Bergson, tout simplement (3/4) : Deux sources de la morale et de la religion

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and hello to all the new paths

trying every day to break free from

social conditioning in the company of Colomba

Grossi, Tristan Grenati, Géraldine

Mosnasawa, Keren Jessel, Antoine Ravon, and

Marianne Chasseur. This week she directed

Michelangelo Vinty, reading "

Creative Emotion," Georges Classe, with

today's melodious sound recording by

Léa the Madwoman.

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At 10:51, it will be time to meet

Géraldine Mosnasawa for her two-

minute butterfly segment. Géraldine, who

today will make you want to read "

The Hunt for Wisdom" by Nicholas of

Cusa, published by Puff Editions. Read in the

clarity of two sources, all of

Bergson's philosophy can appear

as access, in a certain way, to

the divine.

Bergson, quite simply, is the third part.

After Camille Riquier, we will present the

philosopher's first texts left on

the immediate data of consciousness

and Matter and Memory. After Nadia Yala

Kizu yesterday, she unfolded

the creative evolution for you, and before Frédéric

Vorms, who will tell you tomorrow... In what way does

Bergson, the thinker of simplicity, draw from

the magnificent and moving texts of the collection

entitled *La Pensée*?

Today, it is Guillain Waterloo, professor

of philosophy and ethics at

the University of Geneva, who comes to

question

Bergson, pardon me, on the two sources of

morality and religion. Good morning to

you.

If we had been left to our own devices, we

would have flitted from pleasure to pleasure, but then

an obstacle arose, neither

visible nor tangible: a prohibition.

Why did we obey? The question

arose. We had grown accustomed

to listening to our parents and

teachers.

However, we felt that it was

because they were our parents, because they

were our teachers, and therefore, in our

eyes, their authority came less from them than from

their position in

relation to us. They occupied a

certain place, and it was from there that

the command, in

other words, parents and teachers,

seemed to act by delegation, with a penetrating force it would not have had if it had been launched. We were not

entirely aware of this.

But behind our parents and teachers,

we sensed something enormous, or

rather a definition that weighed upon

us with its full weight through them.

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Yes.

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Welcome to a new path of

knowledge, Guilain Waterloo. It's a

great pleasure to have you. The

last time we discussed

this program, you weren't here; you were joining us via

satellite. So today

you're facing me; it's much more convenient. It's certainly

more pleasant

for everyone. So, you're the

author of a book entitled "Bergson

and Religion: A New Perspective on

the Two Sources of Morality and

Religion," available at the latest. Finally, you

directed this extremely

comprehensive and precise work. I've just read the

first lines of the first chapter of

this book, "The Two Sources of

Morality and Religion." We're 25

years after "Creative Evolution." Bergson

published almost nothing in the meantime; nothing

new to this extent, and we hear it from

the very first sentences. Perhaps the wool,

the distance that has grown since "

Creative Evolution." He was much The

question of freedom arises from the very

first sentences, and questions of

constraints and training are raised. He tells us about

training from the world of childhood. What happened in

between? What

happened is that there is

all the work of

Durkheim's sociology of the thousand, Marcel Moos, but

above all, what happens is that Henri

Bergson wants to reflect on the situation of

the human being in the universe he

inhabits. And the human being is not an

individual, is not a collection;

humanity is not a collection

of individuals who,

initially isolated, decide to regroup

to form a society. They are

immediately caught up in a

social reality, and that is what strikes him

initially. What is

very important in Bergson's eyes is

that we always live already caught up in

something that encompasses us, and this something

that encompasses us is fundamentally

very constraining. While he

spoke a lot about freedom, and in the C

and the these last few days, as you have been able to see, what he

observes

first is that for Living for the sake of living

in

difficult natural conditions,

creative evolution also showed

how, through the sheaf-like bursting of

life, living species struggle against one

another

in a finite reality.

Human beings must first ensure their

survival, and for this, societies must

be disciplined. Therefore, the first

striking fact is discipline,

order in societies, and above all,

this curious inclination

of the individual to obey. What we

can emphasize

immediately is that, reflecting on

the moral question, Bergson realizes

that, contrary to the

usual way of approaching the moral question—that is, as a

prescription emanating from reason but

requiring us to

work on ourselves and

against ourselves—Bergson takes the

opposite stance. He

points out, very quickly from the

beginning of the text, the instinctive origin of

morality. It is as if morality did

not come from an external source. This

transcendent, Grandma Manante-like thing, if in

reality it's a form of habit incorporated

into and by the very instinct of man,

which is quite disturbing, well, it's

not exactly a moment,

meaning it would be an instinct

if we were among ants in the

lineage of arthropods, the Imenoptera, the

ants, the bees, there we would

truly be dealing with an instinct. With

human beings, we are dealing with something

that cannot be an instinct

since it is intelligence that is

decisive in human beings. It is

this faculty of

life that has developed along the

evolutionary line that leads to humanity, and

intelligence implies not only the

making of tools but also the

possibility of freedom. So it doesn't mean that we

obey instinctively,

but then how, how are we going to obey?

And here, nobody wonders if, deep down, there isn't

a mechanism at play in our

lives that isn't really an

instinct,

but which isn't a

free decision either, but is something between

So, he reflects on the two of them in

the first 29 pages of the book. He

reflects on this strange thing, and

he even invents a concept for it:

a virtual instinct, a habit

so strong that, deep down, we obey out of

habit, we are inclined to do things without even realizing it,

but

also out of self-interest. Because he clearly shows

that if man is inclined to live in

society, it's because he knows full well that

alone he wouldn't survive very

long. Certainly, not only would

he not survive very long alone, but

even when he believes he is truly

alone, society

still haunts him. It enters him not only

through its language, but through all

the habits that are instilled

everywhere. For example, when he

takes the example of Robinson, he says that

Robinson wouldn't have survived not

only if he hadn't found the

tools that were found on the

beach after the shipwreck, but if he hadn't constantly

thought about the

society he could find again. And deep down,

what sustains him morally is

the presence of others and the fact that

For example, when he's at home

on Sunday, or rather, at home on

his island, he puts on his Sunday best

completely alone, since society has

shaped him entirely since birth.

How, from this point, does what

Bergson calls a

morality—a morality he describes as

closed—produce this? Let's get to it, since it's

the first major theme of this book. He has

a fundamental thesis:

the distinction between the closed and the

open. So, that's what we'll

come to, the distinction between the closed and

the open. But what is characteristic, what comes

first, is the closed. And

why is the closed

characteristic and first? Well, as we just

said, it's so that, in order to

live, to

survive,

societies must discipline themselves, organize themselves rigorously. And so,

the

solidarity between human beings,

the morality that animates them, is fundamentally more

a social obligation than a moral obligation in the strict sense,

or morality as

we would understand it. That is to say,

fundamentally, it is limited to those with

whom we live, and it rests on a

principle—in fact, on the idea—that

those with whom we live, we not

only owe them, but we

are organically linked to them; we

are in solidarity with one another.

Conversely, it is against those who are

not part of our community. The

fundamental characteristic of the Enclosed

is the closure of a community, but above all, it is the

conception, the thought

of an opposition between what is

internal and external. The external, the

others, those who are not part

of our community, are the

strangers, that is to say, the

virtual enemies. Consequently, a

human society, as it spontaneously constitutes itself, as it

naturally constitutes itself, is first and foremost against everything that

could aggress it, and it is with

the attitude of...

Outside, there are those whom we could

potentially kill and whom we must

prepare to potentially have to kill. And

here, we must keep in mind that when

Bergson wrote this text, there had been, between

creative evolution and the

First World War—yes, it

undoubtedly also changed the

conception in relation to the... The man

and society are absolutely excellent. This

book, as you said from the beginning, was

conceived over a very long period, an

unusual period. Well, no one usually has

many years between

drafts of these works, but this one

really took a long time. There were

several reasons for this: the war,

the

political responsibilities he held in 1920 at the

International Commission on

Intellectual Cooperation, and also

difficulties in the conception of the work itself. We'll come back to that,

but what he

discovers, fundamentally, right after

the creative evolution, is mysticism. And this is why

the

anthropological book, which he initially envisioned

and which was supposed to focus more on

aesthetic and

moral questions, actually becomes

religious and moral questions. But so far,

we've only discussed

the moral question in the

strictest, most basic sense of the term—that is to say,

natural morality. So let's give the floor to

Bergson, if I may say so, here interpreted by

the actor George Class, who reads us an

excerpt from the first chapter. of the two

sources of morality and religion

which notably governs this passage from the enclosed to the

open that you mentioned, that it has

a material listening to it, our

social duties aim at social cohesion, whether we like it or not, they

compose for us an

attitude which is that of discipline

before the enemy,

the social instinct that we glimpsed

at the heart of social obligation

always aims, instinct is relatively

immutable, a closed society, however vast it may be,

it is undoubtedly covered by another

morality which it supports and to

which it lends something of its

strength, I mean of its

impetuous character, but it itself does not aim at

humanity, it is that

between the nation, however great it may be,

and humanity there is the whole

distance from the finite to the infinite, from the enclosed to

the open.

We like to say that the learning

of civic virtues takes place in the

family and that likewise, my dear, one

prepares oneself to love

humankind,

our sympathy is the clay and thus, through

continuous progress, would grow while

remaining the same and would end by

embracing all of humanity,

but between the society in which we live and

humanity in general there is, we

repeat, the same contrast as between the

closed and the open. The difference between the

two is one of kind and no longer

simply of degree.

Who doesn't see that social cohesion is

largely due to the necessity for

a society to defend itself against

others, and that it is first and foremost against

all other men that we love the

men with whom we live—such is

the primitive instinct? How do we move from

a Waterloo of closed morality to an

open morality, or like the

landing of this form of love, of

sympathy for society, to love for

humanity in general? Well, as the

text said, it is not by way

of expansion. If we can move by

way of expansion from the family to

society because, fundamentally, there is a

continuity from the primitive horde to the

constituted society, on the other hand, moving to

humanity implies a leap,

so it could not be done by

progressive development,

complexification, and civilization of

societies as nature

initially deposited them.

Something had to happen,

like an accident, something

happens, and that leap will

truly be the mark of the

fundamental distinction between the nail and the open.

It doesn't happen collectively, not through

the group; it happens through the individual, and

more precisely, because Bergson

will call the person...

This means, it presupposes that in

some of us there are

aptitudes, a capacity, an

aptitude for what Bergson will call a "

seren" (a term he will use in his thought, in his

philosophy) to deepen intuition, going back to

the root of the

life principle from which we

live. We are the

result in creative evolution; it

is creation. And some individuals make

this break by going back to the principle

of life and rediscovering within themselves the

principle of creation. No one

draws radical consequences from this; he

says each of them is like a

species with a unique individual,

as if a new

species of living being were appearing

through a person. So it

strongly recalls, in

creative evolution, the call... that he

was also human, but what do

they really bring? What

specific contribution do

these beings make to society? They

fundamentally bring a new

ethical understanding; that is to say, they

introduce a new relationship between

human beings and life, to their society,

but also to all other people,

even to all other living beings. Bergson was

very careful to say

that, fundamentally, it's not simply a

love for humanity, it's a

love for all living beings, for

everything that is radically different. But this, and

this, represents a complete break, a

real break, because, as we were

saying earlier, societies are first and foremost fundamentally and

naturally turned inward,

and the idea of ​​opening oneself

to all other human beings,

considering them no longer as strangers,

therefore virtual enemies, but as

brothers, is something

radically new. And this, if you

will, is an opening towards the

reconsideration of all the values

of existence. Because, if

you will, for it to have an

effect,

it implies reconfiguring

all our fundamental values ​​and

our way of relating to others.

But obviously, the question we

could ask ourselves is

how these

singular individuals, these people, could have had an

effect when they are so

flawed. And before that, who are these

people? Why isn't

everyone inclined to attain

this love for humanity? Is it a matter of

choice or a kind of

virtual instinct? Is it enough to

say, "I would like to take this leap of nature,"

to achieve it? And finally, thirdly,

because it's true that

this insertion of the importance of

love into philosophy is very problematic. It

tips, or at least makes

philosophy play with a limit, which is

that of mysticism, and Bergson

knows this very well. And it will greatly

disturb the readers of this text.

So, basically,

when they talk about these people, they

say they are private personalities; there's

something there. which we cannot

truly claim to explain, in

fact, we observe that there are

people who bring an

extraordinary way of being, but how is it that it is

contagious? And he

says that's where it lies first, it's one of the

fundamental concepts: creative emotion.

And emotion is emotion, that is to

say, fundamentally, contact with

this person who sees all of life

differently and who takes actions that are

completely different and good, and that

break with

natural tendencies. Well, the contact

touches deeply, that is to say, in fact, it

awakens in you

the feeling that there is virtually

a creative personality that can

awaken. And contact with a

privileged personality, a hero, he

says. But although the term "hero" is

not actually that present in the

two sources, very often he talks about

breasts, breasts, and mystics, in

reality, and that's what is quite

striking,

most often religious figures. But the guiding contact

with these people is overwhelming and, fundamentally,

awakens vocations, awakens the call to

a A personality that lies dormant in

embryo and develops, and according to

Bertin, Bergson

believes that there are differences

between individuals, meaning that

some can withstand strong

development, others cannot, and for

others, as he says, the effort

would break them, the effort would break us, he

says, if we followed the mystic to the end.

But we can follow him a

little, and then it is very striking that these

are indeed mystics and

saints. It is very striking to see

that, fundamentally, religion in Bergson will

take on mysticism, especially religion, more than

religion itself, will take on a

crucial importance. It will

take on such

crucial importance that even the

structure of the book is unbalanced. That is to

say, there are four chapters. We are told

we read about the two sources of morality and

religion, so we would expect

chapters on morality

and chapters on religion. There could have been a

chapter on closed morality, then another on open morality, then on

static religion, then on

dynamic religion. But there is... Moral obligation,

one chapter, then static religion,

then dynamic religion, and finally a

fourth chapter of political reflection.

If there isn't this doubling of the

chapter on morality, it's because,

fundamentally, there's a near coincidence

between open or dynamic morality (and the

use of the word "dynamic" is also employed) and

dynamic religion, that is to say, mystical. On this point, it's

quite striking to see how much

Gabriel Marcel was

saying, after all, how much the religious,

rather than

religion itself, takes a

central place in both sources of

morality and religion. So, before

delving into this model, this hero within,

what is the mystical figure in

Bergson that we might need to

learn to follow thanks to this

creative emotion that will make us

open to his gesture, to his

attitude? One point, however, on

the importance of this mysticism. The role of mysticism and

religion in Bergson's philosophy, even

if we take a

slightly different perspective on the text,

can be extremely surprising.

Yet, it's crucial to

understand that, even if it's more complex

for Bergson than for him, this recourse to

mysticism is a way of

developing his

philosophical research method differently. That is to say, it's

not a text that teaches

religion per se, even though it

deals with Christian mysticism.

Even though the message is undoubtedly very

close to the message delivered by the

Christian religion, it remains a

philosophical text, and it is

philosophically that the concept of

mysticism was developed.

So yes, we

can come back to this point; it's

really important to emphasize it.

Ultimately, the mystic is the one who

manages to experience a partial contact—Bergson calls this a

coincidence—with God, what is

called in

monotheistic traditions God,

whom Bergson also calls the

principle of life.

And this contact... This

produces a very important transformation within him, meaning

he will no longer be the person he

was, as he was

shaped within his society. From this point,

he will act,

and through the creative emotion we

were discussing earlier, he will be received and understood.

Ultimately, this

explains—and it seems to me—one of the

important points of

Bergsonian thought developed in both

sources. This explains why we

live in societies where

morality is mixed, that is to say, where there is

simultaneously a strong presence

of obligation, social pressure, and the

principles of society. These are

always present; they are always there, in fact, they never go away.

Bergson says one of the

guiding principles of

both sources is the non-heredity of

acquired characteristics. What is

fundamentally natural remains overlaid

by everything that civilization or

moral progress has brought.

But the mystic has brought something

decisive, something that not

everyone can receive as such.

What, purely and simply, completely,

only that, this something that he

transmits, that he communicates in an

attenuated way, falls within the

moral criteria of the societies that integrate it. So,

Ibergson's reality, but that's

really his principle. We can

recall what Camille Riquier said

on Monday: it's about

mixed societies and the decomposition of mixed societies.

Basically, we live in

mixed societies, that is to say, where the

principles of openness have entered,

but in societies that couldn't

fully receive them. And

these principles of openness entered, but

they were integrated into principles of

closure. That's why, on Wednesday, basically,

societies are half-open; they are in

tension, in tension between the closure

to which there is always a tendency

for societies and the openness to

which mystics call. Basically, there is as much

pressure

naturally in

ordinary and natural social life as there is a

call for openness, which in the first

instance is due to the mystic. So, we say

Christian homismatics. There are

things to say because there is a

Christian tone in the Two

sources of morality and religion, which

is undeniable, meaning that

Bergson, in essence, drew very close to

Christianity.

Even the thought of being baptized at one point—

he considered

baptism, but ultimately renounced it—is evident. He

gives a reason in his will,

in a codicil, where he says he senses

the rising wave of anti-Semitism that will engulf

Europe and that he doesn't want to distance himself

from

the Jews. There's

another reason as well:

the Catholic Church of the time.

For him, if there was a conversion,

it was necessarily to Catholicism. And

the Catholic Church of that time—Bergson

and his works were on the Index—

so that's the second reason.

But there's a primacy of

Christianity that it's

undoubtedly important to revisit. This

primacy of Christianity in relation to

other sources is one of the aspects that I find

questionable. There are two such aspects

in the two sources of the sands. One of the

two is this idea of

incomplete mysticism if we look at the Greeks or at

Eastern mysticism,

and complete if we look at

Christian mysticism. So, before getting to the

second criticism, we still have

time to elaborate on

the text, particularly regarding

this figure of the mystic. Bergson clearly shows

that the mystic is also

political; the mystic wants, in a

way, to work with the world. He is not

simply the receptacle

of ecstasy and completely

unreal crises that would lead him out of the

world. On the contrary, the mystic must

lead to a form of action, and this inevitably

produces problems

between the morality of

society and the one to which he aspires, as

Xavier Beauvois' film *Of Gods and Men* so aptly demonstrates. It's

really useful, I don't know

anymore, I feel like I'm going

crazy. It's

true, staying here is as

crazy as becoming a monk.

You've already given your life,

you gave it in the footsteps of Christ when

you decided to leave everything behind. Your

family, your country, your

wife and children, you could have had

then

[Music] nothing more.

What did we leave for? For

God? To

be heroes? To show the

best? No, no,

out of loyalty

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Nature initiated humanity as

distinct individuals by the very act

that constituted the human species.

Like any constitutive act of a species, this one

was a halt.

By resuming the forward march, we break

the decision to break.

To achieve a complete effect, it would indeed be necessary to

bring

the rest of humanity along with us, but if some

follow and if others persuade themselves that they will do so eventually, that is already a great deal. From then on,

with the beginning

of execution, there is the hope that the circle will eventually

be broken.

In any case, we cannot

repeat it too often: it is not by preaching love

of neighbor that one obtains it; it is not by

broadening

narrower sentiments that one will embrace humanity.

Our intelligence may well persuade itself

that this is the

indicated course of things. They approach things

differently.

What is simple, look at our

understanding, is not necessarily simple

for our will.

Where logic says a certain

path would be the shortest, experience

intervenes and finds that in that

direction there is no voice, no

truth, and that one must pass through

heroism to arrive at love.

Heroism, moreover, is not preached;

it only has to show itself, and its mere

presence can set other men

in motion. It is

itself a return to

movement and emanates from a

communicative emotion, like any emotion

related to the creative act.

Religion expresses this truth in its own way,

saying that it is in God that

we love other men.

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And the great mystics declared that they saw the

feeling of a current that would go from their

soul to God and descend from God to

human beings.

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Applause]

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You are listening to France Culture, the new

joints of knowledge. It is 10:30,

and this is the third installment of our

series dedicated to Henri

Bergson, and for this occasion, I have the great

pleasure of welcoming the philosopher

Guilain Waterloo to discuss the

fifth, sixth, when, how many, by the

way, these are the two sources, what

work, fourth great book,

and the penultimate

of people, the two sources of

morality and religion available at the

most

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[Applause]

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of the film that we heard, of Gods and Men, clearly conveyed

and

illustrated wonderfully, was this conflict,

in reality, that runs through the mystic from the moment he has

made a certain life choice

that implies not renouncing

earthly life, since that is ultimately the

problem, and it is in this that the

political dimension of the mystic is highlighted by

Bergson, and it is there that this character

becomes fascinating and much more

interesting than a simple hero, as you

said, since he is someone with whom

we can identify, yes, absolutely,

and what is therefore striking is that

the mystic, unlike The image

we have of him is not that of a

contemplative lost in ecstasies,

immersed in visions, but of a

person who acts. And for Bergson, this is

the determining characteristic

of mysticism: that

contemplation is only a

stage. This is why, rightly

or wrongly, he believes that the

Greeks and Hindus stopped at

contemplation. But in

Bergson's eyes, contemplation is a moment, the

moment of the return to the principle, or of

the eruption of the principle into

consciousness. But there is only completeness, only partial

coincidence. And

partial coincidence means that the

human will will be grasped by the

divine will, and it is the

divine will that will work through it, within it,

but consequently, work in this

world for this world. This is where, if there is one, we will

undoubtedly say, a

shift—much, much less

optimism in the two sources of

morality and religion than there was

in creative evolution. There is, however,

an optimistic principle in

both sources: the idea that there is

a purpose to human life, and that this

purpose is to

create a world where love is a

reality, where love enters into

the human species among the living. The

mystic is the one whose will,

imbued with the divine will, goes to

others and performs acts

that completely transfigure our

usual way of living and

relating to ourselves. Therefore, it is

fundamentally a principle

of action. Mysticism, contrary to what one

might spontaneously believe, is

a principle of action and not a

principle of contemplation.

Contemplation, in Bergson's work, and even more so

ecstasy or vision, becomes

secondary. But

in saying this, he is simply expressing what he

truly means. He is a

keen and profound reader of the mystics.

Bergson's detractors, the

freethinkers, like to say that when Bergson

speaks of mysticism, it's

secondhand. Not at all; that's completely false.

That is to say, he discovered mysticism

through the work of one of his

students, Henry Delacroix, on the history

and psychology of mysticism. It was there, and also

through William James's book, *A

Variety of Religious Experiences*, that he was truly captivated. But he

was really struck by the leader of

the movement in 1909, as Joseph

Lot would later say, "It was a new

world I discovered." He connected them,

and he read, in particular,

Guyon, who, on the Catholic side,

was somewhat controversial, but

whose work would be published by Protestants.

He read Madame Guyon, spending a long time immersed

in the works of Madame

Guyon, Teresa of Ávila, John

Lacroix, Francis of Assisi, and

Catherine of Siena. Ultimately, what

he realized was that all these great

mystics' primary concern was to

tell their disciples not to become too attached

to visions and ecstasies because, in

reality, they would miss the essential.

Since you raise this

point, Guillaume Waterloo, how do we

differentiate between, on the one hand, because

Bergson calls religion static, which

emanates from what he also calls the

fabulating function necessary for

society, which comes to the aid of the peril in which

intelligence places

man, man will take refuge in

this kind of fabulating function that

produces static religion, and on the other hand,

this dynamic religion, which is

proper to, and is implemented in

part by, the mystic, and which, in

a sense, has nothing to do with

this first religion? How do we

separate the two, since in any case

it doesn't really depend on oneself, since

the mystical being is not given to

everyone? Ah, thank you, thank you for asking this

question because it makes us reflect on

something we might have forgotten; that would have been quite

detrimental. It's

the fabulating function. We spoke of

closed morality earlier; there is a counterpart to

closed morality, which is the

fabulating function, that is to say, in

our case, a kind of spontaneous faculty, a kind of

presence of

Instinct in the intelligence that speaks,

intelligence spontaneously produces ideomotor,

phantasmatic representations.

That is to say, fundamentally,

religion—religions exist

everywhere—there isn't, that's how he

begins chapter 2, there hasn't been,

we would search in vain for a

human society where there is no religion. There are religions

everywhere, but where do they

come from? What is the

generating principle of these religions? And

he discovers it within us, that is to say, in

a faculty of our mind to

produce representations that

will allow us both to

reassure ourselves as individuals and to

strengthen society because, fundamentally,

the human species, among all

living species, is in a somewhat

particular situation.

Intelligence, which is its instrument

of liberation compared to all

other species, is at the

same time what puts it in peril, and

because through intelligence the individual—the

human individual, unlike all

other animals—

represent his death, the fact that he will

die, that he will disappear, a lot of

being in this text,

and tomorrow the individual also represents

the possibility for him, as an individual, to

disassociate himself from the whole of society. These

are two

considerable dangers, fundamentally the

spontaneous productions of

religious condemnation, but

stemming from the fabulating function. These are

fables stemming from the

fabulating function; they will counteract this,

and at the same time, they will

reassure the individual and they will

ensure society. But

these fabulations, which at the beginning are quite

incoherent, are

effective presences, semi-spirits, and then

can orient themselves towards magic, but

little by little, as a society

structures itself, tells itself, becomes more complex,

gradually becoming gods,

personalities, a pantheon of God, and

little by little, religions are formed—

all the religions that we see

flourishing in various societies, in

time and in history, in

civilizations. And these religions all

stem from the fabulating function, but the

mysticism we were talking about earlier... It's not just

one more thing

about this static religion because

the pages

Bergson devotes to this subject are fascinating.

He clearly states that it's

static religion and of vital importance. He speaks

of nature's defensive reactions

against representation, meaning that there's

something almost

biologically vital in this case, in the

relationship between man and religion. Absolutely, absolutely,

it was one of the

sources of religion, to use the

title of the text. Quite right.

And as he said at the end of the

first chapter, basically everything is moral and

biological in essence, in a broad sense.

Well, tomorrow, but religion, insofar as it

stems from the

fabulating function, is also biological. I'll go further:

it's rooted in a

surge of life. Basically, here, it's about

life, not made up of bits

and pieces; it embraces

viability. And Bergson thinks that, fundamentally,

the human species is posited with what

ensures its reproduction, of course,

its perpetuation, and the fabulating function

is an element, just like the

virtual instinct. That is to say, the habit of

forming habits, and likewise the

fabulating function, it is posed with

humanity, but mysticism has passed through

the same source, and precisely the

knife, while listening to a text, so this

time we take a leap forward in the

work, a chapter 3 on

dynamic religion, we

now understand the closed morality, the

static religion, listen to how Bergson describes

the mystical transformation of the soul

precisely towards this opening that

we seek, and shaken in its

depths by the current it will carry,

the soul ceases to turn on

itself, escaping for a moment the law

that dictates that the species, the individual,

conditions each other

circularly,

it stops as if listening to a

voice calling it, then it lets itself be

carried straight ahead,

it does not directly perceive the force

that drives it, but it feels its

indefinable presence or divines it

through a symbolic vision,

then comes an immensity of joy,

ecstasy, in which it is absorbed, or rapture

that she undergoes God is there and she is in

Him, no more

mystery, the problems

vanish, the darkness

dissipates, it is an illumination,

but for how long?

An imperceptible unease that hovered

over the ecstasy descends and clings to

her like her shadow;

it would already suffice, even without the states

that will follow, to distinguish

true, complete mysticism from what was once its

anticipated limitation or

preparation.

It shows, in fact, that the soul of the great

mystic does not stop at ecstasy

as at the end of a journey—

it is indeed rest, if you will—but

as at a station where the machine

remains under pressure, the movement

continuing in a trembling motion,

awaiting a new leap forward.

She does not realize the

profound work that is obscurely accomplished within

her;

she feels that she has lost much; she does not

yet know that it is in order to

gain everything.

Such is the dark night of which the

great mystics have spoken, and which is

perhaps this What is most

significant, or at least most

instructive, in Christian mysticism? The

magnificent text, *Guillaume Waterloo*, is

magnificently interpreted by George

Claes. It concerns this extraordinary effort that

the soul makes in its mystical transformation. One of the

important points for explaining

this dark night of the soul, in the mystical realm

we were discussing, which concludes the text, is the

fact that the soul cannot grasp

itself in the process of transformation. There

is a kind of

impossibility of accessing self-

knowledge through the

mystic's intellect. It is a work

that far surpasses intelligence, and it is

a painful one. The

dark night of the soul is a fundamental concept of

Carmelite mysticism, and indeed of

Christian mysticism.

In any case, Western Christian mysticism

involves an internal work

that is partly a work of

destruction, the destruction of

self-love, which is directed toward ourselves

and, in the group, toward the

group.

This work is

extremely painful.

Mystics often say this,

explaining that, fundamentally, in

contemplation and in the initial states

of... In mysticism, there's a kind of love for receiving

the graces God

bestows. We desire that God is greater than

God and exists in the world because it fulfills us so much.

But ultimately, what do we love most? Do we

love what we

receive from God, or do we love

God himself? And therein lies a

crucial question; there is a work to be done.

Very difficult, very important, and decisive, which

is, properly speaking, the

mystical metamorphosis. This

mystical metamorphosis, once achieved, implies

moving forward without

thinking about oneself anymore. That's what's quite

decisive. And from the person to the

personalization, there is a form of

depersonalization, but in reality, no.

That is to say, but you draw

attention to a very important point,

on which Anthony Feneuil also

worked in Bergson's Philosophy and

Mysticism, a very important point: the

question of personality changes with

experience, with reflection on

the mystical experience. The very notion of

personality changes. It is a

personality that is no longer defined by

a limited history,

self-contained and confined to a specific duration, but

a personality whose

irruption is much broader,

much more beautiful. At the same time, it is

a radical opening. That is to say,

fundamentally, the individual is no longer referring back to themselves what they

receive in the

Ludivine personality. It is a

radical opening; they receive something, and this

something This

new irrigation is both a creation, a

call to creation, and even

politically, we would have

questions of democracy—this is an

important point—and so it is both

a step towards creation and

an absorption into the principle, that is to

say, a discovery at the heart of the

subject of an

eternal and infinite dimension. That's why it's

difficult to

think, since you mentioned it. We

can conclude this question

since Bergson ends his work

indirectly with final remarks on

mechanics and mystics, where he

agrees on the importance of politics.

It is difficult to understand how

the experience you just described,

the transformation of mysticism, will

in turn have, let's say,

any benefit at the level of society. But

we have spoken of creative emotion, but

is that enough to act as a kind of

cement for society? On this point, there are those who

say

beautiful things in their book on Oberson

and creative humanity, on the relationship

between democracy and the metaphysics of

life, and life, the vital lamps, the

impetus, the thought of the Ultimately, for

Bergson, democracy is fundamentally evangelical,

meaning it stems from the idea of

a fraternity among

human beings, that

human beings are

called by God to love one another as

God loves them. This is why, in the

famous motto

of democracy—

liberty, equality, fraternity—no one

considers fraternity, which is often the poor relation

for us. We

talk a lot about liberty, we talk a

lot about equality, we talk little about

fraternity. Well, for Bergson, it's the

pivot. In reality, it's fraternity that

allows us to articulate

liberty and equality in a viable way. These are, in essence,

quite oxymoronic because the

more liberty we give, the

more equality we give, the

less liberty we give. It is

the spirit of fraternity that makes

a balanced relationship between

liberty and equality possible, but above all, it

transforms our lives. So,

in Bergson's work, there's the idea that, fundamentally, it's

the term itself. What's quite striking

when you read *The Two Sources of

Morality and Religion* is that the

notion of love is much more

present than the initial notion of all

Bergson's work, which was freedom. What's

very curious is that there's

a kind of

hymn to love, even though *The Two

Sources of Morality and Religion*

are much more concerned with

creative evolution. Because Bergson

wonders if our temptation,

in the industrial world that had

flourished, won't be to close ourselves off

and no longer listen to the

Word that had been brought and which, in a

sense, had changed everything. We know

that love makes us anxious; love is

worn around the neck; the heart is mad;

four tightly bound arms;

the soul would be

like Snow White's scarf;

love wraps itself and then wolf; love

[Music]

[Laughter]

often does A great commotion at the prime of life,

he shouts, he tears, and he lies, poor oath, we must

thank you very much Guilain

today for making us want to

read and reread the two sources of

morality and religion, and I would also like to

invite your listeners to read

the work you edited, Bergson

and Religion: A New Perspective on

the Two Sources of Morality and

Religion, also available from

[Music] publishers. For

too long, the body, content with

love, at the slightest thing,

these villages at the Clos du Souvenir

cling. The hymn to love, Guilain told you,

Waterloo, well, it's Donkey Skin

that helps us finish this

program and welcome Géraldine Bosna

Savoie to the studio. Hello Géraldine, hello

Adèle, hello everyone. It's

10:51 am, you're listening to France Culture, the

new paths of knowledge, it's time

for your two-minute segment,

Géraldine, and as every day, you

come to make us want to read a

philosophy book that has just been published, I

think it's Nicolas Decuse on the

program today, but yes It's

Nicholas of Cusus, and it's "The Hunt for

Wisdom," published by Puff Editions.

[Music]

Everyone, of course, knows

the etymology of philosophy as the

love of wisdom. Nicholas of Cusus, a

thinker from the late Middle Ages, it must be

said, is much less well-known

than this Immotos etymology

of philosophy. He proposed

a slightly different definition of

this discipline. It was at the end of

his life, in 1462, as a kind of

philosophical testament, that he undertook to take stock

of his thought and

proposed to define

philosophy not as the love

of wisdom, but as a hunt for wisdom. This is the

entire subject of

this work, published by Puff Editions.

The distinction between the love and the

quest for wisdom is important because, as we

see, the emphasis is on the

search. What matters is not so much the

catch as the hunt itself.

So, certainly, the image of the hunt

as wisdom—as a hunt, pardon,

as Kate—is not entirely New,

but Nicholas of Cusa gives it a

new meaning. His idea here is therefore not

simply to love wisdom and do everything to

possess it, but rather to

make this love the driving force of

discovery, the driving force of our power,

our ability to pursue it. Nicholas

of Cusa says this in the very first

paragraphs of his text, and I quote: "We

are driven," he says, "by an inclination of

our nature to possess not only

knowledge but wisdom, namely, a

knowledge that is flavorful, wisdom

as a knowledge that is flavorful." The

formula is quite beautiful because what

happens—and this is also the very essence of

Nicholas of Cusa's thought—is

not only a reformulation of

philosophy as the pursuit of wisdom,

but also as the pursuit of a

flavorful knowledge, far removed from the images of

philosophy as an abstract science, distant

from us. Nicholas of Cusa, as early as

the Middle Ages, makes it a nourishment for

the mind that we try to reach, a

fruit that is within our grasp, and a fruit

that is not limited to knowledge, to possession,

but at least to knowing how to taste. Bravo,

Geraldine! The pursuit of wisdom and the

wisdom of the hunt.

The hunt for wisdom isn't easy, and so it's by

Nicolas de Cuze, published by Pus.

Thank you very much. As for us, we'll

meet again tomorrow for the continuation and conclusion already.

But this week is dedicated to

Henri Bergson. Tomorrow, Frédéric

Vorms will be here to talk to you about the

sublime texts of thought and the moving, the

last collection of texts published by

Bergson. In the meantime,

if you'd like to listen to

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