38

one of the problems with forecasting

35:41

this or that you have and we all have as

35:43

humans is once you make that forecast

35:45

then you of agency to affect the

35:48

forecasts, right? And the forecast for

35:49

>> Well, I mean, we're clear on what we're

35:51

going to use our agency for. Like, this

35:52

is what we believe in. We think that uh,

35:55

you know, we're going to do everything

35:56

we can to push it in this direction. We

35:58

just we see the forces in the other

36:00

direction. Maybe a related fork. Uh,

36:04

there's a lot of talk about like future

36:05

economic models and are we going to do

36:07

universal basic income? Are we going to

36:09

have everybody gets to like own a slice

36:11

of every company? Like, are we going to

36:13

is it capitalism with no change? Is it

36:16

like fullon communism? There's like a

36:18

lot of talk about this. One thing that I

36:20

think is not talked about much is how

36:23

specifically how we distribute compute.

36:26

>> So maybe a lot of the economy can work

36:29

in a way that it's going to work. And

36:31

I've actually I've become much less of a

36:32

even short-term jobs doomer. I've always

36:34

been optimistic we find new things to

36:36

do. But this may not be dup as disrupted

36:38

as I originally thought in the short

36:40

term. Um but we are seeing compute

36:43

shortages now. I can imagine them

36:46

getting much worse and I can imagine

36:48

compute being like the most important

36:50

utility that people need. Uh so if the

36:53

price of compute from a supply and

36:54

demand perspective gets way out of whack

36:56

then I think there will be a very

36:58

interesting fork about what it means to

37:00

equitably distribute compute. So you did

37:03

two very interesting things there which

37:04

you said on the economic side we might

37:07

have need universal basic income.

37:09

Everybody owns a piece of shares. You

37:11

know, one of the speakers in this class

37:12

is um Nikolai Tangjen who runs the

37:16

Norwegian sovereign wealth fund. He's

37:17

awesome. He's awesome. You know, the

37:19

Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Fund owns

37:21

1.5% of all publicly traded companies on

37:23

the planet. They also have effectively

37:25

universal basic income. You could argue

37:26

there's flavors of this already today

37:28

because, you know, the largest employer

37:30

now in the United States is the

37:31

government and you could argue like

37:32

large sections of that are a way for the

37:34

government to redistribute income from

37:36

taxpayers. So are these solutions that

37:39

actually need to be novel or just

37:41

reimplemented for this era? How do you

37:43

think about the novelty of those

37:44

solutions where we often you know in

37:46

Silicon Valley make have this tendency

37:48

to be like reinvent you know old things

37:51

from first principles and so should we

37:53

just look to existing systems and tweak

37:54

them. Um yeah, I don't think that these

37:55

things require

37:57

deeply new ideas. Although I will say um

38:02

I am much more excited about people

38:04

having some sort of ownership stake than

38:07

a fixed monthly cash dividend,

38:09

>> right?

38:09

>> Um and I I funded like a big universal

38:14

basic income study a while ago. I've

38:17

also watched what happens when people

38:18

like invest in startups and I know which

38:21

model I think like hits human psychology

38:23

better. So what I would love to see is

38:26

as leverage in the world shifts from

38:30

labor to capital which I think is going

38:31

to keep happening

38:33

that we find a way to have something

38:36

like a citizens wealth fund in the

38:38

country or in the world eventually where

38:41

you like you basically own a slice of

38:43

capitalism right a slice of these

38:44

companies. And then on the second fork

38:46

there on compute bottlenecks, you said

38:49

uh at some point when compute prices get

38:51

out of whack between January and this

38:53

year, my my current understanding is

38:55

based on data we've seen that H100

38:57

prices and Blackwell prices the spreads

39:00

between long-term reservations and spot

39:02

is like 5x.

39:04

>> I don't know if it's that high anymore.

39:05

I think it got a little better. But

39:07

yeah, tell me.

39:08

>> Or if you can even find H100s cuz

39:10

they're pretty much all gone for this

39:11

year. Does that sound right?

39:13

>> No argument. there's a gigantic comput

39:15

shortage. Yeah. So that that's a good

39:18

example of an of a systems problem right

39:20

now that's live. At least to some folks,

39:23

it feels like co, you know, for the

39:25

comput era, like all the toilet paper's

39:27

gone.

39:27

>> Yeah.

39:29

>> Why are people not freaking out about

39:30

this?

39:31

>> Well, I think people assume we will make

39:33

big inference gains on the hardware we

39:35

have. Uh I also think there is a tsunami

39:37

of hardware coming

39:38

>> but maybe the demand tsunami is even

39:41

bigger and people I think people should

39:42

be freaking out somewhat

39:43

>> and and would you say it's fair like how

39:46

long are we going to exist in a comput

39:47

shortage

39:48

at least you know based on current data

39:51

you have

39:53

>> I think like other you you can't talk

39:56

really about like worldwide demand for

39:58

electricity without talking about the

40:00

price like it's there's an extremely

40:03

different demand about how much energy

40:05

people want to use in the world if the

40:06

price comes down by a factor of 10 or

40:07

goes up by a factor of 10 and I think AI

40:12

is like that too.

40:14

>> Uh the

40:16

if we can make models

40:21

sufficiently smart and a sufficiently

40:23

low cost. I think demand is like kind of

40:26

uncapped and so in some sense as long as

40:28

we can continue to make progress on this

40:30

there will be a shortage forever and

40:32

things will be bid among above what the

40:35

price we think we think the price should

40:37

be even though people are getting better

40:39

smarter more whatever intelligence just

40:42

because you can use like

40:45

if we make really great personal agents

40:47

and you can have 10 of them running and

40:48

working for you all the time or 100 and

40:50

you know you want the hundred I think

40:53

>> it's a lot of inference

40:54

lot of conflict.

40:55

>> Awesome. With that, I'm going to give

40:56

you the swag for the class, which is

41:00

[applause]

41:02

Thank you for coming. Thank you. Thank

41:04

you all.

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