Ethiopia is About to Explode.

Ethiopia's about to descend into all out

war. The story hasn't broken through the

headlines with Ukraine, Iran, and other

conflicts still demanding the world's

attention, but global experts who've

watched Ethiopia for years are all

sounding the alarm. And even Ethiopia's

leaders are starting to forecast what's

coming. On one side, Ethiopian strongman

Abiy Ahmed was recently reelected in a

vote that was less of a free and fair

contest than more of a king's

coronation. On the other, the Tigray

people of the Ethiopian north a well

armed well organized fighting force with

several of Ethiopia's regional rivals

ready to fight by their side. For

Ethiopia and the rest of the region, the

stakes could not be higher. The war in

neighboring Sudan has cost untold

hundreds of thousands of lives and is

already on the brink of spilling past

Sudan's borders. Eritrea to the north

appears to expect war in the very near

future. And Somalia to the south is

inches away from its own internal

breakdown. Powerful players across the

Middle East are taking notice and

choosing sides. Saudi Arabia, Israel,

Turkey, the Emirates, Egypt, and others.

On Ethiopian soil, it's not just the

Tigray who are on the verge of open

conflict. It's the Amhara people and the

Oromo, too. As for how bad this war

could get, well, the last time Ethiopia

went to war against the Tigrayans, the

result is widely recognized as the

deadliest conflict of the 21st century

thus far. But if the African Horn blows

apart in the way that currently seems

possible or even likely, then it's going

to make the ruinous Tigray war look like

the warm up act.

Wind back the clock by a few months to

late February 2026 and a war between the

Ethiopian federal government and the

Tigray people seemed imminent. Ethiopian

leaders in Addis Ababa had been sounding

the alarm for nearly a year warning that

the Tigray regional government was

becoming an obvious threat after a

faction within Tigray's ruling People's

Liberation Front or TPLF seized power in

an internal coup d'état. Later in 2025,

the new Tigray leadership accused

Ethiopia of funding and supporting

anti-TPLF splinter groups and militias

who had launched numerous attacks

against Tigray regional forces. Addis

Ababa responded with claims that the

TPLF was attacking civilians in the

neighboring Afar region and shortly

afterward the Tigrayans accused the

Ethiopian government of a drone strike

that killed Tigrayan soldiers and

civilians. In late January the Tigrayans

seized multiple towns and exchanged fire

with government forces and over the next

several weeks the Ethiopian military

surged northward in a massive military

build-up. The Tigray and the TPLF

leadership responded with a build-up of

their own with Ethiopia alleging that

troops from neighboring Eritrea had

crossed the border to fight alongside

them. By the final days of February the

Tigray region was on the brink of

full-scale war then one that would

probably bring Ethiopia and Eritrea into

direct conflict. But then the world

witnessed a much larger series of events

that forced Tigray and the Ethiopian

government to freeze their ambitions in

place. Starting on the 28th of February

and continuing for several weeks after

the United States and Israel waged war

against Iran while Iran sprayed

retributive drone and missile fire in

all directions. Global oil market

suffered an incredible series of shocks

the Strait of Hormuz was closed and

Ethiopia well Ethiopia is entirely

reliant on refined petroleum that it has

to import from outside the country with

the vast majority of that petroleum

coming out of the Strait of Hormuz. For

the Tigray the situation was no

different with the world's oil tankers

stuck in the Persian Gulf Ethiopians on

all sides would have to try and stretch

their fuel stores as long as they could

and given how much fuel the two sides

would have to consume in order to wage

an open war Ethiopia had no choice but

to place the conflict on pause. Now of

course you need only remember that we're

publishing this episode now several

months after the fact to deduce that the

story did not end there. Tigray's TPLF

leadership appeared to be entirely aware

of the opportunity in front of them

which was broadly similar to the

opportunity that say a younger sibling

might have to torment their older

sibling while they know mom's around to

save them from retribution. In April the

TPLF floated the idea that they might

restore the regional government that had

existed prior to the Tigray War, which

was fought over the span of 2 years

starting in late 2020. That, by the way,

is the deadliest war of the 21st century

that we mentioned earlier with some

incredible estimates suggesting that

over 600,000 people may have been

killed. After the TPLF threatened to

restore those political structures,

including a ruling legislative council,

and accused Ethiopia of withholding pay

from civil servants and attempting a

unilateral power grab in the region,

Ethiopia didn't really offer much of a

response. Suddenly, the TPLF were able

to confirm that Ethiopia was no longer

willing to start a war, or at least not

for that level of provocation. Seeing

their opportunity, the TPLF took the

step to restore its pre-war government

in early May with the chair of the TPLF,

Debretsion Gebremichael, elected as the

region's president. Meanwhile, in Addis

Ababa, Ethiopian leader Abiy Ahmed had

other priorities to focus on at the

start of June. 49-year-old Abiy coasted

to re-election in what was, to put it

mildly, a vote of highly questionable

legitimacy. Not only does Ethiopia

tightly restrict international press

access during election seasons, as well

as maintaining a chokehold over its own

domestic press, the vote excluded the

entire Tigray region, while polling

places were conveniently closed out in

areas where the vote might not have gone

Abiy's way. Far from what global

observers had hoped in the early years

of his tenure, when Abiy was awarded the

Nobel Peace Prize, his victory this year

was a foregone conclusion. But, the vote

still mattered to Abiy and his inner

circle, not because anybody doubted that

they would win, but because it was an

important test of any remaining internal

resistance in government stronghold

areas. Less than a decade after he rose

to power, Abiy is on the verge of

becoming dictator for life. The free

press doesn't exist, the opposition has

been bludgeoned into submission, and

most remaining dissidents and meaningful

political challenges are either in

prison or in exile. So, Abiy's gambit

was a simple one: engage in a brazen act

of consolidation of his own power, and

see whether anybody would do anything

about it. Ultimately, nobody did. But,

during the months leading up to the

vote, it understandably became Abiy's

primary focus. And that brings us to

today, where the situation across

Ethiopia has started to shift back into

the direction of open war. The clearest

indicator as of the time of writing came

in the form of an op-ed published in Al

Jazeera, ironically entitled, quoting,

"Ethiopia must not be dragged back into

war." The title message sounds nice. Of

course it does, but the identities of

the op-ed's two authors give away the

game rather quickly. One of them is

Redwan Hussein, the director general of

Ethiopia's National Intelligence and

Security Service, and a very close

advisor to Abiy Ahmed himself. The other

is Getachew Reda, the very same interim

Tigrayan regional president who was

recently forced out of his post in the

coup we just described. Together, the

two used their time in Al Jazeera to

make the case that the TPLF are working

with Eritrea in a coordinated effort to

launch an imminent attack on the rest of

Ethiopia. The really relevant bit of the

article is rather long, but it is

important enough to quote directly.

"Aided and abetted by Asmara, the

hardline rump of the TPLF has decided to

launch an offensive against the federal

government in the coming days. A clear

violation of the Pretoria Agreement, the

rump TPLF has dismantled the regional

interim administration and set up its

own illegal administration. It has

continued recruiting, training, and

arming a sizeable fighting force with

the direct support of the Eritrean

government. It is also purged and cast

away all of those within its ranks who

advocated for peace and adherence to the

Pretoria Agreement." End quote. Now, of

course, we'd hope it's rather obvious

that these authors are far from neutral

voices on the matter. They're

high-ranking Abiy officials with a

vested interest in building a case

against the Tigray region just shortly

after their government engaged in an

obvious military buildup. But in this

case, they also aren't pulling those

allegations out of thin air. The new

Tigray leadership did restore their

regional government, the TPLF is widely

understood to be coordinating with

Eritrea on some level, and recently the

group appears to have repositioned tanks

closer to the front. The TPLF really did

recently introduce compulsory

mobilization for its citizens while

criminalizing speech and media that

would criticize or oppose recruitment.

Quoting regional expert Liam Karr of the

Critical Threats Project, speaking

exclusively to War Fronts, "Eritrea has

partnered with the TPLF to create a

buffer against Ethiopia, keep Ethiopia

fragmented, and dilute the threat

emanating from Ethiopia." End quote. As

for whether the TPLF intends to strike

first or is trying to defend against an

attack from Addis Ababa, well at this

point it's a distinction without a real

difference. Both sides understand that

the other is prepared for open conflict,

and both sides understand that Ethiopia

is headed imminently in that direction.

Worse yet, international affairs are

starting to cooperate again. As the time

this episode was recorded, the US and

Iran seem to be on the edge of a

memorandum to reopen the Strait of

Hormuz, and while recent military action

centered on Lebanon might still tank the

entire thing, it's impossible to ignore

the way the wind seems to be blowing.

Once the strait reopens, Ethiopia

doesn't need to be nearly so

conservative with its fuel stockpiles,

and that's when the seal is broken. Now

unfortunately, there's also a risk that

the Tigray conflict could explode into a

much larger regional conflagration, but

before we get to that possibility, a

quick pause to tell you about our

subscriber site fronts.co. fronts.co is

our outlet for all the stories that we

just don't have space to do justice here

on the main channel. A place where we

can really dig deeper than we ever do

here on YouTube. Every week we upload

two exclusive videos, two expert written

articles, and a podcast or two covering

all the conflict and geopolitical

stories that matter most to you. Beyond

the African Horn, we also have plenty of

pieces on Ukraine, Iran, Sudan, the

Sahel, Europe, and elsewhere. Not to

mention all the minor conflicts that the

rest of the world tends to ignore. If

you do want to know more about what's

happening in this part of the world,

we've actually recently published an

article by Pavel Wojciech on the ongoing

political crisis in Somalia, plus an

exclusive video on how a toll in the

Strait of Hormuz could wreck the global

economy. A subscription to Fronts costs

just five bucks a month or $50 a year.

Again, that's fronts.co. Check it out.

And now, back to it.

Now, sometimes when we discuss a likely

future conflict on this channel, we have

to really take the time to lay out the

case for just how devastating a war

could be. In this case, however, we only

need to point to the 2-year-long Tigray

War, widely recognized again as the

deadliest conflict of this century so

far. Back then, Ethiopia and Eritrea

were working together to fight the

Tigray in war that saw up to 600,000

people estimated dead, nearly 3 million

internally displaced, nearly a million

more forced to flee the country, and 13

million people left dependent on

humanitarian aid. Now, as bad as that

conflict was, there's already reason to

believe that a second war could be

worse. For one thing, Eritrea would be

on the Tigrayan side this time,

introducing greater parity in equipment,

economic power, and other key factors.

For another, the Tigray are a much more

experienced fighting force today than

they were at the start of the last war.

And the recent regional coup has helped

stamp out dissident voices that might

have opposed a return to conflict. But

this time around, Ethiopia also faces

the risk of inviting a much larger

national breakdown. The country is still

battling another internal insurgency

from the Ethno-Nationalist

Fano militias in the country's Amhara

region. Although reports on the conflict

are relatively scarce outside of

partisan sources, the fighting across

Amhara is known to be intense and

ongoing. The Fano are far from a unified

front, they're chaotic, internally

divided, and lack a coherent vision of

what they'd do if they could actually

win. But even though that

disorganization is an asset to the

Ethiopian government when they're

concentrated on the Fano directly, it

turns the Fano into an unpredictable

destabilizing force if Ethiopia's

attention has to be diverted elsewhere.

In a situation where Addis Ababa is

preoccupied with the TPLF, the Fano

could conceivably realize some serious

gains, attacking government forces that

can't count on reliable reinforcements.

In fact, they've already changed their

posture over the last few months,

escalating their own activity in

response to the military's pivot toward

the Tigray region. As of now, Ethiopia

has launched a limited counteroffensive

against the Fano, but if Addis Ababa

believes it could keep up that pressure

while also fighting the Tigray, well, we

can't say for sure that Abiy would be

wrong, but it certainly be at risk of

overextending. Similarly, Ethiopia would

face the risk of destabilization from

the region of Oromia, and particularly

the Oromo Liberation Army, an

organization that's carried out targeted

attacks within the last several weeks.

Nor is a renewed Tigray war a

self-contained conflict, and the risks

of outward expansion do not end with the

idea that Eritrea could choose to

participate. Ethiopia and Eritrea exist

within a much larger context of rising

tensions across the Middle East and

North Africa, where powerful

international coalitions take up

positions across a range of regional

proxy conflicts. We've discussed these

coalitions at length in other episodes

here on War Front, so for now, we'll

just name names. On one side, Ethiopia

is drawn into closer alignment with

countries including the UAE, Israel,

Morocco, and increasingly India. On the

other side, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar,

Egypt, and a handful of other countries

are getting cozier with their own

nuclear-armed partner, Pakistan. These

coalitions are getting involved in proxy

and frozen conflicts from Sudan to

Libya, to Somalia, to Syria, to Yemen,

to Lebanon, and even Cyprus and

Afghanistan. The Tigray conflict is far

from immune to these larger forces.

Ethiopia has long been at odds with

Egypt, where a growing rivalry over

access to the Nile River, the Red Sea,

and other geostrategic assets has led

both sides to seek out foreign support.

Egypt sees Eritrea as a natural partner

against Ethiopia, and Cairo has been

working to deepen their relationship

over time, including with meetings in

the last few weeks. Egypt also sees the

Tigray TPLF as a regional proxy ally,

and other members of Egypt's coalition

are starting to follow along. Quoting

regional expert Liam Carson again,

"Egypt would almost certainly materially

back Eritrea in the event of a direct

Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict, as it has the

SAF, and Egyptian support given to

Eritrea or SAF could indirectly benefit

the TPLF given those partnerships."

End quote. Turkey, meanwhile, is in a

more difficult spot. Broadly aligned

with Egypt, but also a major supplier of

weapons to the Ethiopian military.

Recently, however, reports from the

region have increasingly suggested that

Turkey is supplying both sides in

Ethiopia, not just the federal

government. And if there were any region

around the world that was primed for a

conflict like this to come along and

throw the entire region into an

international overlapping war, well, it

would be the African Horn. Quoting Liam

Carson once more, "Ethiopia's outsized

role in the region and regional issues

means that it is linked to basically

every other regional issue or hotspot,

and I don't think any other tension

points would coalesce regional conflict

dynamics quite like a war in Ethiopia."

End quote. After several years of

continuous fighting, the civil war in

Sudan hasn't turned out to be the

destabilizing force that regional

experts once feared, but other

countries, including Ethiopia, have

started to take a more active role in

the conflict. Just within the last few

months, Ethiopia allowed Sudan's

genocidal Rapid Support Forces, or RSF,

to launch an offensive from Ethiopian

soil. That was proof positive for the

RSF's enemies, not just that Ethiopia

was getting cozier with the group, but

that Ethiopia was increasingly aligned

with the UAE, who've been the RSF's

primary backer for years. The Sudanese

military regime has already strengthened

ties with both the TPLF and Eritrea, and

both the regime and RSF would likely

view an Ethiopian conflict as being

immediately relevant to their interests.

Worse yet, a renewed Tigray war in

Ethiopia could see mass migration toward

more stable parts of the Horn of Africa,

or the creation of new black market

routes from the Sudanese front lines

toward Ethiopia, or even the movement of

RSF fighters and possibly Sudanese

government forces in response into an

Ethiopian war zone. Quoting regional

expert Alan Boswell of the International

Crisis Group, "We are in an incredibly

dangerous situation where both sides

view the other as actively helping their

armed opponents. All the ingredients are

there for a much wider regional blow-up,

really, a regional mega-war." End quote.

Similarly, we've already referenced

Somalia's ongoing political crisis where

an increasingly unified opposition is

signaling that it may take up arms over

Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mahmoud

as he tries to overstay his mandate. The

Somali government has already started

framing that crisis in regional terms,

referring to the opposition as an

extension of the Sudanese RSF in

Somalia, and the country's internal

divide is well supported by regional

power dynamics. Israel, the Emirates,

and Ethiopia have all supported the

breakaway region of Somaliland and are

likely to back the Somali opposition if

the situation degrades to open conflict,

while Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and other

allies have provided Mogadishu with

diplomatic and increasingly military

support. Finally, any regional crisis in

the Horn of Africa risks destabilizing

South Sudan, where the young country's

internal power structures are so fragile

that a well-aimed sneeze could probably

send them toppling over. Now, as for how

all of this could play out, really the

situation is all the more concerning

because there are so many ways for

things to go wrong. Ethiopia and the

TPLF could engage in a limited conflict

where Eritrea doesn't directly get

involved, and instead the war is a way

to strengthen proxy alliances on all

sides, entrenching regional divisions

that the rest of the world is still

struggling to pick up on. Or, Eritrea

and the TPLF could enter into a larger

conflict with Addis Ababa, incentivizing

the Fano and the Oromo to take up arms

and kicking off a much longer period of

Ethiopian internal instability. In that

world, maybe other countries don't get

involved directly, but spillover effects

start to change the status quo in Sudan

or inflame violence in Somalia. Or in a

worst-case scenario, these regional

conflicts start to really bleed together

and the emerging coalitions across the

wider Middle East decide to get

involved, pouring money and weapons into

what will one day remember as the war of

the African Horn. Perhaps Abiy Ahmed

remains in power in Ethiopia as he

currently seems likely to do. Or maybe

Ethiopia's rising dictator implodes in a

firestorm of his own making. Sadly, it

seems that peace is the least likely

outcome of all. Ethiopia, Eritrea, and

the TPLF all seem to be angling toward

at least a limited conflict. And in a

way, that's the most insidious problem

of all. Each of those three governments

will have its military objectives and

its political priorities. And each of

them will probably have a clear

understanding of how they expect a

conflict to go. But that's just not how

the African Horn tends to work,

especially not recently. It would be

difficult to design a region

deliberately as a place that's more

perfect for conflicts to spiral into

catastrophe. Abiy Ahmed, Ethiopia's

Isaias Afwerki, and the TPLF in the

Tigray region all suffer from the same

critical blind spot. All of them seem to

believe that a war is something they can

control with stakes they can choose and

consequences they can manage. That just

is not true. And if those dueling

governments don't wake up to that fact

soon, then they risk sleepwalking into

an Ethiopian explosion on a scale that

none of them have bargained for. The

only thing that constrains them now is

the fuel moving through the Strait of

Hormuz. But once the strait comes back

online,

all bets are off.

Thank you for watching.