John Mearsheimer: World Changed Forever as Iran Defeated the U.S.

Welcome back. Today is Friday the 10th

of April and we are joined by none other

than Professor John Merchimer. So, thank

you for coming back on. Ah, it's always

my pleasure, Glenn.

So, um these are yeah, crazy times

indeed. We saw that Trump threatened to

wipe out the entire Iranian civilization

with its 90 plus million citizens. Uh

then he embraced this sudden ceasefire

uh which he then seemingly undermined

immediately thereafter. Uh then he

claims victory and uh yeah begins to

distance himself from some of the key

requirements of this ceasefire deal.

It's uh it can be confusing. So I was

hoping if anyone can shed some light on

this it would be you.

Yeah, I think uh it is somewhat

confusing for sure and uh I think

because President Trump uh you know

frequently contradicts himself uh and

says outrageous things that it sometimes

feels like it's hard to make sense of

what's going on here. But I I actually

think it's quite straightforward. And I

think uh if you look at his two tweets

on Monday um it it tells you a great

deal. Now what exactly am I saying? Uh I

think at an over arch from an

overarching perspective you want to

understand that President Trump is

desperate to end this war. He fully

understands that we are close to going

off a precipice that if this war is not

shut down uh we could end up in a global

depression that's worse than we saw uh

in the late 1920s. Uh and he wants to do

everything he can to avoid that. So, you

get two tweets on Monday morning and on

Monday evening, and they're very

different tweets for sure, but they both

show evidence of the desperation. In the

morning, he says that he's going to wipe

Iran off the face of the earth. Uh he's

going to destroy Iranian civilization

forever. This is a genocidal threat of

the First Order. This is the kind of

language that you expect from Adolf

Hitler, not from an American president.

And what's going on here is he's

desperate and he's threatening to

annihilate the Iranians to get them to

throw up their hands

before he has to attack them that

evening. He wants them to concede

defeat. By the end of the day, he does a

180 degree turn

and he says there's going to be a

ceasefire.

But most importantly, he says that the

ceasefire will be based on Iran's

10-point plan. Now, you want to

understand that there are two plans on

the table. One is the 15point American

plan, which has all the maximalist

demands of the United States and Israel.

And then there's the Iranian 10-point

plan which has all the maximalist

demands of the Iranians.

And he says that the negotiations will

take place on the basis of the Iranians

10point plan. This is really quite

remarkable. He says the 10-point plan

provides a workable basis for an

agreement. And again, these are the

maximalist demands of the Iranian

government. He says furthermore in the

tweet that almost all of the points of

contention between the two sides have

been revol have been resolved. Again,

remarkable what's going on here. He's

basically found the off-ramp and the

offramp is to concede defeat. It is the

only off-ramp.

He's long had two options. One is he

could go up the escalation ladder, which

was he which is what he was threatening

to do in the morning. But as I've argued

for a long time, he can't go up the

escalation ladder because he loses at

every step. And the idea that he's going

to obliterate

uh Iran,

this is not acceptable. This cannot be

done. So, he can't escalate. So, he's

got to find an off-ramp. But the only

off-ramp is surrender, is to concede

defeat. And what he does in the second

tweet, again, he reverses gears, goes in

the opposite direction, and he conceds

defeat. He says, "We're going to

negotiate on the basis of the 10-point

plan." This means none of our demands

are going to be achieved, right? None of

the big four demands that we made before

the war started and after the war

started are going to be realized and

we're going to negotiate on the basis of

the maximalist demands that Iran has put

on the table.

So what I'm saying to you Glenn is if

you look at the morning tweet and you

look at the evening tweet you see that

Trump is desperate. He's desperate to

end this war and he wants to get a

ceasefire as quickly as possible and

then he wants to start negotiations.

But it seems like he wants to have it

both ways because yes, he conceds defeat

will accept, you know, that Iran will

set up a toll on the street of Hermoose.

Uh we'll put a ceasefire which includes

Lebanon, all these things. And but then

once the ceasefire is in place, he seems

to be still wanting to claim victory. So

now his tweets are about well, you know,

you better not put any tolls on the

street of Hermoose and uh you know,

Lebanon's not included. It looks like he

wants to have it both ways. He conceds

defeat to get the ceasefire, but once he

has the ceasefire, he wants to make this

victory claim because I noticed that

Pete Exathth, he also tried to do this

victory lap. It was just reading out all

the people who were dead, you know, all

the people they killed as a way of uh

suggesting that this was victory. But

it's I did you see it in a similar way

that he Well, did you see the the

attempt to claim victory here? because

uh you know what they have to agree to

and what they're claiming it's there

seems to be a massive gap there. Well,

first of all, Glenn, they don't have a

ceasefire because to have a ceasefire,

the Iranians have to open the straight

of Hormuz. And the Iranians have refused

to open the straight of Hormuz because

the Israelis are bombing Lebanon and

attacking Hezbollah inside of Lebanon.

And the Iranians say there will be no

ceasefire. Uh the straight of Hormuz

will not be opened until the Israelis

uh stop attacking Hezbollah. And that

hasn't happened. So the Israelis are

undermining the ceasefire. You want to

understand here that first of all

there's the ceasefire, but then there's

the negotiations to end the war. But

before you can get to the negotiations,

you have to get a ceasefire. But we

don't have a ceasefire. That's a key

point to understand. And the question is

whether or not President Trump is going

to be willing to lean on Netanyahu in a

really serious way to get him to stop

attacking Hezbollah. Uh and then we'll

get a ceasefire. Then the straight will

be opened. Uh but in terms of Hexith and

Trump declaring victory, this is putting

lipstick on a pig. Come on. This is It's

clear we've lost. I I you just want to

think about it. We went into this war

with four demands. One was regime

change. Two was Iran would get rid of

its nuclear enrichment capability. Three

is Iran would eliminate all its long

range ballistic missiles. And four, Iran

would stop supporting the Houthis,

Hezbollah, and Hamas. None of those four

demands have been realized. None.

Furthermore, Iran now controls the

strait of Hormuz, which gives it

enormous leverage. Furthermore, Iran

still has a huge inventory of ballistic

missiles, cruise missiles, and drones,

which allows it to attack American bases

in the region, American forces in the

region. Uh the GCC states, they're

allied with the United States and Israel

itself. So Iran is in an excellent

position today compared to the position

it was in on February 27th. And

furthermore, as I said, President Trump

in his truth social post on Monday

night, this is April 6th, said, "We're

going to negotiate on the basis of the

10point plan that the Iranians have put

on the table." Uh, this is a clear

defeat. And by the way, it's an even

bigger defeat for Israel. And uh

in Israel, there is all sorts of talk uh

to that effect. The Israelis fully

understand that if you look at where

this train is headed, this is a

catastrophic defeat for them. And of

course, it is for President Trump as

well.

Well, in the future as well, uh if

Israel or any of the western states

would want to attack Yemen or um attack

Lebanon or genocide the Palestinians

again, then Iran could just yeah shut

down or increase the toll. You know,

they have some different steps up the

escalation on the Hermus. They can, you

know, block some ships. I don't know.

There's this gives a massive instrument

of power to the Iranians. I mean they

seem like they will exit this conflict

as uh uh maybe superpowers a bit too

much but uh at least um yeah adjacent to

a great power. This is uh this is quite

a instrument of power they have and as

you said they didn't have this before

the war. So well there's two points to

be made. First of all, I think you don't

want to uh overestimate uh how powerful

a position uh Iran is in because of

years of sanctions and because of the

destruction we've wrought on Iran since

February 28th.

Iran in a very important way has been

devastated. Uh this is a country that

has been wrecked in a lot of ways. So,

the idea that they're coming out of this

war in great shape uh is wrong. Uh

they're going to have to spend many

billions of dollars over many years to

recover uh or to come close to

recovering from all the damage that we

and the Israelis have inflicted on them.

Uh there's no question however that

given the fact that they control the

straight of Hormuz

uh they have a huge amount of leverage.

And I take it a step further. Uh Glenn,

you want to remember that the Houthis

are their allies. They're one of the

three groups that the Israel that the

Iranians remain very close to. The

Houthis, Hezbollah, and Hamas. And the

Houthis can

they can shut down uh the straight that

leads out of

the Red Sea as they have done in the

past. So the Iranians working with the

Houthis have the ability to shut down

traffic coming out of the Red Sea

uh out of the straight of Babel Mandab

and they have the capability to shut

down the traffic coming out of the

Persian Gulf through the straight of

Hormuz. Uh so they do have enormous

leverage. There's just no question about

that. And uh this is going to present

huge problems for the Israelis moving

forward and for the Americans moving

forward. And by the way, Glint, just to

take this a step further, if you look at

the maximalist demands of the U of the

Iranians, one of them is that all

American military forces leave the

region. Uh I find it hard to believe

that that will happen. Uh, but I would

note that we have 13 bases.

Well, let me put it differently. We had

13 bases in the region on February 28th.

And the New York Times reports that of

those 13 bases, all of them have either

been destroyed or badly damaged. You

just want to think about that. Uh our

presence

in the Gulf has been seriously

undermined by this war. Uh the 13 bases

that we depended on are basically gone

or almost gone. And then you have to ask

yourself the question, are the Gulf

States that hosted us on these bases

going to want the United States to come

back and rebuild those bases? And as I

said, there's also the question of where

whether we're going to want to do that,

right? And then there is the point that

the Iranians want us out of the region.

So what our military presence in the

region looks like uh when all the dust

settles is hard to say but we are going

to be no more we're not going to be more

influ we're going to be less influential

have less power in the Gulf uh less

power projection capability in the Gulf

uh when all said and done than we had

before February 28th.

It's quite extraordinary that uh how

horrible this war was and uh but again u

it was a defeat but uh I'm I'm not sure

what else Trump could have done than to

accept defeat because there was

obviously a growing desperation. I was

just wondering how where you think most

of the pressure came from. Was it that

they were running out of missiles,

intercepted missiles, in other words the

the military? Was it the massive

economic pressure especially yeah the

growing oil oil prices or was it the you

know the fueling the political havoc at

home uh loss of voters? So what what do

you think or is there other dimensions

to this uh disaster that we're missing?

>> Well I think the secondary factor is

that militarily we couldn't figure out

how to win the war in any meaningful

way. just the, you know, ground invasion

didn't make sense. Uh we couldn't use

the navy to do much of anything. Uh we

we just we just didn't have many

options. And I think that was becoming

manifestally clear. And you want to

remember that in this rescue operation

uh where they got the second pilot out,

we lost more aircraft that day than we

have lost on any single day since the

Vietnam War. And think about that. Since

the Vietnam War, right, we have never

lost as many aircraft in one day as we

lost in this rescue mission. Just tells

you that we were not doing well

militarily. Uh so I think that was of

secondary importance. I think what's of

primary importance here is uh what's

happening to the world economy. I think

uh the Chinese and the Russians are very

scared about what the long-term

consequences of this war are going to be

for the world economy. Uh and that

includes the supply of food around the

world as well as oil and gas.

Uh, and I believe the Chinese put

pressure on the Iranians and talked at

great length to the Pakistanis about

getting Iran to come to the negotiating

table uh, and to work out a ceasefire

and then get talking about settling this

war. I think the Chinese understand full

well that this will have disastrous

consequences for everyone. And I want to

underline that word everyone. If this

war continues, this war has to be shut

down. Uh if you look at what's happening

in East Asia, and this includes

countries like South Korea, the

Philippines, Indonesia, India, uh and

the potential for really grave damage in

China, uh and countries like Russia over

the long term. Everybody understands and

I believe the Trump administration

understands that we have to shut this

one down. So I think you see Trump

trying to do that. It's Trump who's

actually been pushing hard for

some sort of exit option, some way of

settling this war. There's no question

that Trump is deeply interested in doing

that. Uh, but the Iranians, as I've long

argued, have a vested interest in

stringing this out.

The the Iranians don't want to settle

this war quickly because the longer the

war goes on and the more damage that's

done to the international economy and

the deeper the panic that Trump is in,

the more leverage the Iranians have. So

it's no problem I think from the Iranian

point of view if this ceasefire doesn't

work out because as it goes on the

conflict that is their leverage

increases but nevertheless I believe

what happened here is the Chinese

working with the Pakistanis and directly

with the Iranians put great pressure on

Iran. They might have even brought the

Russians in to put pressure on Iran to

go to the negotiating table because this

one has to be shut down. So, I think as

you look at the situation today, you go

back to those two tweets of uh President

Trump on Monday, this is April 6th, and

you ramp forward up to the present, and

then you project out into the future. I

I think it's the global economy that

really is driving the train here.

>> Yeah, it's probably true. Uh I think

even now that well even if the war comes

to an end now uh the amount of damage

that has already been done is quite

tremendous especially for the Europeans

and the Asians. Uh but you can maybe put

Africa in that same category but um uh

but we've seen some reports of more US

troops heading to the region. I I don't

know. I haven't seen the exact numbers

but do you think this is I mean it seems

unlikely that Trump wants to have

another go at this because I'm not sure

what he's going to do with the troops.

as you said, boots on the ground never

really made any sense at all. uh or is

it just for pressure to hope that uh the

US will have a little bit more leverage

in the negotiations because you know

this is just a twoe ceasefire supposed

to produce an actual uh peace agreement

and that that peace agreement is going

to be very difficult for Trump to get

because at the moment the ceasefire deal

which is a bit ambiguous there doesn't

seem to be a written paper which they

can point to uh it's um you know it's

it's easy for him to harmonize you know

his claim for victory and also the need

to I guess capitulate but uh in an

actual peace agreement it's going to be

very hard to square this uh I'm I'm just

just wondering how how do you see the

possible ways of this war actually

ending because again we have to get from

a ceasefire to an actual peace agreement

or do you think Trump's just going to

try to extend the the ceasefire

indefinitely and

you know, like a I don't know, just he

tried not to get any pen on paper so he

doesn't have to admit defeat

essentially.

Glenn, he has to admit defeat. He

admitted defeat Monday night. Again,

we're on the precipice. We've got to

shut this one down. He He has no choice

here. You you talk about sending ground

forces to the region and a a ground

force option. That's really going to

work well. That's going to get a quick

agreement. Are you kidding? Right.

That's just going to make a bad

situation worse. Uh there's no ground

force option here. There's no naval

option. There's no air option. I guess,

you know, he could use nuclear weapons

and uh destroy uh Iran forever. I get he

we could do that. We have that

capability. Is he going to do that? No,

he's not going to do that. So, he's got

to shut this one down. And uh he's

between a rock and a hard place because

the Israelis won't cooperate with him.

The Israelis won't even allow him to get

a ceasefire. Again, the straight of

Hormuz is still effectively closed. The

only ships that get through are the ones

that the Iranians let through. Uh so he

can declare victory and talk about you

know the fact that we've gotten

everything we wanted and our goals have

been achieved and so forth and so on.

But nobody's going to believe that we

lost. The Israelis lost.

The the problem is that there just so

many alternative media outlets where

this is all made clear, your show being

one of them, that they can't put

lipstick on a pig and get away with it.

Pete Hgsith can say we won. Donald Trump

can say we won. But who believes that?

Hardly anybody. Uh you see this in the

Israeli case. you know, they'll be

talking about all the wonderful things

they've done because the government has

a vested interest in saying that, but

all sorts of people are going to point

out that this is a ludicrous argument.

They didn't win. They lost. Uh so what I

would say to President Trump, and I

don't think he needs me to tell him this

because I'm sure his adviserss are

telling him this, this thing has to be

shut down immediately. I am sure that

this is exactly what Vance is telling

him. I'd bet a lot of money on that that

this has to be shut down and they're

sending Vance to head this team of

negotiators because they know Vance, you

know, is capable of reaching some sort

of agreement. Uh, you know, you don't

want to depend on uh Steve Wickoff and

Jared Kushner. I mean, these are

basically Israeli assets, not to mention

the fact they're incompetent. They have

a demonstrated record of incompetence

now. So, you want someone like Vance in

charge and hopefully he can shut this

down. Uh, but uh it'll be tough. You

know, Glenn, just to go back to the

Ukraine war and think about all the

endless conversations we've had on

ending the war in Ukraine. President

Trump was determined to end the war in

Ukraine, even before he came into

office. But if he didn't settle that war

before he came into office, he was going

to settle it after he came into office.

And he's been a colossal failure, right?

He and his lieutenants have bumbled

around and really

uh made a hash of the negotiations

to end the war in Ukraine. Uh it's the

gang that can't shoot straight, right?

Well, here we are now trying to shut

down another war, and it's the Trump

administration again. And the question

you have to ask yourself is, can they do

it? Uh, if the cast of characters

involve just President Trump, Steve

Whit, and Jared Kushner, I'd say we're

in deep trouble. But Vance is our great

hope here.

He's He's the new boy in town in terms

of negotiating with an adversary and

we're just all hoping that he can pull

it off. I'm sure the Chinese and the

Russians, not to mention the Indians,

the South Koreans, the Japanese, the

Indonesians, people all over Africa,

people all over the world are pulling

for Vance

to work out a ceasefire than to sit down

and negotiate some sort of settlement so

that we can get the straight open and we

can get the fertilizer. Well, we have to

get that fertilizer flowing and we can

get the oil and gas flowing as well.

uh we're not going to immediately go

back to the status quo ante in terms of

how much

of those goods come out of the Gulf, but

it'll be a good start. But we have to do

this immediately. And I believe that

President Trump understands that. It's

just

it's just difficult to miss what's going

on here. I'm sure that countries all

around the world are calling the White

House every day saying this is a

colossal disaster. Something has to be

done. And again, I think the Chinese and

the Russians fully understand this.

These are the responsible stakeholders

in the system, the Chinese and the

Russians, not the United States. But I

think at a certain point even the United

States, even the Trump administration

gets the message. This is my reading of

the situation. And again, Glenn, I would

say just go back and look at the two

true social posts that he wrote on

Monday, what he said in the morning

about annihilating

uh Iranian culture. And then look at

what he said in the evening did 180°

turn and said, "We accept Iran's

10-point plan as a basis for

negotiations." This is truly remarkable

and it reflects the desperation.

And by the way, uh just if he doesn't

understand, if I'm wrong, if he and his

lieutenants don't understand, just give

him another week or two. They'll

understand uh what's going on here in

terms of the world economy.

I think we should all probably be happy

that Vance will take over some

negotiations, but something good could

come from this though. If he is

successful, at least he should be more

successful than Witco and Kushner, then

perhaps Trump will have the wisdom to

also send him to Moscow because I it

seems more well Van seems more genuine,

not just in opposing the Iran war, but

actually wanting to put an end to the

Ukraine war as well. He doesn't seem to

have any more appetite for throwing more

lives and money into this uh big black

hole. So again, something good could

come from this perhaps, but uh it it is

>> Can I make one can I make just one quick

point on what you said? You do want to

remember though that if Vance negotiates

a settlement in which we lose, and this

is certainly true in the Gulf, and I

believe it would be true in settling the

Ukraine war, the right in the United

States, the neoconservatives,

which are a key element in the

Republican party, will blame him and go

after him hammer and tongue. So, you

just want to understand that politically

for Vance, he's in a very dangerous

situation. There's no question that for

the good of the United States, for the

good of the Trump presidency, and for

the good of the world, we need him to

behave in smart and brave ways to end

this disaster. We We just need him to do

that. But if he's successful, and let's

hope he is, he will pay a political

price here in the United States. And the

question you have to ask yourself is

whether that will affect how he

approaches these negotiations.

Uh he is surely aware of the point that

I just made. I mean, he's a very smart

man. Whether you agree with his policy

views or not, uh he's a smart man and he

has surely figured this out. But uh

let's just hope that you know he puts

the good of the country and really the

good of the world. It sounds funny

saying that but really we are talking

about the good of the world here um

above uh his own narrow political

interests and does work hard to get a

settlement and is successful.

>> Yeah, that's a great point. Actually, I

didn't consider the the domestic

politics of the whole thing, but uh

making the kind of humiliating piece

which has to be made or maybe not

humiliating, but uh well, yeah, perhaps

humiliating. Uh it's definitely going to

come at a price. Uh

>> yeah,

>> but no, it's going to be a humiliating

piece. I hadn't thought of the language

you use, but I think you're right. Uh

and and as I said to you before, I don't

think you can put lipstick on a pig in

this case. it it's just not going to

work because people like us are going to

point out what's going on and uh and

even places like the New York Times and

the Wall Street Journal uh will in the

end have to fess up and say that this is

a real defeat. And by the way, you'll

see this in Israel as well. I mean, you

know, we talk about Donald Trump making

a catastrophic mistake. I mean, BB

Netanyahu,

a huge mistake. And as I said before,

you do not want to underestimate the

trouble they're having in Lebanon,

right? Um, they're not doing well. The

Israelis are not doing well in Lebanon.

So, Israel is in, you know, terrible

shape as a result of what's happened

since February 28th.

Well, that's a good point because I

think the Israelis also bet everything

on knocking out Iran here. I mean, that

was supposed to be the head of the snake

and uh because they were already

overstretched. They're not successful in

Gaza. They're not successful in Lebanon.

And uh and uh now of course uh this none

of the objectives were achieved in the

war against Iran. And I saw today that

the IDF it told Knesset in Israeli

parliament that the new uh government in

Iran was quote more extreme. Um, so

again, this goes a little bit against

what we're hearing from Washington that

this is a better government, easier to

work with. But I think that made never

it never made any sense. You can't, you

know, you can't bomb a country to bits

and then assume that relations will be

better, especially if the country bombed

to bits comes out on on top in terms of

um the war. So

yeah, it I do wonder though how how the

Israelis are going to deal with this

because they they can't really afford to

back down either because they again they

bet everything on this. I mean if what

you're seeing is correct that the US

presence will be diminished uh severely

in the Middle East. Uh Israel's position

will be weakened. Iran, which was the

main adversary, which was supposed to be

destroyed in this war, if not regime

changed and, you know, broken up or at

least chaotic like Syria. Now, it's

going to come up on top. I mean, this is

a horror show for the Israelis. Uh, it's

it's hard to imagine that they will

accept this. I'm not sure what else they

can do, of course, short of launching a

nuclear weapons at the Iranian capital.

But,

>> uh, how do you think the Israel is going

to deal? Are they going to, you know,

will this fuel domestic divisions into a

civil war or will they, you know, seek

another victory on a different front?

How how are they going to deal with

this? Because it's just hard to see how

they're going to recover. Yeah. Before I

try to answer that question, let me just

also point out that this war has done

significant damage

uh to the USIsraeli relationship.

The United States is now in a

catastrophic war, right? This will be

long seen as the most foolish foreign

policy decision the United States has

ever made. You know, the Council on

Foreign Relations did a big study uh a

few months ago where they surveyed

American diplomatic historians and they

asked them what was the most foolish

foreign policy decision that any

president in the history of the United

States had ever made. And what was

clearly ranked number one was George W.

Bush's decision to invade Iraq in 2003.

Well, there is absolutely no question in

my mind that the decision to attack Iran

on February 28th will be seen as a much

worse decision than the decision to

invade Iraq in 2003. There's no question

that the decision to invade Iraq in 2003

led to major league trouble. It was a

catastrophic decision in its own right.

There's no question about that. Did

enormous damage in the region to

America's reputation and so forth and so

on. But it in my opinion pales in

comparison to the decision that

President Trump made on February 28th.

Now, in terms of USIsraeli relations, it

is becoming manifestally clear because

there's an abundance of evidence that

it's the Israelis who led President

Trump into this war. This big New York

Times story that recently came out that

described the decision-making process

made it clear that hardly anyone in the

deep state, hardly any of Trump's close

adviserss were enthusiastic about this

enterprise. And in fact, many of them

were serious doubters, including the

head of the CIA, the vice president, and

so forth and so on. But President Trump

did it because Prime Minister Netanyahu

and David Barnea, who was the head of

MSAD, convinced him that this would lead

to a quick and decisive victory. So, it

is widely recognized that it is the

Israelis who led us into this disastrous

war. That's point number one. And point

number two, as we are watching what's

happening now, it's the Israelis who are

preventing us from getting a ceasefire

to put an end to this disastrous war.

This point is not lost on most

Americans.

So, US

views, the American public's views, the

American elites views on Israel is

undergoing a sea change. You could see

it in the poll data. And in my opinion,

this situation only gets worse with the

passage of time because once the

shooting stops, the dust settles, and

people begin to reflect on the causes of

this disaster. And you want to remember

one thing, Glenn, I learned this during

the Vietnam War. When a country loses a

war, everybody goes back to the causes.

They want to figure out how did this

ever happen? When you win, you don't

care that much about the causes, right?

You won and you celebrate the victory.

When you lose, especially when it's a

disastrous loss like this, people are

going to want to say that people are

going to want to know h how did this

happen? How could a country like the

United States do this? How could

President Trump, who had been such a

great politician and had been so careful

in the employment of military force,

allowed himself to fall off the cliff

like this? What happened? And what

they'll discover very quickly, because

again, the evidence is clear, is that it

was Israelis who led him by the nose

into this disaster. And that is going to

damage USIsraeli relations. So you want

to remember that on top of all the

things that you and I have talked about

up to now, USIsraeli relations are going

to be badly damaged as well. So your

question is where do we go from here?

And in particular, where do the Israelis

go from here? I think this is going to

cause huge trouble inside Israel. Uh I

think it's going to lead to all sorts of

domestic unrest. Uh there going to be

serious political fights uh between

Netanyahu on one side and other

political leaders on the other side as

to who's responsible for this and what

price should be paid and so forth and so

on. But I think most importantly and

most disturbingly is I think the

Israelis will begin to think long and

hard about using nuclear weapons against

Iran. Uh

I think for most Americans we understand

uh and this is certainly true for

Europeans as well that Iran is not a

serious threat to us. I mean Iran is not

a serious threat to the United States.

They did not attack us. We attacked

them. How is Iran a serious threat to

the United States? You just can't make

that argument. But that's not the way

Israel thinks about Iran. Israel thinks

that Iran is a mortal enemy. They think

this is the second coming of the Third

Reich. They've convinced themselves that

Iran is determined to get a nuclear

weapon and to use that nuclear weapon to

eliminate Israel from the face of the

earth. Uh they don't believe that Iran

can be deterred. And they now

understand, the Israelis now understand

that they can't prevent

Iran from getting a nuclear weapon with

conventional means.

This is what the war demonstrates.

They can't do it even with us

conventionally. The only way they can do

it is with a nuclear weapon. And given

how ruthless

the Israelis are uh a and how willing

they are to engage in genocide uh and

murderous behavior uh I would not put it

past them to use a nuclear weapon

against Iran. So, one could argue that

yes, Israel is in deep trouble uh and

that the Iranian threat is not less than

ever, it's greater than ever. You can

make that argument easily from their

perspective.

Uh but the question you then have to ask

yourself is where does that lead? uh and

uh you're talking about a country that

has no problem executing genocides

uh and uh that is convinced itself that

it will face a genocidal state armed

with nuclear weapons in Iran down the

road. In that situation, you can imagine

them trying to use their or using their

nuclear arsenal against uh Iran.

Yeah. Well, it also seems though that

for Netanyahu, the the effort of

portraying Iran as dead set on acquiring

nuclear weapons and also being

profoundly irrational, that this is was

also instrumental in terms of making

Israel's problems into the Americans

problems because that would be the only

way one could conceive Iran as a threat

to the United States. if it would

acquire weapon nuclear weapons and have

no way of being deterred and you know

being devoted to using this in an

offensive manner. Uh but it is

interesting that they seem to buy into

their own rhetoric though about the

irrationality of Iran and um its

determination to acquire a nuclear

weapon.

>> But it also seemed that

this is going to be devastating for the

Trump administration. I'm thinking

though because uh Trump's whole bit I

think was uh you know what he was able

to appeal to he was he is looking at the

US relative decline that is its power in

the world its military its economy the

the work of well position of people in

society and he essentially blamed this

on weak and foolish leaders. So the

weakness of Obama the weakness of Biden

and also the foolishness of engaging in

all these wars. So the solution was

essentially strength. You needed a

strong man. That was Trump. He was

strong. That is, you know, if he was

just tough, decisive and assertive, this

is this is essentially the medicine that

will bring America, you know, make it

great again. And also his toughness

would be matched with, you know, this

intelligence, his high IQ as he always

say, because he wouldn't do this hard

this foolish forever wars. And uh but

now you know he went in he the rhetoric

was all about uh no no one else dared to

do this. Trump did it but there's a

reason why no one else did it. And now

of course he is the war president and he

did something foolish. I mean his whole

persona his whole the core of making

America great again seems to have been

damaged. And even he lost his key

supporters and you probably saw him

scolding Tucker Carlson and um Alex

Jones, Candon's

own all of these people who had

supported him when he was a peace

president. So he essentially had a lot

of problems already before this war and

all these problems are now much much

worse. So how do you think this is going

to you know the international economy of

course is a mess. The military defeat

was an embarrassment. But what do you

think this is going to do to the

political situation within the United

States?

>> Well, I think that this is all going to

destroy the Trump presidency. I mean, he

may uh remain in office all the way to

the end of his term, but uh he's damaged

goods in a truly serious way. But you

want to think about sort of um where we

stand on the world stage today.

Before this war started on February

28th, the Trump administration had

already done enormous damage to

America's position in the world. in

large part because the president who is

the ultimate unilateralist

was uh wrecking international

institutions, paying no attention to the

rules that underpin those institutions.

Uh he was disregarding

uh and disrespecting international law

and he was treating allies with

unmitigated contempt, especially the

Europeans. He was talking about invading

Greenland. Uh he was talking about

making Canada the 51st state. Uh and if

he went to East Asia, the Japanese and

the South Koreans, this is before

February 28th, uh had real doubts about

relying on the United States for

security. And of course in the course of

2025 he had seriously damaged what had

been good relations with India. US India

relations went south during 2025. So the

United States before February 28th was

in real trouble in terms of its foreign

policy and what's happened since

February 28th has just damaged us

further. Uh if you look at US European

relations, uh you think about all the

damage that was done over the Ukraine

war, then all the damage that was done

over Greenland, and now we have this

situation

where President Trump is effectively

trying to blame the Europeans for the

fact that we can't defeat Iran. He's

implying that if only the Europeans had

sent their military forces, especially

their navies to the Middle East, we

would have been able to break through

the straight of war moves and we would

have ended uh Iran's strangle hold on

the world economy. But that didn't

happen. We failed. But why did we fail?

Not because of the United States, but

because of the Europeans. So if you

think about US European relations today,

uh they're terrible. Uh, and what about

other countries around the world? The

Japanese and the South Koreans, the

Indonesians, the Indians. I mean, the

United States is a rogue elephant. Do

you want to get too close to the Trump

administration? No. You want to keep

your distance. So I think in terms of

our foreign policy uh he has you know

done even greater damage than he did

before February 28th. And I I don't see

how he digs himself out of this hole. In

fact, I think if anything uh his

behavior will become more erratic with

the passage of time. This is a man who

thinks he's a genius. He thinks he has

the mightest touch. He thinks anything

he does works out well and he always

emerges victorious. He simply is not

going to make be able to make that

argument in this case. Th this is not

like all the previous cases that he got

away with. Um and uh he's therefore it

seriously damaged goods uh as president

of the United States even if he manages

to shut this one down reasonably

quickly. And that remains to be seen as

we were talking about before. And in

terms of his standing here in the United

States, uh there's no way he's not going

to take a huge hit politically. And you

see him already, as you pointed out, uh

going after people like Candace Owens,

uh Tucker Carlson, Alex Jones. These are

all people who have been big supporters

of his in the past and he's now in a

major league war with them and uh this

is not going to help his standing. And

furthermore, if you just look at what's

happening inside the MAGA base, you look

at what's happening with Christian

evangelicals under the age of 50, uh I

think he has uh he has truly profound

political problems at home and on the

foreign policy front as well.

Yeah, I was also expecting that after

disaster such as this instead of going

through this process you described

before that is having some openness

where did we go wrong out of trouble you

know learning something from the

mistakes I would assume that he would uh

seek to blame others I guess the

Europeans would NATO would be a good

fall guy and uh also diverted the

attention maybe go for a quick victory

that is uh seize Cuba or Greenland

something like is uh such a shift focus

as quick as possible cuz you don't want

to sit around thinking about all the

things or having too many debates in the

country about all the things you did

wrong. Uh this can't do anything well

for him. So I guess erratic behavior

moving forward is a pretty reasonable

prediction. Um but if we take a step

back in the wider picture, what do you

think the world will look like after

this? because uh uh you and I spoke in

the past about uh uh the emergence of a

multipolar world that is uh simply the

international distribution of power

suggest the concentration of power we

had in the '90s is now dispersed. Now

you have many centers of power. The the

fact that well it it looks as if this

would intensify this development.

Well, I think that uh

the United States has obviously lost

this war and that will become

manifestally clear to more and more

people. That's for sure. Uh I don't

think it will diminish uh American

power. Uh I think American power is

based on material capabilities and I I

think losing this war will not affect

how much power the United States has.

Uh, in making this point, I like to

point to the Vietnam War. We lost the

Vietnam War. It was a catastrophic

defeat. Um, was a decisive defeat, but

it didn't affect American power. We

remained as powerful as ever. But this

is not to deny for one second that

losing a war in Iran

will have a profound impact on our

ability to project that power around the

world and to influence other states in

ways that are favorable to the United

States. Uh so this really matters. So

again, I just want to be clear. We will

remain as powerful as ever. And we do

live in a multipolar world. As you know,

Glenn, my argument is we've lived in a

multipolar world since 2017. And the

other two great powers on the planet are

China and Russia, and they're not going

away. Uh and in fact, one could argue

uh that they're better off as a result

of this war visav the United States. But

it's not that China and Russia have

become more powerful relative to the

United States because of the war. I

don't think that's what's happened. I

think that America's ability to project

power and to influence other countries

has been seriously damaged and that

works to China's advantage and to

Russia's advantage. In other words, just

to take the Russian case, uh the Russian

economy uh has benefited from the United

States taking sanctions off of uh Russia

in terms of selling oil. And

furthermore, the Russians have benefited

from the fact that there are less

weapons available for us to give the

Ukrainians to fight against Russia

because we're using up weapons

uh and munitions at such a rapid pace in

Ukraine uh excuse me, in Iran. So, this

all works to Russia's advantage. Uh and

in terms of China, right, uh what's

happening in East Asia is that we're

pulling forces out of East Asia. We're

pivoting away from East Asia because we

have to move forces that are physically

located in East Asia to the Middle East.

This works to China's advantage. It

doesn't change the balance of power, but

it changes our ability to contain China

in East Asia. It creates a situation

where our allies in East Asia really

don't trust us very much anymore. Uh,

not only are we pivoting away from East

Asia, moving military forces out of the

region, but also can you trust American

judgment, do you think that the United

States is a responsible ally that will

take care of you in the crunch? I think

if you're Japanese, a Japanese leader or

a South Korean leader, the answer to

that question is no. uh you can't depend

on the United States the way you once

thought that you could or the way that

you once could. Uh so again, you see the

damage that we have done to ourselves.

And again, to go back to our discussion

of the Gulf and where we end up, we may

end up losing those 13 bases, never

returning to them, and having much less

ability to project power in the Gulf

after February 28th than we had before

February 28th. So you see our power

position around the world in terms of

our ability to project power influence

other countries uh has been badly

damaged and again I

as we were saying as we you and I have

said on numerous occasions we have done

enormous damage to international

institutions international law and our

treatment of allies before uh uh before

February 28th.

So the United States is in just so much

trouble.

>> You know, I think uh yeah, what I might

say is a relative decline as you have

the rise of uh other other powers

because if Iran could have been knocked

out, that would have been uh something

that would have weakened the Russians,

the Chinese and uh I guess strengthened

the hand of the United States. So um but

uh but measuring uh well the ability to

project power in terms of the alliance

system as well is probably also a good

approach because as you said the Gulf

States uh are in a very vulnerable

position. Now I know the rhetoric now is

a bit harsh towards the Iranians but at

some point if the US presence is

expected to diminish uh then they're

going to have to try to make some peace

with the neighbors. Uh, I would say

eventually the Europeans would have to

do the same. We can't fight against the

Russians on our own. If the Americans

will uh reduce their presence, we're

going to have to learn how to get along

with the Russians. And uh, you know, you

can say this this is might be some of

the calculations they're having in East

Asia as well. Um on on NATO though this

is seems to be one of the not a casualty

but one of the organizations which has

also been hit hard by the Iran war

simply by the mutual accusations. Uh the

how do you think NATO will be affected

by by the way this war ended?

Well, I think this is all disastrous

for NATO

uh or or to put it in slightly different

terms for transatlantic relations.

And I think the main reason is that uh

President Trump is going to need a

scapegoat

um for this disaster. And I think that

uh the Europeans will probably be the

number one scapegoat because he won't

blame Benjamin Netanyahu who is the

person he should blame. And he can't

really blame his advisors because none

of them were enthusiastic about this.

Maybe Pete Hexith was. Maybe they'll get

rid of Pete Hexith. But I think what

he's going to do is he's going to blame

the Europeans and he's going to make the

argument

um that uh if the Europeans had ampied

up if they had come to our rescue uh we

would have won the war. The reason we

lost was because our allies failed us.

Uh and given that situation uh what we

should do is basically stop supporting

them. Uh will he end the alliance? Uh

just uh put an end to it. Uh I don't

think so. He might. Uh but I think that

he will so seriously damage the alliance

uh that in the end it'll be largely

meaningless. Uh the other thing is

Glenn, he has what two years and three

month uh two years and nine months left

in his presidency almost three years

left. You know how much damage he's done

in the first uh let's say 15 months? Uh

can you imagine how much damage he's

going to do in the remaining two years

and nine months? Uh it's going to be

enormous. Right. And in the meantime,

in the meantime, the Europeans have to

come up with some sort of defensive

strategy for dealing with the Russians.

Uh I mean, you and I think their

assessment of the Russian threat is

completely overblown. But the fact is

the Russian elites, I mean, excuse me,

the European elites do believe there's a

serious Russian threat there. Let's take

that as a given. And they also recognize

that they can't rely on the United

States anymore. The transatlantic

partnership

uh no longer exists. Call this a

partnership. It's no longer there. So

the Europeans over the next two years

and n months have to figure out how to

deal with this situation.

And that's going to push them to put

NATO in the background uh and not take

NATO seriously. So, I find it hard to

believe that NATO will be a meaningful

alliance

uh in January of 2029

when President Trump uh steps down. Now,

one could argue he may step down before

then. He could be impeached. He could

have medical problems and JD Vance could

become president. And who knows what

Vance would do. Uh I tend to believe

that Vance uh would have a more positive

attitude towards NATO uh than Trump

would. But how much more positive is

hard to say. We all remember his

Valentine's Day speech in Munich in uh

February of 2025.

I mean, Vance didn't look like he was

friendly toward Europe then. Uh and if

he became president, maybe he wouldn't

be

uh once he was in the White House. Who

knows for sure? But uh the future of

NATO looks grim to put it mildly. Yeah.

Oh, it seems to be heading towards an

end. Uh but uh but but by extension,

what what will all of this mean? That is

um the the the loss in the Iran war as

well as uh all the weapons and money

that was spent, the economic further

economic problems for the Europeans. Uh

what does this mean for the Ukraine war?

Uh because uh I see Sinski has been

taking to Twitter and uh now that the

Iran war is over encouraging everyone to

shift focus back to Ukraine, but uh it's

going to be hard to see the

yeah the appetite for Trump to deepen

involvement there. uh or how do you

think well if yeah if take into account

all of these different variables what

would you expect how would you expect

the Ukraine war to be affected by the

loss of the Iran war but also the

fragmentation now we see of NATO

uh I think first of all I wish that

Zilinski were correct and the Iran war

was over and uh we could now focus on

Ukraine uh I think we're going to be

focusing on Iran uh for the foreseeable

future future. Uh I mean this is a

catastrophic situation.

Um and uh with regard to Ukraine,

uh let's assume that I'm wrong and that

two weeks from now the war is

effectively over. Uh I don't think

that's going to happen, but let's assume

that happens. Okay? And let's assume

that we focus on uh Ukraine. What does

that mean? Are we going to give Ukraine

a whole bevy of weapons uh that are

going to allow Ukraine to uh prevail on

the battlefield or do well on the

battlefield? I think the answer is no. I

don't think they're going to get those

weapons. We have run down the inventory

to the point where the last thing we

want to do is give precious uh weapons

and precious uh military assets to the

Ukrainians. Just not going to happen.

And with regard to the Russians, uh we

need Russian oil and global oil markets,

it we just need it, right, to head off

economic catastrophe. And uh so the

Russians are going to continue to do

well economically

uh at least in the short term. And I'm

sure the Russians are getting ready to

launch a major set of offensives against

the Ukrainians. And the Ukrainians, as

you and I have talked about many times,

are in desperate straits. And we're not

in any position to rescue the

Ukrainians. And this is a perfect

situation for President Trump to say the

Europeans are responsible.

Uh, as you know, he's been pushing in

that direction for a long time. So, let

the Europeans deal with the Ukraine

situation because you want to understand

that if people like you and I are right,

Glenn, and it's only a matter of time

before the Ukrainians collapse on the

battlefield and the Russians push them

out of Donbass and the Russians conquer

even more territory on the Eastern

Front, uh, President Trump is going to

want to avoid being blamed for that and

he's going want to blame the Europe the

Europeans for Ukraine's defeat. So, I'm

sure he in his head is positioning

himself

to create a situation where if the

Ukrainians

lose to the Russians and the Russians

win a victory uh in that war that he can

say it's the Europeans fault. We were in

the fight for a long time and as long as

we were in the fight, the Ukrainians did

quite well. But we could not go on

forever because we had other

responsibilities around the world. And

by the way, in those in terms of those

other responsibilities in places like

the Middle East, the Europeans would not

help us. So we were in a position where

we had to turn the responsibility for

dealing with Ukraine over to the

Europeans. And they failed. they are

responsible for this defeat. So what

he'll do moving forward uh is he'll

blame the Europeans for what's happening

in Ukraine while at the same time not

giving the Europeans the necessary

weaponry to give to the Ukrainians to

hold their own on the battlefield. And

furthermore, he'll blame the Europeans

for the defeat in uh in Iran. I mean

this is the way President Trump

operates. He's not somebody who ever

accepts responsibility.

Um, so I I think that is what the future

looks like. I think in one tweet he was

able to squeeze in both blaming the

Europeans for Iran and also say bye-bye

to Greenland or something. So he seems

to be uh yeah preparing both the blame

game as well as a distraction it seems.

But uh no, there's um

uh well, you can see what's going to

happen. I think in in Ukraine, it's a

bit strange the Europeans aren't uh

preparing themselves that not sending

more weapons, but preparing themsel in

terms of picking up the phone. That

would be a good first move u before this

whole thing begins to uh begins to

unravel. Um but I I um I spoke recently

with uh Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson and

he he was making the point that he feels

uh not just the United States but Europe

is growing increasingly irrational and I

after that I thought about asking you

actually because do we have a good

theory in international relations about

uh I guess rationality and declining

hgeimmons uh or collective hedgeimmons

both United States and Europe because it

seems uh over the past years now that

we're in well at least relative decline

uh as there's problems in society uh the

assumption we had we built up a society

about you know ideological superiority

uh how how will we

you expect society and our leaders to

embrace you know reason fully with

military defeats such as we suffered in

Iran or yeah economic decline social

havoc. I mean, how do you I know in

political realism we put uh we assume

that the state is rational but uh uh but

you know at least for the neocclassical

realist they would challenge this

assumption. So how would you assess or

how do you expect the reason or

rationality of states to function in the

years to come? Well, as you know, I

wrote this book with Sebastian Rosado

called How States Think, which deals

directly with the question of

rationality.

Uh, and in fact, the opening case that

we talk about is Putin's invasion

of Ukraine on February 22nd,

uh, February 24th, 2022.

Uh and our basic argument in the book is

that states are rational if they pursue

a policy that's based on a theory of

international politics. Uh that makes

good sense that it's it's a plausible

theory. Uh and if you don't have a

plausible theory underpinning your

policy, uh then what you're are doing is

acting irrationally. uh and we also said

that the decision-making process matters

as well. You have to have uh a

decision-making process that allows all

the key players in the room to voice

their opinions uh in a rational legal

way. Uh and uh so that was our our

definition. Uh I think if you look at

various cases uh like Putin's invasion

of uh uh of Ukraine in 2022, I think

that was clearly rational. Uh he thought

that NATO expansion uh was a threat to

Russia. He thought it was an existential

threat and he launched a preventive war

uh to make sure that uh Ukraine did not

become part of NATO. So that was in our

opinion a rational decision. One could

argue that it was the wrong decision.

One could argue it was an illegal

decision. One could argue it was an

immoral decision. But whether a decision

is rational or not depends on whether or

not uh you have uh an underlying theory

uh that is a proven theory in uh and

that that theory uh underpins the

policy. Now let's just talk a little bit

about the Europeans. I believe that the

Europeans behavior towards the United

States, which often is labeled is

irrational, is actually not irrational

because it has a simple theory that

underpins it, which you can argue is a

legitimate theory. What am I saying

here? The Europeans

have a deep-seated interest in keeping

the United States actively involved in

Europe. The Europeans want the American

pacifier to remain in place. Another way

to put this is the Europeans want NATO

to remain intact

and therefore they want to do everything

they can to accommodate the Americans so

that the Americans don't get angry at

them and the Americans remain in Europe

because it's so important from a

strategic point of view for uh the

Europeans

uh to have the American pacifier in

place. Now, you can argue that that

strategy is wrong. You can have a

different theory that says that it would

make much more sense for the Europeans

to grow a backbone, understand that

their close relationship with the United

States is over, that they can't depend

on the American pacifier anymore, uh,

and therefore they should act

differently. A good realist like me

would say that's how they should behave.

But that's not to say that the strategy

they have employed is irrational because

there are different strategies based on

different theories out there. And the

question is do you have a plausible

theory? And I think that the Europeans

behavior towards the Americans is based

on a plausible theory. I think it's the

wrong theory. But there are lots of

different theories and those theories

are all plausible. Uh I could go into

this in greater detail. I won't now. But

anyway, I think a lot of what the

Europeans do is not irrational. I do

think it's wrong, right? But just

because something is wrong does not mean

it's irrational. And let me just give

you one example of that. It's NATO

expansion.

NATO expansion was opposed by almost all

realists because all realists like me

have a simple theory that says if you

move NATO up to Russia's border, the

Russians are going to react and you're

going to have conflict. You're going to

have really serious trouble. Therefore,

you do not want to expand NATO. And if

you do expand NATO, it's going to lead

to big trouble. There was a whole set of

liberal theories that underpinned our

policy, not realist theories. The

realist theories were rejected. The

advice of realists like George Kennan

and John Marshmer were ruled out of

court. But the liberal theories said

that what we want to do is we want to

move NATO eastward. And what we want to

do is we want to create a zone of peace

in Eastern Europe. And that zone of

peace will be based on a series of

liberal theories. One is democratic

peace theory. The idea was that if we

could spread democracy eastward into

Eastern Europe to include Russia at some

point, we would create a giant zone of

peace because democracies don't fight

other democracies. They also relied on

the theory of economic interdependence.

The idea was you would move the EU

eastward. You would create a situation

where you had a great deal of economic

intercourse in Eastern Europe and maybe

eventually include the Russians in that

and the end result is economic

interdependence produces peace and we

would all live happily ever after. So

there were a set of liberal theories.

These are prominent theories that are

highly respected in academia that

underpin the policy. If you read the

sort of the commentary of Strobe Talbot

and um Matteline Albbright at the time

of NATO expansion, this is in the 1990s.

Their policy prescription for NATO

expansion was based on these liberal

theories. I thought it was wrongheaded,

but I did not think it was irrational.

That may sound funny to certain viewers,

but I think there's

there's a difference between whether one

thinks another theory is wrong or

whether you think it's irrational. So I

think a lot of what is done in

international politics one can think is

wrong, but it's not necessarily

irrational. But I could go on, but there

are lots of cases of American behavior

in particular, but even European

behavior in recent times that would fit

under the rubric of irrational.

No, I think that's a good uh way of

explaining it. And no, I I would agree.

I don't think the European policy was

irrational. As you said, it was powerful

theory. And you know, you can link it a

little bit both in political realism as

well as liberalism. That is the

hegemonic peace. As long as the US was

all powerful, u you know, the Europeans

could benefit. For one, the there would

be no great power rivalry as the US all

all power concentrated in the US would

essentially mitigate the international

anarchy. There would only be one center

of power, no anarchy. Uh second, because

it was the United States, we assumed

that liberal democracy, um human rights

would be elevated, so we would have this

democratic peace as well. And also you

can put a third leg on it which would be

that the US would be the pacifier in

Europe which would allow Europe to

function as it had because we never been

stood together since after World War II

when the Americans came. So so yeah no I

that you can argue that's given that

they can explain what they were doing it

is it is rational and I think that's

also why they were willing to make an

enemy out of Russia by expanding NATO

because this made sure that America's

presence was cemented. But my my view

though is that it could have been a good

strategy but it became the only strategy

which meant there's no political

imagination for anything else. So now

that the actual political realities of

it that is that the unipolar order that

is it's not just a policy it's an actual

distribution power is gone and we see

that for this reason it's in America's

interest to shift its policies that is

focus less on Europe. Now it starts to

feel irrational because now we're just,

you know, returning to hope and

expecting the US to stay in Europe out

of a, you know, just some alliance of

democracies even though it doesn't serve

necessarily its interest. So it is very

strange to see. Um, let me just ask sir.

Yeah. C can I just ma uh make two more

points about this whole subject of

irrationality because this is a very

important subject. Uh people surely who

are watching this show will want to know

whether it was rational for President

Trump uh to uh invade or to attack uh

Iran on February 28th. And I believe it

was irrational. And why do I think that?

The basic theory that underpinned the

decision to attack Iran on February 28th

was that we could use air power alone

to topple the regime and put in place a

regime that would basically dance to

America's tune, would throw up its

hands, surrender to us, and do what we

wanted. Okay,

we

know from the literature on

international politics which is well

understood by many people in the policy

world that it is virtually impossible

to create regime change with air power

alone.

There is no theory of victory that can

be considered rational that is based on

the idea that you can use air air power

alone to produce regime change. In fact,

the literature says that's impossible.

So what President Trump not only what

President Trump did in deciding to go to

war on February 28th was not only a

foolish policy, it was irrational

because he had no plausible theory of

victory. Just very important to

understand that. Let me give you another

case.

the decision that the United States made

before the war started

in Ukraine

on February 24th, 2022.

What's really remarkable in the runup to

the war is despite the fact we thought

we the West, the United States in

particular thought the United that the

the Russians were going to invade

Ukraine, we did nothing, virtually

nothing to stop it. Then the war

started, negotiations

started in Istanbul and both sides were

making very good progress. and the

United States told the uh Ukrainians to

walk away from the negotiations.

Then later, I think it was in November

of that year, General Millie said that

Ukraine had reached the high water mark.

You remember the Ukrainian army had done

quite well in two big offensives during

2022. General Millie, who was chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the

time, said, "Uh, Ukraine has reached the

high water mark. let's cut a deal. Now,

he was told to close his mouth and not

raise the issue again. Now, the question

you want to ask yourself is why was that

the case? Why was the United States not

attempting to prevent war? And then, why

did it tell the Ukrainians to walk away

and tell General Millie to keep his

mouth closed? The answer is actually

quite simple. We thought that we could

bring the Russians to their knees with

economic sanctions. We had a theory of

victory that was based in part on the

Ukrainians holding the Russians off on

the battlefield. Number one, but number

two, we believe that we could use

crushing sanctions to the

Russian economy and literally knock the

Russians out of the ranks of the great

powers. That was our theory of victory.

I thought at the time that it was wrong.

I thought that it wouldn't work, but I

think it was a plausible theory of

victory. I think at the time most people

I know thought that it would work. They

thought that we had so much economic

leverage. They thought all of this

globalization of the 1990s and the early

2000s had created the situation where

the United States sat at the center of

this economic web that allowed it to use

its coercive leverage over countries all

around the planet the way we've done

with Iran, the way we've done with

Venezuela, the way we tried to do with

China. And that's what we thought would

work with the Russians. And I think it

was a plausible theory of victory. I did

not think it was work would work. I had

a different view, a different set of

theories. But the point is it was not

irrational. It was wrong but it was not

irrational. But again to go back to

Trump invading Iran that was irrational

because there was no plausible theory of

victory there.

My view on the Ukraine war though was

initially I thought it made a lot of

sense. that is if you spend all these

years investing all this money and

training to build a massive Ukrainian

army of hundreds of thousands of men,

why would the US and NATO accept it to

go neutral when you can use that big

army to fight and weaken Russia as a

strategic rival? So again, I think it's

uh you know, brutal and uh I wouldn't

advise it, but it made sense, rational,

but my my view is that after you

mentioned November 2022 when General

Millie said, well, it doesn't get better

than this. This is when we strike a

deal. It feels like at that point we

were a bit swept away already by our own

propaganda. That is that the Russians

were inherently weak. they would they

they could be defeated. Their economy,

you know, their gas station masquerading

as a country and and and at this point

it looks like all the rhetoric we had to

fuel the war suddenly we began to buy

into it. And here I started to wonder

how rational is this because if someone

came along said well actually we have to

assess what the Russians actually have.

uh then immediately then oh no well

that's pro Russian you come you know so

so suddenly our ability to assess the

information available to make reasonable

predictions it it seemed like it was all

gone and you see that today as well

there everyone more or less understands

that the war can't be won but they still

want to fight it I mean for me now

there's no reasonable strategy anymore

there's no reasonable theory of victory

anymore so it feels as if yes it began

rational a bit brutal I mean using

Ukrainians to fight their arrival. But

now I feel like we drifted far away. But

uh again just my view.

>> Well just leaving aside the issue of

rationality where I think I've said

enough.

>> Yeah.

>> Let me make another point. Uh I think

Glenn when countries get into major wars

uh it's very difficult for them to get

out. Uh I've said over the years uh and

I think it's because for me the Vietnam

War was a formative experience. Uh but

my rhetoric is it's easy to get in, it's

incredibly difficult to get out. Uh I

like to say it's like turning a giant

super tanker around in the water. Uh you

don't do it quickly. uh and uh I I think

Iran may actually be something of an

exception because of our whole

discussion about the economic

consequences.

You know, if you take what I was saying

before and I know you agree with me on

this that the potential economic

consequences here are catastrophic,

right? The incentive structure may be

such that we do shut this war down quite

quickly, right? And it would be, I

think, quite unusual in that regard. I

mean, think about the Afghanistan war,

uh, 20 years. Vietnam, oh, that went on

for, you know, year after year. It was

very hard to get out of that war. Uh,

and this is what happens when a great

power like the United States or major

powers like the Europeans get involved

in a war. It's it's just very difficult

to walk away. It's the whole some costs

argument. Um and uh and I think that is

what has really paralyzed the Europeans

uh and uh made it very difficult for

them uh to get out. The other thing is

and you know you were talking about this

in the context of Benjamin Netanyahu

before that you know after a while you

begin to believe your own arguments

about Iran. You know, if you say Iran is

the boogeyman for 40 years, at some

point along the road, even if you didn't

believe it in the beginning, you

certainly believe it after 40 years. Uh,

and I think in terms of the Europeans

before the war in Ukraine started, I

don't think the Europeans thought the

Russians were a great threat. Uh you

want to remember in 2008 at the famous

Bucharest

summit, NATO Bucharest summit in April

of 2008, the Europeans in the person of

Uncle Merkel and Nicholas Sarcoi argued

against bringing Ukraine into NATO.

Merkel was adamantly opposed as was

Sarosi. It's not like the Europeans

thought there was this great Russian

threat out there that had to be

deterred. In fact, they thought like you

and I, Glenn, that if you expanded NATO

to bring Ukraine into it, Putin would

interpret it as a declaration of war.

That's what Merkel has said, right?

That's why she was opposed. We agree

with her. But anyway, the United States

foolishly pushed ahead

uh and we ended up in this disastrous

war. But I think what's happened over

time is that the Europeans have

convinced themselves now that the

Russians are the second coming of Nazi

Germany. uh if Putin is Adolf Hitler,

that the Russian army is the Vermach,

then oh my god, if they don't do

something, uh they're going to have uh

the Russian army on the beaches of

Dunkirk. Uh I mean, I find it all hard

to believe. I know you do as well, but

they do believe that. But it's very

interesting if you think about the

change that has taken place over time uh

in European thinking about the Russian

threat. Uh and by the way, just to

elevate uh up another 10,000 ft, uh if

you go back to NATO expansion and the

decision to bring Ukraine in in April

2008, it is very important to understand

that we were not interested in bringing

Ukraine into NATO because we thought

there was a Russian threat to Ukraine or

a Russian threat to Eastern Europe.

That's the realist view. The United

States, which was driving the train on

NATO expansion, was not operating

according to realist theories.

Otherwise, they would not have expanded

NATO into Ukraine. They were operating

on liberal theories. You want to

remember that Putin was at Bucharest.

They invited Puk and Putin to Bucharest.

Uh the Russians and the United States

and the Russians and the Europeans

actually had quite good relations at the

time. We didn't see Ukraine as this

great threat.

Now, Ukraine is seen as a really

powerful I mean, Russia is now seen as a

really powerful threat. Sorry, not

Ukraine. Russia is now seen as a very

powerful threat. It's really quite

remarkable the change that has taken

place over time. But I bring all this up

because it just shows you how difficult

it is now,

right, for the Europeans

uh to change their view and and put an

end to this war which is you and I Glenn

agree would be in uh the interest of

every European state.

Yeah. Now this is uh this was the

warning of Walter Litman that when you

go into war you have all this incentive

to build up your adversary as the just

the embodiment of evil and then when

it's time to make a peace you can't make

peace anymore because you just convinced

everyone that you're fighting evil and

uh that's essentially yeah I think where

we are today

anyways uh any final thoughts before we

wrap up just one final point you want to

remember that In the Iran war a few

weeks ago, President Trump called for

unconditional surrender,

which is powerful reinforcement for your

point.

Yeah, he did not get that. So, no, it's

very difficult to climb down after

making such a thing. But I'm hoping that

Trump's ability to shift focus and uh BS

his way out of things uh could be

something that helps deliver peace. But

uh we'll see. Um anyways, thank you so

much for being so generous with your

time.

>> My pleasure, Glenn. Uh as always, I

enjoyed our discussion immensely.