CHINA IS THE REAL WINNER OF THE IRAN CRISIS – w/ Brandon Weichert

And I've been saying recently that the

war is going to be moving fronts and

it's going to become more I don't know

if we did we talk about it yesterday how

I believe it's going to become more of a

war of proxies.

>> I think you mentioned it either to me or

I watch your show so I I think I've

heard you say it but just you know

everyone should go and see what I was

saying back in March 9th. I was saying

that Somali land and you know there was

the the that side that kind of red sea

area was going to pop next. And uh I

think that's accurate. Yes, we did talk

about it. Actually, we did talk about it

because we were talking about proxy

escalation. So yeah, we did talk about

it.

>> Everyone should go also see what I said

in in February 2nd, 1996.

I said there's going to be more

instability in the region. Everyone

should go check that out. Well, you

would have been you would have been a a

prophet if you had said that because

back then back then 96 those were good

times, man, for everybody for the most

part.

>> Not not the Middle East, man.

>> Not in the Well, yeah, but you know,

it's all relative in the Middle East.

>> Better than True. True. Better than now.

Well, let's talk. I know China is an

area I understand really well. And the

Guardian put out a really interesting

piece today. I just got a summary of it

here. Um so the guiding reports uh on an

on an Asian group analysis uh that says

that China emerged as the biggest

strategic winner from the or in Asia at

least from the US Israeli war against

Iran. Uh number one, China weathered the

energy shock better than expected thanks

to large strategic oil reserves and

years of investment in renewable energy

making it less vulnerable than many

Asian economies. Before we go, there's

four points in there. Before we go to

the second one, pretty clear, and you've

talked about this already, that China

was really wellprepared for this, wasn't

it?

>> Yeah. In fact, like I I think I said it

to you or Tucker in the last two weeks,

China really, it looked to me and

sounded like their leaders were using

this war as a proof of concept to see if

they could really weather a real

geopolitical crisis involving the United

States. and they just proved they could

uh they proved to the world that not

only could they but they actually come

out looking much better. You'll remember

also by the way this is not the first

time China has been in the middle of a

major major crisis and they've actually

come out ahead co which of course

originated in China and I know there's

some argument about the real origins but

physically it came out of China whatever

the origins were I think it was man-made

um but it came out of China and the

Chinese actually if you look at the

first quarter after COVID when

everything started to reopen

China's GDP actually did better than the

West and you know they were ground zero

of it and it's because the Chinese were

able to prepare and they were able to

weather the storm better uh than we and

the West were and here again now you see

this playing out with the Iran war.

Everybody assumed that the United States

and the West were going to come out

ahead because China is so dependent on

Middle East oil and Iranian energy in

particular. That has not proven to be

true as we're now seeing the United

States is the one that's now over a

barrel. Uh you know, we're all waiting

for the the bottom to fall out because

we're so exposed to the disruptions.

China has not been. In fact, as we

talked about last time, much of the rest

of the world looked to China to help

them during this crisis. And how did

China do it? One of the things they did

was voluntary, excuse me, voluntarily

remove themselves uh from the global

market for the last two months, relying

exclusively on that SPR that they built

up. So, Mario, China's looking pretty.

And also it was a proof of concept to

prove to the world that their renewable

sector is truly truly robust. And it is

it is not just wind that they have. It

is not just solar. China has nuclear

power. China has a uh you know

geothermal power. China uses hydro

power. Uh that's what the three gorgeous

dam was about. And I remember six years

ago being on a panel uh in Washington DC

at a closed event and all of the

panelists and these were very well-known

people and because it was a closed event

I will not say their names but these are

very well-known people who are seen on

Fox and MSNBC and CNN and they were all

piling on me cuz I disagreed with them

when they said that the three gorgeous

dam was going to collapse and that was

going to become the the loss of

Xihinping's mandate of heaven. and that

that would lead to the collapse of

China. Never happened. Was not going to

happen. It was all a bunch of

gobbledegook.

>> Sorry. What is the What is that?

>> So, the three gorgeous dam the three

gorgeous dam is, I believe, the largest

dam in the world. Um, it it they China

built it to help to not only dam up the

river, but they also use it for massive

hydroelect electrical power generation.

and they forced a lot of Chinese

homeowners out of that area so they

could basically dam it up and you know

change the geography and it was a big

controversy and a lot of people in the

west were using that as another example

of Chinese government going too far not

being fair to their people blah blah

blah there was concerns that there was

engineering instability with the

construction of the three gorgeous dam

it was so big and massive that they

didn't build it right was the argument

and that it was basically starting to

bend and buckle uh and whatnot. It never

never turned to be true. It it was a

complete intelligence, you know,

misunderstanding

uh for from the west. And the bottom

line is people in 2020 when this story

was going around, including very

well-known people who should know

better, uh were running around telling

the US military, telling the US

government, well, between that and co

gee's coming to an end. It's not

happened. Uh, you know, the the Chinese

is a nearly a what is it? Over 4,000y

old country. They're a civilization

state. They're not going anywhere, guys.

Uh, until the 1400s, in many respects,

China was actually more advanced than

the Europeans, and it flipped in the

mid400s when the Ming Emperor died. But

now, it's flipping again. And I think

that it's very clear that whatever

happens with the Chinese current

government, China is not going away as a

great power. They're a competitor. They

have a lot of durability clearly and

they're only getting stronger. And I'll

just add one other thing, Mario. I have

a dear friend, uh, two people that I

know, but one one I'm close with was Dan

Collins. There's another one named Mitch

Presnik. And these are really really

brilliant. And Brendan O'Reilly as well

who wrote Everyone Is Wrong About China.

These are three brilliant China hands

that I routinely talk to. They all speak

Mandarin. Dan and Mitch started major

businesses and Dan still has businesses

in China and and Brendan is a former

intelligence analyst who lived in China

for a decade. All three of them tell me

that um there's a sort of mentality

among the Chinese. It's a floodplane

mentality. Basically, right now the

times are good. So the Chinese want

their government and want themselves to

maximize the good times because you

never know when the floods are going to

come back and they'll be weak again. And

that is why China is maximizing. They

are uh you know leveling up if you will

even when the west is saying oh no no

they're about to fall. They are not

about to fall. And they're benefiting

now from the geopolitical instability in

ways that Washington never well

Washington didn't predict. People like

me I was not alone in this by the way.

Other people were saying this as well,

but people like me were warning

Washington, this is not going to go the

way you think it will, but here we are.

Um, so the other point in the um in the

piece, the crisis accelerated demand for

Chinese clean energy exports. So,

China's exporting not only for internal

consumption, but they're exporting solar

panels, batteries, electric vehicles.

>> Um, so that's another way they're

benefiting.

>> It's another way they're benefiting. And

they're also sticking an eye a needle in

the eye of the west. Right? Remember I

remember in 2010 I remember everybody

talking about how dirty and polluted

China is. And China has a lot of you

know they're a large country that

rapidly industrialized. So they went

through a really heightened period of of

industrial degradation or or or

environmental degradation. But China

also is the country that committed to

reducing that over time. And one of the

ways they reduced it was through the

creation and the investment and the

scaling of workable alternative

energies. Whereas in the west we talk a

lot we talk a big game and we tax the

hell out of industries to make them

sustainable. China said we're not going

to do any of that. We're just going to

create alternative technological routes

that will inevitably mature and will

inevitably replace the quote unquote

dirty energy production that we go

through today. And that is what you are

seeing in real time happening. They

didn't punish industry in China. They

didn't go after the producers. They just

created alternative means. They scaled

it. They made it marketable. And now

here you have China is again running

circles around the west in a very

interesting and dynamic new field. In

the west we talk about Celindra which

was a massive government project that

failed miserably. Uh it was just it was

a symbol of graft and corruption in

2012. In China they don't have cylindra

was a was a it was during the Obama

administration. This was a big political

issue during Obama's re-election

campaign. Basically, a bunch of Obama

allies, a bunch of Democratic Party

allies got subsidies from the Obama

administration to create Yeah. And it

didn't go well. And the Chinese, on the

other hand, don't have this problem.

>> The renewable renewable energy subsidies

were renewable energy companies.

Correct.

>> There was a renewable energy company

that received subsidies from the Obama

administration to jumpstart solar

industry in the United States or to

scale it. They couldn't do it. They

couldn't compete with China, it turns

out. uh and the American taxpayer ended

up basically footing the bill for that

failure. In China, because they have

scale, because they have mass

production, because they have a very

talented human capital pool, many of

whom we trained, by the way, and didn't

retain here. Um the Chinese have been

able to now become not just competitive,

but dominant in alternative energy. And

alternative energy is not just wind, you

know, that's not all it is. It's hydro,

it's geothermal, it's nuclear. China, my

understanding is they have the hottest

burning Takamac nuclear fusion reactor

right now that's more advanced than

anything in the west. South Korea is the

next one. Uh and I think Japan is right

behind them. But China's leading the way

now in nuclear fusion R&D. So, you know,

China has they've already surpassed us

in so many respects and uh the war is

not helping to slow them down. It's

actually it's actually, you know,

supercharging them.

The Iran war. The Iran war. Yeah.

>> Yeah. So, so, but doesn't that mean

strategically speaking, they have an

incentive for the war to continue?

>> Yeah. So, this is an interesting thing,

and we kind of touched on this before.

Yes. The Chinese are benefiting, but you

have to remember this is a more than

4,000 year old culture. The kind of

preferences and proclivities that have

become ingrained over the course of that

time still dominate the thinking even of

so-called communist leaders. These guys

are not really communists. They're state

capitalists. There's a difference. Um

but the the and the the preference and

the proclivity culturally for China

historically has been we want to

maintain st as much stability along our

periphery because otherwise instability

along the periphery will feed into

instability and disruption and rebellion

in the center of the country which then

leads to the decapitation of regimes,

leads to civil war, leads to famine,

leads to the overthrow of dynasties. And

you have to really you have to really

view notably Xihinping, but you really

have to view the entire Chinese um

Communist Party of China as just another

of several dynasties that has ruled

China. And when you put it into that

perspective, particularly now, you start

to understand the patterns that are at

play and why the Chinese certainly don't

want the US to run the world anymore,

but the Chinese government also doesn't

want to see this kind of protracted

instability because they just don't like

that.

>> That's a good point. So it's like a thin

line where they do want to see a weaker

the U a weaker US where in relative

terms they do benefit but if they do

don't benefit in absolute terms and you

know using their strategic reserves

having higher inflation whatever it is

oil shortages even though even if they

weather the issues better than the rest

of the world so in relative terms

they're doing better they still worry if

they push it too far

>> then having it could lead to instability

back home. So it's kind of they're

treading a very very thin line.

>> That's right. And you have to remember

also the Chinese elite, the people

leading the country, these are mostly

people with engineering and other kind

of mathy hard science backgrounds.

Whereas in the United States, the people

leading our country tend to be lawyers,

lobbyists, liberal arts majors. These

are not people who really think uh in

sort of the grand kind of strategic

terms. Uh notably the civilian

leadership, they don't think like this.

Uh it's all very sort of not

technocratic. It's not competent. Uh

it's very ideological and it's very self

negating. And our system does not allow

really anymore for long-term strategic

planning. It just does not. I mean I I I

point to a recent piece of, you know,

work that I did where I analyzed why did

the Biden administration, I think in

2021 or 2022, sell off the US helium

reserve. We had a strategic helium

reserve that we had been building since

1920s

and we sold it during the Biden

administration to a German company that

had direct and significant linkages

according to the United States Congress

uh when they did an investigation after

the fact it had significant ties to the

Chinese Communist Party. Um so now in a

way indirectly China is owning our

strategic helium reserve and they've

since drained it. The helium reserve has

been drastically reduced. Um and helium

of course is a very critical supply for

multiple industrial inputs. Uh notably

the production of semiconductors. So my

point here is why did we do that? Well

some people say it's because Biden was

corrupt and I think that's probably part

of it. But part of it is also because

the US government wasn't thinking. It

wasn't thinking that, hey, we might need

this and we don't we don't want to get

rid of it. Even if there's a chance we

could maybe make some money uh off of

it, we don't want to get rid of that.

But that's not the thinking. That's not

the thinking.

>> The Chinese do think like that.

>> It's the uh it's the three little

piggies. Remember the three little

piggies? Uh the one that built their

house with brick. uh you know just just

you know maybe I'm getting

>> so how the hell the German company have

ties to the CCP and why did by the

what's your analysis why did

>> eventually so so basically the company

in question had business ties in China

and I'm going off memory now because

it's been a while since I've thought

I've had to talk about it but but

basically the company in question the

the United States Congress they

investigated it after the fact this was

a cifhious failure the United States

Congress determined that this German

firm was able to purchase it um because

they did not present themselves as

having a lot of contact connectivity

with China. They just said, "Hey, we're

a German company." And the Biden

administration signed off on it. And the

twist was after the fact, turns out that

company has a massive presence in China.

They do massive amounts of business with

Chinese-owned ent military entities. And

there is a fear among Congress that

notably the Republicans in Congress that

this sale was actually or this purchase

was actually orchestrated on behalf of

the Chinese government which wanted more

access to helium because of course China

is you know building their own massive

semiconductive production capability.

The third point's an interesting one.

Let me know if you agree with this one.

The report argues the conflict

reinforced China's narrative that the US

is a destabilizing force in the Middle

East and even the world, but in the

Middle East in this case. While China

presents itself as a more stable

long-term partner, China's been trying

to create that image for itself for a

while now, for years.

>> And it seems that Iran, the Iran war

played into that hand really well.

>> 100% 100%. This this at every level this

conflict in with Iran in the Middle East

has been a strategic disaster for the

United States. There is no win here. The

only upside, as I have said before, is

indirect in that if it forces us to

permanently be out militarily of the

Middle East and forces us to rep

prioritize our own hemisphere, that's a

win then. But it isn't by design. I can

assure you of that. None of this is by

design. Um the the the Chinese are the

real benefactor or beneficiaries rather

of this conflict. And from here on out,

we talked previously in one of our

episodes, Mario, of a post-american

Middle East. This is clearly a

postamerican multipolar world system

that's being birthed before our eyes. It

is one in which America is, yes, a great

power. It's not the superpower, though,

and it is in relative decline. We are in

we are officially there's no question

now that this country is in relative

decline compared to other great powers

rising powers like China and it will be

I think a China oriented maybe not China

run because there's there's still some

question as to whether Beijing actually

really wants to fully replace the United

States as sort of the world policeman.

Who would want that responsibility by

the way? Uh only the idiots in

Washington want that. Um but China

definitely will it will be a

Chineseoriented or Chinese orbiting

world system not unlike the concentric

circles of China's tributary system that

ruled their imperial order when the

emperor sat at the middle and everything

else orbited around him in that

tributary system. I think that's where

it's leading to. Do you not worry that

if an autocracy becomes a world

superpower and replaces a democracy, an

imperfect democracy?

What don't you worry about massive

centralization of power on a global

level?

I mean, so generally it's a concern.

Yeah. Uh if you had asked me that 10

years ago, I would have been much more

gung-ho in my answer saying yes,

absolutely. But I look at the United

States after the last 10 to 12 years. I

look at the West, the so-called West in

general, the so-called developed world,

and I I I see a lot of autocracy here. I

see a lot of centralization here, and

it's all

>> still a lot a lot less than the CCP.

>> Uh, admittedly, so I'm not saying that

this the CCP call the president an

right now.

>> Yeah. Yeah. No, I I get that. Well,

well, yeah,

>> try that. Try that. Yeah, you can.

>> I I Yeah. Yeah. I I I get it. I get it.

But what my point is my point is is that

we are trending more closer to the China

model on our own than China is trending

closer to our model. And so really it's

a question of gradation. Um and and

again I don't know if China wants to run

the world

so much as be the center of it. And

there is a slight difference there. Um

the Americans, the British before um the

Romans, they ran the world as they knew

it. Um the Chinese, I it's definitely

not something that's going to be good

for America on a political and military

and kind of national security level. Do

I think the Chinese want to invade

America and conquer us? No. No. No.

Well, don't say of course because I mean

historically empires do that and

America's been doing that now a lot in

the Middle East. Uh we don't call it

that, but that's what we've been doing.

Um so, you know, I don't want China to

run the world, to be clear. I don't want

to see them the number one. I want us to

be number one, the United States. But,

you know, I do I do I get into that kind

of ideological game anymore? No. I think

that's a holdover from the Cold War. I

think the real question is what system

does more for most people? And I think

still the American system has had a comm

c commulatively more positive impact

even with all the covert action and

whatnot. Um but you know I don't think

that's really even relevant here because

it's a question of who has the juice,

who has the power. And uh right now it

looks to me like that power and that

momentum and that leverage is

increasingly Beijing's to lose whereas

the Americans have already given theirs

away. We have already lost the mantle of

if you want to say empire. We've already

lost that.

>> Do you not worry what happens when she

dies?

>> I worry about what happens when American

presidents, you know, change over. Um,

>> no. Less so, less so. Come on. when when

it

>> doesn't really doesn't really have

>> look look G's an interesting figure in

China's system because he is the closest

>> to Mao they've had whereas Mao had like

it was all on him and he led them and he

did the after Mao died you'll remember

they had Dong Xiaoing they had you know

they they had Jang Jim they had Hu

Juntowa um and those three guys ruled

much more like a cadre and less like a

cult of personality. I'm not saying X's

a cult of personality, but he's

definitely more toward that end of the

spectrum. Um I think if you look at and

I think Xi therefore if you look at the

last what five total Chinese communist

rule rulers again communist in

quotations um three of the five have not

been this sort of cultish strongman

type. They've very much led by executive

committee and the you know they've run

it more like a board of directors for a

corporation than they have as like a

dictatorship as we understand it. It

wasn't Stalinist um or Mauist. Um, Xi, I

think when he does eventually go, and he

is old, uh, when he does eventually go,

I suspect it will be he will be replaced

by a more technocratic, less cult of

personality type leader and it might

actually end up stabilizing the

political system beyond what it is at

right now because China's political

system is h, you know, it their economic

model works. those purges and recent

purges and stuff.

>> Yeah. Yeah. And so what he's doing

though also under the the the impromoder

of anti-corruption is he's getting rid

of any potential impediment to his

direct reign. Um that is in Chinese

culture especially that is a that that

gives him more power for sure. It allows

him to maximize what he wants to do as

quickly as possible. But that also means

it's more responsibility. And if things

go pear-shaped on him, that means he's

going to get burned and held accountable

by the other members of the cadre uh far

more than he would have been if he had

governed more like Deng Xiaoing or more

like uh uh Hu Jin Tao. So, and with his

age and with these, you know, there's

there is a reckoning coming within the

political system of China, but I think

that the transition will probably be

less toward another Xihinping like

leader and more toward more of a

committee, more toward that kind of

board of directors style, uh maybe even

a triumpvirate possibly. um which

actually would probably lend itself to

greater levels of stability within

China's political system.

>> I know you worry a lot about a war

between um a continuation of the Iran US

war. How worried are you about a

conflict a direct conflict when it comes

to China and uh and the US and how

worrying is Taiwan for you? What do you

think will happen with Taiwan

eventually? So this is this is actually

the thing that does keep me up more

because um I think under ordinary

circumstances

I think the the if you look at things as

like a gravitational pole I think the

gravitational pole or center of the

world system is clearly in China's favor

slowly naturally pulling the world

system at least the developing world the

global south pulling them firmly within

China's orbit within that sort of

Chinese-led bricks potential order. Um I

think China doesn't have to do anything

and it will naturally reorganize itself

around the center the new center which

is China

but Xihinping is kind of a wild card and

because it's not that committee-led

system they had under the last three

leaders it's more like Mao Xihinping

could potentially overstep miscalculate

say I'm riding high right now I'm going

to I'm going to go even farther now. Um

and that could destabilize the whole

system and trigger a regional and later

world war.

But so far it looks to me like Xi has

also come to the conclusion that he does

nothing and still wins as the meme says.

So I don't yet see and believe me I I

used to think this was coming. So far

though, I don't yet see China making the

moves to initiate or to force a a

situation where their military could

possibly flip the script on the

Americans. They don't have to. They've

already achieved overmatch militarily in

the First Island chain. News flash to

Washington. And I warned them. I warned

them. There's a there's a speech I gave

in 2016 where you can find it, I'm sure.

I warned them that this was coming that

in 10 years time in 10 years time the uh

the United States was going to be if we

didn't change our ways the United States

was going to lose out um the the first

island chain to the Chinese. That time

has come and they've already outmatched

us. And if you go under my wret brief

substack, I have an article up there

today uh demonstrating how with the DF17

hypersonic glide vehicle, demonstrating

how with the uh with what they're doing

in counter space capabilities, with what

they're doing with their anti-access

area denial A2AD capacities, um they

have already achieved overmatch. They

don't really have to do much. They've

already kept the American military at

bay because the American military, the

only way we can fight them is with the

Navy and the Air Force. Well, they've

ranged our air bases in the region uh

with the DF-17 and these other weapons,

and the Chinese can keep our carriers

over the horizon with their DF-21,

DF17s.

Um, we can't afford to lose our ships.

The Chinese can. The Chinese have

missiles in abundance and drones. And

that's something the Iranian war, the

Iran war has taught them as well. The

Americans will keep their ships out of a

contested hot uh combat zone. And so the

question is does China really have to go

to war uh to already achieve their grand

plan of becoming the new number one? I

think a rational actor would say no. But

again because Xi has aggregated so much

power toward himself and there are

inputs you and I aren't privy to in that

closed political system. It's possible

also X says to survive I got to trigger

a war now and red rededicate and

redirect my people away from whatever

they don't like in my regime to you know

fighting a foreign foe. Do I think it'll

be Taiwan? It's possible. That's the

likeliest or that's the most obvious.

But G and everybody who runs Beijing

understands beyond the complexities of

launching an amphibious attack. They

also understand many Chinese view

Taiwanese as fellow Chinese. And most

Chinese people do not want to send their

sons to go fight and possibly die

killing other Chinese. They would much

rather um do something against Japan.

And I that is the unspoken story here.

I'm I think I'm the only one who's been

writing about this at my Substack uh

about the actual threat to Japan,

particularly now that they have this new

government there where the the I think

her name is um I'm forgetting her name,

Tagachi or Tea. The new the new woman

running Japan is extremely militant on

China. China has scale. They have

overmatch. They don't even have to

invade Japan to do damage. They can do

what Hezbollah does to Israel. They can

do what Iran is doing to the Middle

East. They can just overwhelm Japanese

defenses with missiles and drones. What

would be the trigger? Um Brendan

O'Reilly, who my my buddy who wrote uh

Everyone Is Wrong About China, the

trigger would probably be if Japan

decided we're going to get nukes, which

is not impossible at this point given

the breakdown of the US alliance system.

>> I I don't know. I think I think China

would be

more open to Japan having nukes and I

don't think it would be that big of an

issue for China. Um

>> I don't I don't think you know

it is an emotional issue.

>> Yeah, but true. But that goes against if

they if they find that to be an issue

that goes against their

non-interventionist strategy and why

suddenly different for Japan.

>> No, it's that's different. That's

different. We're talking

>> country. It's a southern North Korea has

a has a nuclear weapon.

>> Yeah. North Korea. Yeah, but North Korea

is a cat's paw for for Beijing. Um, in

fact, this was one of the reasons the

one of the the hidden stories, the

backstories behind the Trump uh Kim

Jong-un uh meetings in the first term

was because the Chinese tried to have

Kim Jong-il or Kim Jong-un rather

whacked and replace him with his halfb

brotherther who they could control more

and

>> the Chinese tried to I think tried to

kill Kim Jong-un because Kim Jong-un

came into power replacing his father Kim

Jong-

Kim Jong-un came into power and he was

very independent-minded and the Chinese

were concerned. He the first thing he

did was kill his uncle, which his uncle

was China's man in the royal court of

North Korea. And and Kim Jong-un did

that very pointedly to send a message to

Beijing, I'm my own man. Uh then he uh

he went about killing all and and

excommunicating all the people in the

elite who were very close to China in in

his first several years in power which

led to his brother I think being eyed by

China to replace Kim Jong-un. And Kim

Jong-un famously had or infamously had

his brother whacked. I think it was in

the Thailand airport. Who were the

bodyguards around

>> South Korea?

No, I'm pretty sure it was like Malaysia

or Thailand. Um, who who was the who

were the group that was supposed to be

protecting the half brother

>> were Chinese? Uh, they were Chinese. It

was the chi they were Chinese military

trained.

>> Yeah. And uh and and that to me pointed

to the fact that that was a hit on his

own brother because Kim Jong-un was

convinced the Chinese were going to try

to whack him and replace him with their

agent. uh his half brother. So he

preempted it and then he started getting

cozy with Trump because he didn't want

to be Kim Jong-un didn't want to be too

close to the Chinese knowing that they

were coming at him. And I think that is

what reset everything when Trump and him

got along and started doing some really

momentous stuff together at the

diplomatic level. It's a shame that

Trump didn't continue as president. Um

but but that kind of

>> remember when he crossed into North

Korea yesterday?

>> It was amazing. It was it was I mean

that was like that was iconic. That was

Trump at his finest. Um and it was

beautiful actually to see. And um you

know what happened then was uh Trump got

out of office. He lost and Biden came

in. Biden was um a lot I think uh less

open to Kim Jong-un. And Kim Jong-un

then had to pivot. And who did he pivot

to though? Who did he pivot to? He

pivoted to Putin. Uh Kim Jong-un pivoted

to Putin to play China off of China

because for Kim he knows China tries to

use him as a cat's paw. But ultimately

does China not want to see North Korea

have nukes? China doesn't really care.

They don't care about that. But they do

care. They do care if Japan gets nukes.

You can bet your bottom dollar on that.

And they will do something militarily if

it looks like uh Japan is going to going

to get nukes. And Japan, by the way, is

looking at what happened in the Middle

East and they're looking at what's going

on in Europe and they're saying, "We

can't trust the American security

umbrella." Remember at the start of this

year, Mario, they were having this this

antagonistic round of of of back and

forth between Tokyo and Beijing. And it

and in fact, um what was it? The

Japanese war plananes actually buzzed

the Chinese carrier. I think it was in

the um the Sea of Japan while the

Chinese carrier was doing these

provocative military exercises near

Japanese territory and Trump got on the

phone in December or January and told

the Japanese leader, "Knock it off." And

I think at that point,

>> yeah, it was also when the Japanese

leader was saying Japan will get

involved if China makes a move on

Taiwan.

>> Yes. which is also when I spoke to the

guys at Joint Base McCord several years

ago, I warned the leadership there that

the real issue with Taiwan is not a

China Taiwan scenario because I don't

believe any American leader would

actually intervene militarily to stop it

at this rate. But the mutual defense

treaty with Japan, if Japan got

involved, they might try to rope us in

like NATO's trying to rope us in against

Russia

>> and like Israel's trying to rope us in

even more with Iran.

Everyone's trying to rope you guys in.

>> I know. That's why my new book coming

out. We don't yet know. It's probably

going to be around.

>> The title is Stop Roping Us in

everybody.

>> That's actually not bad, Mario. That's

not bad. No.

>> Leave us the heck alone.

>> That That's not bad. Get off my lawn.

No. Uh, no. That's the title. The title

is Fortress Americas, and it is uh it is

about Western Hemispheric Defense. And

uh

>> Can't wait for it to come out.

>> Yeah, I'll send you a copy. I'm I'm

almost done. I'm I'm about 20,000 words

away and I'm trucking along at about

1,500 to 2,000 words a day. So, I'll be

done soon.

>> Yeah.

>> All right, man.

>> Thanks for jumping on. I think next next

time we chat next time we chat, um I

want to talk about Ukraine developments

there with the assassination attempt in

Monaco as well.

>> Just be on the lookout for Yes. be on

the lookout for Ukraine possibly getting

a nuke. And I'll just leave it at that.

>> Right. All right. He gave us the title

for the next interview that me and

Brandon were doing. Why' you guys take

him off so early? I usually say bye to

him, guys. Why' they kick him out so

quickly? What the hell, guys? All right,

guys. I'll see you guys I'll see you in

um in 15 minutes with a new guest uh

with

uh Tom Luongo and followed by Muhammad

Faridi and then Larry Johnson. See you

guys in 15. Bye.