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hi this is dr. Gregory Sadler I'm a
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professor of philosophy and the
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president and founder of an educational
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consulting company called reason IO
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where we put philosophy into practice
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I've studied and taught philosophy for
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over 20 years and I find that many
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people run into difficulties reading
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classic philosophical texts sometimes
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it's the way things are said or how the
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text is structured but the concepts
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themselves are not always that
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complicated and that's where I come in
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to help students and lifelong learners
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I've been producing longer lecture
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videos and posting them to youtube many
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viewers say they find them useful what
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you're currently watching is part of a
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new series of shorter videos each of
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them focused on one core concept from an
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important philosophical text I hope you
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find it useful as well
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in Section seven of being and time
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Martin Heidegger is introducing us to
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the very notion of phenomenology and he
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discusses the notion or the concept of
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phenomenon the what we call phenomenon
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in English on one side and then he talks
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about the ology but he focuses on the
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logos that that comes from we when we
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say ology we're talking about some sort
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of discipline but that's coming from a
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logos you know which is typically as he
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points out translated as a speech or
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reason he also focuses in judgment some
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sort of discourse very often and we want
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to clarify the the meaning of logos so
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he tells us at the beginning of this
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this section that this concept of logos
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has many meanings in two great thinkers
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Plato and Aristotle indeed in such a way
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these meanings diverged without a basic
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meaning positively taking the lead he
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wants to get at what that basic meaning
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would be so he thinks that we have to go
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you might say to some degree behind
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Plato and Aristotle in terms of time and
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culture but we also do need to draw a
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leading clue from Aristotle's own
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treatment of the matter without thereby
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remaining committed to Aristotle's
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account of it so he says that we have to
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adequately grasp the basic meaning in
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its primary content this is what
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Heidegger and other places calls a
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primordial conception so he says if we
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say the basic meaning of logos is
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something like speech talking right or a
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discourse then the literal translation
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becomes valid only when we do something
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else what is that define what speech
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means or language or discourse that's
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to do he says the latter history of the
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word logos conceal constantly the real
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meaning of speech which is manifest it's
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enough logos becomes translated and that
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always means interpreted as reasoned
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judgment concept definition ground
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relation and and we could actually go on
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it has further meanings in in ancient
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Greek sometimes it can even come to mean
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something like lie or just story that
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you're telling all right so Heidegger
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says that's not very helpful we need to
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back up a bit we need to try to recover
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what the primordial original Greek
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meaning of logos is and we really need
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to get away from thinking that logo
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somehow signifies judgment or set of
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judgments so he says rather logos as
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speech we're looking at this sort of
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beginning meaning of it logos as speech
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really means and uses a Greek word de
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Lune meaning to manifest to show forth
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to display to another to make clear is
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another translation of that
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so speaking shows us things it doesn't
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just operate a code it's not simply
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playing a language game it's connected
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with the world that we live in maybe not
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in a simple way where each word means
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one thing but language allows us to show
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things to each other and to ourselves he
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goes on and he says and introduces
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another Greek term here for us right he
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says de Lune means making manifest what
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is talked about in speech Aristotle here
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he's going to follow Aristotle to a
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certain degree explains this more
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precisely with another Greek term Apple
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finest thigh so Apple is in this case
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translated as from itself right and the
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finest I is to display to to allow
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something to be seen to show or as we're
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going to see a little bit later on to
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reveal in the sense of unconcealed so
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Apple fantasize the verb and we're going
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to get Apple fonts this as another Greek
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term that Heidegger is going to use here
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as the sort of noun conforming to that
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verb the activity of apple fauna sigh
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the activity of displaying through
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language is Apple Fonz's so here are
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Heidegger says something quite important
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that I think I've got it laid out
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slightly here on the board but we're
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going to have to talk our way through
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this he says speech lets us see from
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itself what is being talked about right
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Apple fauna say is something being seen
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namely whatever is being revealed for
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the speaker when we talk we're not just
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revealing something to the others we're
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also in a certain sense revealing
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something for ourselves that that may be
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something well worth dwelling upon so
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there's also this element of speaking to
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other people right something is being
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revealed for the speaker who serves as
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Heidegger says as the medium or for
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those who speak with each other there's
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a difference between merely speaking to
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another and speaking with another
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sometimes we actually do both in the
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same conversation or a discourse but
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this is something again worth worth
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thinking about how does speech reveal
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things to us how does it make things
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able to be seen able to be perceived
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able to be understood
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so he goes and he says in speech insofar
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as it's genuine what is said should be
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derived from what is being talked about
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so in this way says spoken communication
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makes manifest what it's talking about
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and thus makes accessible to another and
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he says this is the structure of logic
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as both fonts Asst again we see the the
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Greek term being used there and he tells
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us not all talking actually manages to
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bring this off all right he says not
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every speech in quotes suits this mode
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of making manifest requesting make
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something manifest but in a different
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way a UK could also mean praying too so
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he goes on and he says that when fully
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concrete speech has the character of
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speaking or vocalization in words logos
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is phone a phone a is an intelligible
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sound so what we get phonetics from
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right indeed and he uses another Greek
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locution here phone a meta font osseous
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which he translated vocalization in
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which something always is cited but
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that's actually an interesting term
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because we could also say a speech or
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sound an intelligible vocalization
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beyond the imagination or the appearance
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right at the fantasy s now he goes on
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and he says because of this this this
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function of logos as apophysis let's
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something to be seen this is the reason
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why logos can have the structure of what
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we call synthesis and this is another
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greek term sin means to gather basis is
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a kind of setting or placing and
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normally when we talk about synthesis we
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talk about having you know things and
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bringing them together into some sort of
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new combination or hole so we might talk
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about a dish as a wonderful synthesis of
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this kind of flavor profile in this kind
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of flavor profile using this kind of
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vegetables right and we said well we're
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we're fusing them together and we might
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think about speech is doing something
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like that with the words and the things
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and ourselves Heidegger says no let's
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really putting the cart before the horse
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synthesis occurs later on the width is
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actually a more primordial one a more
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originally one he says the sin of
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synthesis here has a purely Apple Fanta
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chol meaning that it means it's it's
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revealing something to us to let
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something be seen in what in its
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togetherness with something to be let
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something be seen as something we often
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think about the world as a bunch of
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isolated objects that we can break down
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further and to other isolated objects
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that are associated into systems that is
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not our actual experience of the world
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or of ourselves or of what it is to
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speak with another person we grasp
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things already in the mist of other
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things with them connected with them
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separable from them distinguishable from
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them but they're with them it's not as
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if we first have the things and then
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only afterwards does togetherness occur
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now he goes on here and he brings in
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another idea that's going to be very
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important throughout Heidegger's work
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and it plays a very key role here in the
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notion of what's going on in logos truth
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for Heidegger is fundamentally or
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that's the the Greek word for truth
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which means there's a privat of a you
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know out of against not Laith a which
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means concealment forgetfulness
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so a lethea means bringing things or
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things coming out of their concealment
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we often translate this as on
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concealment here he also talks in terms
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of discovery uncovering something when
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we discover something we don't make
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something up that's completely new right
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we come across it and we didn't realize
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that it was already there so he says
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because logos let something be seen it
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can therefore be true or false what is
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it the truth or falsity he says we have
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to avoid any sort of correspondence
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theory of truth you know the notion of
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truth is being as he says correspondence
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or accordance you been skimming this
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whole notion of like an equation is
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another way of talking about it you know
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adequacy or a at the intellect 'm
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intellectus the the ad equation or
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equality even between mind and things
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right or language and things Heidegger
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says that that's a derivative conception
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likewise he's going to insist here that
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truth is also not to be understood
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primarily in terms of judgement
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judgement rutile comes later in the
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actual story but we will often get mixed
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up about this in part because truth is
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Correspondence is a very seductive
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notion that that that would somehow
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encapsulate when all truth is really
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about so he goes down and he says being
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true of logos as a leaf a lane of
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literally making true or unrevealing or
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revealing or unconcealed means to take
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beings that are being talked about in
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legging and in speech as apple finest
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thigh out of their concealment so what
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are we what are we talking about there
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he's mixed in some Greek terms speech as
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Alethea means to talk in such a way
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that we show forth we display to each
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other or to ourselves what it is that
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those beings are perhaps even what it is
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that those beings are in themselves or
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in light of other beings Zoe says this
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is to discover them similarly being
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false Sudha stai in in Greek in some
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respect literally being lied about right
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is tantamount he says to deceiving in
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the sense of covering up there's a
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couple different modalities of falseness
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that he talks about and they all come
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back to the same idea
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covering up right concealing placing one
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thing in the place of another putting he
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says putting something in front of
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something else that is letting the the
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one thing be seen so that the other
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thing won't be seen and thereby passing
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it off as something that it is not let's
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dwell on that for a moment with some
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examples he doesn't provide some here
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but I think this may be helpful when we
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engage in euphemism we are in a certain
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way lying and gating engaging in su
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Desai and Greek about what the thing is
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to somebody else or perhaps to ourselves
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so calling the harpy's you know the
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peaceful or you know blessed ones or
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anything along those lines
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the Furies rather is is concealing that
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the reality of that when I tell myself
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it doesn't really matter whether I
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exercise or not so long as I have the
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right you know idea about my body type
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I'll lose weight no matter what I'm
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lying to myself right if I tell myself
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something about this chalkboard call it
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something that it isn't I'm concealing
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something and I concealed by placing one
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thing in place of another
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lying or falsehood is always going to be
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you could say parasitical upon truth in
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this primordial sense so he goes on
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Annie says because truth has this
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meaning because logos is a mode of
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letting something be seen logos simply
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may not be acclaimed as the primary
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place of truth logos is not the only
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place where truth is happening so he
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says if one defines truth is what
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genuinely pertains to judgment which is
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very customary today or we might also
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talk especially in terms of the
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correspondence theory things are true
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when there are there objectively the way
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that's a correspondence theory of truth
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that's derivative that's less primordial
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for Heidegger than this this more
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originally conception of truth is a
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lethea so he says if we define this this
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procedures without justification and the
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Greek concept of truth is thoroughly
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misunderstood so he says in the Greek
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sense of what is true and here he brings
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up two other terms and the rest of this
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paragraph I thesis which we usually
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translate as perception oftentimes sense
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perception seeing things hearing things
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smelling things all of that he says we
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we actually grasp the beings as they
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reveal themselves to us or we describe
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them and thereby reveal themselves to to
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to the extent a nice thesis aims at its
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idea what is its own the beings
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genuinely accessible to it so looking at
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at colors he says perception is always
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true what is the in the purest and most
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original sense true is pure he says
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knowing and this is another greek term
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we often translate this as intellection
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right the operation of what goes beyond
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the senses that and we often associate
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this with what makes us part
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a human as opposed to the other animals
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here Heidegger's is calling that
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straightforwardly observe observant
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apprehension of the simplest
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determinations of the being of beings as
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such he says knowing cannot be false
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either at worst it can be sort of not
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working an on apprehending not suffice
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in for appropriate access so how do
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thinks that we actually do have this
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sort of basic you might call it
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interconnection with the world with
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ourselves with others through these
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things it can be mediated through
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language in fact it often does have to
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be mediated through language this is
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what the logos at its core is
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fundamentally about that doesn't mean
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that we have some sort of naive realism
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whereas everything is always exactly as
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we think it is or as we say it is that's
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not at all what he's talking about here
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as a matter of fact that would be
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predicated on something more like a
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truth is correspondence theory now he
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goes on and he says truth of judgment is
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actually only the opposite of covering
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up it's actually what he calls a
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multiplied founded phenomenon of truth
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so that realism and idealism both missed
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the meaning of the Greek concept of
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truth and he says because the function
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of logos lies and letting something be
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seen straightforwardly letting beings be
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apprehended logos can therefore the last
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thing is going to say logos can also
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mean reason this capacity that we have
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for grasping how things are and that
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means in part their relationships with
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other things so he's going to go on and
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bring up a few more terms he says logos
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can be understood both as leg gain that
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is the speaking and as legoman tone that
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which is spoken about all right he says
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it's used in both of these senses so he
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says what always already lies present at
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the basis of all relevant speech and
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because of this logos as let go Menon
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means it's ground or rat CEO rat see
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also means reason he says because it can
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also mean what is addressed as something
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that has become visible in its relation
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to something else in its relatedness
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logos also acquires the meaning of
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relation and relationship so logos
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encompasses a lot all of this is said
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remember to not just to explicate what
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logos as a term means or even just to
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talk about the primordial conception of
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truth but as part of a larger
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conversation in this section about what
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phenomenology the logos of fine omen a
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finite phenomenon right would happen to
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be so Heidegger is telling you all of
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this in order to help clarify his
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conception of phenomenology as a