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What Happens When the AI Boom Runs Out of Money

1:25:55EnglishBy Invest Like The BestTranscribed Aug 18, 2026
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0:00

I think it would be very problematic for

0:02

the US to win. Let's say we take the

0:05

most sort of fantastical scenario where

0:07

if you control AI, your military is

0:09

better than anyone else in this world.

0:12

What is the game theory optimal response

0:15

of China to blow up TSMC? If we get to a

0:19

place where we have a meaningful

0:23

superiority, particularly from like in

0:25

terms of a military national security

0:26

perspective, I think that's very

0:28

dangerous for the world.

0:41

So Ben, if you can believe it, how long

0:43

it's been since we last did this. The

0:44

world was very different. No AI at the

0:46

time. Uh we talked about aggregation

0:48

theory mostly, which I'm sure we'll hit

0:50

at some point today. I thought a fun

0:51

place to begin since the world has

0:52

changed so much is to hear what you

0:54

think it would mean for the US to win

0:57

the AI race. I think it would be very

1:01

problematic for the US to win. Let's say

1:03

we take the most sort of fantastical

1:05

scenario where if you control AI, you

1:08

basically your military is better than

1:09

anyone else. You can like somehow it

1:11

fixes our manufacturing all these like

1:14

things that I don't think AI is

1:16

necessarily going to do because they

1:17

sort of deal with the real world. But in

1:19

this world, what is the game theory

1:23

optimal response of China to blow up

1:25

TSMC? like it and to me this is like

1:28

game theory can get very sort of

1:30

convoluted and complex. To me this one

1:32

actually isn't that complicated. Uh so I

1:35

there's a just a fundamental disconnect

1:38

that I have with a lot of the rhetoric

1:39

coming out of Silicon Valley coming out

1:41

I think of one of the labs in particular

1:43

where if we get to a place where we have

1:46

a meaningful superiority particularly

1:49

from like in terms of a military

1:51

national security perspective I think

1:53

that's very dangerous for the world. But

1:54

in that state, how how much does it

1:57

extend beyond TSMC being blown up?

1:59

Because in that state, I would assume we

2:01

figured out how to build fabs here in

2:03

the US, you know, to some degree and are

2:05

less reliant on that one choke point. I

2:08

think there's a little bit of magical

2:11

thinking which I just invoked in terms

2:14

of manufacturing and whether it be fabs

2:17

whether that be actuators like all these

2:19

sort of precursors like the I think the

2:22

degree to which we are dependent on

2:24

China is underappreciated

2:27

and is not something that is going to be

2:30

fixed outside of a conflict just because

2:33

fixing so many of these things is going

2:35

to be dramatically like dumb. Like if

2:38

your competitor is sourcing from China

2:40

and you're going to start sourcing or

2:42

getting things from the US, you're going

2:43

to be at such a disadvantage relatively

2:45

speaking that you're just not going to

2:46

do it. So you do it when you have

2:48

literally no choice. And that works for

2:52

like very big headline items like you

2:54

can browbeat Apple to move some of their

2:56

iPhone manufacturing to India for

2:58

example. But even that is a good example

2:59

because Apple is not moving truly moving

3:03

out of China. like they're diversifying

3:04

to an extent, but the problem it would

3:08

just cost so much and it's like paying

3:10

an insurance policy that if you don't

3:12

have to pay it and it's astronomically

3:14

expensive, you're just not going to pay

3:16

it. It's one of those sort of hypotheses

3:19

that I just have a hard time even

3:21

gawking because in what the only world I

3:23

see where we truly

3:26

pull out and have no dependency on China

3:29

such that if they want to blow up

3:30

Taiwan, who cares? has no impact on us

3:33

is seems pretty fantastical to me and I

3:36

think there's a bit of facing reality in

3:39

this regard that is not present in these

3:43

conversations.

3:43

>> So put yourself put yourself in their

3:45

shoes like what do you think the

3:46

motivations are?

3:47

>> Everyone

3:49

can use a good bogeyman. I think from

3:51

the AI trade perspective nothing works

3:55

better than we have to be China. And I

3:58

do think we need to be China. We need to

4:01

be competitive. I despair at the extent

4:04

to which over the last few years in

4:05

particular so many of our responses for

4:08

particular from a political perspective

4:10

has been to like try to be like China. I

4:12

think we should be going the other

4:13

direction. Uh more openness, more

4:16

innovation, less top down control, less

4:18

restrictions on speech and things along

4:21

those lines. America succeeds by being

4:24

on the leading edge and by leading into

4:26

that. You said probably the US being

4:28

purely dominant and AI is not the right

4:30

end state for the world. What is your

4:32

ideal equilibrium for how this goes

4:34

worldwide? There's a bit where AI right

4:36

now is kind of like the Taiwan situation

4:39

in that it feels

4:42

the current status quo actually doesn't

4:45

seem so bad. And the question is how

4:48

sustainable is it? But maybe it's

4:50

sustainable for longer than we think. So

4:53

the the way I think about it right now

4:55

is I think OpenAI and Anthropic are

4:58

clearly on the frontier. Who knows

5:00

what's happening with Google and then

5:02

Grock and Meta are chasing them.

5:04

Meanwhile, the Chinese are very capable,

5:08

very smart, and also definitely

5:10

distilling these models to sort of stay

5:12

about 6 to9 months behind. And it feels

5:16

like a pretty good equilibrium that I

5:18

think is generally favorable to the US.

5:21

Now the question is how long can it stay

5:23

this way right and there's lots of

5:24

questions out there like can the Chinese

5:26

actually pull ahead I'm still a little

5:28

skeptical that you know for various

5:31

reasons getting to the leading edge I

5:32

think that last 6 to9 months is very

5:34

difficult I think we'll see how it's

5:37

going to be instructive how meta and gro

5:39

do in terms of actually actually

5:41

catching up is that sort of because

5:43

especially as we get to the world of AI

5:45

improving itself using AI to make the AI

5:47

better which I think is definitely a

5:49

real thing I think you see a real

5:50

acceleration

5:51

from both uh OpenAI and Anthropic

5:53

recently which and that was sort of

5:55

theorized and it seems to be coming true

5:57

and to the extent that's true can you

5:59

actually catch up and I think the other

6:01

question about this by the way is to

6:03

what extent does that apply to cost to

6:05

serve to marginal costs if you can apply

6:08

AI to optimizing your stack to figuring

6:10

things out to analyzing all the data can

6:13

is your cost to serve sort of

6:15

structurally lower than anyone else this

6:17

is the thing about the the open- source

6:19

models the talk about them being free is

6:21

bizarre to me because it's marginal

6:23

costs, right? You still have to run

6:26

inference like GLM or Kimmy. Kimmy is

6:29

very expensive to serve. The cost per

6:31

answer is significantly higher. So the

6:33

everyone referring to these as free. It

6:36

feels like in the narrative it's in

6:37

people's head that free is free. Now I

6:39

can use AI for free. No, you can't use

6:41

AI for free. You're not paying

6:42

necessarily the R&D to

6:44

create the AI, but you're definitely

6:47

paying the inference to sort of run it.

6:49

So right now I kind of like where we are

6:52

and the push back would be oh that's

6:54

right now it's not going to stay that

6:55

way. Um which I think is fair push back

6:57

but I don't know if you can learn

7:00

anything about the future of how this

7:02

will go to be more confident in like

7:04

where where the equil equilibrium will

7:06

end up. What is it? Is it like the

7:07

length of the S-curve? Like how far up

7:09

the S-curve we are of at some point

7:10

these things presumably will level out,

7:12

maybe not. What would be the thing you'd

7:14

want to know that would give you a

7:16

better sense of what the future might

7:17

look like? I am concerned that with like

7:21

the scare around like people freaking

7:24

out about mythos and like this hugging

7:27

face incident that the actual

7:31

implication of that is not that we

7:34

reduce these dangers but we just stop

7:38

releasing stuff and we on the outside

7:42

>> start to lose any sense of like where

7:44

exactly what is actually the frontier

7:46

and where it is And it and there becomes

7:50

sort of a false sense of security

7:53

because like right now everyone's basing

7:55

their understanding of mythos on fable

7:58

but how good is fable actually relative

8:00

to mythos right like that sort of gap is

8:03

only going to I think increase over time

8:07

and so I think that that's that's a real

8:09

question that that I'm not sure about

8:12

this question of the AI the

8:14

recursiveness and AI sort of making

8:16

itself better like does that lead to

8:19

sort of some sort of takeoff? And at the

8:22

end of the day, there's timing questions

8:24

in lots of different ways. I'm worried

8:26

about the timing mismatch in terms of

8:29

the actual return on investment

8:31

producing enough revenue to fuel

8:34

investment. Like we're we we're working

8:36

our way down the capital curve. Like we

8:37

we started with free cash flow, then

8:39

like the speed with which the tech

8:41

companies blew through the debt markets

8:42

is kind of incredible. like it took like

8:44

a year and now Google's issuing equity.

8:47

Nvidia's putting together the you know

8:49

the these

8:49

>> this $500 billion thing

8:50

>> this $500 billion thing to tap into like

8:52

pension funds and insurance floats and

8:55

things like that and the what's after

8:58

that? Where's the money come after that?

8:59

Well, ideally we actually flip back to

9:02

free cash flow funding this. But if

9:05

there's a gap there, if we don't get

9:06

there soon enough, then we could have a

9:09

big blow up, right?

9:11

But at the same time, even if we have

9:14

this blowup, the AI is not going away.

9:18

It's not going to stop improving. It's

9:20

going to keep sort of progressing and in

9:23

a way that we look back on the dot era

9:25

or we look back on the railroad era or

9:27

we look back on whatever bubbles through

9:28

history ultimately immaterial in terms

9:31

of the broad scope of humanity even if

9:33

they were very devastating to lots of

9:35

people.

9:36

>> What did the railroads teach us? Do you

9:37

think

9:38

>> it's now the last bigger buildout,

9:39

right? In terms of percent of GDP or

9:41

getting

9:42

>> I think we might be bigger at this point

9:44

or it's like it was the biggest

9:45

>> in the ballpark. Yeah.

9:46

>> Yeah. You know, the railroads had a real

9:48

duration mismatch. It like to build a

9:52

railroad and make money off it was a

9:55

decade or multiple decades long

9:58

endeavor.

9:59

and the so whereas you had to issue

10:03

money to pay for it in the short term

10:06

and the world ran out of money right and

10:09

I think that is that's probably the the

10:11

aspect I think that's why people reach

10:12

for the railroads because everyone talks

10:15

about are we going to have enough

10:17

compute are we going to have enough

10:19

electricity maybe the nearest term

10:21

question is are we going to have enough

10:22

money which is kind of a bizarre thing

10:25

to think about like that's what happened

10:27

in in the 1870s like we the world just

10:29

ran out of money. But the the the funny

10:31

thing is is the railroads kept operating

10:35

and they expanded the west and they the

10:37

the their contributions to GDP was

10:41

astronomical. They're still contributing

10:42

to GDP. Railroad money is what's going

10:46

into Google right now from Bergkshire

10:47

Hathway. Like like

10:49

>> very funny.

10:50

>> It's it's quite literal.

10:52

>> It's literally Bergkshire Hathaway has

10:54

this problem to me. This Nvidia deal is

10:56

very much paired with the Google equity

11:00

issuance which I thought was was that I

11:02

mean that one was shocking what had

11:03

happened.

11:04

>> Why was it shocking?

11:05

>> Because it's Google they can't raise

11:06

money like why are they issuing equity

11:08

right? Like the the why are they giving

11:10

away the their you know reducing their

11:13

upside if they believe so strongly in

11:15

this. But the Bergkshire the Bergkshire

11:16

Hathway comparison is interesting

11:18

because

11:19

in to a rough approximation they make

11:22

they have seized candies famously right

11:24

tremendously high high margin business.

11:26

The problem with a lot of high margin

11:28

businesses is you can your your the

11:31

percentage profit you can make is very

11:33

high but the absolute profit you can

11:35

make is reinvestment runway.

11:37

>> That's right. Like you just you're just

11:38

accumulating cash. And so the brilliance

11:41

of the BNSF railway thing was basically

11:45

they took the seas candy profits and

11:48

said here's another industry whose

11:50

margins are way worse but the absolute

11:55

dollar amounts are so large that those

11:57

way worse margins result in absolute

11:58

profits that are much larger. like BNSF

12:01

in 2025 or something, their the amount

12:04

of free cash they've threw off in one

12:06

year was more than Candies had thrown

12:08

off its entire lifetime. Even though

12:10

you're talking about a low margin

12:11

business compared to a very high margin

12:13

business and there's a I think there's

12:15

an aspect from Bergkshire Hathway where

12:18

if you're once your capital gets so

12:20

large, you start operating in a world of

12:22

like absolute numbers as opposed to

12:24

percentage numbers. And the reason why I

12:26

thought that was so interesting that

12:28

story is it seems to capture where

12:32

Google itself might be going. And so it

12:34

was very symbolic for them to invest in

12:36

Google. Google has this unbelievable

12:38

high margin business of search. One of

12:40

the most perfect beautiful business

12:42

models of all time and the purest

12:44

aggregator of them all. Like scales in

12:46

every direction. Doesn't have to invest

12:48

any money to do it. Everything's zero

12:49

marginal cost. It's amazing. And

12:52

meanwhile there's this AI opportunity

12:55

which requires just astronomical it's

12:56

just a cash incinerating cash but you

13:00

can imagine if AI is intelligence and

13:04

it's TAM is basically all white collar

13:06

work

13:08

>> and eventually with robotics more

13:10

everything potentially like why like the

13:13

absolute profits available here even if

13:16

the margins are lower is so much larger

13:20

that

13:22

will we look back and Google search was

13:24

seized candies and I it feels like

13:27

that's what's happening and and in that

13:29

world even yeah you use all your free

13:34

cash flow they've done that you tap the

13:36

debt markets to the tune of hundreds of

13:38

billions of dollars they've done that

13:41

you issue equity because like the what

13:44

is what does an equity issues do it

13:45

dilutes your interest in your interest

13:47

your shareholders so you have a smaller

13:49

percentage of the pie Well, if you have

13:50

a smaller percentage of an

13:52

astronomically larger pie, at the end of

13:53

the day, no one's going to be

13:54

complaining. And I I just thought it was

13:57

very symbolic. Bergkshire being the

13:59

symbol of that equity issuance in that

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15:31

I'm curious setting aside the commercial

15:34

and competitive components of this like

15:35

you're describing how AI pill on the

15:39

pure technology would you say you are

15:41

relative to other people thinking about

15:44

this space I have a view that is both

15:47

super bullish and less bullish in some

15:50

respects so

15:53

I am not fully convinced about the

15:56

generalizable argument like AI is

16:00

clearly incredible at coding. It kind of

16:02

blows my mind that people were doing

16:05

this a year ago, like actually like

16:08

writing out code. It's very good at math

16:10

obviously, but the obvious a you know

16:13

repost is that these are sort of

16:14

verifiable do domains and what is the

16:19

evidence or where is the compelling

16:21

evidence of being very good at

16:23

verifiable domains

16:26

cleanly translates to being very good at

16:28

sort of unverifiable domains or domains

16:30

that take have a very long sort of

16:31

verification loops and I think that's

16:34

still a little bit to be determined and

16:37

it's interesting because I raised this I

16:38

raised this question and there were some

16:40

people at the labs that were on a panel

16:42

and I was kind of annoyed at the answer

16:44

cuz the answer took me for an AI bear

16:48

and they're like oh well people thought

16:49

we couldn't solve chess or we couldn't

16:50

solve go and we solved those easy enough

16:53

and I'm like I thought we could solve

16:55

chess I thought we could solve go

16:56

because they're knowable domains and you

16:58

know scale was the answer to both of

17:01

those but also both of those were

17:03

bounded right what what is the go-to

17:06

example that's not chess that's not

17:08

That's not go that is genuinely in a new

17:12

space that's sort of an unknowable space

17:14

where it's doing things that were not

17:15

not possible. So that is sort of the I'm

17:19

not fully convinced sense. However, AI

17:24

trained

17:25

at a rough approximation trained on all

17:27

the data of the internet. All the data

17:29

of the internet that is like that's dist

17:32

distillation. It distilled all of human

17:35

thought.

17:36

>> No it didn't. It distilled all of the

17:39

end state of human thought, the actual

17:42

typing it on on Reddit. It doesn't have

17:44

the traces, right? It doesn't actually

17:46

have the thought, the emotion or

17:48

whatever that went into typing that

17:50

comment or typing writing that essay.

17:54

What if we like say neural link whatever

17:57

what if the actual payoff from neural

17:58

link is actually capturing the traces of

18:01

of human thought that actually

18:03

dramatically expands the capabilities of

18:06

these models in this world. My concerns

18:09

about verifiability is like well we

18:11

solve verifiability by getting more

18:12

data. My sense is that a huge number of

18:16

jobs, a huge amount of economic activity

18:20

does not exist in these domains that I'm

18:21

not convinced that AI is good at.

18:23

Actually, there's a lot of people in the

18:25

world who are kind of like sentient AIs

18:27

to a certain extent. They operate very

18:29

well in verifiable domains. They're

18:31

given jobs. They do them. And that

18:36

it's almost like a somewhat pessimistic

18:38

view of humanity uh to a certain extent.

18:40

But I think that market is so huge and

18:42

so large that if the models did not

18:45

improve at all from where they are right

18:46

now, the economic opportunity is

18:49

actually massive. I wrote an article a

18:51

while ago, you know, there's the whole

18:52

like accelerationist movement and I what

18:54

I call myself was a reluctant

18:56

accelerationist.

18:57

I think we need to push forward because

19:01

we can't go back and the worst thing we

19:03

can do is get stuck where we are. So I'm

19:07

very AI peeled in terms of its impact on

19:10

the economy its sort of upside in terms

19:13

of monetization. I'm not sure about the

19:16

timing. What would be like the gradient

19:18

towards it? Like imagine law or medicine

19:21

where I don't know whether or not you

19:22

would consider those verifiable like law

19:24

is like a code of some sort. Medicine we

19:27

have a certain state understanding of of

19:29

things. I mean, I think medicine is like

19:31

by far one of the biggest opportunities.

19:33

Yeah. Like it's both one of the biggest

19:34

opportunities and also one of the most

19:36

challenging ones because of all the

19:39

regulations and all the access. Like if

19:40

you could turn an AI turn machine

19:43

learning onto all the medical records,

19:46

the number of discoveries and improved

19:48

treatments we could come up with in a

19:49

very rapid amount of time would be

19:51

unbelievable. So that is a very

19:53

optimistic view. On the flip side, like

19:56

when is that gonna happen, right? I

19:58

think the the the

20:00

optimistic frame I put on humans is our

20:03

capacity to create needs is sort of

20:05

unlimited. So I think we'll do a very

20:08

good job of creating new opportunities

20:09

and jobs sort of in the fullness of

20:10

time. The sort of more pessimistic way

20:12

to put it is our ability to create red

20:15

tape and muck is also fairly unlimited.

20:18

And you know how much of our economy is

20:21

actually we've managed to create more

20:24

and more jobs that is just sort of like

20:27

make busy and make slow to a certain

20:30

extent. If I go back to the early 2010s

20:32

or you know maybe the aggregation theory

20:34

was stewing in your brain and then you

20:36

published it in 2015. I think it's fair

20:38

to say like that theory that idea maybe

20:40

you could just quickly remind people

20:41

what it is defined the winners and

20:44

losers of that era of technology. I'm

20:46

really curious how you're thinking about

20:48

what theory or or principles will define

20:51

this era of winners from like a

20:53

financial perspective and market cap

20:55

perspective.

20:55

>> It's a good question. I go back and

20:57

forth even just on the question of of

21:00

aggregation theory itself. How much does

21:02

that ex you know apply in this current?

21:05

>> Yeah. Cuz like like a push back that

21:07

people have is one of the key components

21:10

of aation theory is zero marginal cost

21:12

and zero marginal cost uh shows in lots

21:15

of ways. The one that I sort of focused

21:16

on the beginning was distribution. Like,

21:18

and people say, "Oh, I don't have

21:19

distribution. I have to pay Google for

21:20

friends." Like, "Well, no, you have a

21:21

website. Your problem isn't that you

21:23

have distribution. Your problem is you

21:24

don't have demand." And you're paying

21:26

for demand when you're paying for ads

21:28

and things on those because the

21:29

aggregators control demand. And they

21:31

control demand because in a world of

21:33

abundance, the hard problem is not

21:35

distribution, it's discovery. How do you

21:37

actually find what you're interested in?

21:38

So, the companies that solve discovery

21:40

in their domain come to dominate that

21:42

market. They get a virtuous feedback

21:44

loop. that sort of aggregation theory in

21:46

in a nutshell.

21:48

And the other thing is transaction

21:49

costs. There's no transaction cost.

21:51

Google can scale to the whole world. And

21:52

they can scale to the whole world. Not

21:53

just on the user side, but also on the

21:55

monetization side. The vast vast vast

21:58

majority of advertisers on Google or

21:59

Meta never inter never talk to someone

22:02

at Google or Meta. They just go up and

22:03

they buy ads. It's all done by

22:04

computers. And those computers from a

22:07

business perspective

22:08

>> cost zero dollars. AI obviously that

22:11

changes significantly like be their

22:13

inference costs are real. Uh but then

22:16

again sort of how real are they?

22:18

>> They're real right now.

22:20

>> They well how real I don't know are they

22:23

>> depends on the company but they're

22:24

they're way more real than the those

22:26

prior examples.

22:26

>> Well like if you look at gross margins

22:28

or something

22:29

>> for sure but but you have this

22:31

incredible spread. So you have people I

22:34

think the vast majority of people who

22:35

are using ad today are using it as

22:37

basically a Google substitute or like a

22:39

recipe maker or whatever it might be.

22:41

And my suspicion is that the cost to

22:44

serve those people is extremely low and

22:47

low in the basically similar to serving

22:50

them a web page like I would imagine

22:52

it's it's marginally higher but not not

22:54

that much higher. Then you have on the

22:56

other extreme people who are actually

22:58

leveraging test time scaling right. So

23:01

it used to be we just scale by making

23:02

the models bigger and bigger. Now you

23:04

can scale as far as time. How long do

23:07

you think about the answer? Well, you

23:08

could think about the answer for days or

23:11

weeks or months. And that is a d that is

23:14

directly marginal cost. Like every

23:16

second longer you're thinking is costing

23:18

more money which speaks to like we think

23:22

about AI and inference as this one

23:24

question. And that's I was sort of being

23:25

a bit, you know, pushing back on you.

23:27

But actually the marginal cost question

23:29

for the different user, the user using

23:32

free chat GPT and the user trying to

23:34

solve a a math theorem. They're not even

23:37

remotely in the same universe. And and I

23:39

think you see this challenge actually in

23:41

the enterprise in a very interesting

23:42

way. So Microsoft recently, you know,

23:46

they they are shifting their enterprise

23:48

plan, right? So they come out with like

23:49

an E7 plan, $100 per user per month that

23:53

includes some amount of usage, but then

23:55

they also are charging for usage on top

23:59

of that. And this is kind of a really I

24:01

think this is a kind of a fraught

24:03

position for Microsoft to an extent

24:05

because the positive way to think about

24:08

Microsoft is they do everything you need

24:12

as a business. Every individual

24:14

component might not be the best, but you

24:16

get it all for one price and they all

24:18

mostly work together. And if you're, you

24:20

know, particularly a small or

24:21

mediumsized business or even a large

24:22

enterprise, there's real value in that.

24:24

That's right. It makes life easy. The

24:26

moment you start having to think about

24:29

how much you're paying, it's not just

24:32

that that's a new decision. Number one,

24:35

that is untethered from headcount,

24:38

right? Microsoft got the benefit is when

24:39

you were hiring a new employee, you

24:41

would think about the cost of that

24:42

employee and baked in the cost of that

24:44

employee is $100 a month or $50 a month

24:46

for their their license. It was kind of

24:48

a thoughtless

24:51

revenue stream for Microsoft. Now, if

24:53

you think about usage, you have to think

24:56

every single month, how much do I want

24:59

to spend? And that introduces two

25:02

problems. Number one, most companies

25:04

aren't set up to do this. They make

25:06

budgets like once a year. This idea

25:08

we're going to be thinking about through

25:09

our budgetary aotment on like a monthly

25:12

basis doesn't compute. There's an aspect

25:17

where they're used to thinking about

25:19

capex decisions or one-time costs. And

25:22

there's a bit where what I'm talking

25:23

about this employee like the loaded cost

25:24

of employee. It's not capex but it's

25:27

kind of like capex. It's like you make

25:28

the decision up front then you don't

25:30

think about it anymore if the decision

25:31

is sort of already made. But if you're

25:32

thinking about usage you're doing it

25:34

again. But the the final thing is if

25:36

you're every month you're looking at

25:37

your Microsoft bill and how much do I

25:39

use? You start thinking about what am I

25:41

paying for? Like how good is each of

25:44

these products? Should I actually just

25:46

start thinking about and spraying this

25:47

out? And I think they had to do it

25:50

because

25:51

that extreme of user who uses a ton of

25:54

tokens and is actually leveraging AI

25:57

costs way more to Microsoft than $100 a

25:58

month. They can't support them. But they

26:01

want to hold on to the set cost for the

26:04

vast majority of employees who can fit

26:06

in that because they need to ask their

26:09

customers to think a little bit for

26:11

those extreme employees, but they don't

26:12

want them to think too much because that

26:14

sort of breaks the model in very sort of

26:17

surprising ways. surprised at all that

26:18

the the recipe builder user that is very

26:21

low cost to serve that there hasn't been

26:24

a great business model that's emerged

26:25

around them just yet like you know

26:27

business Google and Facebook are sort of

26:29

business perfected in this in this prior

26:31

era. They haven't seemed to figure this

26:33

out at all. I'm frustrated but not

26:35

surprised.

26:37

This is obviously a market that should

26:38

be supported by advertising like that.

26:40

That is why advertising is always the

26:43

consumer business model. Consumers don't

26:45

want to pay there. So there's two things

26:47

to understand about consumers that

26:48

Silicon Valley has to relearn about

26:51

every 10 years. Number one, consumers do

26:54

not want to pay for software. And number

26:56

two, consumers do not care about being

26:57

productive. And this is like we went

27:00

through this in early SAS. Like the the

27:02

canonical company for this in my mind is

27:04

Dropbox.

27:06

>> So Dropbox, unbelievable product. Like

27:08

especially when it first came out in

27:10

business school, I was one of the first

27:11

people to use Dropbox and that was went

27:14

off like crazy. I have so much storage

27:17

still like my free Dropbox cuz I gave

27:19

out of my code to like so many people.

27:20

So Drew Hston makes his amazing product

27:22

so easy to use, just absolutely

27:24

seamless. And I think very clear about

27:27

this. He wanted to build a consumer

27:30

company and there's that famous story of

27:32

him meeting with Steve Jobs and I think

27:35

you know Apple was interested in

27:37

acquiring Dropbox and they're like oh we

27:39

want to build a company and Steve's you

27:41

know your feature not your feature not

27:44

not a company and you know which that

27:47

plain Jane just file sync Apple did make

27:50

a feature as far as like sort of iCloud

27:52

drive and Dropbox they grew very fast

27:54

and then they had like a 2-year lull and

27:56

in that 2-year year low. What they had

27:58

to do was basically completely rebuild

28:00

the app from the bottoms up because the

28:03

people not enough consumers are going to

28:04

pay for it. They needed enterprises

28:07

could see the value, they would pay, but

28:08

if you want enterprise, you need

28:10

permissions. You need control. You need

28:11

someone else to be able to set all these

28:13

sorts of things. And their app wasn't

28:14

even created to do that at all. So, they

28:16

had to rebuild the whole thing and

28:18

realize the only way we're going to make

28:20

money is by selling to companies. Why do

28:23

companies pay? Because companies are

28:26

paying employees. So to the extent they

28:29

can make their employees more

28:31

productive, they're getting a greater

28:32

return on their investment. It's the

28:34

complete inverse of a consumer. A

28:37

consumer is like, I spent all day

28:39

working. Why do I want to come home and

28:40

be more productive? I want to sit on the

28:41

couch and watch reals. And and the the

28:44

and you see that with AI and you also

28:46

have this overarching just skepticism of

28:49

advertising. You know, I've gotten so

28:52

much traction on trajectory by being an

28:54

advertising appreciator. And I go back

28:56

and read my early articles about

28:58

advertising that were kind of

29:01

directionally correct, but also like

29:04

were not very good at all. But I got so

29:07

much traction doing it because I was the

29:10

only person writing about advertising.

29:11

In a world of everyone want to have a

29:12

blog in Twitter, no one want to talk

29:14

about advertising. But even now there's

29:16

in Silicon Valley there's this sort of

29:19

embarrassment about the fact that the

29:20

valley is in many respects monetized by

29:23

advertising and particularly during the

29:25

last sort of eight years there was a

29:27

Facebook's icky and like all these best

29:29

engineers don't want to go work on this

29:31

problem

29:32

>> and so you literally had open AAI

29:34

replaying the Dropbox story but at like

29:37

100x size being like no we're going to

29:40

sell subscriptions to consumers and they

29:44

did. They sold a lot, but they didn't

29:47

sell enough. If you're going to be in

29:49

the consumer market, you have to be

29:50

doing advertising. And now they're doing

29:53

advertising now. It's a little weird

29:55

they finally pivoted to doing

29:56

advertising. At the same time, they're

29:58

like, "Oh crap, we need to go for the

29:59

enterprise cuz Anthropic is kicking our

30:02

so quite sure what they're doing there.

30:04

They have been rolling out ad features

30:06

very rapidly like things like like copy

30:09

and the the connections with retailers

30:11

so you know if a purchase went through

30:12

so you can do all the tracking and

30:14

things like that. So I'm very interested

30:16

to see how that goes. There's a bit

30:20

where had they leaned into advertising

30:23

immediately as soon as Chat GPT was a

30:25

hit, I think they would have a killer ad

30:28

product right now. I think that Google

30:30

would be in much bigger trouble. I think

30:31

meta would be in much bigger trouble

30:33

because if you have this flywheel, the

30:36

thing about advertising with consumers

30:38

is your ability to monetize the consumer

30:40

>> goes up in because the advertisers

30:44

bearing the price increase. So there's

30:46

zero elasticity issues. If you're

30:48

charging consumers a price, if you want

30:50

to raise the price, like Netflix, this

30:52

is their problem with with the

30:53

subscription plan. They have to be how

30:54

much can they raise prices before

30:56

consumers rebel and drop drop a tier or

30:59

give up the service entirely, right?

31:01

Charging people money is hard.

31:04

>> Giving people things for free is easy

31:07

and it's very frustrating that OpenAI

31:09

did not pursue this sooner. I know

31:11

you've been spending time with, you

31:13

know, some of the big money firms and

31:14

sources of capital. What is your sense

31:17

of their appetite right now and how

31:19

they're thinking about the future?

31:21

Because I think this year it's going to

31:22

be 800 billion or something that we're

31:24

going to spend in capex. Next year it's

31:25

supposed to be 1.3 trillion I think is

31:27

the current estimate. It's going to

31:28

keep, you know, keep going up from

31:30

there. We're burning through all the

31:31

compute that gets installed like

31:32

basically immediately. It's such a

31:35

strange circumstance that we can use the

31:37

capacity right away as soon as it's

31:39

online.

31:39

>> Well, that's the thing though. So

31:41

there's a few timing mismatches that are

31:42

happening right now. All the bulls on

31:44

Twitter is always like we're we don't

31:46

have enough comput. We don't have enough

31:47

compute. Well, we don't have enough

31:49

compute because there was insufficient

31:51

investment made in 2023 and 2024, which

31:55

yes, absolutely. And by the way, if you

31:57

think there's not enough compute, TSMC

32:00

decreased their rate of growth in 2023

32:03

and 2024 and 2025. So like we're our

32:06

shortage of compute is going to get

32:08

worse in the next few years because a

32:11

fab the lead time is even greater than a

32:14

data center. So all today when we say

32:16

there's not enough compute, it's not

32:17

like all the money that the companies

32:19

are putting in today

32:20

>> manifest in comput. No, it all manifests

32:23

in compute in 2028 and 2029. So you have

32:27

like on the calls you have both Andy

32:29

Jasse and Sadella are out there saying

32:32

look we're just building data centers

32:34

like these are the shells. We might not

32:36

use them now, maybe we'll use them in

32:37

the future and we only buy GPUs when we

32:40

know there's demand for them. That is a

32:43

great story to tell. I'm not sure how

32:46

much that I think is a lot of BS because

32:50

the reality is is if you've built the

32:52

shell that money is sitting there.

32:55

You're not going to let it just sit

32:57

there. Like if you have if you invested

32:59

a fixed cost and this is the whole logic

33:01

of commodity markets. I think tech in

33:03

general doesn't understand commodity

33:04

markets. tech is by and large focused on

33:07

if I produce a highly differentiated

33:09

product and that differentiation could

33:10

be like you know software it could be uh

33:14

a network in terms of developers it

33:16

could be a social network sort of thing

33:17

where peerto-peer where I'm highly

33:19

differentiated then my ability to charge

33:21

higher prices provides sort of my profit

33:24

margin so the the classic example is

33:26

like Apple right they have their

33:27

ecosystem and they have their software

33:30

and they have third party and all those

33:31

sorts of things and so they can charge

33:33

they have 50% margins is on their

33:35

iPhone. Everyone looks at Apple as like

33:37

the ideal business model. That's how you

33:38

run a business. But in a commodity

33:40

market, the price is set by the marginal

33:42

supplier.

33:43

>> Cost to serve is all that matters.

33:44

>> That's right. And so I had a good friend

33:47

in Taiwan who was in shipping. Um

33:50

fascinating industry. It's kind of like

33:51

the airlines too. Another industry that

33:52

I love to look at, but like you you you

33:55

buy a ship and the cost of that ship is

33:58

depreciation and your marginal cost is

34:01

actually quite low. It's the fuel to run

34:03

the ship and the cost of the crew and

34:05

like your port fees. Not that much. What

34:08

that means is you are going to run that

34:11

ship

34:11

>> as full as human

34:12

>> basically. No, you're going to run it no

34:13

matter what. And you're going to bring

34:15

down the price of a container as low as

34:17

it needs to be to cover your marginal

34:19

costs. Now, your paper losses in this

34:22

situation might be very large because

34:24

your accounting loss includes

34:25

depreciation, but the depreciation is an

34:28

accounting figment. you already paid the

34:30

money and so you're you're going to run

34:33

that ship at whatever the market will

34:36

bear and the container the beauty of the

34:38

container is it is a pure commodity and

34:40

so the cost of the market is going to be

34:42

the marginal cost now if it gets low

34:44

enough at some point people will exit

34:47

because their marginal cost actually

34:48

can't like they're actually losing money

34:52

on a shipment right uh not just paper

34:54

money but like actual real money they

34:56

will exit but then the supplies

34:58

diminished So then the price the price

35:00

will go back up and you get this

35:02

interplay of sort of coming in and off.

35:04

But then let's say the market's very

35:05

high like it was during co it's like wow

35:07

we're making so much money right now cuz

35:09

there's not enough supply. There wasn't

35:11

enough supply of ships. So containers

35:14

went from like usually being like $3,000

35:16

$4,000 to 17,000 $18,000. Like the the

35:20

amount of money that these shipping

35:21

companies made in a very short amount of

35:23

time was insane. And so what happens

35:26

though? Well, more ships.

35:27

>> Imagine if we had more ships, right? The

35:29

problem is it takes 2 years to build a

35:32

ship.

35:32

>> So by the if everyone makes this

35:35

decision simultaneously, then the ship

35:37

you suddenly have a lot of ships, price

35:39

plummets, etc. Where we see this is in

35:41

components, in memory in particular.

35:43

Memory very famous for boom and bust

35:45

cycles. Uh people entering the market

35:47

late. But to what extent are data

35:50

centers

35:52

going to be memory makers where right

35:55

now everyone can see we don't have

35:57

enough compute. So everyone's like we

35:59

absolutely have to be investing because

36:02

there's so much money to made and look

36:04

at our payback period. The problem is

36:05

you're measuring your payback period in

36:07

a time of scarcity. Is that payback

36:09

period going to hold in a time in a time

36:11

of abundance? Uh and and the sort of the

36:14

bulls would say there's never going to

36:15

be a time of abundance. AI short time

36:18

scaling we're going to be short forever

36:20

which maybe we will be my concern is

36:21

even if that's right we could still have

36:24

an air gap

36:25

>> in that there's so much money going into

36:27

it right now and not enough has come

36:30

online to actually make sufficient

36:31

revenues to cut to handle the situation

36:34

where we run out of capital that like I

36:37

again I believe in AI I think it's a

36:39

real thing I think the economic impact

36:41

is going to be astronomical I think all

36:43

the concerns about societal impact are

36:44

very real and are going to come to bear

36:47

in a major way. You can believe all that

36:50

and still be worried about are we going

36:53

to make the bridge to this actually

36:55

generating the level of returns

36:57

necessary to continue to fuel this sort

37:00

of going forward. Can can you zoom in on

37:02

TSMC and the and the maybe the some of

37:03

the component makers where fabs are

37:05

involved and so far at least my

37:07

understanding is that they've been quite

37:09

conservative in their willingness to

37:10

expand capacity, build new fabs, meet

37:13

the market's demand with similar growth,

37:16

which they have not done. And if that if

37:18

that just rate limits this whole thing

37:19

and prevents us from getting one of

37:21

these giant overbuilds.

37:22

>> Well, we can talk about a few different

37:24

ones like we'll start with memory.

37:26

memory used to have tons and tons of

37:29

memory makers and every time there'd be

37:32

sort of a boom memory makers sort of

37:34

like reenter the market um or like new

37:37

countries would come in like Taiwan used

37:39

to have like a memory market and but you

37:41

would get these exact dynamics if

37:42

there's a shortage of memory there's so

37:44

much money to be made because no one you

37:46

can't bring capacity on immediately

37:47

we're like it's the same as shipping

37:48

it's the same as what we're seeing right

37:50

now and so what would that that would do

37:52

is that would spur sort of people to

37:55

come in the market, you get too much

37:57

capacity, prices would plunge and people

37:59

would just get blown out cuz the issue

38:01

is the upfront cost for these is so

38:03

large. Just like buying a ship, like

38:04

building a fab is even more so. And

38:06

memory now, like the leading edges of

38:07

memory are using things like EUV

38:09

machines. So the costs are getting into

38:11

the billions of dollars for these lines.

38:13

And what happens is every time these

38:15

boom bus cycles, some people would

38:17

enter, more people get washed out. You

38:19

go through there's like these these

38:20

famous historical moments for these

38:22

memory cycles and like companies just

38:23

get blown out. One of the most

38:25

interesting actually memory stories is

38:26

how Samsung sort of took over memory was

38:29

they saw it as an opportunity and they

38:32

had studied history and they realized

38:34

that actually the way to take over the

38:36

market is to invest into downturns so

38:38

that you're ready when the next cycle

38:40

comes around which requires a ton of

38:42

guts and a ton of discipline and a ton

38:43

of money but they did that and basically

38:45

wiped out the Japanese. That's when the

38:47

sort of the South Koreans generally took

38:49

over the market in a major way. But it

38:52

got down to three. And the problem is

38:54

three, it's not a monopoly, but it's

38:56

kind of an oligopoly. And they all got a

38:59

lot more discipline about let's not make

39:02

the mistakes of the past. And we're not

39:05

colluding, but we all are on the same

39:07

page about let's not do that. And I

39:10

think that dynamic sort of ran head on

39:12

to the current moment where it just took

39:15

a while for them to realize no there is

39:18

a secular shift in memory demand that

39:22

didn't exist for for a very long time.

39:24

And so I I think the memory solution

39:27

will be solved eventually. The other

39:29

thing they the risk they run is Apple

39:32

like Apple's lobbying to get Chinese

39:34

memory, right? uh and what is the number

39:37

one focus of like al algorithmic

39:39

changes. How can we use less memory? I

39:41

think the memory makers probably screw

39:43

themselves in the long run by creating

39:46

such a massive target on their back.

39:47

I've analogized memory makers to Iran.

39:50

Like the issue with the straight of

39:51

moose is it's very effective.

39:55

It's more effective if you don't use it

39:57

cuz then it's always hanging out there

39:59

as something you could do. Now they did

40:01

it. Turns out it worked. But like the

40:05

UAE and Saudi Arabia, they're going to

40:07

build pipelines. They're going to build

40:08

new ports. They're not going to let this

40:10

happen again. It's very painful right

40:12

now. But say Iran wants to close the

40:15

straight of our moves in 2035. It's not

40:17

going to have any effect because it will

40:18

have been built around. My concern for

40:21

the Merry Makers is they might have done

40:22

the same thing. Like no one's going to

40:24

let themselves get in this situation

40:25

again as far as memory goes. TSMC is

40:27

arguably worse because there's only one.

40:29

Uh there's one company on the leading

40:30

edge. Um, obviously Intel and Samsung

40:32

are trying to get there and it's the

40:35

same thing like like the all markets

40:39

carry risk and a lot of the question is

40:43

who ends up holding the risk and what I

40:46

think a lot of the tech companies didn't

40:48

fully appreciate is the extent to which

40:51

TSMC has offloaded risk onto the big

40:55

tech companies. And the way they've done

40:57

that is the risk that TSMC is worried

40:59

about is over capacity. If we build too

41:01

much, it's not just that we built too

41:03

much and we have all these fixed costs

41:06

that are not being fully utilized, but

41:08

if we build a fab, we expect that fab to

41:10

run for 30 years. We've like baked in

41:13

too much capacity into the system for

41:15

years and years and years. So, they are

41:17

very biased towards being much more

41:19

conservative. And there's a little bit

41:22

of a culture component to this too. One

41:23

of the most interesting TSMC stories,

41:25

it's kind of analogous to that Samsung

41:26

story was Morris Chang retired in like

41:29

the late 2000s and new leadership took

41:33

over and there was the great recession

41:35

and so they pulled back their plan

41:37

spending. He comes in, fires everyone

41:40

and he's like, "The iPhone just

41:42

launched. This is the biggest

41:44

opportunity we've ever seen. We need to

41:46

be investing, not cutting." And they

41:49

invested through the Great Recession and

41:51

through that downturn. That's what laid

41:53

the foundation for them taking over sort

41:55

of leading edge semiconductors in that

41:57

time. Morschang is what a one of one

41:59

like on the Mount Rushmore in my mind of

42:03

the greatest sort of and most impactful

42:04

tech executives of all time. The entire

42:06

fabulous model is so critical to to what

42:09

tech is and what it does and also just

42:11

the guts to do that right at that time

42:14

particularly in you know someone who

42:16

lived there a culture that doesn't

42:18

necessarily tend to make those sorts of

42:20

bets. TSMC, they were pretty

42:23

conservative to be totally honest. And

42:25

so what happens though? Where' the risk

42:27

go? TSMC's like, "Well, we we don't want

42:29

to take the risk." Risk doesn't

42:31

disappear. It just moves. The risk is

42:35

right now where you have every single

42:39

big tech company realizes if we had more

42:42

compute, we could be making more money.

42:45

So there's lots of foregone revenue and

42:48

foregone profits. That is the

42:50

manifestation of the risk that TSMC

42:52

handed off to them. Risk doesn't

42:54

disappear. It just gets handed off. And

42:56

sometimes that risk doesn't manifest in

42:58

losing money. It manifests in not making

43:00

money. And there's money not being made

43:02

right now because what happened was they

43:06

were very excited about 5G. They did a

43:07

big like wave of like investment um in

43:10

expanding their fabs in around 2020,

43:12

2021, 22. And they're like, "Okay, we're

43:14

good." And like I said, 2024

43:17

like Chri 2022 big thing in tech in

43:21

2023. In 2024, their growth rate went

43:24

down. In 2025, their growth rate went

43:26

down. In 2026, it's up now. It was very

43:29

funny because I, you know, I was writing

43:31

about this a while ago and then I think

43:34

it was like one or two earnings calls

43:35

ago. Suddenly uh CCway the the CEO and

43:38

chairman is talking about like the use

43:42

cases for AI like the whole earnings

43:44

call in a way he never had before. This

43:46

is the problem with the why the makers

43:47

are scared. Usually there's like a bull

43:49

whip and they're worried about being at

43:51

the end of the bull whip where the

43:52

demand happens and it works its way down

43:54

the chain and they're at the end and

43:56

then they double down. It's already too

43:57

late and they're they're wasting all

43:58

their money. And I think the thing with

44:00

AI is if it's a bull whip it's like the

44:02

longest bull whip of all time. like

44:04

there's still so much to be built and it

44:06

just took a while for Asia to get the

44:09

message where these sort of companies

44:11

are. Uh but I think I think they've by

44:14

and large gotten it but them getting the

44:17

message it then takes several years for

44:19

that to actually materialize.

44:21

>> Do you have a sense for like how long

44:23

you think it will take given the extreme

44:25

shortage of compute?

44:27

>> Well, the interesting thing is what this

44:29

means for Intel and and Samsung sort of

44:31

the logic business. So, I've been

44:34

writing about the problem of this

44:36

dependency on TSNC for years. Um,

44:39

actually, one of my first articles in

44:40

2013 was exhorting Intel. You I say you

44:44

have to build a fab a fab business. You

44:46

you like you're not going to be this

44:47

desire anymore. You like there's a huge

44:49

business in manufacturing chips. And I

44:52

thought I was late writing it then.

44:54

Their stock goes to the moon throughout

44:57

the 2010s as they're riding the sort of

44:59

cloud wave. And it wasn't until like

45:01

2020 where they finally realized and we

45:04

fell behind. By the way, there's this

45:06

huge opportunity. We're totally

45:08

unprepared for it. We don't have a

45:09

customer service mindset or culture

45:11

organization or all the IP building

45:13

blocks and all these things that TSMC

45:14

has. And they need a customer. They need

45:18

customers to help them actually build a

45:20

real foundry business. And so I would

45:23

write about this problem and I'd write

45:24

about like the China issue like you're

45:26

dependent on on a a company that is 60

45:30

miles offshore of our greatest political

45:33

you know opponent who thinks it's

45:35

theirs. So I these are big problems and

45:38

that's where I came to appreciate this

45:40

insurance issue for a big tech company

45:43

to go to Intel and say Intel you make

45:45

our chip and by the way the biggest

45:48

benefactor of this is going to be you

45:50

cuz you're going to learn how to work

45:51

with a partner and the biggest pain is

45:54

going to be us cuz we're going to have

45:56

to figure out how to work with you. We

45:57

could just go to TSMC. They are awesome.

46:00

They are so great to work with that we

46:02

know they're going to do a good job. It

46:04

just never made rational sense for

46:06

anyone to go work with Intel. That was

46:09

their fundamental problem. In a in a

46:10

world in a unchanging world, TSMC would

46:13

just win forever. But this is where TSMC

46:15

in some respects made the same mistake

46:16

as the memory makers made the same

46:18

mistakes as I ran. If I can continue the

46:19

analogy because they didn't invest the

46:22

last few years. The shortages are going

46:25

to be so acute. big 10 companies that

46:28

we're foregoing so much revenue and so

46:31

many profits because we don't have

46:32

enough compute. We will go through the

46:34

pain of getting Intel of getting Intel

46:36

up to speed of getting Samsung's logic

46:39

up to speed. The scarcity

46:42

is what ultimately saved Intel. Um, and

46:45

I expect at some point in the near that

46:47

they're going to announce like some

46:49

major partner for the first time. It's

46:51

going to be a big deal. But it was

46:53

ultimately TSMC brought it on

46:54

themselves. It's the cure for high

46:56

prices is high prices thing where we're

46:58

going to route around them. Yep. And

47:00

like and it's just like there's all

47:02

these things as like an analyst sitting

47:03

on the side. You can write these things

47:06

and it it was one of those things I sort

47:08

of learned like no one's going to pay

47:09

insurance they don't need to pay when

47:11

that insurance expected value is is

47:13

negative. The way to solve the

47:15

geopolitical problem of dependence on

47:18

TSMC

47:20

is to come up with a compute use case

47:22

that is so massive that everyone is

47:24

economically incentivized to bring other

47:27

people up to speed and then we get the

47:29

sort of geopolitical insurance for free.

47:31

>> If you think about the let's say top 10

47:33

or 15 technology companies, which ones

47:35

do you think have the most interesting

47:37

setups today for their business?

47:39

>> The answer is always Amazon. Um and the

47:42

reason because what Amazon is so

47:43

compelling is the extent to which they

47:46

build for them. They are their first

47:48

best customer like they provide the

47:51

scale to get basically anything off the

47:52

ground which they then sell to other

47:54

people. AWS is the most obvious example.

47:56

AWS contrary to sort of popular thought

47:59

was not spare Amazon capacity. Actually

48:02

it took a long time to get amazon.com

48:04

onto AWS. But the re what it drove was

48:07

the understanding that we need to have a

48:09

scalable. We can't be having so many

48:11

meetings like we need to have just

48:13

compute that you can plug in purely API

48:16

surface. You don't need to talk to

48:18

anyone. It's just there. And oh by the

48:20

way if we do that for our internal

48:22

retail teams we could do that for

48:23

anyone. And turns out the retail is so

48:26

big we have to start with everyone else.

48:27

AWS actually started serving external

48:29

customers before it served internal

48:30

ones. But now it serves them all. You

48:33

got other products like say the

48:35

logistics right where it was the

48:37

opposite like right now we're using

48:39

external providers for logistics UPS and

48:41

FedEx and USPS we need to build this up

48:43

ourselves and now they built up

48:46

themselves they're offering it to third

48:48

parties right now other people can use

48:49

their use their delivery services and

48:52

you see this in market after market like

48:54

they're talking about things like some

48:56

of their AI products that they're or

48:57

their chip products right what's the

48:59

beauty of the graviton or the tranium

49:02

particular the early versions. The early

49:03

versions were terrible. But if you're on

49:06

Amazon and you're using some of their

49:08

managed services, like say the Redshift

49:10

database service, they don't tell you

49:12

what the processor is underneath that.

49:13

You're just buying a managed service.

49:15

>> So they can put all their crappy

49:17

processors underneath the services

49:19

they're selling and that gives them the

49:22

volume and the capacity to iterate them

49:24

and get better. And they get to the

49:26

point where they can actually sell them

49:27

externally. And so because they were the

49:29

first best customer for Graviton,

49:31

Graviton got better because they were

49:32

the first best customer for Tranium.

49:34

Tranium got better and now Trrenium is

49:36

obviously, you know, running anthropic.

49:37

They're doing the same thing. They're

49:38

doing the same with AI products. We'll

49:40

see if any of them take off. They have

49:41

call center software. Their call center

49:44

or their customer experience is going

49:46

through AI. By the way, it's pretty

49:48

good. I don't I don't know if you like

49:49

>> I haven't tried it.

49:50

>> Well, because I you know, moving back to

49:52

to America, I've been buying lots of

49:54

stuff and well, every summer I'd buy

49:55

lots of stuff in a very brief amount of

49:57

time. sometime in like the last year or

49:58

so, you can go on and you're clearly

50:00

talking to a chatbot, but the chatbot

50:01

does a great job and and it actually

50:03

does take care of the problem. So, you

50:05

could see that actually starting to work

50:06

in that in that regard. But they're

50:08

going to they're building up these AI

50:10

services for their own business that

50:12

they're going to make broadly available.

50:14

And some of them will work, some of them

50:16

won't. But this is it's such an elegant

50:18

sort of approach and given they have so

50:23

many investments in the real world.

50:25

Their core business feels so impervious

50:28

to AI for like the model version of AI.

50:32

It will benefit from AI but their their

50:34

moat feels deeper than anyone as far as

50:36

their core business and their ability to

50:39

just sort of generate new business lines

50:41

organically is is very compelling.

50:44

>> What about Apple? They've sat this whole

50:46

thing out. It seems

50:47

>> it feels like it might be a situation of

50:49

better be lucky than good to a certain

50:51

extent.

50:53

>> I mean, Apple has their whole has their

50:56

whole ecosystem and

50:58

at the end of the day, they do own

51:00

access to customers. So, they can sort

51:03

of get suppliers. This is the classic

51:05

aggregator play. If you own access to

51:07

customers,

51:09

suppliers come to you, not the other way

51:10

around. and and so they can get

51:12

suppliers for their AI sort of as as

51:14

needed. And by the way, you know, to the

51:19

extent it's true that people don't want

51:21

to be productive, they just want a sort

51:23

of a chatbot.

51:25

Not only can they serve them a chatbot

51:28

and with, you know, finally getting a

51:30

Siri that works, but you can see a

51:32

future where this absolutely can work on

51:34

device and they actually don't even need

51:36

to pay for inference costs either

51:38

because they, you know, they're using

51:39

the customers electricity. I mean, I I

51:41

don't think we're quite there. There's a

51:43

reason they're using Google Cloud and

51:44

and Nvidia chips, but you can certainly

51:46

imagine a future where where that's the

51:48

case and they're in physical goods. Like

51:51

actually making phones is is hard,

51:54

right? and having retail, having

51:56

distribution for physical goods is is

51:58

good. So, they're they're more

51:59

insulated. The smartphone is so perfect.

52:01

It's small enough to fit in your pocket.

52:03

It's big enough to watch basically

52:04

anything on it. You can run your whole

52:06

life on it. All your entertainment is

52:07

there. Like when we talk about customers

52:09

just want to be entertained. The TV is

52:11

now an accessory. It's all on your

52:13

phone. And you know, I don't see anyone

52:17

taking over the phone. The question is,

52:19

is the phone always going to be the

52:21

center or is there a bit where

52:23

particularly in the home, this is where

52:25

I'm very, you know, open's efforts here

52:26

are very interesting, uh, where you want

52:30

sort of an ambient AI where you can just

52:32

talk to the AI and it tells you what you

52:34

need. Apple is the best position to

52:36

provide that, but can they provide that

52:40

without having leading edge models? Can

52:43

they provide that if they're so phone

52:45

centric or is it like a Microsoft

52:47

situation? Microsoft didn't miss mobile.

52:50

They were very early to mobile. The

52:52

problem is their mobile was a small PC.

52:54

They assumed the PC would always be the

52:56

center and their phones were going to be

52:59

something that was off that Apple

53:00

realized no we the f we need to reset.

53:03

The phone is not going to be accessory

53:04

to the Mac. The phone is going to be the

53:06

phone. The iPod helped them realize that

53:08

and going with Windows and all that. But

53:10

will they fall into a Microsoft like

53:12

trap like assuming the phone's so good

53:14

it's always going to be the center and

53:16

then let's figure out around it or is

53:17

this finally the time when actually

53:20

ambient the cloud just in general AI

53:23

being everywhere it can manifest through

53:25

your phone it can manifest through a

53:27

device can manifest on your computer is

53:30

actually better and is actually

53:33

disruptive to them I think it's possible

53:36

I also think it's totally valid for

53:39

Apple to double down on what they do.

53:43

The other thing about the AI stuff is

53:46

on what basis should we expect Apple to

53:48

be good at this?

53:50

Like just in like at the most crude

53:53

level, AI is this probabilistic

53:55

endeavor? Apple is the king of

53:58

deterministic products. like a physical

54:02

product. You ship that iPhone, you ship

54:05

it once and it's got to be it's got to

54:08

be good. If it's bad, it costs you

54:10

billions and billions and billions of

54:11

dollars. Apple's never had an iPhone

54:13

recall, which if you think about it is

54:16

actually it's amazing. And that the sort

54:18

of care and decision-m and diligence and

54:23

you know fierceness in terms of your

54:25

supply chain and like making hard

54:28

decisions is very very different than

54:30

everything that goes into like making

54:32

great AI and I'm generally prefer

54:36

companies to do what they're good at. So

54:39

from my perspective I'm fine with Apple

54:40

not doing AI. I I want them to keep

54:42

making great devices. of the five, let's

54:44

call it five potential frontier AI

54:47

winners. So, OpenAI, Ananthropic,

54:48

Gemini, let's put SpaceX AI, you know,

54:52

Grock, and Meta in that pile. Which of

54:54

those firms do you think has the most

54:56

interesting setup? Open Eye and

54:57

Anthropic obviously are the riskiest,

54:59

but also have the biggest upside. You

55:01

know, they're just the never discount

55:04

number one, the power of belief. They

55:06

think they're creating God. like like

55:08

the the most impactful things in history

55:11

have usually been fueled by religion and

55:14

the two religious organizations in

55:16

Silicon Valley are the sort of like open

55:20

kind of like mainline like they go to

55:22

church every Sunday they're sort of like

55:23

evangelicals is like that's anthropic

55:26

like they're they're all in uh it it is

55:29

core their belief that goes a long way

55:32

the fact you need to make a business

55:34

work for you to survive goes a very long

55:36

way Google just needs like search to not

55:39

die too quickly, right? Meta has the

55:42

huge advertising business in in a world

55:45

where Meta was run by anyone other than

55:47

Mark Zuckerberg. They would not be on

55:49

the leading edge. That is the one of the

55:51

purest manifestations of founder sort of

55:54

energy for better or for worse. Their

55:56

business is so amazing. You see them

55:57

just easily sort of doubling down on

55:58

that. Like Google, there's a bit where

56:00

it it made sus.

56:04

They've been doing research in this.

56:06

It's like it makes sense why they're

56:08

pursuing this meta being like actually

56:11

we're going to hire a completely new

56:13

team and we're going to start from

56:14

scratch. This all again is pretty

56:15

insane. So credit to Mark Zuckerberg in

56:18

that regard. Again, you could decide

56:19

whether that's a good idea or not. And

56:21

then SpaceX AI, I mean the

56:26

data centers in space is like that is

56:31

the theory is there like do they have to

56:33

own their own model though to do that?

56:35

They'd get better margins if they do. Um

56:38

then again if we actually run out

56:40

whether through political opposition or

56:42

power or whatever it might be if we run

56:43

out of data centers on Earth like they

56:45

can run whatever model they want as

56:47

we're seeing with their sort of you know

56:50

selling their capacity to anthropic

56:52

right now. So they're all pretty

56:53

interesting. I think um probably the

56:56

case for SpaceX AI is probably the

57:00

weakest because the data center and

57:03

space play is so highly differentiated.

57:07

Like if that plays out, it I'm not sure

57:10

to what extent they need to even have

57:11

their own model. So why are you wasting

57:13

billions and billions of dollars in the

57:15

meantime? Um that's a fair question.

57:19

From a tactical perspective, I love the

57:21

cursor acquisition. like that makes so

57:23

much sense for both companies and so I'm

57:25

intrigued to see what they do. Um, Meta

57:27

is probably the most interesting just

57:28

because you've written a lot about this

57:30

recently.

57:31

>> The

57:33

I think there's a very good case to make

57:35

that it is actually more reckless to not

57:39

be on the frontier if you're a digital

57:41

company. Right? So the the counter to

57:44

the counter to Meta is actually

57:45

Microsoft. Microsoft is not on the

57:47

frontier. The reason why Microsoft has

57:50

$20 billion of free cash flow last

57:51

quarter, Microsoft paid a $10 billion

57:53

dividend last quarter, right? Like

57:55

there's there's some money, but their

57:57

play is, okay, we're going to play all

57:59

these off each other. We're going to

58:00

provide middleware. We're going to

58:02

provide the platform that enterprises

58:03

will build on us and we're going to sort

58:04

of inter, you know, disintermediate

58:06

disintermediate the models. And I think

58:08

it's a I think it's a rational play.

58:11

It's the IBM play of the '9s. Like

58:13

there's, you know, history sort of

58:16

echoes. Everyone talks about Google,

58:18

Google like following Microsoft.

58:19

Microsoft follows IBM and you can see

58:22

that uh to an extent. Uh

58:24

>> what did IBM do? What's the what what's

58:25

now?

58:26

>> Well, so IBM um so IBM had this

58:28

dominant, you know, we talked about it

58:30

in the 70s. Uh and then you fast forward

58:33

to the '9s and IBM is this very sort of

58:35

distressed asset and the thought was IBM

58:38

needed to break up and all these

58:40

different pieces they had. So Lou Gerson

58:41

comes in, he takes it over. And I think

58:44

Gersonner's real key insight to IBM is

58:48

actually everything. We're pretty

58:50

mediocre at everything. It's kind of

58:52

like what I told Microsoft before. And

58:54

that's the price of Monopoly. Once

58:56

you've been a monopoly, you kind of lose

58:58

your capacity to be good because you're

59:01

you didn't need to compete anymore. And

59:03

I think a lot of tech incumbent

59:05

companies have this problem. They it

59:08

didn't matter what they did, they were

59:09

going to rake in money. And if you don't

59:11

have the pressure, if you don't have the

59:13

incentive, if you don't have the fear of

59:15

death or the fear of God as we talk

59:18

about these mono companies, then you

59:20

don't do your best work. And the problem

59:22

is that you once you lose that muscle,

59:24

it's gone. You're just sort of fat and

59:25

flabby. And so what Gersonner realized

59:27

is actually the worst thing IBM could do

59:30

would be to break it up into component

59:31

pieces cuz all those component pieces

59:33

are actually not very good.

59:35

our biggest asset is that we're big.

59:38

It's like what? No. What does it mean

59:40

we're big? We can It's the '9s. This

59:43

internet thing is coming along. There's

59:45

all these companies that kind of know

59:47

they have to figure out the internet and

59:48

they don't know what to do. They need

59:50

someone who can come in, understand

59:52

their business, and help them get

59:53

online. That's basically what IBM did.

59:56

So they built out and this is an echo of

59:58

what's happening now huge consultant

1:00:00

force and they put all their time into

1:00:03

building basically it was middleware

1:00:04

where they would go in and they put this

1:00:07

layer between a company's old school

1:00:09

mainframe like which all these companies

1:00:12

had and then modern web services on the

1:00:14

other end so they could have websites

1:00:15

and e-commerce sites and all this sort

1:00:16

of thing. It gave IBM a 30year lease on

1:00:19

life. Yes, in theory you could go get

1:00:21

point solutions from all these hot

1:00:22

Silicon Valley startups but you you

1:00:24

don't understand that. you don't know

1:00:25

how to do that. You know us. We'll come

1:00:27

in. We'll create all this middleware.

1:00:29

We'll give build this big consulting

1:00:31

force to help you implement it and

1:00:32

you'll get online. And IBM basically

1:00:35

brought all of corporate America online.

1:00:37

And that's what Microsoft's playbook.

1:00:40

Microsoft is um will help you figure out

1:00:43

AI. It will help you figure out in a way

1:00:44

where you're not giving away the crown

1:00:45

jewels to these companies. We're going

1:00:47

to build this platform, this harness,

1:00:50

this sort of middle layer where you can

1:00:52

we're dependable. We're stable like you

1:00:56

know us we we have backwards

1:00:57

compatibility to the 80s like you can

1:00:59

build on us and then we'll manage all

1:01:02

the changing models and what's updating

1:01:04

and do all those sorts of things and

1:01:06

does that mean you'll get the absolute

1:01:07

best experience no middleware sort of

1:01:10

saws off the sharp edges right like you

1:01:12

you sort of get a lowest common

1:01:14

denominator capacity but if you value in

1:01:17

this the oldest enterprise sales motion

1:01:20

how did Oracle go to market Oracle went

1:01:22

to market in the 198 the 80s Larry

1:01:24

Allison with this you know another

1:01:25

technology taken from IBM or just IBM

1:01:28

didn't want it relational databases and

1:01:29

they're like you don't want to be locked

1:01:31

into IBM you want to be able to

1:01:34

relational database you could run

1:01:35

anywhere come come with us the the

1:01:38

reason this is a joke is cuz Oracle

1:01:40

locks you in more than anyone right but

1:01:42

the the the all of enterprise sales is

1:01:46

companies whose long-term goal is to

1:01:48

lock you in getting you on board by

1:01:50

trying to make you scared of being

1:01:52

locked into somebody else, right? Like

1:01:54

all the cloud companies are like, "Oh,

1:01:56

portability and whatever. You can be

1:01:57

whatever." And then they're like, "Oh,

1:01:59

just use our service that only runs in

1:02:01

our cloud and now you're locked in." Um,

1:02:04

so that that that's Microsoft's playbook

1:02:05

and it's a very rational playbook and I

1:02:08

think it makes sense and that is the

1:02:10

opposite. That's why they have extra

1:02:11

money because they're not on the

1:02:12

frontier. They are building massive data

1:02:14

centers, but they're building data

1:02:15

centers for inference. They're not

1:02:16

building it for training. And their

1:02:17

story about we're investing in time in

1:02:19

response to customer demand is more

1:02:21

believable in that regard. they're not

1:02:22

having to tell a fungeibility story

1:02:24

where we're building big data centers

1:02:25

for training that will be used for

1:02:26

inference down the road maybe. But go

1:02:28

back to this notion that it's reckless

1:02:29

to not be in the frontier as a

1:02:30

>> digital. Well, so so the the reason why

1:02:32

that's concerning though is at the end

1:02:34

of the day, why are we using Microsoft

1:02:36

products again?

1:02:37

>> Cuz we did before.

1:02:39

>> Like to what extent does it actually

1:02:41

make sense to have all these artifacts,

1:02:44

all these documents, all these like

1:02:47

email inboxes? Can't AI just do that?

1:02:50

Like there there's a real threat here

1:02:52

where to Microsoft's software business

1:02:56

the whole systems of record thing is

1:02:57

it's kind of funny because one reason

1:02:59

why systems of records are so powerful

1:03:01

is it's so hard to move them to

1:03:02

somewhere else because it's a very

1:03:04

tedious repetitive job.

1:03:06

Oh AI is actually surprisingly good at

1:03:08

that. I'm not sure how good the systems

1:03:10

of record Microsoft isn't so much

1:03:11

systems of record. They do have some

1:03:12

like the dynamics business. It's user

1:03:14

interface. It's like where you actually

1:03:16

interact with the computer. That's the

1:03:18

part that is like when you see codeex or

1:03:22

when you see uh you know claude co-work

1:03:25

or whatever it is like aimed like an

1:03:28

arrow to the heart of what Microsoft h

1:03:31

of what Microsoft has and in the long

1:03:34

run all digital companies are but

1:03:35

Microsoft is very much like there

1:03:37

there's a re their strategy is sound

1:03:39

it's also

1:03:41

desperate in a

1:03:45

existential way and also in a they might

1:03:48

pull it off because they're desperate

1:03:50

sort of way. Meta is not threatened

1:03:53

immediately. But if this is where my

1:03:57

bullish view of AI comes in, I think all

1:03:59

digital

1:04:02

companies are threatened and meta is a

1:04:04

digital company like they they they have

1:04:05

software. Now the sort of one worry is

1:04:09

AI takes up more and more time and that

1:04:10

like time ultimately is is meta's

1:04:13

currency. We saw opening I tried the

1:04:15

sora thing didn't really take off.

1:04:16

Social network is actually pretty hard

1:04:18

also cost a lot of money like it's kind

1:04:20

of really interesting. This came up with

1:04:22

the creator payments stuff. So YouTube

1:04:26

very famously as paid creators kind of

1:04:28

from the beginning and that's a much

1:04:29

bigger drag on the business than people

1:04:31

appreciate because

1:04:33

YouTube has marginal cost to their

1:04:35

content. Now unlike a Netflix they don't

1:04:39

have to put pay that cost upfront. They

1:04:41

pay it after the fact. So they're

1:04:43

sharing revenue. So it's a much it's a

1:04:45

better model than a Netflix model.

1:04:47

Netflix is to pay upfront for content

1:04:48

and then ideally make more money.

1:04:50

YouTube pays along the way. But but

1:04:53

Facebook or Meta

1:04:54

>> pays nothing.

1:04:55

>> They pay nothing. People are like

1:04:58

Instagram is this unbelievable product

1:05:00

that generates all this money for which

1:05:02

Facebook pays zero dollars for content.

1:05:04

It's unbelievable. And so it's funny

1:05:06

because you could see a world where for

1:05:08

YouTube AI generated content could

1:05:10

theoretically be a positive because the

1:05:12

inference cost to generate content could

1:05:13

be less than what they're sharing with

1:05:14

creators. For meta AI generated content

1:05:18

to the extent they're the ones

1:05:19

generating it is actually a worse margin

1:05:22

profile than what they have today. What

1:05:24

they have today is free. So they have

1:05:25

attention. Um there's a bullish world

1:05:28

where meta is actually very well placed

1:05:32

because in a world where we're

1:05:33

interacting with AI all the time the

1:05:35

desire for a human connection becomes

1:05:36

greater and it's sort of like a Meta

1:05:38

going back to their roots. Meta one of

1:05:41

their biggest mistakes actually Meta was

1:05:42

always a social network company. They

1:05:44

killed Snapchat or stop Snapchat's

1:05:46

growth by realizing Snapchat has a great

1:05:48

product. Let's layer it onto our

1:05:50

network. They they took their they

1:05:52

brought their network to bear to kill

1:05:53

Snapchat. uh where Tik Tok the reason

1:05:56

why Tik Tok is just a blind spot for

1:05:57

them is Tik Tok is classified as a

1:06:00

social network and it's not a social

1:06:01

network at all. Tik Tok is an

1:06:03

entertainment product. You it doesn't

1:06:05

matter who you follow on Tik Tok. What

1:06:07

you see on Tik Tok is a function of what

1:06:09

you watched and you're going to get more

1:06:11

more of the same, right? And the it's a

1:06:14

userenerated

1:06:16

content network. And the the insight

1:06:20

from Tik Tok was the way to get the best

1:06:22

content to limit it to your social

1:06:25

network is an artificial constraint.

1:06:26

We're going to give you the best content

1:06:27

from across the whole network. And the

1:06:30

vast majority of content is going to be

1:06:31

crap. But this is like the absolute

1:06:33

question before. Like you don't think

1:06:35

about margins, you think about absolute

1:06:36

numbers. The absolute amount of great

1:06:38

content, even if the margin for great

1:06:40

content is infantessimal, if we have an

1:06:42

a ton of content, the absolute amount of

1:06:44

great content is going to be very large.

1:06:46

And so the then Meta is like we're a

1:06:49

social network. And so Meta is serving

1:06:51

you content from your network of people

1:06:54

you know and Tik Tok serving you the

1:06:56

best content from around the world.

1:06:57

That's why they took a huge chunk out of

1:06:59

them. Meta had to shift. That's what's

1:07:02

happened with with Instagram and with

1:07:04

reals is it's not really a social

1:07:06

network. It is a entertainment product

1:07:08

that pulls from the entire network. And

1:07:10

social networking is like the group

1:07:12

checked. it's possible in AI actually

1:07:14

social network is important again

1:07:16

because like we actually want humans we

1:07:17

want to have some sort of connection to

1:07:19

them that'll be interesting to see how

1:07:20

that plays out then the other thing with

1:07:21

with the models is they're so impactful

1:07:23

on advertising biggest impact of the

1:07:25

models the biggest monetization right

1:07:26

now is probably not anthropic openi it's

1:07:28

it's the incremental gain that is

1:07:30

happening for Google and meta and most

1:07:33

of that most of most of the stuff is

1:07:35

prel but we're getting to LMS whether it

1:07:38

be generating advertising content like

1:07:42

they are the bad like what do we want

1:07:44

want verifiable domains. How do you

1:07:45

verify if a generated image is good for

1:07:47

an ad? Does the ad sell or not? Like

1:07:50

they can they actually can validate

1:07:52

their image creation and their text

1:07:55

creation in a way no one else can. And

1:07:58

their validation is the ad marketplace.

1:08:00

Like running a gazillion AB tests on all

1:08:02

these different things, see what works,

1:08:03

see what doesn't. Most ads are a

1:08:05

throwaway. It's fine. Um like the vast

1:08:07

majority of ads don't convert. So they

1:08:09

have this they have this massive

1:08:10

advantage, this huge liquid market that

1:08:12

is a verification machine where the

1:08:15

verifiers are humans deciding whether

1:08:17

they click on that ad and make a

1:08:18

purchase or not, but they're doing it at

1:08:19

global scale. That can actually have a

1:08:21

feedback loop to make their products

1:08:23

better. You're also going to get a world

1:08:25

where ad matching is actually still

1:08:27

fairly crude. It's like here's the

1:08:29

qualities of the person, here's the

1:08:30

qualities of the ad. And it's like you

1:08:32

create an embedding like a a vector

1:08:34

calculation uh and see what numbers

1:08:36

match and then you sort of match an ad

1:08:38

to the person. What do LM do? LMS

1:08:41

predict like we're going to move to this

1:08:42

world where Meta is going to look at

1:08:45

people and say this person probably

1:08:47

wants to see this next and they're going

1:08:49

to go find that thing and show it to

1:08:50

them. the potential upside in terms of

1:08:53

just showing people better ads that are

1:08:54

more relevant to them. They only need to

1:08:57

increase like a few percentage points

1:09:00

for the returns to be billions and

1:09:01

billions of dollars. This alone is worth

1:09:04

them investing in being on the leading

1:09:06

edge in in having these amazing models.

1:09:09

I think a big problem Meta has is they

1:09:11

don't tell this story. Like it's weird,

1:09:14

but Mark Zuckerberg has the same problem

1:09:15

Sam Alman does. He doesn't love ads.

1:09:17

They have the best ad business in the

1:09:19

world. They have an ad business that I

1:09:20

think is a societal positive. Like you

1:09:23

and I have set up these little content

1:09:25

businesses that make great money, but

1:09:28

we're content is kind of you get a ride

1:09:30

on social media, right? I grew up on

1:09:32

Twitter, people sharing my links. It was

1:09:34

amazing. If you're selling some product,

1:09:37

like the beauty of the internet is there

1:09:41

is a niche out there that wants that

1:09:43

product. The question is how do you find

1:09:45

the niche?

1:09:47

Facebook advertising. That's what it

1:09:49

does. It it connects. It helps products

1:09:52

find the people who didn't even know

1:09:54

they wanted that product, but when they

1:09:55

get it, they're so happy they got it.

1:09:57

And that is tre that's a huge societal

1:10:00

positive. You have new business from a

1:10:02

new entrepreneur making a new product.

1:10:04

You have customers who are happy they

1:10:05

got something that they didn't know they

1:10:06

would get otherwise. Those customers, by

1:10:08

the way, got lots of free entertainment

1:10:09

and they didn't have to pay for it along

1:10:10

the way. And Meta made a bunch of money

1:10:12

for themselves and their shareholders,

1:10:13

which is basically everyone in the

1:10:14

world. Like that this is why advertising

1:10:16

is great. And Meta's advertising in

1:10:18

particular is awesome. And I get

1:10:20

frustrated that Meta doesn't talk about

1:10:23

that. Mark Z has never really talked

1:10:25

about the societal benefits of

1:10:27

advertising except in passing.

1:10:28

>> I see. in 20 years. Like he's handed it

1:10:32

off to other people to take care of. And

1:10:34

maybe there's a bit where him not paying

1:10:35

attention is why

1:10:37

there is a certain like

1:10:40

grit and grind that goes into building

1:10:42

advertising business like and like you

1:10:44

know all the Facebook people get

1:10:46

frustrated or have questions about as

1:10:48

far as data and all those sorts of

1:10:49

things and maybe there was a bit where

1:10:51

he didn't want to be involved in it and

1:10:52

wipe his hands of it. But you saw this

1:10:54

like when when Apple passed ATT app

1:10:56

tracking transparency was one of the

1:10:58

most

1:11:00

one of the worst antitrust violations in

1:11:02

the history of technology like just

1:11:04

Apple unilaterally

1:11:06

obliterating all these business models

1:11:08

while they're simultaneously building

1:11:09

their own as far as advertising goes and

1:11:11

doing like doing all this tracking. Why

1:11:13

trust us? And meanwhile they're running

1:11:15

these advertisements. So remember that

1:11:16

advertisement of people on the bus like

1:11:17

overhearing everyone around them what

1:11:19

they're saying. That was such a

1:11:20

dishonest representation of how

1:11:22

advertising works on the internet. You

1:11:23

had Tim Cook in Congress talking about

1:11:25

companies selling data. Facebook's not

1:11:27

selling your data. That's value to them.

1:11:29

Why would they sell the D like and Meta

1:11:31

was not prepared to respond because

1:11:35

they I think you got this with Cheryl

1:11:37

Sandberg back in the day. She when every

1:11:39

call would talk about advertising, how

1:11:40

great it is and have a bunch of case

1:11:41

studies of like people who are

1:11:43

benefiting from advertising and these

1:11:44

new entrepreneurs and then she left and

1:11:46

it's kind of like that never hole never

1:11:48

got filled and you you it feels like

1:11:51

it's a company that's kind of like

1:11:52

embarrassed. Yeah, we make a lot of

1:11:54

money from ads but we got glasses and uh

1:11:56

we're doing AI. It's like you have ads

1:11:58

and ads are awesome. And

1:12:01

I think if they had made that,

1:12:04

communicated that more consistently,

1:12:07

they would be in a better place

1:12:09

generally from a PR perspective. They

1:12:11

would be better place relative to Apple.

1:12:13

And I think they would have an easier

1:12:14

time right now convincing Wall Street

1:12:16

that

1:12:18

let us invest. The other problem is they

1:12:21

spent

1:12:23

cumulative hundred some billion dollars

1:12:25

on Oculus which I dated all along. Uh

1:12:30

and so there's a bit where why like why

1:12:33

should we let you spend money again?

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1:14:07

The one major player and company that we

1:14:09

haven't talked about much is Jensen and

1:14:11

Nvidia. And I'm curious how you would

1:14:12

tie this back to the notion of like not

1:14:14

understanding commodity markets in

1:14:16

Silicon Valley. Whether or not you think

1:14:17

compute ultimately is a commodity, I'm

1:14:19

curious whether or not you think

1:14:20

intelligence will ultimately be a

1:14:21

commodity. It's interesting that

1:14:23

intelligence and compute which seem to

1:14:26

be by far the most interesting and

1:14:27

important topics in tech both might be

1:14:30

commodities and less differentiated than

1:14:32

>> well that's always the most interesting

1:14:33

thing about the internet is free

1:14:35

distribution

1:14:36

>> like bandwidth is a commodity

1:14:39

>> the the fact that I can pull out my

1:14:41

phone right now and connect to any

1:14:43

information source in the world for free

1:14:45

>> um free on a marginal cost basis is

1:14:46

because it's a commodity it changed the

1:14:48

world commodities change the world

1:14:50

>> like the there's a aspect of

1:14:52

differentiated products by definition

1:14:54

have lower TAMs because you're like not

1:14:57

there's a elasticity aspect to it. Not

1:15:00

everyone can afford to pay for it.

1:15:01

People's willingness to pay is going to

1:15:02

differ. Your market is going to be

1:15:03

constrained. Apple's never going to

1:15:05

serve the whole world by having by

1:15:07

selling a device whereas a Google can

1:15:10

because it's free, right? That matters.

1:15:12

And commodities, you know, you're paying

1:15:14

for a commodity, but to the extent it is

1:15:16

available to everyone is the extent it

1:15:19

is impactful. Yeah, the internet is a

1:15:21

commodity I would say and it changed the

1:15:24

world. So I don't think it'd be weird

1:15:25

that intelligence ends up a commodity

1:15:27

and changes the world.

1:15:27

>> But but still so so commodities often

1:15:30

are not thought of as as good a

1:15:32

businesses as these differentiated high

1:15:34

high margin products. So curious for

1:15:36

your thoughts on yeah that Jensen and

1:15:39

Nvidia specifically

1:15:40

>> Nvidia's position is I think definitely

1:15:43

unnatural. It's like they've maintained

1:15:45

all their margins. Isn't that amazing?

1:15:47

It's 2026 and everyone's coming for them

1:15:49

and they're still charging, you know,

1:15:51

however much money for for for a chip.

1:15:53

Um but they're actually not maintaining

1:15:55

their margins because who is buying like

1:15:58

this whole question of circular

1:15:59

financing is people talk about Lucent

1:16:02

and things like that and you know this

1:16:03

whole deal and Nvidia's providing 25%

1:16:05

back stop but if you actually uh ascribe

1:16:08

a value to that to Nvidia's taking

1:16:12

equity in the Neo clouds or whatever

1:16:14

like they guarantee they're going to buy

1:16:16

all their compute to 2030 right and why

1:16:18

do they do that so that the entity in

1:16:20

question can get a lower cost of capital

1:16:22

so they can buy more GP views etc. But

1:16:26

implicit in that why do they get a lower

1:16:28

cost of capital? They get a lower cost

1:16:31

of capital because Nvidia assumed risk,

1:16:34

right? This is my point before. Risk

1:16:35

never disappears. It just sort of

1:16:37

appears somewhere else. Taking on risk

1:16:40

has a price. Like so Nvidia like now

1:16:44

there is a world where AI takes off. It

1:16:47

never stops and everything is fine. And

1:16:49

Nvidia captured all the upside of their

1:16:51

risk. But there's also a world where say

1:16:55

that this Neo cloud they backed up a ton

1:16:57

of compute comes to market. The

1:16:58

hyperscalers have plenty of comput. They

1:16:59

don't have enough comput. Nvidia is

1:17:00

paying for a computer that no one wants.

1:17:02

They just lost a bunch of money. So, if

1:17:04

you think about it, there's an expected

1:17:06

value of that investment. That expected

1:17:09

value has it's not zero. It's not 100%.

1:17:13

It's somewhere in the middle. But that

1:17:16

is a diminuation of Nvidia's

1:17:19

profitability. If you actually look at

1:17:21

their business holistically, what that

1:17:23

is is a price cut,

1:17:24

>> right? Like they now the price cut

1:17:26

didn't show up in margins. didn't show

1:17:27

up in what they're offering. But a lot

1:17:29

of what Nvidia is doing is how can we

1:17:32

maintain our margins even if the

1:17:36

wide view sort of discounted cash flow

1:17:38

expected value holistic view of our

1:17:40

company people do discount cash flows

1:17:42

but are you actually considering all

1:17:43

these pieces right the reality is is

1:17:45

that moving stuff off the balance sheet

1:17:46

by and large works right and so uh but

1:17:49

they're doing all these all these deals

1:17:52

to maintain what feels somewhat

1:17:55

unnatural and

1:17:58

So I would say like we have seen disc

1:18:00

price cuts. They're just manifesting in

1:18:02

these very bizarre sort of ways. Now in

1:18:04

the long run I think the challenge is

1:18:06

the the challenge Nvidia faces is

1:18:10

their ultimate competitors are the

1:18:12

hyperscalers particularly Google and

1:18:13

Amazon. So Google and Amazon aren't just

1:18:16

building their own chips but they're

1:18:18

also looking to sell those chips

1:18:19

externally. Google already made a deal

1:18:21

to sell sell like 20% of their TPUs to

1:18:22

anthropic. On the last earnings call,

1:18:25

Andy Jasse practically confirmed that

1:18:27

they'll be selling tranium 3es or maybe

1:18:29

tranium four or those tranium chips sort

1:18:31

of eventually externally, which makes

1:18:33

sense. That gives them a long-term buy

1:18:35

into these companies. There's a huge

1:18:37

amount of R&D that goes into developing

1:18:38

chips. They get more leverage on their

1:18:39

spend. It it it all makes sense. And by

1:18:42

the way, they're not selling their chips

1:18:43

on differentiation. They're selling

1:18:45

their chips as commodities. Nvidia is

1:18:46

the one selling differentiation. People

1:18:48

aren't going to Amazon to use tranium.

1:18:51

So they're not cannibalizing like the

1:18:53

attractiveness of their cloud by selling

1:18:54

tranium outside. So they're Nvidia's

1:18:57

biggest problem. It uh because what's

1:19:01

the number one advantage that the

1:19:03

hyperscalers have?

1:19:04

>> Lower cost of capital. It's a capital

1:19:06

fight. They have a lower cost of capital

1:19:09

than the Neoclouds do. The Neoclouds are

1:19:12

they'll buy Nvidia left, right, left,

1:19:14

right, and center. And by the way, it

1:19:15

also makes total sense that like why

1:19:17

SpaceX like Elon's out there. we will

1:19:19

always buy Nvidia because they're the

1:19:20

best. No, you'll buy Nvidia because

1:19:21

they're the most funible. You like

1:19:24

Nvidia is true. It is the most funible.

1:19:25

CUDA's mode is dramatically diminished

1:19:28

because the models don't care what they

1:19:30

run on and that's what actually matters,

1:19:32

what's built on top of the models, but

1:19:33

it still matters. It It's still

1:19:35

something of a mode. It's so if you're

1:19:37

going to be if you want to play the game

1:19:39

SpaceX is doing where we're going to

1:19:40

build a lot and rent it out but reserve

1:19:42

the right to pull it back, of course

1:19:44

you're going to be on Nvidia because the

1:19:45

easiest way to rent it out is to be on

1:19:46

Nvidia. And you saw this very early by

1:19:48

the way. You go back to 2024, 2023.

1:19:50

Nvidia starts talking about all these

1:19:52

sovereign clouds. They start talking

1:19:53

about they tried to come out with these

1:19:54

neo they had the neotron models, but

1:19:56

they had all these they had this thing

1:19:57

in 2024. I remember it was the first one

1:19:59

where was like the rockstar GTC at San

1:20:01

Jose and like the huge coliseum and just

1:20:04

one comes out. It was a very boring GTC.

1:20:06

The old ones used to be Nvidia

1:20:07

demonstrating like 50 gazillion things

1:20:09

cuz they're throwing stuff at the wall.

1:20:10

They knew they had something with GPUs

1:20:12

and they're trying to like

1:20:13

>> find the use. Once LM showed up, it's

1:20:15

like, "Oh, we have the use case." But

1:20:17

they were coming up with all these

1:20:18

enterprise offerings. I can't remember

1:20:19

what they were called, but they were

1:20:20

like these modules basically that of

1:20:23

course they were free, but they only ran

1:20:24

on Nvidia. And you could see what they

1:20:26

were doing is they were trying to lock

1:20:27

people in. They were and and Intel is a

1:20:30

good example here. Intel got AMD cleaned

1:20:35

them out in hyperscaler sales because

1:20:37

the hyperscalers would put in the effort

1:20:39

to get stuff working on AMD versus

1:20:41

Intel. There are still small differences

1:20:42

even though they're they're they're x86

1:20:45

because they're buying at such scale the

1:20:47

investment to do it is worth it to get a

1:20:49

better chip or a lower price or whatever

1:20:51

it might be. Where Intel the part of

1:20:53

Intel's business that never floundered

1:20:55

was selling to government and selling to

1:20:57

enterprises because you're like they

1:20:59

don't have the resources of a

1:21:01

hyperscaler. They're not buying at that

1:21:03

scale. They're just going to keep buying

1:21:05

what they had before. That's why Nvidia

1:21:07

talks about selling to sovereign clouds.

1:21:08

That's why they talk about selling to to

1:21:10

enterprises because they want to get in

1:21:12

these markets where they're not going to

1:21:14

be balancing this chip versus that chip.

1:21:17

The hyperscalers have always been the

1:21:19

threat to Nvidia for that reason just to

1:21:22

like because they're the they're

1:21:23

actually they're actually bigger. So So

1:21:25

you have this issue where they the

1:21:26

hyperscalers are the threat. The

1:21:28

hyperscalers have a better cost of

1:21:30

capital than the other companies wants

1:21:31

to buy them. That's how you get this

1:21:33

deal this week. I see this deal as a

1:21:35

response. That's why it goes with the

1:21:36

Google deal. Google can just issue

1:21:38

equity like it's not shareholders don't

1:21:41

love it but their their monetization

1:21:43

capacity is at the end of the day like

1:21:46

it's it's much higher than than than

1:21:48

Nvidia or Nvidia's customers are. I

1:21:50

think what Nvidia is hoping for, maybe

1:21:53

they wouldn't say this in so many words,

1:21:55

but if we get to a world where we

1:22:00

actually run out of power, that's

1:22:02

probably good for Nvidia because in a

1:22:05

world where we're totally constrained on

1:22:07

power,

1:22:08

>> everyone want the best.

1:22:09

>> We have to get the best efficiency, the

1:22:11

best token efficiency. And I think

1:22:13

Nvidia is still the most token

1:22:14

efficient. Um, and so that is a good

1:22:17

world for them. I think it's been

1:22:18

probably the biggest problem for Nvidia

1:22:21

over the last couple years is I think

1:22:22

the US has actually brought a lot more

1:22:24

power online than

1:22:26

expected. They surprised me like whether

1:22:29

it be what Elon did sort of behind the

1:22:31

meter which has been been replicated

1:22:32

West Texas and natural gas and but even

1:22:35

like restarting nuclear plants like the

1:22:37

extent to which we've

1:22:39

>> you love how the US responds to these

1:22:41

things.

1:22:41

>> It's it's awesome. It's actually one of

1:22:43

the biggest like

1:22:46

encouraging signals about the US is I

1:22:50

was writing early on like what's going

1:22:51

to be the long term like assume this is

1:22:53

a bubble. You want there to be a

1:22:55

long-term payoff, right? The.com we got

1:22:56

fiber in the ground. Google like and by

1:22:59

the way Google has played this game

1:23:00

before. Google built its business by

1:23:02

buying up dark fiber. They had the

1:23:04

killer search engine, but they so much

1:23:06

of the the power what they do is because

1:23:07

they bought up all this dark fiber that

1:23:09

was basically free after the.com era.

1:23:12

Like our core internet still runs on

1:23:14

worldcom fiber, right? Like uh like the

1:23:17

and so that was a lasting benefit. The

1:23:20

railroads BNSF is is throwing off money

1:23:23

that's going to Google from Northern

1:23:26

Pacific and Jay Cook selling bonds to

1:23:28

retail investors. like the the you you

1:23:31

want a bubble that produces something

1:23:33

that lasts. And very often it's like

1:23:35

what's going to last from from AI? The

1:23:37

GPUs don't last that long. Like data

1:23:40

centers, yeah, okay, fine. But what is

1:23:42

it going to be? It's like power. It has

1:23:44

to be power. If we have if we're in a

1:23:47

world where this all blows up and we

1:23:49

have way too much power, that is an

1:23:50

amazing world to be. We've always been

1:23:52

energy constrained. Energy undergurs

1:23:54

everything. What would it be like to

1:23:56

live in a world of energy abundance?

1:23:58

Like it's it's hard to even imagine

1:23:59

because our minds are so constrained by

1:24:01

the fact we've actually always been in

1:24:03

energy scarcity. I think we've done an

1:24:06

unbelievable job. Like power for sure is

1:24:10

a constraint. It's going to be a

1:24:11

constraint, but I think it has taken

1:24:14

longer to be become a constraint than

1:24:17

anyone expected. And I wouldn't be

1:24:19

surprised if that includes Jensen Hong.

1:24:21

Like I think he thought a power

1:24:25

insufficient power was going to be

1:24:28

Nvidia's moat sooner than that than that

1:24:31

that that it happened. And it turns out

1:24:34

that the longer we have enough power,

1:24:36

the more time Amazon has to make Tranium

1:24:38

better, the more time Google has to to

1:24:40

make TPUs competitive from a efficiency

1:24:43

standpoint. And if we get in a world

1:24:45

where just a world where those margins

1:24:47

seem very hard to sustain.

1:24:48

>> I love hearing your takes on just

1:24:50

everything going on. It's the most

1:24:51

interesting time I've ever observed in

1:24:52

this world that you love so much. So,

1:24:54

thank you so much for your time.

1:24:55

>> Thank you very much.

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