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GUATEMALA (CIA al Descubierto) Golpe de Estado Fantasma - Documentales

47:42EnglishTranscribed Jul 29, 2026
0:01

Guatemala 1954.

0:04

The Central Intelligence Agency launches

0:07

an operation codenamed

0:08

BABY'S ACCESS to overthrow the government

0:11

that threatens

0:12

US interests in the region. It

0:15

will be its first mission of this kind.

0:19

Operation BABY'S ACCESS was

0:21

risky and dangerous. 500 rebels will

0:25

face the

0:27

president's 6,000-strong army. The stakes were high,

0:30

and they couldn't afford for it to go wrong.

0:33

The CIA has already chosen the next leader of

0:35

Guatemala and is at the head of the rebel army.

0:40

The soldiers will be trained by Rich

0:42

Roberts, a legendary

0:44

paramilitary agent, and the decision has been made to resort

0:48

to psychological warfare, used for the

0:50

first time by the city.

0:53

A covert psychological warfare operation

0:55

is based on deception and

0:57

lies.

1:00

Based on recently declassified files,

1:02

we reveal the

1:05

CIA's first attempt to overthrow a

1:07

left-wing government in Latin America.

1:10

[Applause]

1:14

August 12, 1953, Washington

1:18

[Music]

1:20

A top-secret meeting is held

1:22

at the White House. Its objective is

1:26

to confront a new threat to the

1:28

country's security. A small country of

1:30

Central America, Guatemala:

1:34

the most powerful men

1:36

in the US attend, including President Dwight

1:39

Eisenhower, his Secretary of State, and Aleix Esther,

1:42

Director of the

1:45

Central Intelligence Agency.

1:46

Eisenhower ran the government

1:49

very clandestinely, and the three of them devised

1:52

many strategies that they applied

1:54

worldwide. Now they have a new problem:

1:59

a country less than 1,300 km from the

2:01

southern border of the US. Guatemala has

2:04

recently elected a leader with

2:06

well-known communist ties,

2:08

Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán. He has

2:14

already begun to threaten

2:18

US interests. His government

2:20

confiscates thousands of hectares from the

2:21

multinational company United Fruit. In addition, he will

2:26

be a threat to

2:29

the national security of the

2:31

US.

2:34

With the Cold War well underway, the great

2:37

concern in Washington is to prevent

2:39

communism from spreading throughout the

2:41

world, and more specifically, throughout the

2:42

Western Hemisphere. The CIA began to

2:45

see communists everywhere and

2:49

was prepared to use its troops

2:50

to reduce their power.

2:53

The decision has been made: they must overthrow

2:56

Arbenz.

2:58

The CIA wanted an operation to... To

3:00

overthrow the Guatemalan government,

3:04

they presented the president with a

3:06

top-secret document containing an extraordinary plan,

3:10

the so-called 'Operation Babies Access.'

3:15

It was summarized as how an

3:18

established regime could be overthrown without using US troops.

3:25

The plan was to secretly support an

3:28

armed uprising against the

3:31

democratically elected leader of Guatemala and overthrow him through

3:33

a coup.

3:37

But Sean Hauer wondered how he had to prevent

3:40

the CIA plot from being linked

3:41

to the US president.

3:45

Why were the US so afraid of being

3:47

involved? The operation could

3:50

be perceived as the overthrow of

3:51

a democratically elected government—a

3:53

violation of the principles of the treaty they

3:55

had signed before the

3:57

United Nations—and it would have damaged the reputation of

3:59

American ideals.

4:02

No one could attribute the operation to the

4:04

president.

4:11

The operation combined three key strategies:

4:15

first, an invasion with a

4:17

small, specially trained army;

4:20

second, the application of foreign political pressure;

4:26

and finally, the use of a whole

4:28

range of deceptions by the CIA.

4:32

Operation Babies Access proposed a

4:35

new strategy, things that had never been

4:37

seen before, actions that had never been

4:39

put into practice.

4:45

These methods were so novel that the

4:47

CIA didn't even know If they were to work, it

4:50

was dangerous because no one knew

4:52

exactly what was going to happen.

4:54

They considered that the operation only had

4:57

a 40% chance of success. If the

5:00

CIA had to quickly plan a

5:03

covert and feasible operation,

5:08

Eisenhower said, "Go ahead, we must do it. I

5:11

think it will work, and I think it is

5:13

important to do it." The

5:20

CIA's first move was to

5:22

establish a command center at

5:24

Opa-locka Air Force Base in Miami, Florida. The

5:27

secret command center, Opa-locka, Miami,

5:29

was so secret that

5:32

only a few men who worked

5:33

directly under the

5:35

president knew its location.

5:39

Why Miami, first of all, because it

5:42

was far from Washington. If they did it

5:44

from Washington, the whole operation could be

5:46

exposed.

5:50

With the command center ready, the CIA

5:52

needed a straw man who could

5:54

lead a rebel army against the

5:56

president of Guatemala.

5:58

The leader had to be someone malleable

6:01

who would obey the CIA's orders and

6:03

be loyal to the US government.

6:06

He placed his bet on a man named

6:08

Carlos Castillo Armas.

6:15

Armas was a

6:17

charismatic and ambitious Guatemalan colonel.

6:21

Three years earlier, he had participated in a

6:23

military coup. The failed operation

6:26

had been imprisoned

6:28

and, according to rumors, had managed to

6:30

escape through a very daring plan.

6:34

The CIA finds him living in exile in

6:36

Honduras.

6:38

The CIA had decided he was the

6:40

perfect candidate to lead the

6:42

attack and, through him, reestablish

6:46

American control over Guatemala.

6:50

Weapons are flown to the command center in

6:52

Opa-locka.

6:54

Both sides reach an agreement.

7:01

The next challenge is to create a

7:04

rebel guerrilla force that will lead the

7:05

uprising. The CIA establishes a

7:08

secret training base in the jungles

7:10

of Central America, specifically Honduras.

7:14

The man

7:17

chosen to train the

7:18

secret army is Rich Roberts, a former

7:21

specialist in

7:22

covert paramilitary operations. He loved

7:25

being in the jungle; some people

7:27

thrive there. A true warrior

7:29

never stops fighting, and

7:31

Roberts, a Rep. Roberson,

7:34

loved that kind of thing. He was

7:37

born to do it and to get paid for it,

7:39

acting with the protection of the US

7:41

government. It must have seemed like

7:43

paradise to him.

7:50

Rebel Army training camp, Honduras. In January 1954,

7:53

the training period begins.

7:55

Roberson is ordered to convert... Those

7:58

men, a well-trained fighting force

7:59

in six months, were

8:03

Guatemalan exiles

8:06

recruited from other Central American countries.

8:09

Among them were professional mercenaries.

8:12

[Music]

8:13

Keeping the number of personnel

8:15

below 400 men allows them

8:17

to be trained in secret.

8:20

[Music]

8:25

Repair Robertson had to train his

8:28

team in guerrilla tactics, as they

8:30

say in the world of

8:32

special operations: to be able to enter, cause the

8:34

desired damage, and leave undetected.

8:37

Robert trains them to master

8:39

sabotage, explosives, and various

8:41

weaponry. He

8:45

implements a grueling

8:47

physical exercise program that will allow them to

8:49

advance through the complicated terrain of

8:50

Guatemala.

8:52

[Music]

8:58

But that's the easy part.

9:01

Armas and his group of mercenaries must

9:04

now face a formidable opponent:

9:07

the Guatemalan army.

9:11

Guatemala had the largest army and the

9:14

largest police force in

9:15

Central America,

9:17

with 6,000 men in its

9:19

army and 3,000 in the

9:21

police force—figures far superior to those of

9:23

any other Central American country.

9:26

For the moment, the army remains

9:28

loyal. Arbenz, their newly elected leader

9:31

who enjoys the support of the

9:32

Guatemalan people, was also an

9:35

expert general.

9:38

Arbenz himself was a

9:40

respected military man, considered brilliant and cultured

9:43

by the CIA.

9:45

Against such a popular and

9:47

powerful opponent and his loyal army, the

9:48

CIA's chances of success

9:50

appeared very slim.

9:54

The big question was how to defeat a

9:56

rebel army of 200 or 400 men against

9:59

one of 5,000 or 6,000.

10:01

The CIA believed it had the answer:

10:04

a secret weapon developed

10:06

covertly within the agency that had not been

10:09

tested so close to

10:10

US territory

10:13

until now:

10:19

psychological warfare.

10:22

Psychological operations are based on deception and

10:25

lies; they involve employing

10:27

dirty tricks, and nothing works if one reveals their

10:30

identity.

10:32

Psychological operations have been used

10:35

since World War II, but

10:36

until now they had never been attempted on

10:38

such a scale.

10:40

It was the first time the CIA attempted such a

10:43

maneuver to overthrow

10:44

a government,

10:49

and the CIA recruited the expert

10:51

radio announcer and public relations man David Attlee

10:53

Phillips to execute the

10:55

psychological phase of the operation.

10:57

[Music]

10:58

The so-called 'Operation Be What'

11:03

aimed to undermine the president's popularity so he would

11:05

lose all his

11:07

support.

11:10

What they did was create a

11:13

clandestine radio station called Radio

11:16

Liberation.

11:19

The idea was to present this

11:21

radio station as the secret voice of the

11:24

liberation army that was about to

11:26

arrive to liberate the people of

11:27

Guatemala.

11:28

[Music]

11:31

Opa Locka Recording Studio, Miami. The

11:35

first phase of the operation will take

11:36

place in Guatemala.

11:39

Phillips has the help of two

11:41

Guatemalan broadcasters who appear in

11:43

the declassified files as Mario

11:45

and PP.

11:48

As part of the psychological offensive,

11:50

they must record hundreds of hours of

11:52

radio programs that will

11:54

later be broadcast in

11:56

Guatemala itself. One of the first questions

11:59

the CIA agents ask themselves is, "

12:01

Who do we address?" Phillips has to

12:04

choose between addressing the

12:05

Guatemalan people, the intellectual elite, or

12:08

even the religious leaders. "All of

12:12

them, but our main target is

12:14

the army.

12:17

The army and the generals are the

12:19

fundamental target."

12:22

Phillips knows that the generals and the

12:24

higher command are... The biggest obstacle

12:27

[Music]

12:28

everything contributes to the central objective of

12:30

the covert psychological operations

12:32

which is to open a rift between Arenys and

12:34

the army.

12:36

Phillips develops a series of

12:38

radio programs designed to distance the

12:40

army from its leader.

12:43

One was called "We Accuse Him of High

12:46

Treason." In it, they accused Arbenz of

12:49

having abandoned the army, of having

12:51

betrayed it, of being a traitor against whom

12:54

immediate action had to be taken. The

12:58

objective of the programs about this

13:00

treason is to sow the idea that

13:02

officers who support the government

13:03

will receive severe treatment after

13:06

the coup.

13:09

Here are more names to add to the

13:12

blacklist of traitors to the

13:14

fatherland.

13:16

Next, Philip addresses the

13:19

officers' weak point: their wallets. In

13:23

one of his campaigns, they suggested that the

13:25

currency was about to collapse and

13:27

Arbenz wouldn't have money to pay

13:29

the officers. Nothing inspires more fear in

13:31

the ranks of soldiers who are there for

13:33

money than the idea of ​​not being paid

13:42

day after day, night after night, for

13:46

six whole weeks. Phillips and his

13:49

team make hundreds of recordings.

13:52

When the recordings are The

13:55

CIA lists the tapes transporting them from Opa-

13:56

locka, Florida to a secret radio station

13:59

near the Guatemalan border.

14:04

To this day, we still don't know

14:06

where Operation Web was broadcast from.

14:10

Some reports place it in the

14:12

Honduran jungle, and others in a barn on the

14:14

Nicaraguan dictator's ranch.

14:23

May 1, 1954: Less than three months

14:27

after Phillips was recruited,

14:28

Radio Liberación begins

14:32

broadcasting from a

14:34

secret location within the

14:36

republic.

14:43

The propaganda of the

14:45

radio programs recorded in Opa-locka is

14:47

heard by tens of thousands of

14:48

listeners throughout Guatemala who are unaware

14:50

that it is a city plot.

14:52

[Music]

15:02

While the rebel army trained

15:05

by Reeve Roberson is ready to

15:07

attack, the CIA executes the final phase of

15:10

its plan: to

15:12

politically isolate President

15:14

Arbenz. In

15:17

late October 1953, the

15:20

plot to isolate him begins. The CIA sends the

15:23

American diplomat

15:24

Jon Perfil to Guatemala.

15:27

The ambassador Perfil was Chosen

15:30

carefully for his

15:31

arrogant personality and staunch opposition to

15:34

communism,

15:37

his job was to increase the

15:39

pressure against President Arbenz.

15:42

But today he was very ostentatious;

15:46

he wore a Borsalino hat adorned with

15:48

feathers and always seemed to carry a

15:53

pistol in its holster. His

15:57

first attack against Arbenz came only

15:59

a few weeks later when he was

16:01

invited to meet with the president. It

16:04

must have been an extraordinary scene,

16:09

and all Perfil did was criticize

16:13

the presence of communists in his

16:15

government. It

16:19

could be said that it served as an indicator

16:22

of what Perfil's behavior would be like

16:24

in the future.

16:26

[Music]

16:28

One of Perfil's first jobs

16:31

was to create a secret

16:33

CIA delegation within Guatemala City.

16:35

[Music]

16:36

But where could he establish an ambassador,

16:38

an operations center, without being

16:40

discovered by the government?

16:45

Evidently, in the US embassy

16:48

where he himself worked. They

16:51

occupied an entire floor of the

16:54

embassy to handle all the

16:56

internal planning necessary to

16:58

achieve their ultimate goal, which was to

17:00

get rid of Jacobo Arbenz. It

17:04

was an area of ​​the embassy whose sole

17:07

function was to work to overthrow the

17:09

Arbenz government. We can imagine

17:14

maps, chains of command, the people to

17:19

contact. The planning of the

17:22

various tactics to be

17:23

employed was a set of actions

17:25

designed to deliberately figure out

17:27

how to overthrow that

17:29

government

17:35

once the CIA had established its base in

17:37

the embassy. But now, they begin

17:39

investigating which members of the

17:41

Guatemalan elite might turn against

17:43

their own government.

17:46

One of the things done from

17:49

the US embassy was to pay

17:51

army officers to

17:53

desert. This was a crucial operation, as

17:56

the CIA planners

17:57

believed that if they could influence the

17:59

army, it would be the end of Arbenz. At times, he

18:03

considered it an impregnable defense,

18:04

and it was difficult to figure out how to

18:07

break it. They invested a lot of time in

18:11

encouraging officers to desert

18:12

through cash payments. In

18:16

fact, at one point, someone

18:18

offered money to Arbenz himself to

18:21

relinquish power.

18:24

Evidently, this person was removed from his

18:27

office simply for

18:28

suggesting it. They tried to eliminate all of Arbenz's

18:33

support in the army to weaken it

18:37

until it was practically useless for

18:42

protecting Arenys.

18:44

While drilling, the CIA tries to win over the

18:47

enemy from within Guatemala.

18:48

The CIA focuses on searching in The rest

18:51

of the world ways to undermine Arbenz's power.

19:00

The FIA ​​needs a major event,

19:03

a political incident so serious that it

19:06

allows the US to unleash a major

19:08

political attack against the Arbenz.

19:12

They were looking for something to justify what they

19:15

were about to do

19:17

and they found it by surprise. The

19:21

CIA's stroke of luck doesn't

19:23

happen in Guatemala but 10,000

19:26

kilometers away in a

19:28

communist country in Eastern Europe.

19:30

[Music]

19:33

On April 17, 1954, a

19:37

CIA spy stationed in Poland discovers a

19:39

suspicious cargo on a ship

19:41

called the Al-Front. In this Poland,

19:45

they realized that the ship

19:47

had certain unusual characteristics

19:48

that could carry weapons.

19:54

The spy informs the CIA about the Al-Front,

19:58

warning that it could head for

20:00

America.

20:04

The CIA monitors the Al-Front's route

20:06

as it heads towards the Caribbean.

20:10

They control the Al-Front's journey, which passes

20:13

through Dakar in Africa and then the

20:16

Dutch Antilles,

20:18

but after three weeks, it suddenly

20:22

looks south. To their surprise and

20:25

satisfaction, its destination is Puerto

20:28

Barrios in Guatemala

20:34

[Music]

20:36

Puerto Barrios, Guatemala, May 17th. Four

20:40

weeks later, when the

20:41

Alzheimer docks, the CIA obtains from its

20:43

cargo all the evidence it

20:45

needs.

20:47

In total, it's 2,000 tons of

20:50

light weapons such as rifles, machine guns, and

20:53

mortars.

20:56

They obtained proof that the

20:58

communists were infiltrating

21:00

that country and a justification to

21:02

invade it.

21:06

Eisenhower has all the

21:09

diplomatic ammunition he needs to unleash

21:10

a political storm against Arbenz.

21:15

In response to the arms shipment, he

21:17

sends army ships,

21:20

planes,

21:22

and submarines to patrol

21:24

the coast of Guatemala.

21:27

They used their entire arsenal to overthrow

21:29

the government of Guatemala.

21:32

Eisenhower was determined to achieve it.

21:40

Arbenz can only watch in horror

21:42

as his country is strangled by a

21:44

naval blockade.

21:47

He and his generals even wonder

21:49

if the US might invade their country. At

21:53

that moment, Arbenz understood that they

21:56

had organized a great campaign against him.

22:00

Alarmed by the show of force

22:02

from Washington,

22:03

Carmen tries to get help.

22:04

Political bridges with the US: sent its

22:07

foreign minister by

22:09

ice to meet with Perfil to see if they

22:11

could agree to a third peace,

22:20

but the last thing the CIA wanted at that

22:22

moment was a truce.

22:23

Operation Peace Access had a single

22:26

objective: regime change.

22:33

June 15, 1954: The rebel army,

22:37

made up of 500 men, was transported

22:39

to more advanced offensive bases

22:41

near the border with Guatemala.

22:45

The troops were deployed at five

22:47

offensive points along

22:49

Guatemala's eastern border.

22:52

[Music]

22:54

By dividing them into five, the CIA intended to create

22:57

the illusion of a much larger army than it

22:59

actually was

23:02

and tried to make them believe that it was

23:05

a large-scale attack from

23:07

the Pacific coast, the Atlantic coast, and

23:10

neighboring countries that would destroy all of

23:12

Guatemala's defenses and allow

23:15

Castillo Armas to seize power.

23:21

[Music]

23:29

To support the ground invasion, the CIA

23:31

flew a dozen unmarked planes

23:33

to the front lines. They

23:37

were piloted by

23:39

US Air Force officers who have

23:41

not yet been identified. From a

23:46

military psychology perspective, the

23:48

use of aircraft was tremendously

23:50

important.

23:52

The planes would not only support the

23:55

troops but also play a

23:57

key psychological role, as they would intensify

23:59

the illusion of a major invasion.

24:04

[Music]

24:08

With air support prepared and the

24:10

army positioned and ready to act, the

24:14

CIA contacted the leader of

24:16

the Guatemalan rebels, Castillo

24:17

Armas, and gave the green light to the invasion. A

24:22

lot was at stake, and they couldn't afford for it to

24:25

go wrong. June 18, 1954:

24:29

The coup begins.

24:34

Late in the afternoon, the

24:36

coup leader, Castillo Armas, is on a

24:38

remote road near the Guatemalan border. He

24:41

leads a group of 120 of the

24:44

500 soldiers who make up the

24:47

eastern contingent of the invasion.

24:53

If everything goes according to plan, in a

24:55

few days he will be the next president of

24:57

Guatemala.

25:01

As they approach the border, they see

25:03

two guards.

25:09

One of them is a customs official and

25:13

is quickly shot down.

25:17

[Music]

25:21

The first shot of the attempted coup is heard. From then on,

25:24

chaos ensues.

25:42

[Music]

25:48

The second falls dead as the convoy

25:50

crosses the border. From Guatemala,

26:01

the plan is to continue advancing on foot.

26:06

The CIA has opted for a

26:08

guerrilla attack to conceal the true

26:09

number of soldiers.

26:13

The longer they can make

26:15

the army believe it is facing thousands of

26:18

people, the greater their advantage will be.

26:22

The men-at-arms advance through

26:24

rugged terrain for three whole days. It

26:26

is difficult to orient themselves in the

26:29

thick jungle,

26:31

and torrential rains are falling. On

26:39

the third day of the invasion, they reach the

26:42

small town of Esquipulas.

26:48

[Music]

26:54

After a brief battle with

26:56

local police, Castillo de Armas achieves his

26:59

first victory.

27:01

The inhabitants of Esquipulas must have been

27:03

thrilled to see

27:05

those guerrillas appear in the main square.

27:07

Some of the soldiers handed out weapons

27:10

to several of the bewildered

27:12

townspeople to give the impression that they

27:15

were joining Castillo de Armas to

27:18

overthrow Arabs.

27:21

Meanwhile, 160 kilometers north

27:24

of Armas's position, the second

27:26

contingent of the invasion crosses the

27:28

border at Hualán. They encounter an army

27:31

garrison,

27:34

and Hualán, west of Guatemala

27:42

[Music],

27:44

is the battle. The fiercest phase of the

27:46

invasion so far

27:52

lasts 36 hours.

27:56

It's the first major test for the

27:58

CIA mercenaries trained by

28:00

Reeve Roberson:

28:02

kill them or they'll try to kill you—

28:05

a matter of life and death.

28:09

But the situation worsens.

28:16

One by one, the rebels begin to flee.

28:21

When the remaining soldiers realize

28:23

what's happening, none want to

28:25

be captured and accused of treason.

28:28

Seeing two, three, five, or six

28:30

people flee, they begin to think that perhaps it's

28:33

the best option. It's one of the

28:35

problems that arise with an irregular army.

28:39

Finally, almost the entire second column

28:41

flees back toward the border. It

28:46

's the first major setback for the rebel army.

28:51

Many of its soldiers end up wounded

28:54

or dead

29:05

in Washington. The situation is about to get

29:08

worse.

29:10

The plan was to increase pressure on the

29:12

president of Guatemala in the diplomatic arena,

29:16

but world leaders are suspicious of

29:18

the US stance.

29:21

The Ardennes government decided to turn

29:24

to several international organizations for

29:26

protection.

29:27

The first was the United Nations; the

29:29

second was the Organization of

29:31

American States (OAS).

29:33

[Music] The

29:46

United Nations They even agree to

29:48

form an investigation team to

29:50

analyze the invasion.

29:53

The CIA plot risks

29:55

being discovered,

29:57

and those responsible for Operation

29:59

Babies Access have little time

30:01

to prevent it from becoming a

30:03

failed coup that would have

30:04

cost millions of dollars and

30:06

resulted in international humiliation. In

30:14

Guatemala, the following phases of the

30:17

invasion go from bad to worse.

30:20

The third invasion detachment,

30:22

which departs from El Salvador, doesn't even manage

30:25

to enter Guatemala.

30:28

60 rebels are arrested while

30:31

trying to cross the border.

30:34

The fourth detachment, tasked with

30:36

attacking Puerto Barrios in the north of the

30:38

country, is defeated by

30:40

armed dockworkers.

30:42

The situation seemed to be getting worse and worse,

30:46

and this isn't the only bad news

30:48

the CIA receives. Not even the

30:50

air strikes manage to reach their targets.

30:53

Almost all the fighter jets are

30:55

disabled by mechanical failures.

30:58

The air attack was reduced to 50 or

31:01

60 percent. As a result, the

31:05

invading army practically lost

31:07

all its air support, and the CIA was

31:10

worried that it wouldn't be able to win

31:12

without that show of force.

31:16

Vital air support remains on the ground, and

31:19

the uprising has only

31:20

Having penetrated 10 kilometers into

31:22

the country, the entire operation hangs by a

31:24

thread.

31:27

Only the top brass of the CIA knew

31:29

how close the operation was to

31:32

ending in failure.

31:33

[Music]

31:38

June 23, 1954. A few days after

31:42

the attack began, the CIA receives

31:44

a declassified secret report from intelligence services

31:46

stating, "We do

31:49

n't know how this will all end. If

31:51

the army remains loyal to Arbenz, all

31:54

is lost. But if they turn

31:56

against him, we could win."

32:00

The operation is approaching a

32:01

critical point, and Lindhal, the

32:04

CIA director, holds

32:06

a secret emergency meeting with President Eisenhower.

32:10

The president is surprised by the failures

32:12

of the military operations.

32:15

Eisenhower is baffled, as he

32:17

thought everything had gone according to the

32:19

CIA's plans.

32:23

Dales tells him directly that the only

32:25

option to reverse the catastrophic

32:26

invasion is for the president himself to

32:29

authorize a small contingent of the

32:31

best US fighter jets.

32:35

So he asks Dales, "

32:37

Can you really win if I give you two more planes?" And

32:39

Dales... I replied, I think we'd have a

32:41

20 percent chance,

32:47

and after a few seconds, Eisenhower

32:49

said, "Okay, I'll give it to you."

32:51

[Music]

32:56

Declassified files have

32:58

revealed that the president provided

33:00

these two new F-47 fighter-bombers

33:02

valued at $150,000.

33:05

[Music]

33:07

The F-47 Thunderball was undoubtedly the

33:10

best fighter jet in Central America

33:12

at the time. The CIA was worried that

33:14

someone would discover

33:16

US involvement and had the American markings removed

33:18

from planes

33:20

flying illegally to Central America.

33:23

They had a feeling that this could

33:25

go wrong, but they had to try

33:27

anyway.

33:30

It was unlikely that the F-47s would be enough

33:33

to change the course of the investment,

33:35

but the CIA still had another ace up its

33:38

sleeve.

33:40

[Music]

33:41

The psychological warfare

33:49

in Operation Babies Access was all

33:52

based on illusions. It was based on the idea

33:55

of ​​making the Guatemalan people believe

33:57

that a huge rebel army was about to

34:01

take over the country.

34:07

The CIA increased the frequency of

34:09

Radio Liberation transmissions and It

34:11

begins to continuously broadcast

34:13

news bulletins that speak of a

34:15

devastating invasion. If you tune in to

34:19

that station, you'll hear story after story

34:21

about rebel victories.

34:23

You can hear about bombed railway lines,

34:27

sabotaged food depots, but the reality is

34:30

completely different. The army of

34:33

weapons was hundreds of kilometers

34:35

away.

34:41

The next target of the CIA is the

34:43

Guatemalan army. The CIA and

34:47

Operation Sherwood achieved a great

34:49

victory when a colonel who had

34:52

led the Guatemalan air force

34:53

defected, crossed the border

34:56

piloting his private plane, and surrendered

34:58

to the

35:03

Davies chair. Gleave Phillips, the head of

35:05

the radio campaign, wants the

35:07

colonel to announce his defection live,

35:11

but he refuses.

35:13

Phillips pretends to accept his refusal and

35:16

serves him a whiskey, then another,

35:19

until the guy is half-drunk.

35:23

[Music]

35:25

The colonel is getting more and more drunk.

35:29

Phillips uses a tape recorder to record

35:31

the account of his defection without him

35:33

noticing.

35:36

As soon as he can, Phillips edits the

35:38

recording and...

35:46

[Music]

35:48

Not only did the other

35:50

air force officers hear the recording,

35:52

President Arbenz also heard it.

35:56

[Music] He

35:59

immediately ordered the

36:01

Guatemalan air force to remain

36:03

grounded, fearing that other commanders might

36:05

desert. It was a great triumph of the

36:08

operation. To be handsome is to be good,

36:11

and they will continue to use tricks of this

36:14

kind, more and more deceptive.

36:18

He used an ingenious trick to try to

36:20

gain the listeners' trust. He

36:23

faked an attack on the station.

36:30

Those who had it tuned in were

36:32

listening to a normal broadcast and suddenly

36:35

heard screams, shrieks, children

36:38

crying,

36:43

and then he cut the broadcast. There was

36:46

silence.

36:49

But it was all a deception to make the

36:51

listeners believe that the clandestine station

36:54

had managed to resume broadcasting.

36:57

The next day the radio station

37:00

broadcast again with a triumphant tone, as if

37:01

saying, "We're back." June 23,

37:05

1954, Guatemala City. The next

37:08

deception occurred when two new EFE

37:10

47s arrived in Guatemala

37:13

six days after the

37:15

invasion began. The air attack began.

37:18

[Music] They

37:27

had never seen anything. Like an F-47

37:30

Thunderball attacking their city, flying

37:32

low and so aggressively,

37:37

when we heard the planes,

37:41

my mother was very scared and didn't give me any

37:44

courage.

37:45

It was quite complicated

37:48

at the time; we had

37:50

n't experienced a war before.

38:01

The air raid was so shocking that

38:05

Guatemalans invented a

38:07

very appropriate nickname for the bombs: "sulfates."

38:11

Sulfate was the term they used to

38:14

refer to a laxative, something that makes you

38:17

go to the toilet. That was the effect they

38:21

produced on the population of Guatemala.

38:25

And after the bombs, the machine guns

38:29

[Music] It's

38:33

probably one of the

38:34

most terrifying experiences a

38:36

person can suffer on land.

38:39

Imagine a plane making a tremendous noise, one that

38:45

seems impossible to get away from,

38:48

coming directly towards you

38:51

with its weapons roaring on its wings. It

38:54

was panic, a

38:58

terrible thing,

39:00

something very frightening.

39:03

Imagine such a scene in Guatemala, a

39:06

country that hadn't experienced

39:07

terrifying bombings. Suddenly,

39:11

a plane arrives flying low with its engines

39:13

roaring,

39:15

dropping explosives,

39:18

and today it's close to you. A tremendous noise.

39:29

Despite the terror caused, the

39:32

declassified files of the The CIA reveals something

39:34

surprising. I do

39:36

n't think they intended to cause great

39:39

damage.

39:40

If they had wanted to use the F-47s

39:43

to launch a devastating air strike,

39:45

they would have used the 227-kilogram bombs they were

39:48

designed for, but they did

39:50

n't.

39:52

The F-47s can carry three

39:55

227-kilogram bombs; they could have

39:58

caused a lot of damage with them.

40:02

In fact, the damage was more apparent

40:05

than real.

40:08

According to reports, there wasn't a

40:11

single death, nor was a single

40:13

truly powerful bomb dropped during the attack.

40:16

The truth is that in some cases

40:18

they dropped Coca-Cola bottles from the

40:20

plane, since the shattering of the glass

40:23

sounded like a loud explosion.

40:27

All of this is part of the psychological operation.

40:30

The objective of the air strike is not to kill,

40:33

but to sow chaos and panic among

40:36

the Guatemalan population. They

40:38

dropped a large bomb

40:40

that wasn't actually an

40:42

explosive device, but it created a huge

40:44

black cloud over the city, giving the impression

40:46

that something horrible had happened.

40:50

Yes,

40:52

the smoke bomb leads many

40:54

Guatemalans to believe they are

40:55

suffering a direct attack. That's

40:59

when we spotted

41:01

black smoke coming

41:05

from somewhere, or from the From the capital, the

41:09

CIA's psychological tactics went

41:11

even further. They used another trick

41:14

typical of covert operations:

41:16

replicating the sounds of a bombing raid.

41:20

They installed enormous loudspeakers at the embassy in

41:22

Guatemala City that

41:25

reproduced the noises of a bombing raid

41:27

and jet aircraft to

41:29

instill fear in the population.

41:33

[Music]

41:40

The older people

41:44

were saying that many people were going to be killed

41:50

and that it was better not to participate further in the

41:55

defense of the government.

41:59

[Music]

42:06

Although the psychological offensive is

42:08

beginning to yield results, the

42:10

rebel army has been reduced to a handful

42:12

of desperate soldiers who have only

42:15

penetrated 10 kilometers into the country,

42:17

and Arben remains in power.

42:20

The CIA is about to make an

42:22

incredible gamble, a bluff that will turn its

42:25

defeat into a stunning victory.

42:27

[Music]

42:31

Right at that critical moment, Phillips

42:34

resorted to what he called his biggest and most

42:36

important lie.

42:39

His biggest and most important lie is the

42:42

final phase of the fake radio broadcasts

42:44

that offered a

42:46

completely fabricated version of the invasion.

42:49

In a way, there were two invasions: on the

42:52

one hand, the real one, which consisted of

42:54

an invading force... On top of that, with their

42:56

forces reduced by half, and on the other hand,

42:59

the situation invented by Radio

43:00

Liberación, which suggested that those

43:03

troops were continuing to advance without obstacles, the

43:08

CIA radio broadcasts spoke

43:11

of one victory after another,

43:14

an invasion that in reality did not exist. They

43:21

said that the rebel forces were advancing

43:23

towards the capital, that the invasion was a

43:25

success, that the uprising was

43:48

underway; it was one story after another about the inevitable victory of the rebel forces. The biggest lie of all came when the radio reported that thousands and thousands of soldiers were approaching Guatemala City. The lie was those two columns of the army that were advancing towards the capital,

43:50

ready to take it.

43:57

The bet on the big lie paid off.

44:01

Thousands of Guatemalans fled the

44:03

city; traffic was paralyzed; the

44:06

city gradually ground to a halt, and

44:09

people went to the outskirts of the

44:12

city and evacuated; families were evacuated.

44:18

The critical moment of the big lie

44:20

came when the high command turned its

44:22

back on the president of Guatemala. The

44:25

great moment of the covert psychological operation

44:26

came when several

44:29

army colonels made it clear to Arbenz that They will not

44:32

remain by his side. Basically, they

44:35

tell him, "You and your communist friends

44:37

have created problems for us with the

44:38

Americans, and now you must resign."

44:41

11 officers surrounding Arbenz

44:45

distance themselves from an increasingly

44:47

isolated president. Imagine the colonels of the

44:50

Guatemalan army listening to the

44:52

news about those

44:53

military operations and wondering, "Where will I end up?

44:56

Where will I be when the situation

44:58

calms down?"

45:00

The pressure on Arbenz, politically

45:02

isolated, reaches enormous proportions. He

45:06

not only fears defeat at the hands of

45:08

his great enemy, but

45:10

also the terrifying possibility

45:13

that it is the US

45:15

behind him. The question was not whether they

45:17

were fighting against Castillo Armas and his

45:19

men, but whether it was the US that

45:22

threatened to invade the country and

45:24

whom they would have to face. He

45:27

sat in the

45:29

presidential office, bewildered and not knowing

45:32

what to do. He had

45:34

collapsed internally. The

45:38

chair had managed to look at him,

45:43

and that was truly the end of his

45:45

term.

45:47

[Music]

45:50

As the army command turned

45:52

against him, Arbenz resigned on June 27. He

45:56

could not bear it. The

45:58

psychological pressures were too great.

46:00

[Music]

46:08

Ten days later, Castillo Armas is sworn in

46:11

as the new president of Guatemala.

46:16

The colonel, exiled until just over

46:19

a week ago, is a

46:20

relatively unknown figure, but he has

46:23

become the most powerful man in the

46:25

country.

46:26

In Washington, Operation Baby's Access

46:29

is considered a huge victory by

46:34

all standards. It was an operation

46:35

that shouldn't have gone well, and it was made

46:38

possible by audacity, willpower,

46:40

and, in a way, a reckless

46:44

lack of prudence. Operation Baby

46:47

Shaq 6 was a brilliant deception, one of

46:51

the great achievements of artistic deception

46:53

carried out by the CIA.

46:57

Operation Baby's Access demonstrated that

47:00

psychological warfare could be

47:01

used as a lethal and effective weapon. It

47:05

deceived an entire country and managed to

47:08

overthrow a president.

47:11

Within the CIA, Baby's Access

47:14

becomes the model for future

47:16

regime changes around the world.

47:31

[Music]

47:36

[Music]

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