El conocimiento de la realidad la explicación científica

We continue with the second topic of the

course syllabus,

the knowledge of reality. This time, we will

focus on specific aspects

of the scientific explanation of

reality. However, the

process of producing

scientific knowledge, being characteristics of

science and the scientific explanation of

reality itself,

let us recall that in the previous session

we started from the fact that reality,

or to express reality in the

philosophical field, we know the category of

being, insofar as this is a category

that allows us to designate the possibility

of existence of everything that exists.

In this case, our criterion for

this moment is that, evidently, when we

speak of scientific knowledge,

we are talking about knowledge about something.

In other words, the prerequisite

is that this something exists so that, in this

case, knowledge can be built upon it

that can be considered

scientific. This

something can be material beings, or

ideal beings; it can be

human interactions that fall within the process of,

or within the classes of

material beings that we categorize as social.

The characteristics of some and others we

had already indicated in the

previous session. Now, what interests us is to

draw some conclusions from this.

The first, evidently, is that reality is

something that is present there; therefore,

in this In this case, science deals with

things that exist in one way or another; this

is the given fact, and it is this given fact that we

must accept the challenge of being able to

explain it objectively.

Secondly, reality

manifests itself as a plurality, as

the graph already showed us: there is a

diversity of materials. It is by

using our capacity for

reason that we are able to

organize this diversity of materials and

even explain the

nature and functioning of this

diversity of materials and phenomena,

which would constitute our third

conclusion. This

conclusion, which

we were already considering as basic from the beginning, is that

all the knowledge we construct

about it is an expression of the relationship we

establish with the world. The world

offers us a diversity of problems that

can be elucidated by humankind

itself, using its capacity for

thought.

And finally,

the world we construct is the proper sphere

in which we develop, since

this constructed world, these

interpretations, evidently

offer us the possibility of inserting them into

a life endowed with meaning.

We are interested in highlighting the third idea

in question: it is

through thought that we

can organize all the materials

that reality presents to us, all the

problems that reality presents to us.

From this perspective, knowledge is presented as

an activity that allows us to become

aware of reality itself as a

structured and ordered whole.

This capacity, this knowledge,

allows us to understand reality. By

understanding it,

we evidently assume that what we have constructed about

it is true from a

certain point of view, and this obviously allows us to

insert ourselves into that reality

more effectively.

Throughout history, humankind

has sought to understand

reality because it has always sought to

exert dominion over it.

Evidently, the different forms of

knowledge show us different degrees of

dominion that humankind has exercised over

reality, over nature in

particular.

From this point of view, we could say

that the root of knowledge is

essentially a vital root. Humankind

requires understanding the world to be able to

insert itself into it in the best

possible way. Now,

when dealing with

scientific explanation itself, we must keep

in mind that it

places us in two

initial spheres. Knowledge is

essentially a collection of information

that we have about things, but this

collection of information that we have about

things must have been

obtained and produced according to certain

procedures.

Therefore, when dealing with

scientific knowledge, we must keep in mind... What

this production of

knowledge represents is the proper domain of

scientific research,

and secondly, we must bear in mind

that the scientific research process

produces a body of

knowledge that the

scientific community accepts and recognizes as such, at

least as true at the time it is

produced, as long as there are no

new approaches that show us

its falsity and that can, in this case,

replace it. We will

not be moving in those two

previous directions. Let us recall that

in the first topic we

characterized what science is as a

form of worldview that man

has constructed throughout history,

and at that time we said that as a

worldview, science has two

characteristics: rationality,

which presupposes that it is a form of

knowledge that is constructed by appealing to

reason, building theories, using, we

said, concepts, laws, and formulas

to be able to communicate its contents, and

that in doing so it tries to explain

reality to us as objectively as possible.

And when speaking of this,

we must keep in mind from the outset that this

objectivity particularly indicates

something that is achieved and pursued, and is

achieved above all in the field of

practical sciences,

since the sciences Formal sciences, how they

move within materials of

logical order, obviously we are not going to

verify objectivity as we

could have verified it in the

field of biological sciences.

Well,

science, as we said at that moment,

presents itself in three ways:

as a body of knowledge that

explains reality to us; as the

research process through which

that knowledge is produced; but also

in a third way, as a

transformative force of reality, insofar as

the acquired knowledge

allows us to construct a technique and a

technology capable of influencing the

image we have of the world and the world

that they constructed. Well,

as we mentioned in the previous session,

we will therefore have to have the

basic classification of science, and the

basic classification of the sciences is

evidently into formal sciences and

practical or empirical sciences.

Formal sciences deal with ideal entities;

in this case, mathematics and logic.

Ideal entities, for example, geometry,

the triangle, the circle—it works

with the triangle and the circle,

but the triangle and the circle are

not things that exist in reality.

In reality, there are things that have a

circular shape, perhaps, but the

circle is a perfect figure and as such

in nature. In

mathematics, we work

with signs and symbols, and

a series of processes are carried out relating

those signs and symbols. But, for example,

the numbers 2, 3, and 4 don't exist in

nature either. What

exists in nature are things that can

be two, three, or

four units, but the number two as

such doesn't exist. There can be two glasses,

two bananas, but not the number two. It's

astral.

Therefore, formal sciences are

those that we say work with

things of an ideal order.

Factual sciences work with phenomena and

processes that occur in

objective reality, whether it's nature or

society. They deal with

physical beings, and in this case,

notice that they deal with aspects of or

manifestations of those physical beings.

Physics, geography, geology, or

what deals with biological order, and

therefore botany, zoology, anatomy—

and anatomy studies

not only the structure of the body of

animals, but when we talk about

human anatomy, it would study, in this

case, the human being not as a

social being, but as a being

Biological

and social sciences: sociology

studies social groups,

social movements, or history, which

studies the continuity of the

human being over time

and therefore deals with beings of a

different nature, but these are beings that

occur, as we pointed out before, in

time. An

example of this is the Pythagorean theorem.

In the Pythagorean theorem, we work

with signs and symbols; we have a

square equals a square plus b

squared. But each of these signs and

symbols is not something that exists in

objective reality.

The treatment of these contents is developed

through a series of

transformation rules that science accepts

and incorporates in order to address its

customs. And there, the

formula is cleared, which will be true, according to what we

had said, to the extent that

the unity of the system is not broken. But

if

the unity of the system is altered, it

would evidently be false.

In the case of the empirical sciences, in

the field of theological and

physical science, the law of conservation of

matter and energy, the law of

conservation of mass, which tell us

how certain

reactions occur in nature,

and which evidently It will be true if

we can verify that what the law tells us is

manifested in reality.

The law of conservation of

mass states that in an ordinary chemical reaction,

mass remains constant; that is,

the mass of the reactants consumed

is equal to the mass of the products obtained.

This statement will be true as long as

we can verify it in

reality.

Therefore,

both formal sciences and

practical sciences are evidently, or are

evidently characterized, because they are

constructed from the point of view of

reason.

Now, objectivity, as

a correspondence with reality, is something we

can observe and feel

more clearly in the field of science.

Thus, the 15 characteristics

that Mario Bunge indicated to us from the

first topic are evidently

characteristics related to the

practical sciences.

Practical science would be biology,

geology, or

history; these are sciences that

deal with them, but evidently they are not

limited to a description of the facts,

but rather they transcend the facts and

try to explain them. They propose

interpretations, theories, and laws that, in

one way or another, explain things to us

at the moment we are studying them.

But if in Later,

we find new evidence, new

data. These theories could even be

modified since it is,

we say, open knowledge; it is

knowledge that has the virtue of being

able to self-correct and perfect itself.

Formal sciences and

practical sciences obviously have

differences, which we must take into

account.

While formal sciences are not

objective in the sense that their

propositions agree with

concrete facts, and cannot be because they

work with people of an ideal nature, as we have already

said, practical sciences work

on concrete facts and try to

propose explanations that

agree with the facts, and if that is

achieved, we say that their explanations are true.

Formal sciences, since they work

with signs and symbols,

relate these signs and symbols

according to the rules of transformation that

formal science itself possesses.

In the case of empirical sciences, the

scientist observes facts, discovers

regularities, ways in which

the facts relate to each other, and tries to explain

them by highlighting these

relationships that occur between the facts and

events or processes.

Therefore, the method, the

characteristic method of the formal sciences, is

evidently the method Deductive reasoning

par excellence is a method of

rational order that, starting from a

general proposition, deduces others.

In this case, it is based on pure

rationality that demonstrates and proves

its contents. This

differs from the

practical sciences, where the

deductive method is evidently useful and

necessary but not sufficient, since

facts are being observed. In the

realm of practical sciences, experiments can therefore be conducted to

obtain

controlled observations that

allow us to verify that things are as they are.

Formal sciences express themselves according to

the characteristics of their

disciplines, as do

practical sciences. However, this means, for

example, that in formal sciences,

since they work with signs and symbols, they

express themselves precisely

through this relationship between signs and

symbols. And since these signs and

symbols do not represent facts that

exist in nature, we say that

these symbols are, in this case, empty symbols.

In the case of practical sciences,

we use language as we know it

to communicate things; we use

signs, but they are not empty signs, rather

signs that refer us to a specific

reality. In this case, while, for

example,

in formal sciences, in algebra

and x can be Variables

in the field of practical sciences:

these symbols are symbols with a

content to which they refer us. For example,

h refers us to hydrogen and allows us to refer to

oxygen, and if we have h2O in a formula, it

refers us to water. In each case, we are

talking about interpreted symbols that

refer us to a specific content of reality.

Formal sciences and

empirical sciences also differ in the

nature of the propositions they

pose, in the type of truth they

propose, and in the kind of demonstration they carry out. Formal

sciences

are apolitical; they present us with

facts that must necessarily happen that way.

Practical sciences, unlike these,

interpret and propose forms of

explanation for the facts they

deal with,

but their propositions do not necessarily

occur that way; rather, they can happen that way.

Truth in the case of

formal science is a truth

we defined in the previous session regarding

the criterion of truth. The predominant criterion of

truth in formal science

is what we call truth as

coherence; that is, its propositions are

true as long as they maintain

coherence within the system to which they

belong. Unlike them,

practical sciences formulate

propositions that are Statements are true as long as

they agree with the facts or

phenomena they address. In this

case, this is what we have called

truth as correspondence or adequacy,

since the demonstration of

formal sciences, which work with

ideal entities, is

predominantly due to

deductive reasoning. This is

not the case in

practical sciences, which work with hypotheses that

must be verified by contrasting

them with facts that can, in this

case, support them or admit the

possibility of their rejection.

Therefore, it requires

much more complex procedures.

Another aspect to consider

is the language used in the

context of

both formal and practical sciences.

In this case,

we differentiate two kinds of language:

natural language and

artificial language. We call natural language that which

is constituted according to the

patterns of the language itself. Therefore, with

respect to it, we follow the

procedures that the language

provides us, according to the

syntax of the language in question.

We call artificial language certain

special codes that evidently

respond to their own irregularities. They

are, therefore, special forms of communication,

e.g.,

mathematical notation, where

what is related is not

facts to each other, but rather... In the case of

signs and symbols, according to the

transformation rules

formulated by the discipline,

or musical notes

with which

any kind of

musical composition can be carried out, these are therefore

special languages ​​that have their own

extraction systems.

In this case, according to the language,

formal sciences will use

artificial languages, while empirical or

practical sciences will use

natural languages.

Artificial language uses signs

and symbols, while

natural language uses words.

Formal language responds to the

transformation rules established

in the discipline. For example, in this

case, the commutative law states that the order of the

factors does not alter the product;

therefore, 3 times 2 is equal to 2 times 3.

In the case of empirical sciences, they are

structured according to the norms, the rules

of elaboration of the language, which

in this case corresponds to a part of

grammar that we call

syntax. These

transformation rules

allow us to construct propositions that

can have different intensities or

psychological intentionality; they can be

active and transformed into

passive sentences; they can be dubitative; they can

be of different natures, as

classified by the language.

The second criterion of truth We chose this because it is

an aspect that

interests us. In the case of

formal sciences, the

predominant criterion will always be the criterion of

coherence;

its statements are true as long as they

are coherent with each other. If

the rules on which this

procedure is carried out are altered,

the proposition would obviously be false.

In the case of empirical sciences,

we said it is the criterion of

correspondence or adequacy, and things

will be true, or propositions

will be true, as long as they

coincide with reality. Another aspect to

consider

pertains to the structure of science.

When we speak of the structure of

science, we are talking about that set of

elements that science uses to

express its contents.

These elements are particularly

concepts, hypotheses, laws, and

theories.

Now,

the four constitute the structure of

science,

but it does not necessarily mean that the

four express a

scientific explanation of reality.

Concepts are abstractions, products

of the mental processes that we

regularly carry out. Through the concept,

we grasp a certain aspect of

objects.

Evidently, a single concept cannot

allow us to explain a phenomenon or a

given fact;

for that, we would require many

concepts.

Hypotheses, unlike

concepts, do offer us An

interpretation of certain facts and

processes is already an interpretation, but these are propositions that

try to explain why or

how things happen, and therefore

are subject to demonstration.

In this case, we must subject it to an

experimental process through which

we can conclude that what

the hypothesis

proposes is true or false,

depending on the process. This

process is evidently essential and

guiding in the construction

of scientific knowledge, but it does not,

therefore, constitute

a scientific proposition or explanation in itself.

Only when

it has been duly

demonstrated does it begin to constitute

a scientific explanation of

reality, which can result in the

statement of a law.

In this case, laws are

universal statements that express

constant relationships between natural phenomena,

facts, or properties of things, and

whose truth has been sufficiently

tested by experience and

observation.

In this case, it would consist of a

duly demonstrated hypothesis.

Theories, unlike laws,

are also evidently... A

scientific explanation of reality, but

theories are characterized by the fact

that they gather scientific knowledge

and promote it at the same time. Their

development involves broader formulations

and serves, in this case, as a basis

for formulating new hypotheses

and, evidently, new investigative processes.

In this sense,

concepts, hypotheses, laws, and theories are

part of the structure of science,

but in the strict sense of the

word, only laws and

theories constitute a

scientific explanation of reality.

Finally,

we address the functions of

scientific knowledge,

and according to what we have been describing,

we can say that there are at least four

fundamental functions that

scientific knowledge

expresses. The first, evidently, is to

describe; in this case, to offer us

the set of characteristic features

that facts,

things, and phenomena possess.

Secondly, it

must explain why things

happen as they do; in order to explain, it must

discover the causes or irregularities that

make things happen in one way or

another.

Thirdly,

when we have the ability to explain

why things happen as they do,

we also gain the possibility of

predicting how things would happen if

the conditions under which they

occur are more or less similar.

And fourthly... In this case,

science offers us a set of

true propositions, a set of

theories and explanations about

reality that allow us to

actively and transformatively influence it.

This knowledge

can therefore serve to

solve concrete problems we

face in reality, and not only that,

but it is clearly useful and

necessary to build a series of

tools that allow us to act

more effectively upon reality.

Therefore,

scientific knowledge translates into techniques and

technology, and this is perhaps the

most common way in which we encounter

the

content that science has been

developing throughout history.

Let this serve as a

description of what

scientific knowledge represents,

and subsequently we will need to

address, at least in broad terms, how

scientific knowledge is produced.