Ep. 6229 - Trita Parsi on the Likeliest Outcome of the Iran Ceasefire - 4/16/26

You ladies and gentlemen of the press

have been less than honest report

according to the American people what's

going on in this country.

>> It's a baby.

>> We're dealing with Hitler revisited.

>> This is the Scott Horton Show.

Libertarian foreign policy mostly.

>> When the president does it, that means

that it is not illegal.

>> We're going to take out seven countries

in

>> they don't know what the they're doing.

Negotiate now. End this war.

>> And now here's your host, Scott Horton.

>> Welcoming again the great Treata Parsy.

He is co-founder of the Quincy Institute

for Responsible Statecraft and is of

course the author of the fantastic

treacherous alliance about the secret

history of America, Israel, and Iran. He

also wrote Losing an Enemy in a single

roll of the dice, which I admit I

haven't read. And now that I think about

how much I love that first book, I

really do need to read those second two

about diplomacy with Iran in the Obama

years there. But anyway, um uh welcome

back to the show. Thank you so much for

joining us again, Trina.

>> Thank you so much for having me. Really

appreciate it. Okay. So, you just

tweeted a thing very uh recently here

from Laura Rosen, who is a longtime um

you know, State Department and

journalist type uh very close to like

for example, she did very in-depth um

even minute-by-minute coverage of the

diplomacy over the JCPOA back in uh 2015

and so forth. And you tweeted out an

article by her uh quoting informed

sources saying, "Looks like talks are

continuing here. We also heard that from

Trump. looks like they're going to be uh

talking. So, um I also noticed uh a

piece that you had earlier saying that

um you believe that Trump has the

strategic upper hand here in the talks

and in in getting his way, which is a

little bit counterintuitive on the face

of it considering America's strategic

failure in the war. But I'm very

interested to hear your explanation for

that.

All right. So, I don't really say that

he has a strategic benefit. What I'm

saying though is that the ceasefire

enabled Trump to get the key thing he

wanted, which is precisely because this

war was such a strategic disaster and

defeat and would have become an even

worse defeat for Trump if it continued.

if the war continued.

Getting the ceasefire enabled him to get

the key thing that he wanted at this

point, which was to just get out of the

war. His key objective wasn't any longer

the nuclear issue or whatever else it

was. You know, he will make up any

narrative that he want. That's not his

problem. His problem is to actually get

out of the war. And prior to the

ceasefire, he couldn't get out of the

war without Iran's consent because

Iranians would have continued to bomb

even if the US stopped bombing.

But because of a ceasefire now, the

Iranians cannot restart the war. Just

let's say that you have a scenario in

which the US just walks away.

>> Okay.

>> He doesn't lift sanctions. He doesn't

open up the straits. Um well, the

straits will be open, but it will be

under Iranian control.

>> Uh and he just washes his hands of it

and says, "You look, I'm done. I

destroyed their military. I'm I'm good.

And if the Israelis want to continue the

war, that's their issue. but he will

just not be in the war any longer and

his base would be very happy with him

making that decision.

>> Mhm.

>> In that scenario, the Iranians cannot

restart the war without becoming the

aggressors.

>> Right.

>> Right.

>> I see what you're saying. You're saying

>> the more he disengages, the more the

burden is on them to figure out how to

get along with everybody else.

But then the thing is the key thing the

Iranians want is to make sure that they

end this with sanctions relief and a

permanent end to the war. To get that

they need to have a deal. But the key

thing Trump wanted he already got. He's

out of the war.

>> Uhhuh.

So now the Iranians are in a stronger

position of being the ones that have

more future gains to lose if there isn't

a deal. whereas Trump already has gained

the key thing he wanted. Now, I think it

would be better for him and for the

United States to strike a deal to make

sure that, you know, the nuclear issue

is pacified, sanctions are lifted,

hopefully a different relationship

between the two countries. So, we're not

in this state of constant. Is there

going to be war? Is there not going to

be a war? That would be better for the

US. But that's going to require

something that Trump may not be willing

to give, which is not that he's against

giving the sanctions relief, but can you

imagine how upset BB Netanyahu will be

if he's not only ending the war, but on

top of that making a deal with Iran that

lifts the sanctions on Iran. There's not

been a single deal the US has

contemplated with Iran that the Israelis

have supported or have not opposed.

if it entailed sanctions relief. As soon

as sanctions relief is included, the

Israelis are against it because

sanctions is in and of itself a way to

degrade Iran over time.

You can do it faster with bombings, more

intense, more deadly, etc., or at least

in the short term. But you can also do

it by having these strangulating

sanctions on the country over the course

of decades. And they managed to get some

of the strongest sanctions under Obama

and later on under Trump. and they will

not sit still if Trump is about to lift

them. So for Trump, he may end up in a

scenario in which he thinks, you know

what, I don't want to have that headache

with the Israelis. They're pissed off

enough that I'm even ending this war, so

let me just walk away. I got the key

thing I needed. The Europeans and the

Asian countries are going to be upset

about Iran controlling the straits, but

the US is not importing a lot of oil

from the Persian Gulf, and the Iranians

will not close the straits. They want

the straits to be open. They want to

make money off of the toll. So, they

need to let traffic go through. It's

just that they're going to insist on

collecting the tolls. But this rate will

be open. Oil prices will come down. Gas

prices will come down in the US. And and

sure enough, people will soon forget

about this war because at the end of the

day, as bad as it was, it could have

become much much worse if he stayed in

the war. So, I can see him making that

calculation. It would leave the Iranians

in a very bad situation because yes,

they control the straits. That's a

strategic benefit compared to where they

were before. But they need sanctions

relief and they needed an opportunity to

meet the US at the negotiating table

from a relative position of strength.

And for the first time in 47 years, they

are actually at the table from a

relative position of strength.

>> But not

>> they will not get the opportunity to

translate that into a new status quo if

he just walks away.

>> Right. I see. And as you're saying, he's

already halfway away now having stopped.

>> Yeah. I mean, he just said that we

actually have a very good relationship

with you on I don't know if you saw the

clip. He just said that like an hour

ago.

>> Listen, I mean, this is the very best

thing about Donald Trump is that he can

demand unconditional surrender one day

and then surrender unconditionally the

next and he don't give a damn. He just

slip on any dime. Oh, the new Look, I

really dislike the guy's father, but the

new Ayatollah comedy is fantastic. like

what the hell? Why not, dude? You know,

you can't think of a reason why not. So,

that's good enough for me. I'll tell you

what, man. You can get him to flip-flop

that bad, then thank goodness. Um,

now,

you know, I got to wonder though whether

he's willing to take that win. I mean,

in fact, you know, as even the uh

guess it was the New York Times, right,

ran a big piece quoting all Israeli

officials just wailing and lamenting the

failure of this war to achieve all of

>> Netanyahu's stated objectives here. And

in fact, as said, they've been

tremendously empower. The Persian Gulf

is no longer an American lake. It is

again the Persian Gulf in every sense of

that term. It's a massive strategic

benefit that they've gained there. I

don't know if we can even reopen any of

those Gulf military bases ever again or

what would be the point of trying it. So

I mean the US could the question is okay

a lot of these things

>> we did not we did not really change the

regime we did not you know somehow

uninvent their ability to enrich uranium

to whatever percent that they want and

etc etc we did not force them to abandon

Hezbala and the Houthis and their Shiite

militia friend the PMUs in Iraq right so

none of the strategic goals stated have

been achieved at this

I I think I mean obviously that's

absolutely true. I think it's at the

same time important to understand

most of those things were never

achievable anyways.

>> The only reason why he even pursued him

was because the Israelis had essentially

called him into believing that he could

do these things and it was clear he

couldn't. The US cannot do those

different things. So there's a part of

me that don't want to begrudge him for

not having achieved things that were

unachievable that I have ridden for

years are unachievable. I think some

credit needs to be given to the fact

that he recognized that this was a

strategic mistake and as a result

found a way out of it and is apparently

trying to end it. Whereas most American

presidents in the past when they end up

in these debacles, they just keep on

going and kick the can down the road and

hope that the next president will have

to deal with it. And that's how we ended

up in these endless wars. And the fact

that he didn't do that and he didn't

compare where he is to what he said he

would achieve, but he compared where he

is and what he can achieve to the cost

that would be inflicted if

he didn't end this war and all of the

significant damages that will come after

that. To me, it's kind of like imagine

if we are in May 22nd, 2023,

sorry, 2003. That's the day before Paul

Bremer decided to dismantle and disband

the Iraqi army,

>> right?

>> Which was one of the most crucial

dangerous decisions that made that

really set the stage for the insurgency

and everything else.

Imagine if on the day before George W.

Bush woke up and said, "You know what? I

actually campaigned on no nation

building. We got rid of Saddam, but this

is the country of the Iraqis, not our

country. I'm just going to leave it to

them to figure it out." Would he be

criticized? Absolutely. Would there have

been some instability? No doubt. Would

it have been a good situation? No,

because we shouldn't have gone in there

in the first place. But compared to

staying for another decade, birthing

ISIS and all of that other stuff, it

would have been better if he pulled out

on May 22nd. And that's kind of what

Trump did in this situation, I think.

>> Yeah. Well, I sure hope it sticks. I

mean, there's so many stories saying

he's sending more troops to the region,

rearming and getting ready. And if the

Iranians don't give in and give up

enrichment and all of this, then we're

going back to war. I don't know if this

is credible, man. You know, anti-war.com

is running a story a little lower down

on the page today

from a Turkish paper saying that the

Russians had repeatedly offered to take

all of Iran's

uranium stockpile out of the country and

convert it to fuel rods. And that

America continues to reject these

offers. In other words, they need this

pretext to keep fighting. Otherwise, why

would they just let the Russians take

the damn uranium then and call and and

even use that as a basis for ending the

war? That there, see, we achieved our

objective. The stockpile's gone now.

Even though, of course, that would have

happened under the JCPOA if he just

stayed in the JCPOA. That was where they

had already agreed to ship all their

>> stockpile. Look, the Russians have made

that offer several times. I've written

about it. And again earlier on the

reason why Trump didn't accept it is

because the Israelis had convinced them

don't make any deal

>> right

>> you can get rid of this regime you'll

get the best possible deal by simply

getting rid of this regime why make a

compromise when you can actually get

them to surrender

>> right

>> so he rejected that proposal he rejected

what the Omanis put on the table all of

them far superior to the JCPOA in many

aspects

>> right

>> he rejected all them because he was

under the belief that within 4 days he

would have either have gotten Iran to

surrender or for the regime to collapse.

And again, completely unachievable. This

was never really in the cards. US

intelligence said that, but he chose to

listen to the Israelis instead of

listening to the US intelligence.

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>> It's interesting that New York Times

story um widely cited and I guess

credible because you could tell like it

was, you know, the highest level

principles were the sources for the

story. However authorized they were to

frame it the way they did, I don't know

exactly, but the way I read it, and I

should probably reread the thing, too.

But the way I read it was sort of like

in two pieces, right? The first part is

Netanyahu came and blew all this smoke

about how it's going to be like a magic

wish. is going to be so easy and fun and

great. And then when he left the room,

everybody said, "No, actually, sir, he's

really embellishing about how easy it'll

be. It won't be that easy to change the

regime." But then they did go ahead and

reassure him that with military power,

we can severely set them back in terms

of their missile force and in other

ways. And so

um he seemed to the way the story read

to me treated was that he was launching

the war not really on Netanyahu's

promises but on General Ka's that look

we will be able to degrade their missile

force to a substantial enough degree

that you might even think worth it to

get started even at the risk of them

retaliating uh back. and they sort of

let him feel like it was okay to do that

on a military basis had Seth been king.

>> Look, I I think something that needs to

be remembered is that

>> but he

did say in his when he launched the war,

he announced that like now is your

chance Iranian people to rise up and all

that. So you could tell there was still

a bit of that in there.

Yeah. Yeah. Because look look

the way the military tends to operate is

that if the president says hey I want to

do this the military has to come up with

plans. Okay this is how you can do it

and these are the resources you need.

Very rarely do they say sir this cannot

be done.

>> Yeah.

>> Right. Well, when he army of the joint

chiefs of staff job though, by the way,

for people who don't know, I I know you

know this, but he's actually not even in

the chain of command. He is not under

the secretary of defense. The secretary

talks straight to the chiefs. He is the

military advisor to the president more

than any other thing. It's his job to

say, "Sir, this really isn't realistic

unless you're really willing to pay this

price." and and and I don't even

remember what's in the New York Times

story on that, but people I spoke to

throughout this entire period were often

times saying it's not just him, but many

others who are very very skeptical and

are not expressing their skepticism

as strongly as they want to and as they

should and as they probably could out of

fear for a variety of things. Others who

had fell out with Trump and were no

longer at the table. There were several

people who were very much part of the

conversation in June and in May of last

year, but because of their opposition to

the war and because Trump thinks that

that war was an amazingly successful

war, he's not even considering their

opinions any longer despite the fact

that they should be at the table given

their titles.

This then creates that type of a

scenario in which people just don't

contradict the president when they see

that he really wants to go in certain

direction and he had really been

convinced by the Israelis to go in that

direction. And the push back ended up

just being too polite, too soft. One of

the things that kept on happening is

that the Pentagon kept on saying, "Well,

if you want to do this, you're going to

need another aircraft carrier and you're

going to need more of this and more of

that." And I'm sure you remember in

January there was this like this

constant reporting that actually there's

a decision to send even more stuff. Part

of that is to convince him it's not a

good idea to do it.

>> Right? But it's just not a very

effective way of doing it with someone

like Trump. Other presidents probably

wouldn't understood that. Okay, they're

they're telling me this because they're

trying to tell me don't do it.

>> Right. It's tough, man. You know, I

don't know exactly how it went down. And

I'm sure you remember this story by Joe

Klein and Time magazine about the chiefs

took, not just the chairman, but they

all kind of took Bush to the tank in the

basement of the Pentagon in this skiff

and they said, "Look, we'll do Iraq.

We'll do the surge this January07. We'll

do the surge, but please don't make us

do Iran. We do not want to do Iran

because yes, ultimately we can defeat

them, but they can hit back and we will

not as they said that we won't have

escalation dominance. we won't be able

to choose every stage of the war. They

will also be punching us in the mouth

the whole time, too. And so, that's why

we want to not go. We've got all our

troops in Iraq embedded with Shiite

forces, by the way, um, and at risk. And

we've got bases all up and down the Gulf

and a bazillion dollars worth of

economic targets. And Iran can reach out

and touch all of them. And so, yeah,

>> yes, we could. We're the superpower and

they are not. But can they defend

themselves in a effective way that makes

the cost for us way too high? Yeah, they

can. And that's why we don't want to.

And Bush said, "Okay, boys, forget it."

Then that was it. And and

that spring trying to pressure him into

changing his mind, but his mind was made

up in January that the military says,

"Forget it." So, forget it.

>> Exactly. Exactly. And I think the sugar

high of Venezuela made Trump even less

receptive to any arguments that there's

something the US military cannot

achieve.

>> Right?

>> The riots, the protests

further intensified a belief in his mind

that wow, this regime is really about to

fall. If you remember in December when

the protest first began, they were very

small. But already back then, the

narrative in the western media was, "Oh

my god, is this regime going to fall?" I

remember talking to one guy in Tehran. I

was asking him like, "Okay, how

widespread are they protests?" And this

is, you know, the first two or three

days of the protest. And he said, "I

drove around Tehran all day yesterday. I

couldn't find them." Now later on,

January 8th, they became massive. But

the narrative that the regime was on the

brink of falling started on December

29th

>> long before the protests actually were

that large.

>> It's such an important

>> and and again it just and and I don't

think that was uh coincidental by the

way. I think this were things that in

which certain interests are pushing a

specific narrative and they were doing

it partly and I actually wrote about it

at the time. They're trying to convince

Trump that this is going to be so easy.

So they're overstating what actually is

happening in Iran.

>> Right. So that's such a crucial point,

right? Because the main propaganda about

that is look how horrible they are that

they would kill so many people and

everyone they killed were all peaceful

protesters. As Trump said the other day,

they killed 45,000 entirely innocent

peaceful protesters. And the thing is

about that is obviously the main point

is to drive outrage among the public

that oh my god these guys are so evil.

Can we continue to allow them to rule

Thyron? It would be the way that they

get to phrase it. But then the real

point is like you were pointing out

there is that this convinced Trump that

they had to kill 45,000

people in order to apparently convince

the other I don't know half a million to

go home. Otherwise, they would have been

overthrown right then. And obviously

this proves that they cling to power

only through violent force and they have

no popular support at all. And in fact I

saw um when Joe Kent did this interview

on Newsmax which is you know boomer

right-wing uh you know Fox pro-war

mongery Zionist kind of thing. And the

Joe Kent said to the guy, "Listen, when

you bomb a country, you drive up support

for the government people. It's called

the rally around the flag effect, and

that's what's happening in Iran now."

And the interviewer quite sincerely

treated

he thought

said to Joe Kent that's not the case

here though because we saw in January

they had to kill 40 50,000 people just

to be able to cling on to power and that

proves that no one in Iran supports them

at all. No matter how many regime

targets we bomb. that's never going to

increase support for people who are

essentially just captives of whatever

this alien force that is their

government. and he totally believed what

he was saying there that the protest

proved never mind popular sovereignty

they had no popular support whatsoever

because they had to kill that many

people which by the way was like half as

many people were slaughtered by Israel's

merciless genocidal campaign in Gaza

over two years right but whatever you're

supposed to just believe that happened

in two days even though we did not see a

Dresden style firestorm anywhere in

Tyrron.

>> Yeah. No, look, um I think

that whole thing again was part of, you

know, the normalization, the

manufacturing of consent in favor of the

war. And what's fascinating is that it

really didn't work outside of the media

class and the blob because the

population in the United States was

still overwhelmingly against this war.

Now, he had his own base, but his own

base doesn't pay attention to these

issues. They just pay attention to what

he says, and they tend to trust him and

they believe him. But this really

reminded me of what happened in 2003

because back then as well, the

mainstream media was parading Iraqi

Americans on TV begging for their

country of birth to be bomb. And now

suddenly the same thing happened here.

What was fascinating was that there was

a campaign going on for about four years

prior to this that started which was

aimed at discrediting all

Iranian-American voices that opposed war

or oppose sanctions so that they were

out of the scene. So by the time this

war started they would be able to fill

the airwaves just with these people who

are saying please bomb us, please bomb

us or the Iranian people will cry if you

don't bomb them. and and and they

succeeded again in in in doing that and

and dominating the airwaves for the

first two weeks, but it collapsed very

quickly because it became clear that

this is not only not a good war, is a

disaster, but also it really wasn't

supported not even by the

Iranian-American community, but by also

inside the country at all. That level of

support never existed. It was one of

these other things that was done to give

the impression that this is a good moral

war. It's the moral thing. remember some

of these voices said on TV, "Oh, this is

not a war. This is a rescue mission."

I mean, these type of things that were

being used to convince the American

public. I'm actually very uh impressed

to see that the American public never

fell for it. I mean, in the beginning of

the war, roughly 70% 75% were against it

and and then those numbers have just

gone up. So it's very different from

Iraq in which of course it was like a

hero propaganda that started before the

beginning of the war but by the time the

war started 79% of the American public

were in favor of the war. I think the

American public has become much more

savvy. There's also another aspect of it

that is very important. Voices like

yourself and others because of the

emergence of the alternative media has

made it much much more easy for

Americans to get an diverse perspective

on these things and not just fall for

the single unitary voice that comes out

of most of the mainstream media.

>> Yeah. I mean the polls show that there's

the Fox News watchers versus the rest of

the population essentially on this,

right?

>> Yeah. Absolutely. And and even there I

think if Trump had gone on with this war

for another week, he would have lost a

Fox News voters, not all of them, but a

big portion of them as well because it

was really going towards a disastrous

situation.

>> Yeah.

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but what about the great Satan, Benjamin

Netanyahu? I mean, he can just do

whatever the hell he wants here, man. I

mean, as we're recording this, they just

announced a ceasefire in Lebanon, which

makes me suspect that Netanyahu will

drop an atom bomb on them tomorrow. I

don't know.

>> Well, the Israelis intensified the

bombing today and Hezbollah responded as

a result of the ceasefire because it's

not coming into effect yet. But uh it

will be interesting to see if this

actually is

um a response, a a preliminary effort to

actually secure a final deal with

Iranians

because the Iranians are going to insist

on Lebanon and actually Gaza to be

included in this.

>> Yes. Because if I particularly for

Lebanon, it's very hard for them.

There's already a narrative that Iran

betrayed Lebanon in 2024

and the Iranians want to be very careful

so they don't do anything that

reinforces that narrative. There's also

the realization that if the war

continues in Lebanon, it will eventually

spill over into Iran as it has already

done twice. But most importantly, and

this goes back to what we started off

talking about, I think from the Iranian

side, they look at this as

this is a test for the United States. Is

the United States capable and willing to

reign in Israel? Because if the United

States is not capable or unwilling

to re in Israel and Israel can restart

these wars and the Israelis can drag the

US into these wars, what's the point of

an agreement with the United States if

the United States is not the decision

maker, right? Why make a deal with the

US if the decision maker is sitting

somewhere else? You either continue the

war or you make a deal with that

decision maker. So I think from the

Iranian perspective, they're insisting

on this really strongly

because it will be a reflection as to

whether the rest of the agreement is

worth the paper is written on.

>> Yeah. Well,

you know, it seems just as likely,

doesn't it, that the agreement would be

between the Lebanese government, every

faction but Hezbollah, or at least the

most important factions with the

Israelis to let Israel keep bombing

Hezbollah, just not other parts of

Lebanon, something like that, because

they're not even included in the talks.

And they probably don't want to quit

fighting either until they've taught

Israel a lesson the same way that the

Iranians apparently succeeded in

teaching America one here.

I think um if the outcome is one in

which through the pressure of the

Iranians there is a ceasefire in all of

Lebanon,

uh Hezbollah will see that as a

significant victory because it will

essentially mean the disarmament of

Hezbollah is not possible by the

Israelis

and it's certainly not possible by the

Lebanese government. The Lebanese

government

is essentially propped up by the US in

order for it to be strong enough to take

on Hezbollah not strong enough to deter

Israel.

>> Mhm.

>> But the Lebanese clearly have chosen

that between getting bombed by Israel or

going towards a civil war, they prefer

to get bombed by Israel. That doesn't

mean that they don't want to disarm

Hezbollah, but it's not about disarming

Hezbollah. It's about integrating

Hezbollah

uh into a larger Lebanese system which

has to be done by the Lebanese on

Lebanon's terms on Lebanon's time frame,

not on Israel or the United States's

time frame.

>> Mhm.

>> And if this ends up becoming a ceasefire

that also includes them, I think they

believe that they're much closer towards

reaching that goal and it will be a

strategic defeat for the Israelis.

And this is part of the reason I'm

saying it's bad enough for Israel if

there is a peace. It's terrible for them

if there is sanctions relief.

So, I think they will do everything they

can in their power to sabotage that

>> and I'm not sure or confident of how

effective Trump will be in standing up

against that. Now, if he has a really

good deal on on the table and he can be

historic figure that actually gets a

deal to resolve this issue, he may be

able to erase the memory of the

stupidity of starting the war in the

first place.

>> Yeah. Will he say no to that in order to

avoid a conflict with Netanyahu? Remains

to be seen.

>> Yeah. Interesting. So, you know what's

funny, man, is

no one is saying as part of this that

Iran has to cut off all support for

Hamas in the West Bank. I mean, pardon

me, in the Gaza Strip. Um, no one is

pretending this week for whatever

reasons, I guess, because trying to end

this war is too serious. So, they're not

going to sit here and pretend that Hamas

is the same level of proxy as Hezbala.

And and Iran is not demanding that

Israel ceasefire against Hamas, even

though they have an official ceasefire.

Israel bombs Gaza almost every day. They

kill, you know, maybe a dozen people a

day instead of 120 a day like it was

before the so-called ceasefire. But it

doesn't seem like the Iranians are

sticking their neck out for the

Palestinians here at all, right? And

demanding a real end to that as part of

this deal.

I mean, I I think if the Iranians could

from their standpoint, that would be a

feather in their cap. If they could make

sure that this also ends their campaign

in Gaza.

But the Iranians have a very different

relationship with Hezbollah than they do

with Hamas.

>> And so I think they have a much stronger

um commitment to Hezbollah than they

have to Hamas and to Gaza.

And I can see that within their own

base, I'm not talking about the Iranian

population as a whole, but within the

base of support for the Islamic Republic

inside of Iran, which I think is

probably around 15 to 20%. It's still

about 18 million people. Um,

giving up on Hezbollah is probably a red

line. I am not so sure if it is a red

line on Gaza, particularly if they have

an otherwise very attractive deal in

front of them.

Yeah. Well, and after all, Hezbala

jumped into this fight on Iran's side by

launching these missile salvos and

whatever.

>> Exactly. Exactly. Whereas Hamas started

the attacks on October 7th against

Iran's u uh wishes and uh

recommendation.

>> Okay, I got tell me more about that

because you know I just heard what I

knew were false claims to the contrary

the other day. Um, and I I I just argue

that well, look, obviously Iran and

Hezbala and the Houthies could have all

attacked at the same time if they'd been

ready and that didn't happen. But you

obviously more about it, so please do.

>> Yeah. No, I mean there's intelligence

that has been revealed that showed that

the

>> Hamas tried to convince the Iranians

that this was a good idea. They didn't

reveal all the details or the date or

anything like that, but the Iranians

were not ready. I mean, the Iranians

have their own issues to deal with. Same

thing with Hezbollah. So they never

really uh joined in, never supported it.

And once it happened, it was kind of

like Hamas was trying to force their

hands. And you saw that both Hezbollah

and Iran, well, I mean, Hezbollah did

start some low-level attacks to kind of

keep the Israelis engaged in the north

so they wouldn't turn all of their

efforts against Gaza, but it was nothing

compared to what a real war would be. Of

course, there's always been this ladder

of uh acceptable escalation, if one can

call it that, between Israel and and and

Hezbollah. The Iranians didn't join in

at all and and you know, push very hard

for a ceasefire from the outset.

So, if this actually was coordinated, if

this was something they were in on, the

golden opportunity would have been to

attack immediately after October 7th

when the Israelis were in complete

disray. And the Iranians and his blood

did absolutely not do that. Right.

>> So, I think that in of itself tells you

what's going on.

>> Yeah. In fact, that reminds me. There

was a Wall Street Journal story where

the CIA was saying that they did not

believe that Iran told Hamas to do it or

had ordered the

>> There was a Wall Street Journal story

that said that they were and it was so

badly sourced. It was an embarrassment.

>> Okay.

>> Yeah. And said that, you know, all of it

was actually planned, if I'm not

mistaken, in Beirut. It was like it was

just so

um it was just so ludicrous. It actually

got a tremendous amount of push back.

And they said, "I'm so sorry. I got to

run right now.

>> Yeah. And they saw the Iraqis give

Muhammad Ata a flask full of anthrax

there, too.

>> Yeah. Exactly. Exactly.

>> All right. Hey, man. Thanks for talking

to Really appreciate you, man.

>> Thanks so much. Appreciate it. Talk to

you soon.

>> That is Treat Parsy. He's at the Quincy

Institute for Responsible Statecraft.

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