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Martin Heidegger, Being and Time | The Concept of Logos | Philosophy Core Concepts

22:06981 summary words · ~5 min readEnglishBy Gregory B. Sadler - That Philosophy GuyTranscribed Aug 17, 2026
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Summary

Martin Heidegger retrieves the primordial Greek meaning of logos not as logical judgment or mental reason, but as apophansis—the spoken capacity to unconceal entities and let them be seen from themselves.

By demonstrating that truth (aletheia) as unconcealment precedes propositional correspondence, Heidegger dismantles traditional epistemology and establishes the linguistic grounding required for phenomenology to disclose Being.

Section summaries

0:00-3:00

Introduction: The Multiplicity and Concealment of Logos

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Dr. Sadler introduces the video series on philosophical core concepts and contextualizes the discussion within Section 7 of Heidegger's *Being and Time*. In defining phenomenology, Heidegger examines both 'phenomenon' and 'logos', noting that logos has historically diverged into numerous conflicting translations such as speech, reason, judgment, definition, and ground. To uncover its core philosophical significance, Heidegger must trace the term back past Aristotle and Plato to its primordial meaning.

  • Section 7 of Being and Time clarifies phenomenology through the dual concepts of phenomenon and logos.
  • Historical translations of logos as judgment, reason, or ground obscure its primordial meaning.

Provides introductory framing and video series context before the core philosophical argument begins.

3:00-8:00

Logos as Deloun and Apophansis

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Sadler unpacks Heidegger's thesis that logos fundamentally signifies *deloun* (making manifest or displaying) and *apophainesthai* (letting something be seen from itself). Rather than functioning as an abstract code or language game, genuine speech acts as a medium that unconceals what is talked about for both the speaker and their interlocutors. Sadler notes that this apophantic structure does not apply uniformly to every vocalization, as modes like requesting or praying operate differently.

  • Logos primarily means deloun (manifesting) and apophainesthai (letting entities be seen from themselves).
  • Apophansis establishes speech as a shared medium of uncovering rather than mere symbolic coding.

Crucial section laying out Heidegger's core redefinition of logos as apophansis.

8:00-11:00

Vocalization and Synthesis Reconsidered

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Sadler examines concrete speech as vocalization (*phone meta phantasias*) and addresses the concept of synthesis (*synthesis*). In traditional logic, synthesis is viewed as assembling isolated concepts into composite judgments. Heidegger reverses this premise, arguing that the *syn* (togetherness) is apophantic: speech lets things be seen in their already-existing togetherness with other beings in the world rather than manufacturing an artificial combination.

  • Concrete speech operates as intelligible vocalization (phone) pointing toward phenomena.
  • Synthesis is apophantic: it reveals entities in their primordial contextual togetherness, not as glued-together isolated units.

Explains Heidegger's critical subversion of traditional logical synthesis.

11:00-15:00

Aletheia: Truth as Unconcealment vs. Falsehood as Covering Up

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Sadler turns to Heidegger's conception of truth as *aletheia* (un-concealment or uncovering) derived from the privative 'a-' and 'lethe' (forgetfulness/hiddenness). Truth is not fundamentally propositional correspondence (*adequatio intellectus et rei*), which Heidegger considers derivative. Instead, being true (*aletheuein*) means retrieving entities from concealment through speech, while being false (*pseudesthai*) means concealing an entity by placing another in its place.

  • Truth as aletheia signifies unconcealment or uncovering rather than mental correspondence.
  • Falsehood is parasitical on truth, operating by covering up entities and passing them off as something else.

Essential for understanding Heidegger's critique of the correspondence theory of truth.

15:00-18:00

Deception, Euphemism, and the Limits of Judgment

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Sadler provides practical illustrations of falsehood as concealment, referencing euphemisms (such as calling the Furies 'the blessed ones') and self-deceptions regarding health and fitness. He explains why logos cannot be designated as the exclusive or primary locus of truth: treating judgment as the primary domain of truth severely distorts the ancient Greek understanding and elevates a derivative intellectual operation over direct uncovering.

  • Euphemisms and everyday lies function structurally by placing a surrogate perception over reality.
  • Propositional judgment is a secondary, founded mode of truth rather than its original source.

Provides concrete examples that clarify Heidegger's abstract distinction between primary truth and propositional judgment.

18:00-21:00

Aisthesis, Noein, and the Grounds of Phenomenology

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Sadler concludes by exploring the non-propositional uncovering in pure perception (*aisthesis*) and direct intellection (*noein*), both of which directly apprehend beings and cannot be strictly false, only deficient in access. Because logos straightforwardly lets beings and their interrelations be apprehended, it secondarily acquires the historical meanings of ground (*ratio*), relation, and rational discourse. Sadler reiterates that this analysis grounds Heidegger's entire conception of phenomenology as the logos of phenomena.

  • Pure sensing (aisthesis) and intellection (noein) are direct uncovering activities that avoid the realism-idealism dichotomy.
  • Logos encompasses both the act of speaking (legein) and what is spoken of (legomenon), grounding reason and relation.
  • Clarifying logos provides the methodological foundation for phenomenology as the disciplined unconcealment of phenomena.

Synthesizes the entire argument and ties Heidegger's definition of logos directly to the definition of phenomenology.

Key points

  • Logos as Apophansis (Discursive Showing) — Heidegger bypasses historical definitions of logos as 'reason' or 'judgment' to recover its root as deloun (making manifest) and apophansis (letting something be seen from itself). Genuine speech functions as a medium through which entities become accessible to both speaker and listener.
  • Synthesis as Primordial Togetherness — Rather than treating synthesis as the external fusion of previously isolated concepts, Heidegger defines the 'syn' apophantically as letting entities be seen in their already-existing togetherness with other entities.
  • Aletheia Over Correspondence — Truth is fundamentally aletheia—unconcealment or uncovering—rather than adequatio intellectus et rei (the correspondence of intellect and object). Truth occurs when speech uncovers an entity from hiddenness, while falsehood (pseudesthai) operates parasitically by placing one entity in front of another to conceal it.
  • Perception, Intellection, and the Ground of Reason — Pure perception (aisthesis) and intellection (noein) are fundamentally discovering activities that cannot be false in a propositional sense, only deficient in access. Because logos uncovers entities and their relations, it secondarily takes on the meanings of ground (ratio) and rational discourse.
the latter history of the word logos conceal constantly the real meaning of speech which is manifest it's enough logos becomes translated and that always means interpreted as reasoned judgment concept definition ground relation Dr. Gregory Sadler
logos as speech really means and uses a Greek word de Lune meaning to manifest to show forth to display to another to make clear Dr. Gregory Sadler

AI-generated from the transcript. May contain errors.

0:00

hi this is dr. Gregory Sadler I'm a

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professor of philosophy and the

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president and founder of an educational

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consulting company called reason IO

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where we put philosophy into practice

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I've studied and taught philosophy for

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over 20 years and I find that many

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people run into difficulties reading

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classic philosophical texts sometimes

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it's the way things are said or how the

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text is structured but the concepts

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themselves are not always that

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complicated and that's where I come in

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to help students and lifelong learners

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I've been producing longer lecture

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videos and posting them to youtube many

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viewers say they find them useful what

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you're currently watching is part of a

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new series of shorter videos each of

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them focused on one core concept from an

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important philosophical text I hope you

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find it useful as well

0:51

in Section seven of being and time

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Martin Heidegger is introducing us to

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the very notion of phenomenology and he

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discusses the notion or the concept of

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phenomenon the what we call phenomenon

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in English on one side and then he talks

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about the ology but he focuses on the

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logos that that comes from we when we

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say ology we're talking about some sort

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of discipline but that's coming from a

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logos you know which is typically as he

1:26

points out translated as a speech or

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reason he also focuses in judgment some

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sort of discourse very often and we want

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to clarify the the meaning of logos so

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he tells us at the beginning of this

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this section that this concept of logos

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has many meanings in two great thinkers

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Plato and Aristotle indeed in such a way

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these meanings diverged without a basic

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meaning positively taking the lead he

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wants to get at what that basic meaning

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would be so he thinks that we have to go

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you might say to some degree behind

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Plato and Aristotle in terms of time and

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culture but we also do need to draw a

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leading clue from Aristotle's own

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treatment of the matter without thereby

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remaining committed to Aristotle's

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account of it so he says that we have to

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adequately grasp the basic meaning in

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its primary content this is what

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Heidegger and other places calls a

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primordial conception so he says if we

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say the basic meaning of logos is

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something like speech talking right or a

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discourse then the literal translation

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becomes valid only when we do something

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else what is that define what speech

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means or language or discourse that's

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not quite so easy

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to do he says the latter history of the

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word logos conceal constantly the real

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meaning of speech which is manifest it's

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enough logos becomes translated and that

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always means interpreted as reasoned

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judgment concept definition ground

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relation and and we could actually go on

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it has further meanings in in ancient

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Greek sometimes it can even come to mean

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something like lie or just story that

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you're telling all right so Heidegger

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says that's not very helpful we need to

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back up a bit we need to try to recover

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what the primordial original Greek

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meaning of logos is and we really need

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to get away from thinking that logo

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somehow signifies judgment or set of

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judgments so he says rather logos as

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speech we're looking at this sort of

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beginning meaning of it logos as speech

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really means and uses a Greek word de

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Lune meaning to manifest to show forth

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to display to another to make clear is

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another translation of that

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so speaking shows us things it doesn't

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just operate a code it's not simply

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playing a language game it's connected

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with the world that we live in maybe not

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in a simple way where each word means

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one thing but language allows us to show

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things to each other and to ourselves he

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goes on and he says and introduces

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another Greek term here for us right he

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says de Lune means making manifest what

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is talked about in speech Aristotle here

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he's going to follow Aristotle to a

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certain degree explains this more

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precisely with another Greek term Apple

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finest thigh so Apple is in this case

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translated as from itself right and the

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finest I is to display to to allow

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something to be seen to show or as we're

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going to see a little bit later on to

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reveal in the sense of unconcealed so

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Apple fantasize the verb and we're going

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to get Apple fonts this as another Greek

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term that Heidegger is going to use here

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as the sort of noun conforming to that

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verb the activity of apple fauna sigh

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the activity of displaying through

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language is Apple Fonz's so here are

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Heidegger says something quite important

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that I think I've got it laid out

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slightly here on the board but we're

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going to have to talk our way through

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this he says speech lets us see from

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itself what is being talked about right

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Apple fauna say is something being seen

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namely whatever is being revealed for

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the speaker when we talk we're not just

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revealing something to the others we're

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also in a certain sense revealing

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something for ourselves that that may be

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something well worth dwelling upon so

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there's also this element of speaking to

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other people right something is being

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revealed for the speaker who serves as

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Heidegger says as the medium or for

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those who speak with each other there's

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a difference between merely speaking to

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another and speaking with another

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sometimes we actually do both in the

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same conversation or a discourse but

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this is something again worth worth

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thinking about how does speech reveal

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things to us how does it make things

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able to be seen able to be perceived

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able to be understood

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so he goes and he says in speech insofar

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as it's genuine what is said should be

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derived from what is being talked about

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so in this way says spoken communication

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makes manifest what it's talking about

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and thus makes accessible to another and

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he says this is the structure of logic

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as both fonts Asst again we see the the

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Greek term being used there and he tells

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us not all talking actually manages to

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bring this off all right he says not

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every speech in quotes suits this mode

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of making manifest requesting make

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something manifest but in a different

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way a UK could also mean praying too so

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he goes on and he says that when fully

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concrete speech has the character of

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speaking or vocalization in words logos

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is phone a phone a is an intelligible

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sound so what we get phonetics from

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right indeed and he uses another Greek

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locution here phone a meta font osseous

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which he translated vocalization in

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which something always is cited but

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that's actually an interesting term

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because we could also say a speech or

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sound an intelligible vocalization

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beyond the imagination or the appearance

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right at the fantasy s now he goes on

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and he says because of this this this

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function of logos as apophysis let's

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something to be seen this is the reason

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why logos can have the structure of what

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we call synthesis and this is another

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greek term sin means to gather basis is

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a kind of setting or placing and

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normally when we talk about synthesis we

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talk about having you know things and

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bringing them together into some sort of

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new combination or hole so we might talk

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about a dish as a wonderful synthesis of

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you know

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this kind of flavor profile in this kind

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of flavor profile using this kind of

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vegetables right and we said well we're

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we're fusing them together and we might

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think about speech is doing something

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like that with the words and the things

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and ourselves Heidegger says no let's

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really putting the cart before the horse

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synthesis occurs later on the width is

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actually a more primordial one a more

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originally one he says the sin of

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synthesis here has a purely Apple Fanta

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chol meaning that it means it's it's

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revealing something to us to let

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something be seen in what in its

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togetherness with something to be let

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something be seen as something we often

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think about the world as a bunch of

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isolated objects that we can break down

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further and to other isolated objects

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that are associated into systems that is

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not our actual experience of the world

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or of ourselves or of what it is to

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speak with another person we grasp

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things already in the mist of other

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things with them connected with them

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separable from them distinguishable from

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them but they're with them it's not as

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if we first have the things and then

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only afterwards does togetherness occur

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now he goes on here and he brings in

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another idea that's going to be very

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important throughout Heidegger's work

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and it plays a very key role here in the

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notion of what's going on in logos truth

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for Heidegger is fundamentally or

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primarily Alafaya

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that's the the Greek word for truth

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which means there's a privat of a you

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know out of against not Laith a which

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means concealment forgetfulness

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so a lethea means bringing things or

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things coming out of their concealment

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we often translate this as on

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concealment here he also talks in terms

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of discovery uncovering something when

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we discover something we don't make

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something up that's completely new right

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we come across it and we didn't realize

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that it was already there so he says

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because logos let something be seen it

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can therefore be true or false what is

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it the truth or falsity he says we have

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to avoid any sort of correspondence

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theory of truth you know the notion of

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truth is being as he says correspondence

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or accordance you been skimming this

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whole notion of like an equation is

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another way of talking about it you know

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adequacy or a at the intellect 'm

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intellectus the the ad equation or

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equality even between mind and things

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right or language and things Heidegger

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says that that's a derivative conception

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of truth

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likewise he's going to insist here that

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truth is also not to be understood

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primarily in terms of judgement

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judgement rutile comes later in the

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actual story but we will often get mixed

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up about this in part because truth is

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Correspondence is a very seductive

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notion that that that would somehow

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encapsulate when all truth is really

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about so he goes down and he says being

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true of logos as a leaf a lane of

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literally making true or unrevealing or

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revealing or unconcealed means to take

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beings that are being talked about in

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legging and in speech as apple finest

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thigh out of their concealment so what

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are we what are we talking about there

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he's mixed in some Greek terms speech as

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Alethea means to talk in such a way

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that we show forth we display to each

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other or to ourselves what it is that

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those beings are perhaps even what it is

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that those beings are in themselves or

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in light of other beings Zoe says this

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is to discover them similarly being

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false Sudha stai in in Greek in some

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respect literally being lied about right

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is tantamount he says to deceiving in

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the sense of covering up there's a

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couple different modalities of falseness

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that he talks about and they all come

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back to the same idea

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covering up right concealing placing one

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thing in the place of another putting he

15:03

says putting something in front of

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something else that is letting the the

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one thing be seen so that the other

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thing won't be seen and thereby passing

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it off as something that it is not let's

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dwell on that for a moment with some

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examples he doesn't provide some here

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but I think this may be helpful when we

15:22

engage in euphemism we are in a certain

15:27

way lying and gating engaging in su

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Desai and Greek about what the thing is

15:34

to somebody else or perhaps to ourselves

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so calling the harpy's you know the

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peaceful or you know blessed ones or

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anything along those lines

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the Furies rather is is concealing that

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the reality of that when I tell myself

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it doesn't really matter whether I

15:59

exercise or not so long as I have the

16:02

right you know idea about my body type

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I'll lose weight no matter what I'm

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lying to myself right if I tell myself

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something about this chalkboard call it

16:15

something that it isn't I'm concealing

16:19

something and I concealed by placing one

16:22

thing in place of another

16:26

lying or falsehood is always going to be

16:31

you could say parasitical upon truth in

16:35

this primordial sense so he goes on

16:39

Annie says because truth has this

16:45

meaning because logos is a mode of

16:48

letting something be seen logos simply

16:51

may not be acclaimed as the primary

16:53

place of truth logos is not the only

16:57

place where truth is happening so he

17:00

says if one defines truth is what

17:02

genuinely pertains to judgment which is

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very customary today or we might also

17:07

talk especially in terms of the

17:08

correspondence theory things are true

17:10

when there are there objectively the way

17:11

things really are

17:12

that's a correspondence theory of truth

17:15

that's derivative that's less primordial

17:19

for Heidegger than this this more

17:22

originally conception of truth is a

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lethea so he says if we define this this

17:30

procedures without justification and the

17:32

Greek concept of truth is thoroughly

17:35

misunderstood so he says in the Greek

17:39

sense of what is true and here he brings

17:41

up two other terms and the rest of this

17:43

paragraph I thesis which we usually

17:45

translate as perception oftentimes sense

17:48

perception seeing things hearing things

17:51

smelling things all of that he says we

17:54

we actually grasp the beings as they

17:58

reveal themselves to us or we describe

18:01

them and thereby reveal themselves to to

18:03

us as well right

18:04

to the extent a nice thesis aims at its

18:08

idea what is its own the beings

18:11

genuinely accessible to it so looking at

18:13

at colors he says perception is always

18:17

true what is the in the purest and most

18:21

original sense true is pure he says

18:24

knowing and this is another greek term

18:27

we often translate this as intellection

18:31

right the operation of what goes beyond

18:34

the senses that and we often associate

18:36

this with what makes us part

18:38

a human as opposed to the other animals

18:42

here Heidegger's is calling that

18:45

straightforwardly observe observant

18:47

apprehension of the simplest

18:49

determinations of the being of beings as

18:52

such he says knowing cannot be false

18:55

either at worst it can be sort of not

18:58

working an on apprehending not suffice

19:01

in for appropriate access so how do

19:04

thinks that we actually do have this

19:05

sort of basic you might call it

19:08

interconnection with the world with

19:11

ourselves with others through these

19:13

things it can be mediated through

19:15

language in fact it often does have to

19:17

be mediated through language this is

19:20

what the logos at its core is

19:23

fundamentally about that doesn't mean

19:25

that we have some sort of naive realism

19:26

whereas everything is always exactly as

19:29

we think it is or as we say it is that's

19:31

not at all what he's talking about here

19:34

as a matter of fact that would be

19:35

predicated on something more like a

19:38

truth is correspondence theory now he

19:42

goes on and he says truth of judgment is

19:44

actually only the opposite of covering

19:47

up it's actually what he calls a

19:50

multiplied founded phenomenon of truth

19:53

so that realism and idealism both missed

19:56

the meaning of the Greek concept of

19:58

truth and he says because the function

20:02

of logos lies and letting something be

20:03

seen straightforwardly letting beings be

20:05

apprehended logos can therefore the last

20:09

thing is going to say logos can also

20:11

mean reason this capacity that we have

20:15

for grasping how things are and that

20:18

means in part their relationships with

20:21

other things so he's going to go on and

20:23

bring up a few more terms he says logos

20:28

can be understood both as leg gain that

20:33

is the speaking and as legoman tone that

20:37

which is spoken about all right he says

20:41

it's used in both of these senses so he

20:45

says what always already lies present at

20:48

the basis of all relevant speech and

20:50

discussion

20:51

because of this logos as let go Menon

20:56

means it's ground or rat CEO rat see

21:01

also means reason he says because it can

21:05

also mean what is addressed as something

21:07

that has become visible in its relation

21:09

to something else in its relatedness

21:10

logos also acquires the meaning of

21:12

relation and relationship so logos

21:17

encompasses a lot all of this is said

21:20

remember to not just to explicate what

21:23

logos as a term means or even just to

21:26

talk about the primordial conception of

21:28

truth but as part of a larger

21:32

conversation in this section about what

21:36

phenomenology the logos of fine omen a

21:40

finite phenomenon right would happen to

21:43

be so Heidegger is telling you all of

21:47

this in order to help clarify his

21:51

conception of phenomenology as a

21:54

discipline

22:03

you

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