Nora Fulton · Transcendental Appropriation – Kant and Heidegger, Schema and Transition

thank you

um first of all thank you so much to

Nathan and petar for inviting me here I

was so happy this ended up being able to

still occur after being planned

pre-pandemic so

I'm very happy to be here um can you all

hear me okay yeah okay so I have a lot

to get through so I'm just gonna jump

right in uh the paper is titled

transcendental appropriation content

Heidegger schema and transition and

opens with this epigraph from content

the problem of metaphysics in respect

before the law which as a free creature

I give to myself I cannot despise myself

uh also these slides mostly just to give

you something to look at while I go

through a lot of really dense textual

stuff some of the things I won't be able

to get into they're just sort of side

material that may be of interest and

some just some of the the block quotes

I'm using it's easier to follow if we're

talking about Heidegger and Kant

thinking is often characterized by

himself most of all as being cloven by a

transition it was a transition that

began in the immediate aftermath of

being in time in a moment where as he

said in March of 1932 all of his prior

output had become alien to him

he had been on he thought a path brought

to an impasse on Whose edges stands much

that his contemporary and mendacious

often in such a way that these are taken

as more important than the path itself

in other words he considered his

thinking up to that point to be guided

by disidentification oriented always

away from that which he would correct in

the history of philosophy and the

scientism of modernity

being in time was a massive success but

it was also he thought at that time

readily misinterpreted and misused as an

anthropology or a philosophy of

existence

he even worried that he had spoken as

the Learned they without realizing it

everything up to that point seemed to

him to be a failure best put in the

shadows of what would come after

so we set out on a new course away from

the existential analytic of being and

toward a conception of being as event

from the understanding of being to The

Happening of being

this also brought him away from the

thought of conditions and toward the

thought of the capacity of those

conditions to change to be radically and

irrevocably transformed where and when

did this alienation from himself begin

chronologically last Among The Works

Heidegger listed as belonging to his

pre-transition thinking was Kant and the

problem of metaphysics

an exegesis of the critique of pure

reason published in 1929

the comic book as I'll refer to it was

thus for Heidegger the dead end of the

sequence with which he continues to be

most associated the development of the

existential analytic

or rather up to the publication of being

in time or rather the publication of the

first two divisions of the first part of

being in time

in Heidegger's plan part one would have

been followed by a second part comprised

of a further two divisions and at the

heart of one such of these would have

been the analysis of the hot book

which tracked the profound

transformation that the faculty of

imagination underwent between the first

and second editions of the critique

for the most part the critique substance

remained unchanged across the revision

and Kant made no major changes to his

system this wasn't the case however for

the section in which he worked out his

argument for the objective validity of

the categories the transcendental

deduction will be a little overlap with

the previous talk sorry the comic book's

goal was to re-center the schematizing

power of the imagination in that

argument also in const thinking as a

whole

for Heidegger the schematism is not as

it is conventionally understood to be or

maybe I should say canonically and

dominantly understood to be the

post-empirical application of rules for

the synthesis of products of the

understanding and the intuition

but is instead a pre-empirical capacity

for synthesis more generally that stands

at the root of both faculties as the

soil in which all else grows we've it's

kind of interesting to follow Samantha's

talking and to give an idea of

one of the more

um most cited articulations of this

conventional reading of the two

deductions would be like Dieter Henrick

the proof structure of Khan's

transcendental deduction where he goes

through

the history of both of them this is like

a 1969 paper and his argument is

essentially that I think it's similar to

Samantha is that it's a it's a there's

no like difference except for a semantic

sloppiness and the use of the word mind

is what he focuses on in this reading

and Daniel Dahlstrom 's realization

Heidegger had noticed in const doctrine

of schematism a connection between the

traditional problem of being and the

phenomenon of time

he accused Khan of retreating from the

question that he had left open prior to

the revision of the critique and claimed

that his own thought was posing that

question anew

most of all he felt that a

reconstruction of the first version of

the deduction

suppressed up to that point and he was

reacting against the neocontianism of

his time

all right he was at Marburg when he was

working in the seminars and that was a

prevailing mood there

could articulate a concept of

temporality that didn't require a

subject which is also his goal

and carrying out this reconstruction

though Heidegger found something he may

not have been looking for

question of the capacity for transition

between the antic and the ontological

this notion that what is optically true

for Dawson it's inauthentic

determinateness could in some sense

become ontologically true for us as an

authentic freedom for determination was

absent prior to this point

at the outset of the Kant book he still

holds that antic truth necessarily

adjusts itself to the ontological

contributions to philosophy a decade

later post-transition as he would

position it

one of the differences is that the ontag

ontological distinction had all but

disappeared from his discourse it's not

something he uses as much

there the ontological I'm going to try

and do this and I'm quoting him other

people even when grasp as a condition of

the ontic is only something

supplementary to it

between these two points Heidegger began

to identify Khan's transcendental

imagination with his own conception of

temporality and any problems he found in

the former would by transitive relation

become visible in the latter and indeed

they did

my suggestion in this paper is that this

identification with Kant made his own

transition both possible and necessary

for him his trajectory away from being

in time irrevocable

just as the transcendental magic

imagination and Kant became for

Heidegger a legal activity that forms

even as it unites turning Caprice into

rule ontological truth became the event

of the Antics possibility for

ontological adjustment and

supplementation

turning throwing this into origin

this is to go a bit too far in advance

first I'm going to try and show the

importance of the deduction to the

critique

I'm going to lay out the two versions of

the imagination given by these different

editions the A and B deductions

and once this has been accomplished I'll

try to show how exactly Heidegger

performs his retrieval of the priority

of the imagination in a and how he

problematizes the supposed Solutions

offered by the B I'll track the impact

of this retrieval and both Heidegger's

turn and the Legacy in his work of the

kantian concept of schema as it

transforms from a dangerous precipice of

indetermination into the ground of

post-turned dazines peculiar form of

Auto affection

via the insistence in stagnikite on

identity

it is this form of Auto affection that I

claim is at the root of one of the two

dominant understandings of transition

today transition as Appropriations

that's kind of where this fits into my

research

at the heart of the critique of

the question of those conditions which

make experience and thus knowledge

possible

against empiricists who help that

knowledge is constituted by experience

alone and denied the possibility of

pre-existent truths Kant attempted to

show that our experience is indeed

conditioned by a priority Concepts these

are the concepts of the understanding

what structure any possible judgment

namely quantity equality modality and

relation and their moments or modes

these Concepts in turn find their

content in the faculty of the intuition

which structures any possible sensation

both temporarily and spatially

in the transcendental aesthetic which

precedes the deduction Kant shows how

space and time are necessary

representations

forms of representation of objects

rather than objects in themselves

without these forms of representation

there could be neither sensation or

knowledge

space the form of pure magnitude is what

allows for things to be outer objects

for us and time the form of pure

succession is what makes the experience

of perdurance and all actuality of

appearances possible

these two structures of possible

representation aren't equal even in the

B deduction however

since for time since time for Kant is

nothing other than the form of inner

sense

to which an outside can be related via

its determination time is also the

condition of space

the intuition is what any category of

the understand standing must stand in

essential relation to

categories two are nothing other than

the conditions of thinking in a possible

experience

just as space and time contain the

conditions of the intuition for the very

same thing

however the possibility indeed the

necessity of these categories rests on

the relation that the entire sensibility

and with it all possible appearances

have to the original app reception which

everything is necessarily in agreement

with the conditions of the thorough

going Unity of self-consciousness

Under Universal functions of synthesis

these functions of synthesis reside in a

faculty of the imagination which Bridges

the intuition and the understanding

the first thing that must be given to us

a priori for the condition cognition of

all objects is the manifold of pure

intuition the synthesis of this manifold

by means of the imagination is a second

thing but this still doesn't yield

cognition

the concepts that give this pure

synthesis unity and that consists solely

in the representation of this necessary

synthetic Unity or the third thing

necessary for for cognition of an object

that comes before us

it is kant's second thing that changes

drastically between the first and second

Editions

in the first edition the order of

thought proceeds as follows

comp Begins by returning to to the

conjecture that there are a priori

Concepts and forms of representation at

all

if they do exist he says they can

certainly contain nothing empirical

to have them refer to determinate

content of the outset would defeat the

purpose of the pre-experiential truths

that he sought

with these contact Concepts contain are

only ever the pure a priori conditions

of a possible experience and of an

object of it

a priori Concepts like the categories

are thus the pure thinking in every

experience but not the sources of

experience

intuition cannot be said to be the

source of experience either since every

intuition contains a manifold in itself

which would not be represented as such

if the Mind did not distinguish the time

and the succession of Impressions on one

another

what could give us the truth prior to

experience of something like

manifoldness insensibility

that which intuition gives its

representations again pure succession

and time magnitude and space

it's not yet experienced as such so much

as a way that experience must be given

if we're to experience things the way we

seem to

what the intuition actually does give us

is not even initially grasped as

manifold its multiplicity is so chaotic

that it can't even be thought as

multiple let alone thought at all

at least initially and in itself

something else is doing the giving here

and it's the imagination which and this

is really important spontaneously allows

the manifold of intuition to be gone

through taken up and combined in a

certain way

this tripartite movement a synoptic

going through a reproductive taking up

and a recognition through combination

is said said by Kant to be the

three-fold synthesis which is

necessarily found in all cognition

versions of the deduction synthesis in

the most General sense concerns the

action of putting different

representations together with each other

and comprehending their manifoldness in

one cognition

but the a deduction uniquely gives the

imagination essential tasks in each of

these three moments

first synopsis which apprehends the

manifolds as manifold

second reproduction which takes up the

manifold as a totality even when its

full membership can never be given and

third recognition which combines the

manifold with Concepts according to

rules known as schemas and allows the

manifold to be taken as a Unity

a couple examples of this

I think Samantha remarked that

one of the examples of schema is number

or mathematical figuration and talks a

lot about geometry this is just one

example of something like this is a part

of 17th century geometry

bonavent bonaventura cavalieri's

principle of volume for two figures

uh there's a reading of this use of

schema in con that describes this as

being really concerned with figuration

and the grammar of figuration the bill

Kramer has an interesting article on

this

so if what I'm I'm still summarizing so

if you're bored feel free to look at

this

in the imaginations first moment

apprehension the imagination must run

through and then take together a

manifold the manifoldness of a given

intuition

synopsis doesn't mean summary or

condensation for Kant its meaning for

him is closer to its etymological roots

coming into view or a seeing together

synoptic synthesis is not an

apprehension of a whole this occurs

later but as more akin to a I mean

logically later sorry it's more akin to

an unstructured but ongoing riffling

through

this first form of imaginative synthesis

were not by definition always incomplete

it couldn't encounter a manifold at all

since what it would have before it would

only appear as an unchanging hole of

like you've finished going through the

entire Rolodex

unlike in the B deduction the

imagination is already defined by a

temporal dimension in this way of

describing it of the ongoingness of it

as a procedure

as well as by a Unity that's logically

prior to any app receptive eye which

hasn't come into the picture yet

when turning to the second of the three

moments of the imaginations synthesis

current remarks that representations

that have often followed or accompanied

one another are finally associated with

one another thereby placed in Connection

in accordance with which even without

the presence of an object one of these

representations brings about a

transition of the mind to the other in

accordance with a constant rule another

form of schema

there seems to be conscious saying a law

instituted by the imagination upon the

multiplicity of any manifold it ripples

through as soon as the first moment of

apprehension synopsis is in play as soon

as the manifold is taken as manifold its

elements can be grasped in their

temporal succession and relative

magnitude

at the same time the relations of

succession magnitude reproduce the

manifold's manifoldness in every member

of it um

that that belongs to it even as a

potential relation

Kant explains this through his uh famous

example of Cinnabar

this is really kind of cheap but it's

just a pretty Stone you just

yeah and it always forms with Merc with

Mercury deposits too which is not often

remarked about this example that

um in its natural state it's poisonous

also

so I'm sure we all know this quote but

I'll just

reread the last little part about it

it's Cinnabar we're Now red now black

now light now heavy if a human being

were now changed into this animal shape

now into that one if on the longest day

the land recovered with fruits now with

ice and snow then my empirical

imagination would never even get the

opportunity to think of heavy Cinnabar

on the occasion of the representation of

the color red

or if a certain word were attributed now

to this thing now to that or if one in

the same thing were sometimes called

this sometimes that without the

governance of a certain rule to which

appearances are already subjected in

themselves then no empirical synthesis

of reproduction could take place

this is the actions first Divergence

from the B for its major Divergence

without the second

con says not even the purest and most

fundamental representations of space and

time could ever arise

the reproductive imagination and the a

deduction is a necessary condition not

just for our representation and

experience of objects but for the forms

of our intuition they put into synthetic

relation

and since manifolds of appearances are

not things in themselves but the mere

play of representations which in the end

come down to determination of the inner

sense it's left open whether

reproductive synthesis may not determine

the inner sense as well to some extent

and by that I mean left open a deduction

as a result in the third moment the

synthesis of recognition

when the identification of objects comes

about through the combination of

intuition with conceptual judgment

according to rules of their various

schema

the a deduction is forced to conclude

that the imagination grounds

transcendental app reception and not the

other way around

or at least that these components of

cognition stand on equal footing

transcendental app reception is a pure

original unchanging Consciousness even

in this version but it's also nothing

more than the identity of its action

what is its action prior to any other

nothing more Kant says at this point

than the threefold synthesis he's laid

out for us or of its combination

in the a the app reception of the inner

sense also ends up being something

intuited as a manifold and thus

synthesized by the imagination

it also possesses a Unity which endures

in time and encompasses an extension

as with the concept of a body which

serves as the rule or schema for our

cognition of outer appearances

and like cinnabar's unity and perderance

would be lacking without a rule like

this

Cinnabar after all really is that once

red black light and heavy among many

other things but the mind doesn't take

each of these appearances of the stone

in turn it takes them and must take them

as a Unity

can't acknowledge where this path could

lead the principle of the necessary

Unity of the pure synthesis of the

imagination prior to app reception is

thus the ground of the possibility for

all cognition

this is a kind of quote that makes me

like disagree with this argument that

it's purely a semantical difference

we can talk about that in the

conversation

but it seems Khan should be forced to

say that transcendental synthesis which

he calls productive synthesis

is more pure original and unchanging

than any app receptive eye if this were

the case if a pure synthesis in the

imagination did stand equally alongside

if not logically prior to Pure

understanding

then it would still remain in itself

entirely undetermined and contingent

whether appearances were also associable

in case they were not a multitude of

perceptions or even an entire new

sensibility would be possible in which

much Imperial empirical Consciousness

would be encountered in any mind but

separated and without belonging to one

consciousness of myself which he says is

impossible so he kind of wants to

disagree with the the conclusion he

seems to have let himself into

foreign

the only remedy Kant could offer for the

circularity a introduced was at the end

the suggestion of an affinity between

the app receptive eye and the productive

synthesis of the imagination an

indelible resemblance of one to the

other an identity between them

so if a new Affinity could be produced

the I Would by implication see itself

transformed irrevocably without a trace

of what it had once appeared to be

so we'll return to these questions soon

in the B deduction the order gets

reversed rather than beginning with the

question of the possibility of a priori

Concepts Kant begins where the a left

off with the question of the ground for

synthesis as such

and transcendental app reception is his

new answer to that question

in B can't hold against a that through

the eye as simple representation simple

changed his mind concretely on this

point nothing manifold is given

the transcendental appreception of the B

deduction is a simple I.E not composite

representation an instance of objective

unity in contrast to the manifold

determination of inner sense

which is now merely a subjective Unity

rooted aposteriori an empirical

self-reflection on Consciousness is

manifold

in a sense Kant decided to shunt the

argument that had led him to aporia at

the end of a out of the pre-experiential

altogether it's not that he's saying

that characterizing appreception as

productive synthesis should or could be

denied but that it can only be accessed

as such once the eye has been determined

empirically in some way and the

determination would have to come from

experience and not from the pure

possibility of synthesis

example goes along with this shunting

for it's now the self that stands in the

place that Cinnabar had stood

my perception he says must have both an

objective and subjective Unity because

otherwise I would have as multi-colored

diverse itself as I have representations

of which I'm conscious

was once a counterfeit counterfactual

against the flux of experience is now a

counterfactual against the flux of that

witch experiences

foreclosing the potential of productive

synthesis to create identity beyond the

subject

the imagination too has been downgraded

in importance in B it's no longer

faculty of cognition in its own right

but an effect of the understanding on

sensibility it's discussion he says

belongs not in transcendental philosophy

but in psychology

and its three moments are replaced with

just two intellectual and figurative

synthesis

in be these modes of the imagination are

but sub-faculties of the understanding

in that they require for their activity

Concepts that only the understanding can

render and both remain transcendental

only and so far as the understanding is

treated transcendentally

but whether given as an intellectual

synthesis which is the combination of a

category with an intuition in general or

a figurative one it's kind of related to

the diagrammatic question and his

examples are mathematical in that

section the combination of sensible

intuitions onto a manifold to which the

eye could be added

the imagination is only the faculty for

representing an object without its

presence and intuition this is kind of

the reduced weaker form of it

this was formerly the job only of the

reproductive synthesis in b

so that one's kind of been split into

and expanded to be the whole domain of

the imagination

the first absent object furnished by the

figure figurative synthesis

just as had been the case with the

second moment in the a deduction is the

app receptive eye itself

but in B this representation is in the

very same motion handed over to the

intellectual synthesis which adds it to

all other possible representations

were formerly both possible objects and

the possible being of the app receptive

eye implied thinking's tardiness to the

scene of the imagination

now now that b being about perception

and its imaginative activity is given

only in its actual synthesis with its

objects and that's the extent of its

objective Unity

in the standard interpretation the B

deduction was a clarification through

confision of a and const view B resolved

a circularity the grounding of the

subject in a productive synthesis that

guarantees its own Unity this is a

circular problem not by denying such a

ground this is what he would say

but by stating that it too is unknowable

to us

by inverting the order of reasoning and

clarifying that this site of

subjectivity isn't produced by the

imagination but produces through it a

relation to its exterior

Khan thought he'd answered his critics

and found a stable footing for his

system and

a view though conservision was a retreat

and the concessions that be made

Heidegger saw limited and merely

epistemological argument about the

finitude of the subject and its grasp on

truth

in opposition to this epistemological

interpretation Heidegger says at the

outset of the comic book that the

critique of pure reason has nothing to

do with the theory of knowledge if one

could allow the interpretation that it

does then that would be to say that it's

not a theory of knowledge

um it's not a theory of ontic knowledge

but a theory of ontological knowledge

it is 1929 debate with the neocontian

philosopher Ernst casserer Heidegger

stated his sense of this project plainly

I believe I'm

of appearance in the transcendental

Logic for which Kant is only negative in

the form in which it appears which for

Kant is only negative in the form in

which it appears there

that it's actually a positive problem

and that the following is in question

is appearance just a matter of fact

which we state or must the entire

problem of Reason be apprehended in such

a way that we grasp from the beginning

how appearance necessarily belongs to

the nature of human beings

so I'm just going to move to the

compbook now

what is immediately clear is that in the

three modes of the imagination synthetic

activity they've been translated into

heideggerian idiom in the combo

the synthesis of apprehension which with

its synopsizing going through becomes an

immediate taking in stride

a synthesis of reproduction with its

taking up of what is no longer

immediately given is a retaining forming

the synthesis of recognition which

combines the manifold with Concepts is a

reconnoitering which explores The

Horizon of being able to hold something

before us

it's a preliminary attaching a watching

out for and a preparation for Pure

identification

not with a being that a being which it

can hold before itself as self-sane but

with the Horizon of what that being can

identify and identify with

each synthetic moment is read for its

temporal character and made to stand in

for the present past and future

for Heidegger the transcendental power

of the imagination is original time it's

thanks to this temporality this forming

of time through time determination that

imagination is said to be productive

the imagination's productivity is never

accomplished though even as it makes

experience possible for the first time

as a perpetually incomplete engagement

with what can potentially be encountered

or conditioned and all the way that

constant thinking develops

but the imagination's creativity is what

is said to be essential and that it

temporalizes or phenotizes the subject

and its possibilities

for Heidegger all determination of

essence is first achieved in the setting

free of this essential ground of

possibility

and if we tarry alongside the a

deductions abyss and refuse to read the

imagination as a mere effect of the

understanding Heidegger Wagers then we

can catch sight of what is being set

free by the perpetually homeless

groundless forming Unity of both

in order to clarify this point we have

to explore the central element of his

interpretation his approach to the

tripartite relation between appearance

schema and image

at the core of Heidegger's Khan is a

claim that appearances Are Not Mere

illusion but the being itself

far from the idea that appearances are

substitutes for or deformations of

things in themselves or constone warning

that their relation to the numinal is

unknowable Heidegger is content to

accept them as things in themselves they

are appearances of themselves only

appearances for Heidegger can only mean

the standing forth of the appearance as

a being

the being in the appearance is the same

being as the being in itself he says in

turn the pure understanding reveals

itself as the faculty of letting stand

against

appearances stand forth occur and

Concepts stand against those appearances

in characterizing the phenomenality of

objects as ways of standing and

withstanding

Hardware again is emphasizing their

temporal imminence and that they

withstand and endure time and appear to

have a permanence only because of this

it's because of this

essentiality of appearances is also

related to the work of the imagination

in addition to that which we Intuit and

that which we understand he says there

has to be a third thing which stands in

homogeneity with the category and the

appearance and makes possible the

application of the former to the latter

this mediating representation has to be

purer and yet intellectual

sensible as well such a representation

is the transcendental schema

what schemas represent no matter their

object is a transcendental time

determination modification of the inner

sense by its synthesis with a sensible

manifold

schemas do not concern themselves with

any intuition in particular though

they're merely the guarantors of unity

in a in a determination

when applied a posterior and supplied

with empirical content the imagination

produces not a schema but an image

the image concept is a product of the

empirical faculty of productive

imagination well the schema of sensible

Concepts such as figures and space is

this mathematical Legacy

is a product and as it were a monogram

signature of pure a priori imagination

it's here that Hyde

[Music]

height forming

the narroweth that creates forms from

out of itself the pure look this is his

refund image

is it not the case then that even

ontological knowledge which occurs in

the transcendental power of the

imagination is creative

does not the finite creature become

infinite through this Creative Behavior

do beings come to be known then in this

creative ontological knowledge I.E are

they created as such created as known

these this is him sorry remember

absolutely not but to what uh are they

related

what is the known of this knowing a

nothing Kant calls it the X

and I'm gonna claim that two points are

being made here I'm trying to summarize

these dense passages

um first by interpreting const

transcendental object equals X as the

reference to a nothing Heidegger is

insisting again that the transcendental

deduction can function without any

reference to a ground Beyond appearance

which I think is the real essence of

this disagreement between

which which version should have priority

second in his interpretation of image as

pure look he's claiming that what

schematism produces is an experience but

a field in which submission to a rule

becomes possible

because transcendental time

determination accompanies all intuition

as a condition of its possibility

for him the pure power of imagination

gives schema forming in advance the look

or the image

of the Horizon of transcendence schema

forming is this this field in which that

becomes possible

as a result time procures a look prior

to all experience which serves as the

ground for our being there a schema is

the representing of the rule that

guarantees the manifold's perdurance and

the making sensible of rules

well an image is the possibility of

actually sensing that rule before it

comes into view

images are capable of changing which is

always this novel yet original coming

into view for Heidegger

but schemata are not capable of changing

against Khan Heidegger claims that the

understanding does not bring forth the

schemata but just works with them

as if they pre-exist at perception in a

sense he claims pure thinking in itself

not after the fact is capable of taking

things in stride I.E pure thinking is

pure intuition

this structural coherent receptive

spontaneity must accordingly spring

forth from the transcendental

imagination

uh to be able to be what it is and

that's kind of his summary of the thesis

in fact transcendental app reception is

all but Superfluous to Heidegger's Khan

because for him the power of imagination

is also and precisely a faculty of

intuition I.E of receptivity

and it's receptive moreover not just

apart from its spontaneity rather it is

the original Unity of receptivity and

spontaneity and not a Unity which was

composite from the start

the self-affection that Heidegger claims

can't shrank back from is equally a

self-intuiting a spontane spontaneity of

attention to the possibility of

schematizing which arises only through

the recognition of one's Essence as Auto

legislating

it's as if one must encounter oneself as

having like we give ourselves the rule

of our own identity at every moment

foreign

[Applause]

so the general generalized capacity for

identity that Heidegger locates via this

reading is not an identification with

something that the imagination is not

and doesn't prefer possibilities for a

change of identity as a product project

that can be taken up if identification

is an essential structural belonging

together of appearance and being and of

the possible with the actual this is

what he means when he describes the

imaginations a priori synthesis as the

seed which provides its own ground

um

to Heidegger the imagination is this

root and ground at once and no matter

the course of its development it has to

remain germinal in that sense

so what if kant's theory of change

how does Heidegger incorporate this into

his own

ensure for con change is real knowable

only in the phenomenal Realm

anticipating the acute accusation of

idealism he specifically names the

problem of change in relation to time he

doesn't deny the reality of alterations

but says that it's cognition that orders

representations in such a way that

change and that which is capable of

change becomes visible

time isn't a thing in itself that

subsists on its own but a sequencing of

nouns that can determine the inner sense

as continuous

without this continuity transcendental

app reception couldn't function as an

unchanging ground in the infinite range

of possible representations of what lies

Beyond it would remain disorganized and

multiple the eye wouldn't even be able

to distinguish itself from its

representation such as mentioned earlier

but the eye is at the same time nothing

more than its combination with its

representing this is why he says that

there's only one experience in which all

perceptions are represented as in

thorough going and law-like connection

whether the schema in question is a

mathematical figure or a body empirical

change in appearance cannot touch or

alter the a priori condition of

imagining change

transcendental uh Apperception if you're

cleaving to the B deduction or the

imagination if you're taking the a

so yes alterations are real but the

condition by which they become thinkable

as alterations can't be modified

let alone from out of its own

spontaneous thinking

for heidekirt seems the answer about

change must be different it's in his

interpretation con system never needed

to find a ground in our perception

because its true identity was the

imagination's temporalization of itself

if appearances are said to be taken as

things in themselves that refer only to

a nothing that any change in appearance

would constitute an ontological change

one might assume that an identification

of time thought and intuition

um means that schematism is in some

sense a free activity a poetic power of

gathering essential to the subject slash

design this wasn't yet the case though

he would get there when Heidi garissa

and the kanteed created for himself was

first simply that auto affection is a

kind of radical passivity

one of the examples he gives is pleasure

I'm going to skip over this quote but

something John Luke Nancy has talked

about about the self-sensing of pleasure

the free self-affecting of the law that

in the absence of ground

is given and the way that the given

modifies itself is always the law the

schematization of its own being this is

for Heidegger the truth of kant's pure

spontaneity there is in every experience

sensible or no a self-submitting

immediate surrender to Pure receptivity

there must then be only one experience

for Heidegger as well submission to the

given and recognition of the Givens role

in the authorization of everything that

submits to it

hiker's interpretation of the schematism

in the comic book stands between his

definition of dasan and being in time a

throne projection of its own

possibilities and what dazan would

become post-turn post-transition in the

contributions a throne projection that

is only when it refuses what is possible

for it when it Embraces is most proper

to it the seclusion from potentiality

and being in time designs projectedness

is denied any relationship to the

teleological to the execution of a plan

there projecting has nothing to do with

comporting oneself toward a plan that's

been thought out and in accordance with

which Dawson arranges its being

this begins to change in the comic book

where we're told that the explicit

execution of a projecting

and even what is grasped in the

ontological must necessarily be

Construction

this construction can be understood as

designs assault upon the Primal

metaphysical factum in it an assault

which arises from dasan itself

and design Bears a new identity

altogether after the transition and

contributions

which is this first I won't read this

first to all of this first quote just

the italicized line the projector of the

projection is a throne projector but

only in the throwing and through it

it's the carrying out and taking over of

the withstanding steadfastness

it's design and taking over is the

undergoing wherein what is

self-secluding opens itself as a

maintaining and buying

uh binding it's very abstract but in the

event another part of the sequence of uh

seminars and notes from the same time

period

summarizes Sheltering is the enshrouding

that preserves emergence the most proper

essence of the beginning is

indestructible Act of beginning

behind the density of this passage

design is transformed

and in possession of a capacity to

finally decide upon a possibility most

proper to it which is always the

Sheltering of possibility from

actualization

for Heidegger this allows dazine to bind

the ontic potential of its Throne

projection as the ontological truth of

originariness appropriation transforms

beings into being

this preparation for transition if not

is if not the transition itself which

would be the event of being's occurrence

for the the Heidegger of the

contributions

it's the closest of the beings that we

are get to change this preparation

Heidegger calls this a nearness to the

event it goes without saying that the

view of transition as appropriation that

I'm trying to attribute to Heidegger

here is that one's supremely radical and

conservative it is uh I think sort of a

putting this into layman's terms would

be to say that the greatest possible

change is to refuse change to become who

one already is or finds oneself to be

this definition of transition

encapsulates the best and worst of

Heidegger's Legacy philosophically and

politically

prior to the turn dazan was nothing but

its possibilities

after dazan's possibilities are its

origin and thus origin even An Origin

Yet to Come is only is its only

possibility

in this sense the design of the

contributions is something overcome

in the event something that in every

instance has decided finally that its

possibilities are its truths or as being

in times design decides only uh on which

are its own

to make what is true possible that is

what the thoughtful projection of being

has to accomplish accomplish

to be sure but not as the fabricating or

devising in the sense of an unrestrained

contriving for this to occur a moment of

that which is appropriated by being as

appropriating event a moment of dazine

has to be successful so the goal-driven

decision has appeared after this

transformation

it was the productive Auto effective

passivity Heidegger discovered in his

reading of con schematism that finally

allowed him to think that a decision

against radical change could be the most

profound transitional event

as Charles sure over puts it it's a

short step from Heidegger's Kant to

Heidegger himself in the comic book

Heidegger claimed to be adding to Khan's

three guiding questions what can I know

what should I do what my hope a fourth

what is the human being in his view Kant

saw that the person is more than the I

he saw that the person is grounded in

self-law giving this is just the full

quote from which this comes

kind of gives you an idea of the

political moment also

but he was not able to see Heidegger

said

I can't wasn't that he had no path to

the essence of space and time

for Heidegger this path could only be

the becoming law of the human being

transition does not take the form of a

remaking but is rather the appropriation

of what is as what could be

the transformation of the actual into

the possible

Sheltering it from its possibility

it's ironic that Heidegger's

identification with Kant and his

transitional moment triggered such a

profound transformation in him he was a

philosopher who he had felt he felt had

retreated from the essential question

and it's this figuration transition as a

retreat from transition that Heidegger

ends up applying to his own theory of

the event using as this Theory at the

event

his own flight from the tasks he'd set

for himself prior to the Kant book can

then only be seen as a kind of honesty I

think in his commitment to his

particular kind of change a flight from

a retreat

Kant fled from the power of the

schematizing force he had located in the

imagination did Heidegger shrink back to

okay thank you sorry for going over